互聯互通是中國和東南亞的共同利益，“海上絲綢之路”正是為達成這一目標而不斷努力的體現。陸地和海上聯通對貿易與安全至關重要。為數眾多的東盟內部、東盟與中國之間有關互聯互通的會談、協議和承諾，都說明它的重要性。緬甸、老撾和越南與中國陸地接壤，越南、柬埔寨、泰國、馬來西亞、印度尼西亞、汶萊和菲律賓是南海沿岸國家，毗鄰泰國灣。東盟對華貿易發展迅速，預計將從2014年的3665億美元增加到2020年的1萬億美元，而互聯互通將是實現這一目標的關鍵。此外，地理上的接近使（毒品、武器、人口和水貨的）販運走私和（過度捕撈、海盜、氣候變化對糧食和生存安全的不利影響等）地區公共事務管理的漏洞增加。這些地理風險凸顯了雙方互聯互通的特點，那就是推動雙向貿易和商務、旅遊、人文交流，攜手應對共同關心的問題。

東南亞對中國周邊外交至關重要。所以對中國外交政策來說，管理和解決地區關切，如南海爭端，始終是一個挑戰。中國不斷增加在南海的存在和力量投射，使海上軍事強國擔心其海空軍在這一戰略航道長期享有的航行飛越自由被剝奪。而且，中國對外威脅的日益增加，迫使處于軍事劣勢的沿岸國家為對抗或阻止中國在有爭議海域的挑釁行為而擴大與域外強國的安全合作。地理上連接中國與東南亞沿海各國的海洋，成為領土爭奪和海洋權利聲索的對象，使域外大國的介入進一步複雜化。然而，儘管存在爭議，（陸地與海洋的）毗鄰實際上可以用來促進互利關係，這正是改善關係、保持地區和平與秩序的基礎。“海上絲綢之路”在這方面大有可為。

2013年，中國國家主席習近平在印尼議會的演講中提出構建21世紀“海上絲綢之路”。它是連接中國與歐亞、中東和非洲的更廣的“一帶一路”倡議的海上部分，表明中國有濃厚興趣加強加快與東南亞國家的全方位互聯互通，包括在海洋領域。選擇在印尼這個區域領導性、戰略上連接太平洋和印度洋的國家正式宣布“海上絲綢之路”，表明中國對東南亞地區和海上互聯互通的高度重視。

有中國對地區互聯互通的倡導以及東南亞國家的支持，人們可能期待出現更好的良機。“海上絲綢之路”可以錨定以往眾多雙邊和地區的互聯互通草案、建議、協議（如2004年的“運輸合作諒解備忘錄”、2007年的“東盟-中國海上運輸協議”，及其他姊妹港口協議）和經濟聯繫（如海關程序協調），進而獲得整個地區的響應。2003年，菲律賓推出“強大的共和國海上公路計劃”，意圖貫通這個島國的汽車擺渡和公路。2014年，印尼提出成為“海洋軸心/支點”的構想，它包含五大支柱：海洋文化、資源、聯通、外交和成為兩洋戰略橋樑。在東南亞大陸，也有一系列連接東盟與中國的鐵路公路建議（如新加坡至昆明鐵路）。從這個有利角度來說，“海上絲綢之路”恰與該地區的聯通意願吻合。

有幾個因素會使“海上絲綢之路”加強互聯互通的成功機會提高。其中包括：

1）“海上絲綢之路”的靈活性。它可以容納所有類型互聯互通項目，除實物基礎設施外，與一些誤解相反的是，它還超越“海上”這一概念；

2）中國展示出的金融能力（2015年成為資本凈輸出國）、技術和基礎設施能力（世界最大水壩、第一輛磁懸浮列車、最長的高鐵運輸網、最高的橋樑、海拔最高的鐵路線）；

3）巨大的地區基礎設施融資缺口；

4）強大的地區支持（所有10個東盟成員都是亞投行意向創始成員，亞投行與絲綢之路基金同為“一帶一路”的主要融資機構；

5）全球性燃料和基建原材料價格低企。中國佔世界鋼鐵產量的50%，占水泥產量的60%，這也是為什麼中國承包商能夠在海外基礎設施項目競標中擊敗外國同行。

其他一些進展也利好“海上絲綢之路”。如中國在地區基礎設施市場日益擴張，亞投行與現有多邊發展銀行（世界銀行、歐洲復興開發銀行、亞洲開發銀行）逐漸聯合融資。這些項目的穩步推進，中國與接受方和東道國的良好工作關係，亞投行與其他主要國際貸款機構維持的互補及夥伴關係，都將提升“海上絲綢之路”的成功率。“海上絲綢之路”和更廣的“一帶一路”的物質成分（如土地、天空、海洋、能源、互聯網和電信）似乎得到更多關注，但實際上它的覆蓋面更廣，包括了農業、林業、漁業、金融一體化、貿易便利化、電子商務等領域的合作，以及設立經濟區。事實上，落實“海上絲綢之路”不能只看亞投行的融資項目，也要看中國進出口銀行、中國國家開發銀行和中投公司等國家政策銀行和主權財富基金的融資項目。

