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| Republican presidential nominee and former U.S. President Donald Trump walks during Day 1 of the Republican National Convention (RNC) at the Fiserv Forum in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, U.S., July 15, 2024. (Andrew Kelly | Reuters) |
With several months remaining until presidential election in the United States, global attention is increasingly focused on developments. The recent shooting incident at a Trump campaign rally has further heightened the election's prominence in the media. The election results will not only shape the direction of U.S. domestic and foreign policies in the next phase but will also influence international dynamics. Although the China issue is not the top priority for America's political parties, its importance is growing, and the election outcome will have profound implications for U.S.-China relations.
During the primaries, the China issue emerged as one of the topics on which both parties competed to appear tough. While the focus remains largely domestic, both parties are vying to bring more jobs to American blue-collar workers and revitalize manufacturing. In foreign policy, they are competing over who can better maintain U.S. leadership and protect U.S. security in the economic, technological and informational domains. Many American voters do not directly focus on China in foreign policy but are concerned about the narratives under which both parties are linking the China issue to domestic affairs. For instance, Donald Trump has repeatedly emphasized that China is responsible for the loss of wealth and jobs in American society, while the Biden administration has stated that Chinese technology poses security risks to the United States.
Overall, the heightened rhetoric about China during this election season could pose challenges to China-U.S. relations. The strategic relationship between the two countries will also affect the perceptions of their citizens. As both parties continue to politicize the China issue during the campaign, American public perception of China may become distorted, while Chinese citizens may feel disillusioned by U.S. rhetoric and actions. Notably, the ongoing narrative in the U.S. about alleged Chinese interference in elections damages China's image and weakens mutual trust and understanding between the people of both nations, complicating cultural exchanges and undermining the public foundation of China-U.S. relations.
In the longer term, regardless of the election outcome, the main thread of strategic competition with China established under both the Trump and Biden administrations will remain unchanged, with differences only in the specific methods and intensity of competition.
If Joe Biden is re-elected, he will continue to advance America's Indo-Pacific Strategy in the geopolitical and economic realms and further promote NATO's pivot toward the Asia-Pacific, gradually implementing his vision of linking Europe with the Indo-Pacific region. The Biden administration intends to build a more intricate and comprehensive network of alliances and partners in the Indo-Pacific to shape China's surrounding strategic environment.
In terms of security, the Biden administration will focus on advancing defense cooperation with countries in the Indo-Pacific, engaging more deeply in regional affairs. The U.S. will emphasize developing the QUAD (quadrilateral security dialogue), AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States alliance) and two trilateral relationships — U.S./Japan/South Korea and U.S./Japan/Philippines — while continuously incorporating Indo-Pacific security issues into NATO's agenda.Economically, the Biden administration will continue to push the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), increase investment and infrastructure aid for developing countries in the region and accelerate the establishment of a regional supply chain system that excludes China. This will challenge China's cooperation space in the Asia-Pacific region, making regional cooperation mechanisms and national relations more complex and susceptible to more pronounced bloc trends.
In trade, the Biden administration will use allied forces to exert more systematic pressure on China. The Democratic Party does not seek complete decoupling from China in trade but does emphasize “de-risking,” even as it selectively decouples from China in key areas, such as renewable energy, semiconductors, chips and medical products.
In the technological realm, the Biden administration is inclined to adopt more aggressive strategies to pressure China, expanding the scope of the “small yard, high fence” approach to include more critical technologies in export restrictions. Additionally, it hopes to form a “technology values alliance” to shape the legitimacy of its competition with China. This is an attempt to isolate China from technological development and standard-setting processes using highly subjective standards such as democracy, human rights and freedom.
If Biden wins in November, the existing communication channels between China and the U.S. will largely remain, allowing for dialogue on important sensitive issues. Currently, China and the U.S. are engaged in discussions on trade, regional hot spots, climate change, artificial intelligence and more, facilitating timely communication and management of differences. This trend can be expected to continue into a Biden second term.
If Trump returns to the White House, the U.S. alliance system will face disruptions, indirectly impacting U.S. competition with China in geopolitical and economic realms. Under Trump's leadership, the U.S. may be reluctant to invest heavily in alliances, rather expecting allies to shoulder more responsibility — although this stance does not necessarily imply a significant undermining of U.S. security and economic commitments to its allies.
In the Indo-Pacific region, Trump will also aim to strengthen ties with traditional allies such as Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, maintaining U.S. deterrence and influence in the region by enhancing its military presence. Regarding NATO, Trump will emphasize increases in defense spending by allies and show reluctance to continue extensive aid to Ukraine. The U.S. will apply pressure on Ukraine and Europe to end the crisis swiftly, potentially influencing unforeseen developments.
In trade, Trump has explicitly stated his intention to impose a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods to secure more favorable trade conditions for the U.S. Compared with Biden's more targeted trade policies, Trump shows a stronger inclination toward decoupling from China, with some Republican think tanks even suggesting a total decoupling in trade. It should be noted, however, that Trump's transactional nature means that his extreme pressure tactics may aim to achieve a favorable deal with China. This suggests that decoupling and deal-making may define U.S. trade policy toward China under Trump.
Regarding communication channels between the two countries, the existing channels could face risks given the Republican Party's general reluctance to engage with China. During the campaign, Trump criticized Biden for being too soft on China and accused China of insincerity in its dialogues with the United States. Because of uncertainties in Trump's personnel appointments, it is unclear at present who will make up his cabinet. Whether his core advisers can smoothly transition and take over remains in question. Moreover, Trump's adherence to his “America first” policy and lack of interest in global governance on issues such as climate change and sustainable development may squeeze the space for China-U.S. dialogue and cooperation.
Overall, the U.S. election has added complexity to China-U.S. relations, but it's unlikely that the underlying strategic competition framework established by the U.S. toward China will fundamentally change. This is precisely the root problem built into the U.S. strategy. If America continues to frame the relationship as inherently competitive, it risks perpetuating a zero-sum, win-or-lose dynamic that could escalate tensions globally. Adding a caveat to acknowledge that competition does not inevitably lead to confrontation or conflict — and that the U.S. can accept competition outcomes regardless — would represent a more nuanced approach. However, in the current U.S. political climate, no politician seems able to make such a balanced statement.
Moreover, the “strategic competition” between the two major powers lacks clear rules. There is no consensus on what constitutes fair competition. This ambiguity leads to mutual accusations of “unfair” competition, which in turn intensifies the competition. The absence of rules and a neutral arbiter makes it easier for great power competition to escalate into conflict, as countries may resort to using power rather than adhering to agreed-upon norms in a volatile environment.
Therefore, regardless of who ultimately wins the election, perhaps they will only adjust competition with China at the tactical level and not change the competitive essence, unable to make any innovations in the overall strategy. This strategic framework is reminiscent of the Cold War and may distort U.S. policies toward China in specific areas, making bilateral cooperation more difficult.
