一般而言，美國《國家安全戰略》報告代表政府對國家安全和對外戰略的頂層設計和未來設想，也是美國政府各機構圍繞對外戰略部署工作的重要指南。去年3月拜登政府率先發佈的《臨時國家安全指南》，可以視為《國家安全戰略》報告的預覽版，它初步勾勒了新一屆政府國家安全戰略的大體輪廓。

今年10月新版《國家安全戰略》報告姍姍來遲。值得注意的是，報告公布時美國所處的背景極為複雜，大國博弈日趨激烈，烏克蘭危機持續發酵，中期選舉迫在眉睫，國內經濟面臨通貨膨脹等重重挑戰。此時，美國亟需一份內外戰略設計的引領。不過該報告中的諸多政策已在推出前漸次鋪開，新版報告與其說是一份戰略指南，不如說是對拜登第一任期接近半程時的階段性總結。

相比特朗普政府2017年推出的《國家安全戰略》報告，新版報告內容更豐富，結構更複雜，折射出拜登政府面對時代變局的“戰略三觀”——國際觀、地區觀和中國觀。

“決定性的十年”

在對國際形勢的認知上，拜登政府延續特朗普政府的核心理念，但也承認當前世界本身的複雜性。根據這份報告，美國和世界必須應對兩大戰略挑戰，一是後冷戰時代已徹底結束，當今世界已步入大國競爭；二是世界仍然面臨諸多跨國界的共同挑戰，需合力應對。

新版戰略報告的主要願景仍是重塑美國全球領導地位，實現和捍衛美式民主價值觀。“競贏”（outcompete）或“智勝”（outmaneuver）戰略競爭者，應對共同挑戰和塑造路徑規則，將是實現目標的手段。這意味着拜登政府承襲了前任政府對世界重回“叢林法則”的悲觀判斷，所不同在於，戰略競爭的全球性令其看到“競爭”不能完全定義世界趨勢，美國仍應在弱政治領域謀求全球合作。

此外，拜登政府還強調美國應對世界變局的緊迫性。全文誇大的威脅感知，也反應出美國戰略界的不安。新報告首次為大國戰略競爭框定期限，文中六次提及“決定性的十年”（decisive decade），認為地緣政治競爭的條款將會在未來最初幾年確定。

優先事項和雙軌政策

新版報告中的地區戰略倡導與盟友和合作夥伴的積極接觸，體現出以下特徵：

在戰略定位上，報告區分了針對不同接觸地區的優先主次。印太地區仍是重點，促進“自由開放”被放在地區戰略的首位。報告也強調與歐洲盟友聯合，呼籲擴大和深化跨大西洋紐帶。這也是在聯合盟友推動大國競爭、應對烏克蘭危機動機下的選擇，而西半球、中東、非洲等議題被往後排。

在戰略目標上，報告重視地區間的關聯性，強調通過各方合作以實現全球性議程。例如，報告呼籲印太國家與歐盟國家建立更緊密的聯繫，從而在印太與跨大西洋兩個方向實現聯動，增強集體合力。比較此前“美國優先”的策略，拜登政府並不認為盟伴是某種負擔，而將其視為戰略資產，採取更為鮮明的協同路徑以形成競爭協作力，同時為解決共同挑戰塑造全球戰略環境。

在戰略路徑上，報告提出以“雙軌”政策（Dual-track approach）作為驅動與平衡機制，確保在戰略競爭下加強國際合作。一方面，報告提出將與包括競爭對手在內的國家就共同挑戰開展合作；另一方面，主張進一步與聯盟核心的民主國家建立強大、有韌性、相互加強的關係網格（latticework）。

被“競爭”定義的對華戰略

報告展現的“中國觀”並沒有出乎意料之處，仍是拜登政府一直以來的對華思路，與布林肯今年5月的對華政策演講一脈相承。報告一方面承襲和升級了特朗普政府對華負面定位和主張，另一方面也對拜登執政後的對華政策進行了概括總結。

一是從戰略目標上看，美國再次明確“競贏”中國是核心目標。報告將中國定義為“未來十年的主要競爭對手”，宣稱“中國是唯一既有重塑國際秩序意圖，也逐漸擁有經濟、外交、軍事和科技力量來日益推進這一目標的競爭者”。這種對華定位呼應了當前美國政府世界觀中的重要部分，即大國競爭全面回歸，而中國顯然是定義競爭態勢的重要行為體。

