2021年4月19日，歐盟理事會通過歐盟印太地區合作戰略決議。該決議指出，歐盟在印太地區具有重大利益。歐盟重申對印太地區的興趣和責任，顯示世界經濟的中心正在向印太地區轉移。然而，該地區的地緣政治競爭也在激化，並給貿易、供應鏈、科技、政治和安全領域帶來許多壓力，這種壓力不僅威脅地區的安全和穩定，也產生了溢出效應。

2019年以來，在歐盟幾個主要國家中，法國、德國、荷蘭相繼制定了各自的印太戰略文件。歐盟印太戰略文件出台是預料中的結果，而中國無疑是歐盟制定這份文件的重要因素。這份歐版印太戰略是對美國的戰略追隨，還是歐洲獨立的戰略考量？中國又應如何評估和應對？

“印太”作為區域概念包括太平洋和印度洋沿線地區，是由德國地理學家和地緣政治學家卡爾·豪斯霍費爾在上世紀20年代提出的，但直到近年才日漸納入國際社會政策話語，並有逐步取代“亞太”概念的趨勢。這自然與美國朝這一方向的一系列努力有關。美國的印太戰略以安全為主導，有很明顯的指向，其核心是在價值觀旗幟下開展與地區國家的合作，制衡中國的崛起。美國對地區盟友和夥伴的選擇標準是秉承基於“自由和開放的印太地區”的規則和價值觀，強調的是“基於規則的地區秩序”。在價值觀上，歐盟的印太文件與美國的印太戰略是兼容的，然而歐盟文件中強調基於規則的國際秩序，這與美國的戰略目標就有很大不同。也就是說，歐盟的印太戰略更多是從促進歐盟作為全球行為體的能力出發來考慮問題的。

從最初的謹慎觀望到自我定義為印太事務的參與者，歐盟對“印太”概念的接受也有一個逐步發展的過程。歐盟一直非常強調其作為規範性力量的作用，對美日印澳主導的印太戰略和中國的“一帶一路”倡議一直存在不同程度的擔憂。隨着中美在地區的競爭日趨激烈，歐盟認為，這不僅會削弱其發言權，甚至最終會危及它在印太地區的利益。此外歐盟認為，自己作為規範性力量的代表，可以在印太地區發揮獨特作用，其中立的安全形象及與印太地區相關大國保持良好關係的優勢，有助於為該地區日趨激烈的大國博弈帶來穩定因素。

歐盟印太戰略主要在歐盟整體及歐洲主要國家兩個層面展開。歐盟層面主要規劃自由貿易協定、首腦外交等一般性政策和執行機制；歐洲主要國家則通過外交對話、軍事演習及港口互訪等手段，將政策轉化為實際執行力，以加強在印太地區的存在及影響力。

具體而言，歐盟主要通過以下途徑構建歐盟版印太戰略：

首先，以地區現有制度框架和雙多邊平台為依託謀求政治影響力。在現有印太地區多邊合作機制中，歐盟是亞歐會議堅定的支持者，也是東盟地區論壇的支持方和南盟觀察員，並與環印度洋地區合作聯盟關係密切。這些多元化的溝通渠道和機制在歐盟與地區國家的交流合作中將發揮重要作用。在雙邊層面上，歐盟重視與印太地區有份量的地區國家——尤其是印度、日本、澳大利亞——開展密切的政策協調和互動。

第二，通過加強與重要區域協定的聯繫，如《跨太平洋夥伴關係全面和漸進協定》和《區域全面經濟夥伴關係協定》，來保證歐盟在貿易上的戰略地位，維護印太地區現有多邊貿易體系和開放的市場，創造公平競爭的環境。為促進貿易和投資自由，歐盟長期以來就與印太地區相關經濟體進行貿易和投資協定談判做了大量工作。歐盟已經完成與新加坡、越南、韓國等的自貿協定簽署，與東盟、澳大利亞、新西蘭的自貿協定談判也在進行中，并力爭同中國在《投資全面協定》上有更多進展。這些都有助於歐盟在印太經濟格局中佔據有利地位。

