蘋果CEO蒂姆·庫克2017年12月3日出席在中國浙江省烏鎮舉行的第四屆世界互聯網大會開幕式。（路透社/ Aly Song）

圍繞今年世界互聯網大會的熱門消息就是蘋果和谷歌公司首席執行官的首次出席，而這將批評人士的注意力從一個同樣有趣的問題上轉移開來：各國派出科技行業和政府代表參加這樣一個大會從長遠來看究竟能獲得什麼？西方科技公司應當如何行動才能比肩甚至抗衡中國通過大會精心發展出來的深厚雙邊政治經濟影響？

第四屆世界互聯網大會，又稱烏鎮峰會，吸引了來自中亞、中東和非洲的多位領導人參加。而峰會如何以及為何具有如此吸引力的原因，不僅在於中國近期對海外科技項目進行了大規模投資。從本世紀早期開始，中國學者、政策制定者、通訊業代表甚至中國軍方都漸漸開始從屬地理論角度解讀互聯網在全球的發展。而這種屬地理論已經轉變為網絡主權概念，即主權國家對位於其國境內部的網絡基礎設施及網絡內容享有主權。一些人們現在耳熟能詳的論點，如根服務器等核心互聯網基礎設施大量設置在美國等國家（而不是人口更加稠密的中國等國家），成為了發展中國家應當團結一致爭取在全球互聯網管理權中分得一本羹的論證基礎。而隨着中國——在某些程度上也包括俄羅斯——越來越強調，作為從發展中國家發展而來的超級大國，他們是推動這種原則（該原則包括多邊互聯網治理思路）得到國際認可的最佳人選，這種論調慢慢開始獲得支持。無獨有偶，一些在自由之家（Freedom House）2017年網絡自由度評估報告中表現最差的國家，都傾向於支持互聯網的多邊治理。而來自這些國家的很多政府代表、通訊公司和科技行業都參加了本次的世界互聯網大會。

中國政府長期以來一直奉行的發展中國家應當聯合起來從美國和歐洲手中奪取後者不成比例的互聯網治理權的理念其實早在斯諾登事件之前就已經存在了，斯諾登揭露出的美國國家安全局的監聽證據只是令這種理念恢復了生機。因此，首屆世界互聯網大會於事件爆發一年後的2014年召開毫不令人意外。通過四屆烏鎮峰會，組織者測試並改善了他們對於網絡主權中心原則的表述，並將其作為與中國在數字經濟和互聯網治理領域進行合作的必要條件。與前三屆峰會大力推動網絡主權概念不同，中國與會者在本次峰會上弱化了這一原則，轉而不露聲色地將網絡主權編織進關於企業家精神、跨境數據流通及縮小數字鴻溝等演講主題中。今年的世界互聯網大會推出了以消除貧困、打擊網絡犯罪及保護上網兒童等為主旨的分論壇。這一系列議題——從網絡基礎設施建設到互聯網內容和規範——為很多發展中國家提供了發展路線圖，向它們展示了如何建立起一套科技生態系統。同時，這些議題也在一定程度上揭示出中國政府和科技企業擴展其全球影響力的方式。

中國快速發展的互聯網基礎設施建設與升級，以及中國政府對本國科技巨頭企業在國內外市場發展的支持，令中國成為與會各國積極效仿的典範。出席今年烏鎮峰會的沙特阿拉伯代表對參與中國數字絲綢之路倡議進行了探討，還利用這個機會會見了中國國家發展與改革委員會成員，並參觀了位於上海的華為研究中心。出席峰會的利比里亞國家通訊企業代表也參觀了華為，而與此同時，其他中國公司則積極向土耳其和秘魯推銷數字貿易。中國還在東盟各國建立了寬帶及其他網絡基礎設施，並通過阿里巴巴和騰訊提供網絡內容服務。這兩家中國企業正在大力投資或收購東南亞網絡創業公司。此外，中國政府還在西南部設立了“信息港口”，推動與東盟國家的數字貿易往來。而在一個更大規模上，中國還將在“一帶一路”倡議沿線國家參與互聯網基礎設施建設，這將為中國軟硬件產品帶來更廣闊的國外市場。

正是鑒於中國政府向世界推銷中國科技、投資和管理模式這一意義深遠的意識形態和經濟戰略，美國的確不應再繼續“無視中國作為全球網絡參與者的角色”了。然而，與其抨擊蘋果和谷歌為了在利潤豐厚的中國科技市場分得一杯羹而不得不向嚴苛的政府管制妥協，我們不如思考這兩家公司及其他跨國科技企業如何才能降低自身對中國的依賴。雖然我們或許無法出台可以比肩中國的大規模雙邊基礎設施建設項目，但美國科技企業能從阿里巴巴、華為、騰訊的海外擴張中學到些什麼？一個較為明智的建議就是，蘋果應當謀求供應鏈多元化，這將加深美國公司與其他國家的合作，這些國家通常視中國的支持是實現科技跳躍式發展遙遠目標的最佳途徑。雖然谷歌的“尋找下一個10億用戶（Next Billion Users）”開發團隊一直致力於研究新興市場的不同用戶需求，谷歌及其他科技公司應該還能做得更多，去抗衡對網絡主權和多邊治理等有害行為日益強大的支持。

