國共高層領導人互動已經成為兩黨的慣例。政黨溝通，形成意向和民意基礎，再由兩岸雙方具體推進和平發展，穩定台海局勢，已經成為這兩個具有“九二共識”共同政治基礎的政黨的品牌。國共兩黨的高層溝通與國共論壇行有經年，成為兩岸關係發展的發動機。“習洪會”是十八屆六中全會以後作為中共中央領導核心的習近平總書記闡述大陸對台政策，也是中國國民黨首次徹底淪為在野黨、民進黨首次全面執政之後的第一次國共領導人會面，具有強調底線、摸索新局的重要意義。

首先，“習洪會”明確了兩岸關係的性質和底線。“九二共識”表明兩岸關係的性質，是兩岸是否屬於一個國家這個關鍵問題的試金石。蔡英文上台後，拒不承認“九二共識”，單方面破壞過去8年來形成的兩岸關係和平發展的現狀，導致兩岸關係進入冷對抗時期。蔡英文當局用時間換空間，妄圖藉助兩岸的“冷”實現“台灣內部的國家正常化”，用“釋憲台獨”等方式實現“台灣法理獨立”。當前，大陸在台灣島內沒有抓手，沒法以直接影響台灣民意的方式改變島內的民意格局。但是，台灣與大陸在憲法和法律上屬於一個中國的事實毋庸置疑，因此，通過國共領導人會面的方式闡述大陸維護國家主權領土完整的決心決不動搖，闡述遏制“台獨”的決心決不動搖，闡述決不讓國家分裂的歷史悲劇重演具有強烈的指標意義。這就意味着，儘管大陸無法直接影響台灣“法理台獨”的進程，但是一定有辦法遏制“法理台獨”的結果。這也意味着，大陸在一個中國原則上的底線旗幟鮮明，這一政治底線和法理底線不可能動搖。

其次，“習洪會”是國民黨內兩岸路線鬥爭的試金石。國民黨作為台灣島內曾經的第一大黨，其黨內路線和未來走向直接牽涉到兩岸關係的未來。一個“獨台”並與“台獨”合流的國民黨只能讓兩岸僵局進一步冷卻甚至使得兩岸關係走向更不可知的未來；一個繼續高舉“九二共識”大旗並具有國家統一目標的國民黨則會成為兩岸關係冷對抗時期的緩衝劑和重要溝通渠道。從“九合一”慘敗到“二合一”徹底在野，國民黨內鬥不止，兩岸路線自然也是黨內鬥爭不可或缺的內容。洪秀柱以明朗的國家統一觀在國民黨內獨樹一幟。此次“習洪會”，洪秀柱完整闡述國民黨和平政綱，明確深化“九二共識”，積極探討以和平協議結束兩岸敵對狀態的可能性，并力圖使國民黨扮演推動兩岸和平制度化的角色的表態，到底在國民黨內如何發酵，國民黨內鬥的結果到底如何，洪秀柱回台之後黨內政治地位如何，都是觀察國民黨未來走向的指標。

第三，“習洪會”是摸索兩岸新局的嘗試。當前，蔡英文依美日抗大陸，美國從人員配置到兩岸議題，與蔡英文當局的關係甚密，甚至出現為民共尋求新共識的迫切願望和積極行動。而國民黨則首次完全在野，國民黨在台灣政治生活中的地位處於有史以來的最低地位。儘管國民黨作為最大的在野黨依然活躍在台灣政治舞台上，儘管國民黨對台灣當局、台灣民意代表部門、台灣裁判部門還有一些發言權，但是它已經失去了掣肘民進黨的作用。加之，台灣當局採用“轉型正義”、“不當黨產條例”等方式遏住國民黨的財政、波及國民黨的合法性，國民黨對台灣的政治影響力處於空前的低潮。在這種情況下，如何既不與拒不承認“九二共識”的台灣當局進行官方接觸，不與擁有“台獨黨綱”的民進党進行黨對黨交流，又對島內堅持“九二共識”的政治力量和民眾有所表示，就需要摸索出一條新道路。“習洪會”釋放了大陸方面繼續以“九二共識”和兩岸同屬一中的核心意涵作為推動兩岸關係交流互動底線的信號，表達了摸索兩岸新局的嘗試。

“習洪會”是目前兩岸關係和平發展充滿挑戰和變數情況下兩岸關係的重要事件，國共關係的鞏固和發展，國民黨內部認同“九二共識”力量的穩定是兩岸關係和平穩定的重要因素。這一歷史事件在當前兩岸冷對抗的特殊情勢下所起到的作用不容低估，因為，歷史事件不但具有即時性，而且具有歷時性（diachronic），它可能是未來兩岸探索新局的開端。