第三，在安全和防務領域深化合作，加強在印太地區的軍事存在。在反恐、供應鏈安全、網絡安全、軍控以及航道安全方面，歐盟主要國家在該地區都有切身利益。法國是歐盟國家中唯一在印太地區擁有實質性軍事戰略部署的國家，在該地區共有七個海外領地，駐紮約7000名軍事人員。因此，法國在防務方面有更強烈的需求，更傾向於與日印澳等印太地區國家建立有重點、有層次的防務合作。並且，歐盟已經佔據印太軍火市場相當大的份額，雖然目前軍售以商業利益為主，尚未轉化為對印太地區更大的軍事影響力，但從長期看來，日益加劇的印太地區軍備競賽有可能促使歐盟調整武器出口策略。

第四，除了以上在多邊、經濟和防務領域的持續建設外，歐盟印太文件還列出了廣泛的合作領域，包括互聯互通、海洋治理、減災、健康、數字經濟、氣候和生態保護、高等教育和科技、人權、促進兩性平等，等等。總體來說，歐盟印太戰略的內容和議題十分豐富，其目標全面而宏大，以長期接觸為原則，與聯合國可持續發展目標相一致，強調國際法和國際公約的重要性。同時，文件還涉及西印度洋地區的內容，也就是非洲東海岸國家，傳統上歐洲與該地區國家的互動和聯繫也更為緊密。這些都是美國版印太戰略所缺乏的。撇開價值觀，歐盟文件更多談及國際社會的功能，而在所列出的具體合作領域中，歐盟與中國的利益能找到許多契合點。

對政策制定者而言，概念是重要的，但概念下的具體內容更為關鍵。 “印太”作為一個日漸流行的政策概念，不同國家都會根據自身利益以及所面臨的政策環境制定各自的印太戰略。即使美印日澳的“四方對話”有更多制衡中國的因素，但各國的立場也有諸多不一致。因此，美國想用所謂“印太戰略”來統一盟友的思想很難成功，而多元化的印太戰略則會在一定程度上削弱美版印太戰略的指向。

中國是地區經濟的火車頭，同時也是多邊主義、國際合作的提倡者，不論是歐盟還是其他國家，仍會以實際且彈性的方式與中國開展各個領域的合作。對於各個國家相繼出台的印太戰略，我們需要認真解讀不同版本，以平常心看待，並從中尋找與中方在責任和利益上的共同點。如果能更多地從“印太”地理和區域層面看待印太戰略，而不僅僅把視野局限在安全和防務層面，那麼對於消解美版印太戰略的安全指向，深化具體的地區合作議程，發展建設性的地區夥伴關係，都具有十分積極的意義。

本文為國家社科基金重大項目《引導美歐國家參與“一帶一路”建設對策和展望研究》（項目批准號18VDL008）階段性成果。

On April 19, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, which laid out significant interests of the EU in the region. This reaffirmation of European concern and responsibility demonstrates that the center of the world economy has already shifted to the Indo-Pacific, along with intensified geopolitical competition and great pressure in trade, supply chains, technology and politics. These will not only threaten regional security and stability but also lead to negative spillover effects.

In view of the successive India-Pacific strategic documents from France, Germany and the Netherlands since 2019, the introduction of EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific should come as no surprise. And China undoubtedly serves as an important factor in the whole picture. From here, two questions emerge: Is the European version of the Indo-Pacific strategy a follow-up to the United States or an independent strategic consideration? How should China evaluate it and respond?

Proposed by German officer and political geographer Karl Haushofer in the 1920s, the concept of the Indo-Pacific comprises areas along the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It has been adopted by the United States with new geopolitical and strategic meaning that replaces “Asia-Pacific,” which seems unsuited to its current strategic consideration: competition with China. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is tied to its own security and that of regional allies under the banner of values.The core idea is to counterbalance China by reinforcing alliances and strengthening cooperation — particularly with India, Japan and Australia — by invoking rules and values that underpin a free and open Indo-Pacific. This version emphasizes a rules-based regional order under U.S. leadership.On values the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy is compatible with the U.S. version, yet the EU has attached great importance to a “rules-based international order,” showing that the fundamental purpose is to promote Europe as a global actor. This varies greatly from the strategic goal of the United States in the region.