這些措施建議不必全都是競爭性的，也可以選擇與已經進入新興市場的中國公司進行合作。與美國及其盟友相比，這些新興市場大多從中國得到了更多支持。互聯網治理辯論中潛在的“搖擺國”——既不支持多邊治理也不支持多方利益——或許正在減少，但拒絕多邊主義符合經濟常識的論點依然站得住腳。如果說我們的最終目標是遏制網絡審查及網絡治理的中國模式在中國以外的地方蔓延，努力與那些對烏鎮模式還不完全買賬的國家攜手共進還為時不晚。

Apple CEO Tim Cook attends the opening ceremony of the fourth World Internet Conference in Wuzhen, Zhejiang province, China, December 3, 2017. (REUTERS/Aly Song)

This buzz surrounding this year's World Internet Conference (WIC) has been about the first-time attendance of Apple's and Google's CEOs, distracting critics from an equally interesting issue: what do countries that send both tech industry and government representatives gain in the long term from participating in these meetings? What can Western tech firms do to match or counter the deep bilateral economic and political influence that has been carefully developed on the sidelines of the WIC?

Part of the explanation behind how and why the WIC, or Wuzhen Summit, attracts political leaders from Central Asian, Middle Eastern, and African countries extends well beyond more recent Chinese investments in technology initiatives abroad. From the early 2000s through the present, Chinese scholars, policymakers, telco representatives, and even military figures have increasingly spoken of the global spread of the Internet in the territorialistic terms that have come to be identified with the concept of Internet sovereignty, or state control over Internet infrastructure and content within a country's borders. Some of the now-familiar arguments about the uneven concentration of core Internet infrastructure such as root servers in places like the United States (as opposed to more populous countries like China) formed the foundations for the argument that developing countries need to band together and claim their stakes in global Internet governance. This argument has slowly garnered support as China—and to a lesser extent, Russia— increasingly made the case that as former developing states turned global superpowers, they were best suited to deliver international recognition of the principles that comprise the multilateral approach to Internet governance. It is not coincidental that some of the nations listed among the worst offenders of Internet freedom in Freedom House's 2017 Freedom on the Net assessment are pro-multilateralism, or that a subset of these states sent government, telecommunications, and tech industry representatives to the WIC.

The Chinese government's long-standing vision of developing countries cooperating to wrest what they see as disproportionate control over Internet governance away from the United States and Europe pre-dated the Snowden revelations, yet was rejuvenated given evidence of the NSA's espionage. It should thus come as no surprise that the inaugural WIC was launched a year later, in 2014. Over the course of four Wuzhen Summits, the organizers have tested out and refined their presentation of the central tenet of Internet sovereignty as the sine qua non of cooperating with China on issues concerning the digital economy and Internet governance. Rather than making compliance with this value front and center as in previous years, Chinese speakers at the fourth WIC toned down and subtly threaded the Internet sovereignty message through speeches about entrepreneurship, cross-border data flows, and narrowing the digital divide. This year's WIC included panels on poverty alleviation, combating cybercrime, and even protection of children using the Internet. This array of issues—scaling from infrastructure up through content and regulation—provides a roadmap to constructing the types of technological ecosystems that many developing states are eager to cultivate, and mirrors aspects of the approach that both China's government and tech companies have taken in expanding their global influence.

China's own rapid Internet infrastructure build-out and upgrading, along with support of its domestic tech giants at home and abroad, has made the country an attractive exemplar for the types of states that flock to WIC. Saudi Arabian representatives at this year's Wuzhen Summit discussed their participation in the Chinese Digital Silk Road Initiative, and used the opportunity to both meet with members of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) as well as visit the Huawei Research Center in Shanghai. Liberian state telco attendees of the WIC likewise visited Huawei, while other Chinese companies touted digital trade with Turkey and Peru. Across the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Chinese construction of broadband and other Internet infrastructure is complemented by provision of content from heavy hitters including Alibaba and Tencent, which are increasingly investing in or acquiring Southeast Asian startups. The Chinese government has additionally set up an “Information Harbor” in southwestern China to promote digital trade with ASEAN. On a broader and as yet unsystematically examined scale, China will construct Internet infrastructure along the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) route, which will result in even greater expansion of foreign markets for Chinese hardware and software.

Given this far-reaching ideological and economic strategy to win favor for Chinese technology, investment, and regulatory models abroad, it is indeed the case that “The U.S. can no longer ignore China as a global internet player.” Yet instead of asking what Apple and Google are capable of changing by maintaining a foothold in China's lucrative tech markets and complying with draconian regulations, what might they and similar multinational tech firms be able to do to reduce dependence on China? Although high-level bilateral infrastructure projects on a scale to compete with China's are perhaps out of the question, to what extent can U.S. tech companies learn from the expansion of Alibaba, Huawei, Tencent and others in foreign markets? One wise suggestion has been for Apple to diversify its supply chain, which could result in deeper cooperation with states that see Chinese support as their best bet at the elusive goal of technological leapfrogging. While Google has a Next Billion Users development team that addresses different user experiences in emerging markets, they and other tech companies can do more to meaningfully push back against growing support for the most damaging practices that arise from Internet sovereignty and multilateral approaches to Internet governance.

These suggestions need not all be competitive, and can even lean toward limited collaboration with Chinese firms that have already established a presence in emerging markets that receive more support from China than from the U.S. and its allies. The list of potential “swing states” in the Internet governance debate— states that neither come down on the multilateral or multistakeholder side— may be dwindling, but the economic case for rejecting multilateralism still stands. If the ultimate goal is to curb the expansion of censorship and similar aspects of the Chinese model of Internet governance in places outside of China, it is not too late to attempt more substantive efforts to engage with countries that have not fully committed to the Wuzhen Process.