 |
| EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, British Foreign Secretary David Lammy, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock attend the meeting of Foreign Ministers on Feb. 15. (POOL/AFP via Getty Images) |
If one takes Marco Rubio's recent remarks on the end of unipolarity at face value, one could be mistaken for believing that the question of a multipolar world is settled. On the contrary, Rubio's ruminations, together with remarks from members of the new Trump Administration, including the President himself, buttressed with decisions made in the first few weeks of the new administration, suggest that the issue of multipolarity is very much in question.
Rubio's multipolar world is one with distinctly American characteristics. His conceptualisations can be starkly contrasted with the ideas advanced over the years by Russia and China, and which have recently been laid out in crystal clear terms by China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi in three separate addresses delivered in February 2025.
Multipolarity with American characteristics is a world of 'great power competition', in which major powers jostle for authority over spheres of influence and diplomacy is the practice of inter-state dialogue to keep the temperature down when it risks boiling over. It is a multipolarity that is multipolar in name only, but in practice, aims to carve the world up amongst a set of dominant large powers.
Neither Russia nor China are interested in this kind of 'multipolarity'.
The Trump Administration remains as committed today, as has previous US administrations, including Trump 1.0, to the notion that China is a peer adversary that must be contained and curtailed. This much is clear from Rubio's remarks in his now famous interview with Megyn Kelly, in which he argued that the period of unipolarity was an unnatural historical aberration.
These remarks made headlines, overshadowing the rest of the interview. It became clear that as far as Rubio was concerned, as unipolarity faded into the annals of history, the claimed threat of China was to be confronted. It is China that keeps Rubio and co awake at night.
Rubio is not alone in this one-eyed focus on China. Indeed, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth has made it clear too that China is America's principal geopolitical adversary. Trump, for good measure, has stepped in on a few occasions taking aim at BRICS, in which China plays a prominent role. Trump argues (erroneously) that BRICS aims to dethrone the US dollar and replace it with an alternative BRICS currency. No such plan has ever been discussed, let alone consummated, but Trump has threatened tariffs of 100% and then 150% on BRICS nations who would dare to settle trade in non-USD currencies.
So far, he hasn't moved on these threats, though in typical bombastic style, has already pronounced the death of BRICS in the face of these threatened tariffs. To paraphrase Mark Twain, Trump's story of BRICS' death has been greatly exaggerated. BRICS is alive and well.
Actions, of course, speak louder than words. In the first few weeks of the new Trump administration, key decisions were made that confirm its obsessions with curtailing China.
On Friday February 21, 2025, the US Trade Representative proposed additional fees to be levied on imports by Chinese owned ships, Chinese-built ships in general, and firms that have ordered Chinese ships. These proposals impact all goods exported by any country to the US, because what matters is the nationality of the shipowner or where the ship was built.
On the same day, the White House released the America First Investment Policy. It laid out principles and objectives of such a policy, and specifically singled out certain “foreign adversaries, including the People's Republic of China (PRC)” whose foreign investments into the US are undertaken in ways that threaten US national security. It announced an intent to “establish new rules to stop United States companies and investors from investing in industries that advance the PRC's national Military-Civil Fusion strategy and stop PRC-affiliated persons from buying up critical American businesses and assets.” It went on to indicate that the US will “use all necessary legal instruments … to restrict PRC-affiliated persons from investing in United States technology, critical infrastructure, healthcare, agriculture, energy, raw materials, or other strategic sectors.”
National interest risks have been reduced to 'state of origin' questions. This is Chinese Exclusion redivivus.
Multipolarity with American Characteristics is a world of great power rivalry, in which China and “PRC-affiliated persons” are considered adversaries. The game is framed as a zero-sum affair, in which diplomacy is practiced only to minimise the risk of the rivalries turning kinetic.
By way of contrast, China conceptualises multipolarity in terms that do not revolve around 'great power rivalry' and zero-sum adversarial games, but rather, emphasises the need to curate shared commitments to collective security and other common interests.
Wang Yi spoke at this year's MSC and laid out China's approach to multipolarity in clear terms. He argued that all countries should receive “equal treatment”. He contrasted this with the observation that historically, rivalry between major powers had “brought disaster to humanity”. For China, multipolarity means “equality of all countries regardless of size”. For such an ethos to be institutionalized, international rule of law must be respected. He argued that “major countries must take the lead in honoring their words and upholding rule of law, and must not say one thing but do another, or engage in zero-sum game”. Multilateralism must be practiced, for which the United Nations continues to act as the institutional fulcrum. In practice, this means a modus operandi that features “extensive consultation and joint contribution for shared benefit”. Lastly, Wang argued, multipolarity is defined by the pursuit of openness and mutual benefit. “Protectionism offers no way out,” he said, in clear remarks aimed at the prevailing US approach. Instead, Wang insisted, the key is to “pursue open cooperation, and support an equal and orderly multipolar world with a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization”.
Wang expanded on these core points in subsequent speeches on the occasion of China taking the rotating chairmanship of the UN Security Council and at the G20 ministerial meeting in South Africa.
There can be no clearer difference on how multipolarity is framed than in the remarks of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his colleagues, and the concepts articulated by China's Wang Yi. Where Rubio speaks of great state rivalry, Wang speaks of equal treatment of countries regardless of size. Where Rubio speaks of China as an adversary, and where American policy singles out China as an “adversary”, Wang emphasises the importance of practicing multilateralism and the need for all countries to develop together. Where Rubio speaks of diplomacy as a means of avoiding the descent into kinetic confrontation, Wang speaks of shared responsibilities in global governance and the need for extensive consultation for shared benefit. Wang spoke of China as an enabling great power, in contrast to Rubio's explicit retreat to narrow self-interest. For Wang, great powers in a multipolar world must empower others to develop, so that all countries can “find their place and play their role in a multipolar paradigm”.
That's multipolarity with Chinese characteristics.