Moving from cautious onlooker to participant in Indo-Pacific affairs, the EU has undergone a gradual process of understanding and acceptance of the term Indo-Pacific. The EU has always highlighted its unique role as a normative power. In recent years it has expressed varying degrees of concern over the Indo-Pacific Strategy led by the U.S., Japan, India and Australia, as well as China's Belt and Road Initiative.As competition between China and the United States intensifies, the EU believes this will not only weaken its position in international affairs but will also eventually endanger its interests in the Indo-Pacific region. As a normative power it believes it has a unique role to play: The neutral image in security and the good relationships with relevant regional powers enable the EU to become an indispensable player in maintaining regional balance and stability.

The EU's Indo-Pacific strategy is laid out in two main parts: overall planning and the specific policies of major countries. General policy and implementation mechanisms, such as free trade agreements and summit diplomacy, are brought under a plan at the EU level. Member states are expected to demonstrate executive ability through diplomatic dialogue, military exercises and port visits, whereby the EU may achieve a heightened presence and greater influence in the Indo-Pacific region.

Specifically, this version of the Indo-Pacific strategy can be constructed in the following ways:

The first relies on current regional institutional frameworks and bilateral multilateral platforms, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting, ASEAN Regional Forum and South Asian Association Regional Cooperation, in the interest of political influence. At present, the EU is an observer of SAARC and a staunch supporter of ASEM and ARF. Meanwhile, it maintains a close relationship with the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation.These diverse channels of communication and mechanisms are playing an increasingly important role in exchanges and cooperation between Brussels and relevant countries. At the bilateral level, Europe places high value on close policy coordination and interaction with major Indo-Pacific countries, especially China, India, Japan and Australia.

The second advances its presence in key regional agreements, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, to ensure a strategic position in trade, to preserve and improve the existing multilateral system of trade and open markets and to create a level playing field. The EU has long devoted a tremendous amount of effort to conducting FTA negotiations with concerned economies.In concrete terms, the signing of free trade agreements with Singapore, Vietnam, South Korea and other countries has been completed as negotiations with ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand were underway. Brussel also seeks profound achievements in the China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, or CAI, which will contribute to a favorable economic position for Europeans in the region.

The third, deepens cooperation in the field of security, to strengthen the military presence in thee Indo-Pacific area on account of European countries' vital interests in counterterrorism, cybersecurity, arms control and the eesecurity of maritime and aviation routes. Considering the fact that France is the only EU country that has deployed substantial military in this region, it has a stronger demand for defense and it is more inclined to establish defense cooperation system along with Japan, India, Australia and other countries. Moreover, the EU has already occupied a significant share of the Indo-Pacific weapons market though commercial arms sales. The accelerating arms race in the region may boost arms exports of the EU and increase its impact on security and defense.

Fourth, the EU's Indo-Pacific strategy lists a wide range of areas of cooperation, including connectivity, ocean governance, research, technology, health, climate change, disaster reduction and ecological protection, apart from the above-mentioned constructions in the fields of multilateral cooperation, economy and defense. In general, this strategy covers substantial content and topics that indicate the EU has ambitious, comprehensive goals in the Indo-Pacific region.If the issue of values is set aside, there has been a convergence between the EU and China in areas of cooperation and multilateralism. Different from the American version, the EU's Indo-Pacific strategy follows the principle of long-term engagement that is consistent with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, while emphasizing the importance of international law and conventions. Moreover, it covers the western Indian Ocean region — the East Coast of Africa — to which Europe has traditionally been closely linked.

For policymakers, the content of a concept is more crucial for analysis than the concept itself. Under the banner of an Indo-Pacific strategy, different countries set their own agendas for the region according to their interests and policy environment. Therefore, it is quite a challenging task for the U.S. to unify the policies and behaviors of its allies, even if they share a similar values framework. While balancing China is an important strategic goal of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the four constituent countries have differed at the concrete level on how, exactly, to interact with it. The Indo-Pacific strategies in European countries also vary in outlook. The pluralistic reality of the various strategies has blurred the strategic direction and weakened the influence of the U.S. version.

Regarding multiple Indo-Pacific strategies, it is necessary to treat them with a calm mind, carefully study and analyze the approach of different countries and find common ground in responsibilities and interests regarding China. To conclude, if strategy in the Indo-Pacific could be evaluated from the level of regional development rather than the narrow focus of security, it would be of positive significance to deepen the regional cooperation agenda and develop constructive regional partnerships.