剛剛結束的美國總統拜登對中東的訪問，是他就任總統近一年半以來首次中東之行。值得指出的是，拜登這次中東行是“應急之作”，是在俄烏衝突背景下運作安排的，因此美國方面給訪問“賦予太多的任務”，大大超出美國現有的影響和能力，因而註定是不會成功的。

根據拜登行前美國國務卿布林肯、國家安全事務助理沙利文以及總統本人在《華盛頓郵報》的發文看，拜登此次中東之行有以下五方面目標：

一是“催油”。俄烏衝突發生後，美國及其盟國對俄羅斯實施空前嚴厲的制裁，造成世界能源市場供需失衡，加之石油短缺的風險和心理影響加大，世界石油和天然氣價格暴漲，美歐成品油價格創下紀錄，通貨膨脹高企。拜登支持率的一路走低，已經嚴重影響到民主黨在即將到來的美國中期選舉的選情。因此，拜登總統的中東行被認為是“為油而來”。

二是改善美國與沙特的關係。與特朗普不同，拜登的民主黨政府處處高舉人權大旗。拜登在競選時就曾借卡舒吉事件嚴厲指責沙特，甚至聲稱要把沙特打入“賤民國家”。就任總統後，他一直拒絕與沙特實際掌握權力的王儲穆罕默德親王接觸，既不見王儲也不通電話，以至於俄烏衝突發生後，拜登需要沙特配合增產石油，給王儲打電話時被拒接。

三是聯合中東地區盟友向伊朗施壓。拜登就任總統一年半來，一直在推動伊核問題談判，力圖恢複核協議。去年4月維也納談判恢復後，有關各方先後進行了八輪會談，基本上就相關問題達成一致，但尚缺“臨門一腳”，即伊朗提出的底線——解除對革命衛隊的制裁。拜登受制於國內政治掣肘實難退讓，因此試圖向伊施加新的壓力。

四是推動以色列深度融入中東地區，形成所謂“地區安全聯盟”，在美國自己力不從心又不願更多投入的情況下借“中東版北約”來維護美國在中東的主控地位。

五是遏制中國、俄羅斯在中東影響力的擴大。拜登行前在《華盛頓郵報》發文，特意把中國也“扯進來”，甚至在吉達舉行的美國與海灣六國及埃及、約旦和伊拉克的峰會上聲稱，“美國不會離開中東，不會給中國、俄羅斯或伊朗留下真空”。

7月16日拜登結束了總統任上的中東首秀。盤點他此行的成果，可以總結為一句話：收穫平平，難掩尷尬。

首先看他此行的“重頭戲”——推動以沙特為首的OPEC產油國大幅增產石油。雖然在與沙特國王和王儲的會談中，拜登都重點提到了增產問題，但直至他離開，也沒有得到沙特方面大幅度增產石油的明確承諾。實際上，從主客觀兩方面來說，沙特都對增產缺少熱情。從客觀上說，2014年之後世界石油價格曾經歷長期低迷，導致全球範圍內新油田的勘探開發大大滯後，目前重要產油國（包括沙特）的潛在生產能力是很有限的，所謂“地主家也沒有餘糧”。而從主觀上來說，在油價長期低迷的背景下，以沙特為代表的OPEC產油國和以俄羅斯為代表的非OPEC產油國已經形成一套有效的合作機制（穩價機制），來維護產油國的利益，現在讓沙特“自毀長城”顯然是其內心不願意的。而且，在拜登來訪前，媒體還曝光沙特大幅增加從俄羅斯低價購買發電廠燃油，而把自產原油高價在石油市場出售。

其次，美國與沙特的關係表面上改善，但實質上有明顯的隔閡。雖然拜登此行與沙特王儲“碰了拳”，也進行了雙邊會談，但拜登在會談中和會談後的記者會上一再提及卡舒吉事件和所謂人權，並遭到沙特王儲的“回懟”。王儲提到了美國在伊拉克的表現，並明確告訴拜登把自己的意識形態強加於人是不會有好結果的。

第三，推動建立所謂“地區安全聯盟”存在兩個結構性障礙。一是除以色列和美國外，中東地區國家（包括沙特）並不願意公開與伊朗為敵，更不用說去針對俄羅斯和中國了。二是以巴關係的僵局大大制約着美國“讓以色列深度融入中東地區”的努力。拜登此行不僅使那些期待沙特與以色列建交的人大失所望，而且沙特還公開表示“此次峰會沒有討論與以色列建立任何防務聯盟，也不存在所謂的阿拉伯北約”。

第四，拜登此次中東之行引起伊朗和俄羅斯的高度警惕，伊俄也作出一些反制舉動。伊朗高調亮相新成立的“無人機師”並進行演習，宣布對美國諸多人員進行制裁，並與俄羅斯、土耳其舉行“阿斯塔納”進程峰會。俄羅斯總統普京於7月19日訪問伊朗並出席俄、伊、土三國峰會，與土耳其總統埃爾多安也舉行了雙邊會談。普京在拜登之後接踵而至，明顯有唱對台戲的味道，也在一定程度上抵消了拜登首訪中東的影響。

第五，拜登試圖阻止中國擴大在中東影響力的圖謀更是不可能如願。在中東，沒有一個國家（包括以色列）願意“拿中國說事”，沒有一個國家接美國所謂“中國填補真空”的茬。多年來，中國推進“一帶一路”建設，阿拉伯國家、中東國家深受其益，怎麼可能隨美國的指揮棒起舞呢？沙特政府就明確表示，沙特與美國的關係絲毫不會影響沙特與中國的關係。

Joe Biden's recently concluded trip to the Middle East was his first as U.S. president. It's worth noticing that, against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, this trip was "improvised," leading the U.S. to attempt to stretch beyond its present influences and capabilities. It was thus destined to be unsuccessful.