二是從戰略手法上看，拜登政府將繼續貫徹此前提出的對華政策“投資、協同、競爭”的“三點論”。報告對此並沒有做出太大調整，這三點分別以不同形式體現在“投資自身實力”、“地區戰略”與“全球優先事項”等章節中。報告多次強調未來十年將是決定性的，凸顯美國方面對華競爭的強烈焦慮感。

三是拜登政府既想綁定中俄，又想有所區分。自烏克蘭危機升級以來，拜登政府就一直在渲染“中俄綁定論”，借這次危機製造和渲染“民主對威權”的敘事，試圖在意識形態上製造全球分裂。報告在“全球優先事項”中將中俄並列陳述是又一次新嘗試。

同時，拜登政府不願將中俄完全划上等號，認為中國是需要“競贏”的，而俄羅斯是需要“約束”的。這反映出拜登政府對中俄兩國挑戰的不同認知，中國是長期的、更具影響力的挑戰，而俄羅斯是更短期的、更具緊迫性的挑戰。

報告設想的對華政策謀求一種魚與熊掌兼得的理想狀態，希望美國能以和平方式贏得對華戰略競爭。這種設想存在明顯矛盾。報告既把中國定義為“最大的地緣政治挑戰”，又肯定“和平共存”的可能性，並聲稱“不尋求讓競爭轉變為對抗或新冷戰”，但它卻沒有提供走好這一平衡木的現實路徑，仍更多強調如何與中國競爭甚至是擠壓中國影響力。這並非華盛頓想像中的“雙軌”政策。

因此，“戰略三觀”最大的重疊因素就是“中國”，而“競爭”一詞是貫穿其中的主旋律。總體而言，新版報告在框架和結構上做到了推陳出新，但內容乏善可陳，是對拜登執政後美國國家安全政策與行動的盤點與總結，也始終無法跳出“戰略競爭”的窠臼。

美國戰略界曾認為當前的中美關係猶如一場牌局，而美國是手握更多好牌的一方。然而，新報告中所折射出的威脅感知與力求必勝的競贏策略，一定程度上反應了美國的戰略焦慮。究其本質，儘管報告增加了針對全球合作的篇幅和內容，但拜登政府在對華戰略競爭問題上的認知並未超越特朗普，正愈發將雙邊關係的光譜向競爭推移。這對於遏阻兩國走向全面對抗並無益處，也無法對世界和平與發展做出真正貢獻。

The U.S. National Security Strategy report represents the top-level design and future vision of the United States government on national security and foreign strategy. It is also an important guide for government agencies as they do their work. Last March, the Biden administration released its Interim National Security Guidance, which can be regarded as a preview of the NSS report and a preliminary outline of the national security strategy of the new administration.

In October this year, the new edition of the NSS report was long overdue. It is worth noting that the report was released at a time when the country was experiencing extreme complexity in the great power game, facing a long-term Ukraine crisis, the upcoming midterm elections, inflation and other economic challenges. It is in urgent need of an internal and external strategic design to lead the way. However, many of the policies in the report had already been rolled out. The report is not so much a strategic guide as it is a phased summary for Biden as he nears the halfway point of his first term.

Compared with the NSS report launched by the Trump administration in 2017, the new version is richer in content and more complex in structure, reflecting the three strategic views of the Biden administration in the face of the changing times — an international view, a regional view and a China view.

A decisive decade

The Biden administration has maintained the core international concepts of the Trump administration, but it also acknowledges the complexity of the current world. According to the report, the U.S. and the world must deal with two major strategic challenges. First is the end of the post-Cold War era, as great power competition has emerged. Second, the world is still facing many common cross-border challenges that need to be addressed together.

The main vision of the new strategic report is to reshape global leadership and achieve and defend American-style democratic values. Out-competing or outmaneuvering strategic competitors, tackling shared challenges and shaping the rules of the road will be the means to that end. This means that the Biden administration has inherited the pessimistic judgment of the previous administration and that the world will return to the law of the jungle. The difference is that the global nature of strategic competition has led it to see that competition does not fully define global trends and that the U.S. should still seek global cooperation in weak political areas.

In addition, the Biden administration has emphasized that it's urgent for the U.S. to respond to global changes, even as the exaggerated threat perception in the full text reflects the unease of the U.S. strategic community. For the first time, the new report sets a time frame for strategic competition among major powers, with six references to a “decisive decade.” It argues that the terms of geopolitical competition will be determined over the next few years.