“海上絲綢之路”改變了中國投資格局，證明分歧未必阻礙投資。它推動了中國投資的多元化，使其從資源開採變為對基礎設施和綠地的投資。關注社會問題和扶貧也成為突破點，已經獲批的亞投行和世界銀行共同資助的印尼全國貧民區改造項目就是例證。實踐證明，爭議不會成為“海上絲綢之路”的障礙。中國國家開發銀行為雅加達-萬隆鐵路項目出資約3/4，為印尼國家銀行、印尼人民銀行、曼迪利銀行提供10年期30億美元貸款（2016年），批准為印尼的52個項目提供118億美元貸款，涉及金融、電力、電信、農業等領域。中國進出口銀行向寧平煤基尿素（化肥）廠提供融資（2013年），中國國家開發銀行為永昂發電廠一期工程提供融資（2013年），這兩個項目都在越南。要知道，印尼和越南在南海與中國存在捕魚和海洋權利糾紛，它們能夠得到貸款，說明只要高層政治關係穩固，中國願意擱置爭議，緊張局勢也是可控的。中國在動蕩和風險地區的投資，如撒哈拉以南非洲和中東，強化了良好政治關係的重要性，它們或許超越了對可行性和風險的考慮。

16年初，印尼雅加達至萬隆高鐵項目正式啟動，圖為兩名當地人在開工儀式上與高鐵列車模型合影。（選自：新華網）

“海上絲綢之路”雖然前景光明，但也面臨幾大挑戰。中國在這一地區（包括部分在南海有主權要求的國家）資助和支持的基礎設施項目取得進展，證明“海上絲綢之路”可以超越分歧前行，但本地區的政治和安全環境始終會給這些項目帶來影響，因為爭議影響着對中國的整體看法和信任。與“絲綢之路經濟帶”相比，“海上絲綢之路”推進較慢，或許可以猜到，是南海爭議牽制了中國在這一地區的投資。另外要解決的，是它帶給人的困惑和相關信息匱乏。亞投行成員地位等同於“海上絲綢之路”國家嗎？東南亞國家中的保守主義（觀望）、排外主義和對經濟被別國控制的恐懼，也是“海上絲綢之路”要克服的挑戰。“海上絲綢之路”大體是向西的，給人的印象是要繞道某些東南亞沿海國家。而交通、電力能源、電信和關鍵工業部門被認為是戰略產業，外國的類似參與和控制總是會引起關注。中國以往在這一地區的項目受挫，包括涉及貪腐、無規則、質量和安全環保標準低劣，也影響人們對“海上絲綢之路”的看法。這需要給對方信心，需要釋放善意，保持中國與東南亞國家的對話。不得不說的是，與遲到者和騎牆派相比，主動先行者總是有望享受到更好的條件和優惠。

Connectivity is a shared interest for China and Southeast Asia, and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) represents part of the continuing efforts to highlight this. Land and sea connections are important for trade and security. The long list of intra-ASEAN and ASEAN-China discussions, agreements, and undertakings related to connectivity demonstrate its importance. Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam share a common land border with China. Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines are littoral states of the South China Sea and the adjoining Gulf of Thailand. Burgeoning ASEAN-China trade is projected to increase from $366.5 billion in 2014 to a target of $1 trillion in 2020, and connectivity will be critical in facilitating this. In addition, geographic contiguity increases vulnerability to trafficking and smuggling (of narcotics, arms, human and contraband) and problems in managing regional commons (e.g. overfishing, maritime piracy, adverse effects of climate change to food and livelihood security). These geographic risks highlight the salience of connectivity for both sides in order to promote two-way trade, commerce, tourism, people-to-people exchanges and to cooperatively address issues of mutual concern.

Southeast Asia is important for China's neighborhood and periphery diplomacy; hence the management or resolution of regional concerns, such as the South China Sea (SCS) disputes, represents a continuing challenge for Chinese foreign policy. China's increasing presence and power projection in the SCS worries naval powers concerned about potential curtailment of their longstanding freedom of navigation and overflight for their naval and air force assets in the strategic waterway. Furthermore, China's increasing external threat has led militarily disadvantaged littoral states to expand security engagement with external powers in order to counter or deter Chinese assertive actions in the disputed sea. Hence, the sea that geographically binds China and maritime Southeast Asia also constitutes a space, which became the subject of competing territorial and maritime claims and further complicated the participation of extra-regional powers. However, while disputes persist, proximity and contiguity (by land and sea) can actually be used to foster mutually beneficial ties which can serve as foundations for improved relations and enduring regional peace and order. MSR can help in this regard.

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the 21st Century MSR in an address in the Indonesian Parliament. MSR is the maritime component of the larger One Belt, One Road (OBOR, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative) that would connect China with Eurasia, the Middle East and Africa. MSR signals China's deep interest in enhancing and accelerating all-around connectivity with Southeast Asia, including on the maritime front. Choosing regional leader Indonesia, which also strategically links the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as the venue to officially announce MSR suggests the high importance attached by China to Southeast Asia and to maritime connectivity.

