Since Donald Trump took office, significant shifts have occurred in both U.S. domestic and foreign policies, reshaping the Asia-Pacific region's strategic landscape and long-term trajectory. While this multifaceted subject invites comprehensive analysis, I will concentrate on two critical aspects and share my observations on how countries in the region can jointly safeguard peace and stability.
I. Evolving hot spots
Since the end of the Cold War, regional security flashpoints closely tied to China's interests include the Korean Peninsula, East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea and the China-India border. Latent tensions crystallized into acute crises during the 2010s, presenting severe challenges to peace and stability in the region from time to time.
In recent years, engagement has yielded progress in mitigating tensions and stabilizing three critical theaters: the East China Sea, South China Sea and the China-India border, primarily driven by territorial and maritime disputes. China's preference of diplomatic dialogue instead of coercive measures and the balancing of sovereign rights protection and regional stability have been instrumental in the deescalating those disputes.
Nevertheless, two Cold War legacies — the Taiwan question and the divide on the Korean Peninsula — continue to defy resolution. The reasons are complex and profound. Extra regional power projection by Washington has been a primary driver for their emergence, development and continuation.
Over the four years of Trump 2.0, how will these two unfold?
In my view, there are two likely scenarios for the Korean Peninsula. If Trump succeeds in improving U.S.-Russia relations and reviving the U.S.-DPRK summit model, tensions may gradually ease. If U.S.-Russia/DPRK relations stagnate and Trump tacitly accepts the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a de facto nuclear-weapon state, the Republic of Korea and Japan may also go nuclear, and military standoffs on the Peninsula may intensify. China will endorse the first scenario while guarding against the second.
There are also two scenarios for the Taiwan Strait. If the U.S. maintains its policy of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan — by restraining the Lai Ching-te authorities and pressurizing Taiwan with substantial increases in military expenditures and expanding arms sales — cross-strait tensions will escalate. On the other hand, if “abandoning Taiwan” gradually becomes an option with senior U.S. officials, who overtly or covertly reject security protection for Taiwan or even openly accept any outcome of cross-strait dialogue (including peaceful reunification), then pro-independence forces, losing their backer, will lose momentum. That will be conducive to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
The second scenario seems unlikely now. However, if Trump's moves against the so-called deep state cause internal turmoil in the United States, leading to increased isolationist sentiment, the likelihood of this scenario will also increase. China must prepare for both.
II. Evolution of America's Indo-Pacific strategy
Both the Trump 1.0 Republican administration and the subsequent Democratic administration under Joe Biden centered on encircling and suppressing China, obstructing its development and undermining the Belt and Road Initiative. They differed in approach. The Biden administration favored getting more allies to join its efforts.
But under Trump 2.0, it is expected that the Indo-Pacific strategy will still be rather anti-China in security, economics and science. But its effectiveness will hinge on four variables: the trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine war; dynamics between the U.S., China and Russia; the impact of Trump's unilateral, protectionist and isolationist moves on U.S. relations with Asia-Pacific countries, including U.S. allies; and China's policy.
I believe developments in all four aspects will have negative effects on the Indo-Pacific strategy:
First, Trump wants to end the Russia-Ukraine war and then get the U.S. out of Europe as soon as possible — and then refocus on the Indo-Pacific and on suppressing China. The reality is that it's by no means easy to achieve even a cease-fire in the near term, let alone end the war and put in place a framework for lasting peace. Second, the so-called “reverse Nixon” approach — befriending Russia to take on China — is an illusion. Today's China-Russia strategic partnership differs starkly from the hostile China-Soviet relationship.
Further, Trump's unilateral, protectionist and isolationist tendencies will have unavoidable negative consequences for U.S. relations with other Asia-Pacific countries, including America's allies.
Additionally, China, which is committed to peace, stability and development in the Asia-Pacific region, will continue to oppose U.S. attempts at strategic competition with it and will strive to develop ties with the U.S. featuring mutually beneficial cooperation and the absence of conflict or confrontation.
Thus, it may be predicted that over the next four years, U.S.-China competition in the Asia-Pacific may relax to a certain extent, which will be contrary to Trump's intent but in alignment with China's aspirations. Such a relaxation will be conducive to regional peace and stability, as the two countries gradually adapt to each other through long-term readjustments instead of violent clashes.
III. Steps to take
Under this analysis, I believe that countries should do the following to promote peace, stability and development in the Asia Pacific:
1. To further stabilize the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the China-India border, the stakeholding countries should implement all existing bilateral agreements and arrangements in good faith. China may also wish to resume or strengthen its consultation with Japan, Vietnam and Indonesia and strive for practical progress at an early date.
2. On the Korean Peninsula, for a long time to come, all parties concerned should prioritize the resumption of bilateral and multilateral dialogues and the avoidance of accidental military conflict or further nuclear proliferation.
3. To maintain peace and stability with regard Taiwan, Beijing should strengthen its determination to promote peaceful reunification and deter any move toward Taiwan independence. It should steer for cross-strait integration and development. Countries in the region should stick to the one-China policy and avoid sending supportive signals to separatists on the island. The U.S. and Japan should also make a clear their commitment not to support Taiwan independence.
4. Asia-Pacific countries should resolutely safeguard and promote free and fair trade in the region and collectively oppose Trump's attempts to foment trade wars. In this connection, they should strengthen cooperation bilaterally and in regional multilateral economic cooperation organizations or mechanisms. China, Japan and the ROK should also set up a free trade area as soon as possible.
5. Countries in the Asia-Pacific region should vigorously enhance coordination and cooperation in all multilateral security dialogue and cooperation mechanisms, strengthen regional governance and turn regional multilateral dialogue and cooperation mechanisms toward championing peace and stability. The U.S. bilateral military alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region should be transformed to practice a solely defensive policy of non-interference. The allies should engage in non-traditional security cooperation with others in the region.
To avoid bloc politics and confrontation or even a new cold war in the Asia Pacific, China, the U.S., Russia, Japan and India should actively develop dialogues and exchanges and make persistent efforts to strengthen differences and crisis management, prevent and reduce misunderstandings and miscalculations, avoid an arms race and pursue cooperation on the basis of common interests. Peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation among major powers will be the greatest guarantee for the peaceful and stable development of the region.