Interaction between leaders of CPC and KMT has already become a convention between the two parties. Public opinion has welcomed such communications and formed a basis for the two sides across the Taiwan Straits to promote peace and development and stabilize cross-Strait relations. This has become the brand of these two political parties, both of which uphold the 1992 Consensus. The high-level exchanges and the CPC-KMT forum have powered the development of cross-Strait relations. The meeting between KMT Chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu and CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping was the first meeting between leaders of the two parties since the DPP took power and the KMT became the opposition. Xi took the opportunity to elaborate the mainland's policy towards Taiwan. He emphasized the bottom line of the mainland and attempted to explore new aspects of cross-Strait relations.

First, he clarified that the 1992 consensus is about the nature of cross-Strait relationship and serves as the touchstone of whether the two sides belong to one country. Tsai Ying-wen, the new Taiwan leader, refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus and has unilaterally disrupted cross-Strait peace and development, a status quo that has developed in the past eight years, driving cross-Strait relations into an age of cold confrontation. Tsai wants to seize the time of relationship cooling down to achieve 'state normalization within Taiwan' and 'jurisprudential independence' by way of 'constitutional interpretation'. At present, the mainland is not able to directly influence and thus change public opinion in Taiwan. However, it is an undeniable fact that Taiwan and the mainland belong, constitutionally and legally, to one China. It is therefore strongly symbolic to reiterate the unshakable determination of the mainland to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity, to contain 'Taiwan independence' and to prevent the historical tragedy of secession. To put it straight, although the mainland cannot directly influence Taiwan's jurisprudential independence process, it vows to be resourceful in dealing with the result. The one-China principle constitutes the inviolate political and jurisprudential bottom line for the mainland.

Second, the Xi-Hung meeting was a touchstone for the struggle between two camps on cross-Strait relations within the KMT. The KMT used to be the largest political party in Taiwan, and its program and orientation have a direct bearing on the future of cross-Strait relations. A KMT that favors an 'independent Taiwan' and converges with 'pro-independence forces in Taiwan' will only further chill the cross-Strait relationship and steer it to a more unknowable future. On the other hand, a KMT that holds high the banner of the 1992 Consensus and the objective of national reunification will serve as a buffering agent and an important communication channel during a period of cold confrontation between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. From the crushing defeat to being driven out of the ruling position, the KMT went through incessant infighting, with cross-Strait relations a point in dispute. Hung plowed her own furrow with forthright support for national reunification. During her meeting with Xi, Hung gave a complete elaboration of the KMT's 'peace platform', clearly deepening the 1992 Consensus, actively exploring the possibility of a peace agreement between the two sides, and steering the KMT to contribute to institutionalizing peace across the Taiwan Straits. How will these statements brew within KMT? What will be the result of KMT infighting? What will be Hung's political status within her party after going back to Taiwan? Answers to these questions will testify to the future orientation of KMT.

Third, the Xi-Hung meeting was an attempt to explore new prospects for cross-Strait relations. At present, Tsai Ing-wen relied on the US and Japan to counter the mainland. From staffing to agenda setting, the US is on intimate terms with the Tsai regime, even urging active moves to find new consensus for DPP and CPC. On the other hand, the KMT is for the first time completely out of power and trying to adapt to its lowest position in Taiwan's political life since its founding. Although the party remains politically active as the largest opposition force and still has some voice in the three branches of government, it is no longer able to hold back the DPP. Furthermore, the Taiwan authorities have used 'transitional justice' and 'improper party assets regulations' to contain the KMT's finances, which produced spillovers to questions about KMT legitimacy, resulting in unprecedentedly low political influence for the party. In this situation, the mainland must explore a new path to continue rejecting official contact with the Taiwan authorities that have refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus, avoiding inter-party exchanges with a DPP that has a Taiwan independence clause and showing some kindness to the political forces still insisting on the 1992 Consensus and people in Taiwan. The Xi-Hung meeting thus signaled that the mainland will continue using the 1992 Consensus and its core content, i.e., both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to one China, as the bottom line of cross-Strait exchanges and interaction — while seeking new ways to develop cross-Strait relations.

The meeting is an important event at a time where the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations faces challenges and uncertainties. The role of this historical event in the special situation of cross-Strait cold confrontation must not be underestimated because historical events are not only instantaneous but also diachronic. Consolidation and development of KMT-CPC ties and stability of forces recognizing the 1992 Consensus within KMT are important factors for cross-Strait relations to enjoy peace and continuity.