特朗普政府自1月20日上任以來，執政精力聚焦國內改革、終止烏克蘭危機和中東衝突上，對亞太地區的投入似乎不多。到目前為止的主要動作，包括1月22日國務卿魯比奧主持召開“四邊安全對話”（QUAD）外長會，2月特朗普會見日本首相石破茂和印度總理莫迪。最新消息是，3月底美國國防部長赫格塞斯將前往印太司令部和關島美軍基地，並訪問菲律賓、日本。雖然目前特朗普第二任期的“印太戰略”還不清晰明朗，鑒於“印太戰略”為特朗普第一任期所提出，且大國競爭已是美國兩黨共識，“印太戰略”未來大概率會繼續推進。不論是否會出台“印太戰略”3.0版，重塑美國對華優勢、服務“讓美國重新偉大”的核心目標，都將是特朗普政府印太地區政策的出發點和主要訴求。

美國“印太戰略”自2017年特朗普第一任期提出以來，經歷了從理念構想成型到多領域機制構建的發展。特朗普第一任期推出以“自由和開放”為口號的“印太戰略”，主要舉措是外交上優先升級美日、美韓等雙邊同盟，積極拉攏印度，重啟“美日印澳四國安全對話”（QUAD）並升級到外長會；軍事上推進“太平洋威懾倡議”，將美軍太平洋司令部更名為印太司令部，擴大在南海的“航行自由”行動，將台灣納入“安全夥伴”框架；經濟上與日本、澳大利亞等盟友推出一系列支持地區基礎設施、能源安全、數字經濟和網絡安全的舉措，如“藍點網絡”計劃、“數字連接與網絡安全夥伴關係”、亞洲能源促增長與發展倡議（EDGE）等。特朗普第一任期“印太戰略”強化了單邊軍事手段，但缺乏整體經濟框架，與盟友關係也齟齬不斷，總體上建樹不多。

拜登政府任內，“印太戰略”進入機制發展期。拜登政府延續特朗普時期的對華競爭戰略，以“塑造中國周邊戰略環境”為目標推進“印太戰略”。2022年2月出台的《印太戰略報告》提出開放、連接、繁榮、安全、韌性五大支柱，並系統闡述美國推進“印太戰略”的五大目標和十項行動計劃。拜登政府通過QUAD、AUKUS、美日韓等小多邊機制強化與盟伴的科技與安全協同，將美國-東盟關係升級為“全面戰略夥伴關係”，舉行“美國-太平洋島國峰會”積極拓展在南太平洋地區影響力，並推出“印太經濟框架”（IPEF）彌補經濟短板。然而，受制於烏克蘭和中東兩場危機及盟友利益分歧等因素，實際成效“高開低收”。

特朗普重返白宮後，其“印太戰略3.0”將基於“美國優先”理念，投射特朗普本人的政策偏好和行事風格，表現出更多的單邊主義、交易性與不確定性。一是戰略收縮與資源聚焦，即從全球分散到“印太”集中。從特朗普本人和核心決策班子的政策主張和表態看，特朗普將延續“新孤立主義”傾向，減少對歐洲、中東的投入，將資源重新聚焦到“印太”地區，集中力量對付中國。二是盟友關係功利化，轉向“交易式同盟”。特朗普政府在深化與盟伴防務合作的同時，會要求日本、韓國、澳大利亞等分擔更多防務成本，“以經濟換安全”。同時，推動美印情報與防務合作深化，在“印太戰略”中發揮支點作用，但印度需購買更多美國軍備，並向美國開放農產品市場。三是奉行“以實力求和平”，優化軍力配置，進一步強化在“印太”地區的軍事部署，包括擴大在關島、菲律賓等基地的前沿存在，部署中程導彈等進攻性武器系統，並加速武裝盟伴和海上東盟國家，增加與地區國家的聯演聯訓。四是經濟脅迫工具化，大搞“美國利益至上”，可能更多將“關稅大棒”揮向亞太國家，重塑地區貿易規則，促進制造業迴流，並要求日、韓、印度和東盟國家降低對華依賴，尋求美國對能源主導權和供應鏈的掌控。

特朗普第二任期的外交政策將加劇亞太地區形勢的不確定、不穩定。本地區國家一方面可能寄希望於四年後美國回歸多邊主義，採取一定妥協策略，另一方面也將加緊強化自身的戰略自主能力。此外，中國對亞太秩序的引領塑造能力在不斷增強，周邊國家與中國的合作意願也在上升。未來四年，亞太格局將進一步呈現“中美競合”與“地區自主”並行的雙重張力。而亞太國家間的互動合作將更大程度上決定本地區能否避免“新冷戰”陷阱，走向更具包容性的多極秩序。

Since the inauguration of Donald Trump on Jan. 20, the U.S. administration has concentrated mostly on domestic reforms and ending conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East conflict. It seems to have put little effort into the Asia-Pacific region. Its main moves related to the Asia-Pacific have been Secretary of State Marco Rubio's hosting the Quad foreign ministers meeting on Jan. 22 and Trump meeting with the Japanese and Indian prime ministers in February. The latest news is U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's trip to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the military base in Guam. He visited the Philippines and Japan starting on March 24.The Indo-Pacific Strategy of Trump 2.0 remains unclear — although the idea was put forward during his first term, and major power competition has been a bipartisan consensus. It will likely continue to be pursued. Whether or not there will be an Indo-Pacific Strategy 3.0 to rebuild U.S. advantages against China, serving core MAGA goals will be both the starting point and the major goals of Trump's Asia-Pacific policy.