According to U.S. State Secretary Antony Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and the U.S. president's own article published in the Washington Post, the trip had five goals:

First was to urge for oil. The U.S. and allies have imposed unprecedentedly harsh sanctions against Russia since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, resulting in imbalance between supply and demand in world energy market. Combined with the risk and expectation of a global oil shortage, petroleum and natural gas prices surged worldwide; refined oil prices set historical records, inflation escalated, and Biden's approval ratings continued to slide, seriously dampening the Democratic Party's prospect in the upcoming midterm elections. Biden's Middle East trip was thus believed to be targeted at oil.

Second was to improve ties with Saudi Arabia. Different from Trump, Biden's Democratic administration holds high the human rights banner everywhere. Biden lambasted Saudi Arabia on the campaign trail for Jamal Khashoggi's murder, even vowing to make the oil-rich country a "pariah state." Biden had refused to contact Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who wields actual power in the country, since coming into office, neither meeting him nor talking to him on the phone. So when the Russia-Ukraine crisis broke out and the U.S. wanted Saudi Arabia to cooperate and increase oil output, Biden made a call to the crown prince, but the latter refused to answer.

Third was to pressure Iran via U.S. allies in the Middle East. Biden had been pushing for negotiations on the Iran nuclear issue over his past year and half in office, striving to restore the nuclear agreement. Since negotiations were restarted in Vienna in April 2021, related parties have had eight rounds of talks, and basically reached consensuses on related issues, except that Biden couldn't take a step back on Iran's bottom line - lifting sanctions on the Revolutionary Guards - owing to domestic political resistance. So he attempted to mount new pressures on Iran.

Fourth was to urge Israel to integrate into the so-called "regional security alliance" in the Middle East, so that the U.S. can preserve its dominance in the region with such a "Middle East-edition of NATO" when it is unable or unwilling to invest more.

Fifth was to contain the expansion of Chinese and Russian influences in the Middle East. Biden dragged China in with his Washington Post article, even claimed at the summit with six Gulf countries and Egypt, Jordan and Iraq that the U.S. won't leave the region and leave a vacuum for China and Russia to fill.

Biden's first trip to the Middle East as U.S. president, which ended on July 16, can be summed up as mediocre and embarrassing.

First let's look at the priority goal - urging major OPEC members led by Saudi Arabia to increase oil output. Though Biden highlighted an output increase in his meeting with the king and talks with the crown prince, he had not received any clear Saudi promise to do so until his departure. In fact, Saudi Arabia demonstrated little interest in doing so. Objectively, world petroleum prices have long undergone stagnation since 2014, as a result, exploration and development of new oil fields have lagged far behind worldwide, and the potential productive capacities of major oil-producing nations, including Saudi Arabia, are limited. Subjectively, against the backdrop of longstanding low prices, OPEC members represented by Saudi Arabia and non-OPEC oil producing nations like Russia have built a set of effective price-stabilizing mechanisms for cooperation to preserve their interests. Therefore it is difficult to persuade Saudi Arabia to stray from its own interests. Prior to Biden's visit, there were reports that Saudi Arabia would greatly increase imports of cheap fuel oil for power plants, while it sells its own products at high prices in the market.

Second, despite the apparent improvement in U.S.-Saudi ties, there still are obvious obstacles between them. Though Biden had a "fist bump" with the crown prince and had bilateral talks, Biden had to repeatedly mention the Khashoggi murder and human rights during the talks and the news conference afterward, which invited refutation from the crown prince. The crown prince mentioned the U.S.' performance in Iraq, and explicitly told Biden there won't be good outcomes when one side imposes its own ideology on the other.

Third, there are two structural obstacles to forming the so-called "regional security alliance": one is, except Israel and the U.S., Middle East countries including Saudi Arabia don't want to openly take Iran as an enemy, not least to target Russia and China; the other is the impasse between Israel and Palestine greatly constrains U.S. efforts to make Israel integrate deeper into the Middle East. Biden's trip not only greatly disappointed those who had anticipated Saudi Arabia and Israel would establish diplomatic relations, but Saudi Arabia openly stated the summit didn't discuss establishing any defense alliance with Israel, nor would there be a so-called "Arabian NATO".

Fourth, Biden's trip also triggered high alert in Iran and Russia, causing them to take some countermoves. Iran debuted its newly formed "drone division" and conducted a corresponding exercise, announced sanctions against multiple U.S. personnel, and held an "Astana Process" summit with Russia and Turkey. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Iran on July 19, participated in the Russia-Iran-Turkey summit, and held bilateral talks with Turkey President Recep Erdoğan. That Putin visited the region on Biden's heels certainly had a taste of rivalry, which to some extent offset the influences of Biden's trip.

Fifth, Biden's attempt to prevent greater Chinese influences in the Middle East will be an impossible mission. In the Middle East, not a single country, including Israel, is willing to find fault with China, not a single country accepts the U.S. rhetoric about China filling in a "vacuum" there. China has been proceeding with the Belt and Road projects in the region for years, which has benefited Arabian and Middle East countries tremendously. How can they dance to the U.S.' tune? The Saudi government has made it clear Saudi Arabia's relations with the U.S. would in no way affect its relations with China.