With China championing regional connectivity and Southeast Asia supporting the same, better traction is expected. MSR can anchor on numerous prior bilateral and regional deliberations, proposals and agreements on connectivity (e.g. 2004 MoU on Transport Cooperation, 2007 ASEAN-China Maritime Transport Agreement, sister port agreements) and economic linkages (e.g. harmonization of customs procedures) to get regional buy-in. In 2003, the Philippines launched the Strong Republic Nautical Highway, an integrated system of RORO (roll-on, roll-off) ferries and highways to link the archipelagic country. In 2014, Indonesia came up with the Maritime Axis/Fulcrum doctrine which encompasses 5 pillars – maritime culture, resource, connectivity, diplomacy and strategic bridge between two oceans. In mainland Southeast Asia, there was a proposal to link ASEAN with China through a series of highways and railways (e.g. Singapore-Kunming Rail Line). From this vantage point, MSR taps into regional connectivity aspirations.

Several factors can increase the chances of MSR's success in terms of promoting connectivity. This includes:

1) MSR's flexibility – it can accommodate all types of connectivity projects beyond physical/hard infrastructure and, contrary to some misconception, actually goes beyond “maritime”;

2) China's demonstrated financial factor (just became a net capital exporter in 2015), technological and infrastructure capacity (world's largest dam, 1st maglev train, longest high speed rail network, highest bridge, highest altitude railway);

3) huge regional infrastructure financing gap;

4) strong regional support (all 10 ASEAN members are provisional founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which together with the Silk Road Fund, constitute the key financing vehicles for OBOR), and;

5) low world price environment for fuel and construction materials. China accounts for about 50% of the world's steel and about 60% of the world's cement production, which can help explain why Chinese contractors can outbid their foreign peers when competing for infra projects abroad.

Several developments also bode well for MSR. This includes China's expanding footprint in regional infrastructure market and gradual co-financing of AIIB and established multilateral development banks (World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Asian Development Bank). Steady progress of these projects, good working relations with recipient and host states, and continuing complementation/partnership of AIIB and other international lending institutions will enhance the success of MSR. The physical infra component (e.g. land, air, sea, energy, internet and telecoms) of MSR and the larger OBOR seem to be getting much of the limelight, but it actually covers a broader gamut including cooperation in the fields of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, financial integration, trade facilitation, e-commerce and the setting up of economic zones. In fact, in the implementation of MSR, one has to look not just at projects financed by AIIB, but also by Chinese policy banks and sovereign wealth funds, like China Export-Import Bank (CEIB), China Development Bank (CDB) and China Investment Corporation.

MSR changes the complexion of Chinese investments and proves that differences do not necessarily hinder investments. MSR promotes diversification of Chinese investments away from resource extraction and into infra and greenfield investments. Wading into social issues and poverty alleviation is also becoming a thrust as evidenced in the approved AIIB-WB co-financing of the National Slum Upgrading Project in Indonesia. Disputes also proved not to be an impediment to MSR. CDB funded about ¾ of the project cost of Jakarta-Bandung Railway; extended $3 billion 10-year loans to Bank Negara Indonesia, Bank Rakyat Indonesia and Bank Mandiri (2016); and approved $11.8 billion in loans to fund 52 Indonesian projects covering finance, electricity, telecoms, agriculture, etc. CEIB financed the Ninh Binh coal-based urea (fertilizer) plant (2013), while CDB financed the Vung Ang Power Plant Phase 1 (2013) – both taking place in Vietnam. It must be remembered that both Indonesia and Vietnam are at loggerheads with China over fishing and maritime disputes in the SCS, but the fact that they were able to get funding suggests that China is willing to sideline disputes so long as high level political relations remain strong and tensions can be managed. Chinese investments in volatile and risky regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East reinforces the importance of good political relations, and it may override viability and risk considerations.

Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway project in Indonesia kicked off in early 2016, the image shows two local people taking pictures with the train model at the openning ceremony.（Source:Xinhuanet）

However, despite the promising prospects for MSR, several challenges remain. While the progress of Chinese-funded and supported infrastructure projects in the region (including in some SCS claimant states) suggests that MSR is moving despite the disputes, the regional political and security environment will continue to impact such projects as the disputes affect the overall perception of and trust in China. Compared to the Silk Road Economic Belt, MSR is proceeding slower, and it can be surmised that the SCS disputes moderate regional Chinese investments. Confusion and lack of information about MSR also needs to be addressed. Does AIIB membership equate with MSR inclusion? Conservatism (i.e. wait-and-see), perception of exclusion, and fear of economic domination on the part of Southeast Asian states represents other challenges that MSR has to hurdle. The general direction of MSR is westward, creating an impression that it bypasses certain maritime Southeast Asian states. Transport, power and energy, telecoms, and key industrial capacity are also considered strategic industries, so foreign participation and control of the same always raises concern. Prior setbacks of Chinese projects in the region – in light of involvement in corruption, irregularities, poor quality, safety and environmental standards – also affect views towards MSR. This requires reassurance, demonstration of goodwill and continuing China-Southeast Asia dialogue. Having said that, active first movers seem poised to enjoy better terms and privileges than latecomers or fence sitters.