Since being proposed in 2017, America's Indo-Pacific Strategy has evolved from a theoretical concept into mechanisms in multiple areas. The main measures of the strategy during Trump 1.0 — which proclaimed a “free and open” Indo-Pacific — included diplomatically prioritizing the upgrading of such bilateral alliances as those with Japan and South Korea, actively roping in India and reviving the Quad and elevating it to a foreign ministers meeting.Militarily, it implemented the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, renaming USPACOM as USINDOPACOM, expanding “freedom of navigation” activities in the South China Sea and incorporating Taiwan into the Security Partners framework. Economically, it took a series of steps, together with allies and partners (such as Japan and Australia) to support regional infrastructure, energy security, digital economy and cybersecurity, such as the Blue Dot Network, Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership and the Asia EDGE Initiative. The “Indo-Pacific Strategy” of Trump 1.0 consolidated unilateral military capabilities, but it accomplished little for the lack of an overall economic framework. Constant conflicts with allies arose. Overall, its achievements were limited.

During the presidency of Joe Biden, the Indo-Pacific Strategy entered a stage of mechanism development. The Biden administration continued Trump's strategy of competition with China, pushing forward the Indo-Pacific Strategy to shape the strategic environment around China. The Indo-Pacific Strategy, which was published in February 2022, proposed five pillars: openness, connectivity, prosperity, security and resilience; and it systematically expounded five goals and 10 action plans.The Biden administration consolidated sci-tech and security coordination with allies and partners through such minilateral mechanisms as the Quad, AUKUS and the U.S.-Japan-South Korea and U.S.-Japan-Philippines cooperation. It upgraded U.S.-ASEAN relations into a comprehensive strategic partnership, held the U.S.-Pacific Islands Country Summit to actively expand influence in the South Pacific and proposed the IPEF to make up for its economic weaknesses. However, constrained by such factors as the crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as by the conflicting interests of some allies, they accomplished less than expected.

Following Trump's return to the White House, the new administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy 3.0 will be based on the idea of “America first” to project Trump's personal policy preferences and working style, and demonstrate more unilateralism, transactionalism and uncertainty.First comes a strategic contraction and resource concentration, evolving from global dispersion to concentration on the Indo-Pacific region. Judging from policy statements by Trump himself and by core members of his decision-making circle, Trump will continue his “neo-isolationist” tendency, reduce inputs in Europe and the Middle East, concentrate resources on the Indo-Pacific and focus on dealing with China.Second is a utilitarian approach to alliances and partnerships, orienting at “transactional alliances.” While deepening defense cooperation with allies and partners, the Trump administration will ask Japan, South Korea and Australia to share more defense costs and trade economic benefits for security. It will attempt to deepen intelligence and defense cooperation with India, turn India into a fulcrum in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy (asking India to buy more U.S. military equipment) and open its market to U.S. agricultural products.Third is the pursuit of a policy of “peace through strength” to optimize military deployments, further enhancing them in the Indo-Pacific, including expanding America's front-line presence at bases in Guam and the Philippines. It will deploy such offensive weapons systems as mid-range missiles, accelerate the arming of allies and partners (and maritime ASEAN members) and increase joint drills and training with countries in the region.Fourth is economic coercion, openly pursuing Trump's “America first” agenda. The strategy may increasingly include pointing the baton of tariffs at Asia-Pacific nations to reshape regional trade rules and promote the reshoring of manufacturing. Japan, South Korea, India and ASEAN countries will be asked to reduce their dependency on China. And U.S. energy dominance and control over supply chains will be sought.

The diplomatic policy of Trump 2.0 will worsen uncertainty and instability in the Asia-Pacific. Regional countries on the one hand may make some compromises, hoping the United States will return to multilateralism over the next four years. On the other hand, they will hurry to consolidate their own strategic autonomy.China's ability to shape the Asia-Pacific order is steadily increasing, and the willingness of neighboring countries to cooperate with China is also on the rise. Over the next four years, the Asia-Pacific landscape will further demonstrate the tension of the parallel existence of China-U.S. competition and regional autonomy. Interaction and cooperation between Asia-Pacific nations will, to a greater extent, determine whether or not the region can avoid the trap of a new cold war and proceed to a more inclusive multipolar order.