Dual-track approach

The new regional strategy in the report promotes affirmative engagement with U.S. allies and partners and reflects certain traits.

For example, the report makes a distinction between goals for various engagement regions in terms of strategic positioning. The promotion of a “free and open” concept is prioritized in the Indo-Pacific and tops the regional agenda. The need to unite with allies to win the great power competition and address the Ukrainian crisis also drives the report's emphasis on alliances with European allies and calls for expanding and deepening transatlantic ties. Issues in the Western Hemisphere, the Middle East and Africa are given less attention.

Regarding strategic goals, the report focuses on inter-regional connections and the collaboration of all parties to advance a global agenda. In order to connect up in both the Indo-Pacific and transatlantic directions and improve collaboration, for instance, the report urges deeper relations between Indo-Pacific countries and the European Union. The Biden administration, unlike Trump's “America first” policy, views friends not as a burden but as strategic assets, adopting a more clearly coordinated approach to gain a competitive edge while influencing the global strategic environment to address shared concerns.

As a driving and balancing mechanism to assure improved international collaboration in the context of strategic competition, the report suggests a dual-track strategic path. It advocates strengthening a latticework of strong, resilient and mutually reinforcing relationships with the democracies at the core of the alliance, while suggesting cooperation with nations — even competitors — on shared challenges.

China policy defined by competition

The view on China presented in the report is not unexpected. It remains the Biden administration's long-range approach on China, and is in line with Secretary of State Antony Blinken's China policy speech in May. On one hand, the report inherits and upgrades the Trump administration's negative positioning and claims about China; on the other, it summarizes Biden's policies toward China after he took office.

First, from the perspective of strategic goals, the United States has once again made clear that out-competing China is its core goal. The report defines China as “a major competitor in the coming decade” and declares that China “is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to advance that objective.” This positioning of China echoes an important part of the current U.S. government's worldview, namely the full return of great power competition. China is clearly an important actor in defining the competitive landscape.

Second, from a strategic point of view, the Biden administration will continue to implement its three-point theory — invest, align and compete — in its approach to China. The report does not make much adjustment in this regard, and these three points are reflected in different forms in various chapters such as “Investing in Our Strength,” “Our Global Priorities” and “Our Strategy by Region.” It repeatedly emphasizes that the next decade will be decisive and it highlights the strong sense of anxiety on the part of the U.S. regarding competition with China.

Third, the Biden administration intends to bind China and Russia but also to distinguish between the two. Since the escalation of the Ukraine crisis, the U.S. has been playing up the China-Russia tie-up theory, using the crisis to create and exaggerate a narrative featuring democracy versus authoritarianism in an attempt to create a global ideological divide. The report's juxtaposition of China and Russia in the “global priorities” list is another new attempt.

At the same time, the Biden administration is reluctant to put China and Russia on equal footing, arguing that China needs to be out-competed, while Russia needs to be constrained. This reflects the Biden administration's different perceptions of the challenges between China and Russia: While China is a long-term and more consequential challenge, Russia is a more short-term and urgent one.

The China policy laid out in the report seeks an ideal state characterized by both fish and bear's paw. It hopes that the U.S. can win the strategic competition with China in a peaceful manner. But there are obvious contradictions in this vision. The report defines China as the greatest geopolitical challenge while affirming the possibility of peaceful coexistence and claiming that it does not seek to transform competition into confrontation or a new cold war. It does not provide a realistic way to walk this balance beam but rather emphasizes competing with and even squeezing China's influence — not the dual-track approach imagined by Washington.

Thus, the biggest overlapping factor in the three strategic views is that “China,” coupled with the word “competition,” is the main theme throughout. On the whole, the new report is new in terms of framework and structure, but its content is lackluster. It is an inventory and summary of U.S. national security policies and actions since Biden took office, and it has never been able to break out of the “strategic competition” rut.

The U.S. strategic community once thought the current China-U.S. relationship was like a game of cards and that the U.S. held more good cards. However, the threat perception and the race-to-win strategy exhibited in the new report reflect the strategic anxiety of the U.S. to a certain extent. The essence of the report is that, despite the increased length and content of the report on global cooperation, the Biden administration's perception of strategic competition with China has not evolved beyond that of Trump. Rather, it is increasingly shifting the spectrum of bilateral relations toward competition. It neither advances global peace and development nor prevents the two countries from heading into confrontation.