近期，美國國務卿布林肯訪華。這是中美落實兩國元首舊金山會晤共識的重要舉措，有助於雙方保持對話、管控分歧、加強國際事務協調。今年4月2日，拜登總統同習近平主席通話時表示，希望安排布林肯國務卿訪華。由此可見，在美國大選年的背景下，拜登政府在加大對華外交接觸方面展現出很強的主動性。俄烏衝突、巴以衝突的延宕，對拜登選情的影響日益加大。尤其是，美國國內多所大學爆發的支持巴勒斯坦的抗議行動，加劇了民主黨精英的焦慮，美國青年選民和少數族裔群體對拜登的支持率料將下降。

在上述背景下，確保中美關係不出現“戰略意外”變得至關重要。布林肯訪華期間表示，美中關係是世界上最重要的雙邊關係，負責任地管理兩國關係是美中雙方的共同責任。美方不尋求改變中國體制，無意同中國發生衝突，不尋求同中國脫鉤，不尋求遏制中國發展，一個發展、成功的中國對世界是好事。中美同意保持高層交往和各層級接觸，繼續發揮外交、經濟、金融、商務等領域磋商機製作用，進一步推進中美禁毒、氣變、人工智能合作，進一步推進中美禁毒、氣變、人工智能合作。

保持中美關係穩定，離不開妥善處理台海、南海等問題，需要加強對中美互動的全過程管理。5月下旬，賴清德將正式就任台灣地區領導人。賴清德的“台獨”傾向昭然若揭，他在就職後會否通過挑釁性言行製造危機，備受關注。布林肯表示，美方繼續奉行一個中國政策，不支持“台獨”。然而，從美國深化與台灣地區政治、軍事關係的實際行動看，美國的“一個中國政策”與大陸的“一個中國原則”之間的差距似在加大。中方對布林肯明確表示，台灣問題是中美關係第一條不可逾越的紅線。中方要求美方不折不扣恪守一個中國原則和中美三個聯合公報，不得以任何方式向“台獨”分裂勢力發出錯誤信號。

此外，美國在南海方向的負面言行也在增多，可謂文武兼備、多管齊下。一方面，美國試圖進一步提升“南海仲裁裁決”的國際法理地位，為菲律賓小馬科斯政府在黃岩島、鐵線礁的侵權挑釁撐腰打氣。另一方面，美國不僅加快自身在菲律賓境內基地部署軍事力量，還通過打造美國、日本、菲律賓三邊聯盟以及美日菲澳四邊機制等方式，強化“武力護菲”的準備，推進多國艦機聯合巡航等一系列對華示強行動。

值得警惕的是，布林肯訪華主要談及的三個議題，也顯示出美國大選年因素對中美關係的不利影響。一是所謂中國支持俄羅斯的軍事工業問題。拜登政府試圖將中國塑造為影響烏克蘭危機走向的關鍵因素。對此，中方強調，美方需要切實反思自身在烏克蘭危機中應當承擔的責任。烏克蘭問題不是中美之間的問題，美方也不要把它變成中美之間的問題。

二是所謂中國干預美國大選問題。這是近年來美國政界人士渲染炒作的新話題，藉以指責中國對美國實施“銳實力”行動，破壞美國的民主體制。對於中國而言，無論拜登還是特朗普上台，都不會改變對華施壓的大方向。換言之，這就好比是“兩碗毒藥”，中國何須費力“干預”選舉。民主黨將希拉里·克林頓在2016年大選中敗給特朗普，歸咎於俄羅斯的干預。今年如果拜登敗選，恐怕要把這頂帽子扣到中國頭上。

三是所謂中國產能過剩問題。經濟和就業是美國大選的核心議題。美國大選的贏家不是依賴普選票，而是“得搖擺州者得白宮”，其關鍵在於獲得搖擺州藍領工人的支持。不久前美國財長耶倫訪華時大談產能過剩問題，此番布林肯來華繼續就此施壓。這表明拜登政府試圖在大選年加大對美國本土產業的保護力度，以討好藍領工人，贏得中西部工業地帶搖擺州的支持，避免在貿易問題上被特朗普攻擊。

總之，雖然中美關係在去年11月兩國元首舊金山峰會後出現一定的企穩跡象，但卻具有不容忽視的脆弱性。到今年下半年美國選戰正式開打後，兩黨候選人打“中國牌”的做法或會更為突出。布林肯訪華集中展現了拜登政府在處理中美關係問題上既想穩定、又要示強的矛盾心態，這對中國運籌對美戰略而言構成複雜挑戰。

（2024年5月經北京大學國際戰略研究院項目組審核）

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's recent visit to China was an important interaction as the two nations seek to implement the consensus reached by their presidents in San Francisco. It was also important for maintaining dialogue, managing differences and enhancing coordination on international affairs.

In the context of the upcoming U.S. presidential election, the American administration has demonstrated a proactive approach to increase diplomatic engagement. In a phone call with President Xi Jinping in early April, for example, President Joe Biden expressed hope of arranging a Blinken visit. Additionally, the persistent Russia-Ukraine conflict and Palestinian-Israel conflict are having an increasing impact on Biden's reelection chances. In particular, pro-Palestinian protests at many universities in the United States have created a sense of anxiety among Democratic Party elites, potentially leading to a decline in support for Biden among young voters and ethnic minority groups.

In this context, it is crucial to prevent strategic surprises in China-U.S. relations. During his visit to China, Blinken emphasized that the U.S.-China relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world, and that it is the two countries' common responsibility to manage it responsibly. The United States does not seek to change China's system, has no intention of sparking conflict with China and does not seek to decouple from China or hold back China's development. A developing and successful China is a good thing for the world, he added.

During his visit, China and the United States agreed to maintain high-level exchanges and engagement at all levels; harness consultation mechanisms in the fields of diplomacy, economy, finance and commerce; and promote cooperation on drug control, climate change and artificial intelligence.

The stability of relations also depends on the proper handling of issues regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea and good management of bilateral interactions on all fronts. In late May, Lai Ching-te will officially take office as the leader of Taiwan. Given his clear proclivity toward Taiwan independence, the question whether he will create a crisis through provocative statements and actions after taking office has attracted much attention. Blinken reiterated Washington's commitment to the “one China” policy and its opposition to Taiwan independence.

However, Washington's moves to deepen political and military relations with Taiwan indicate a widening gap between its “one China” policy and the Chinese mainland's “one-China principle.” China has emphatically told Blinken that the Taiwan question is the most important red line that must not be crossed. It has urged Washington to adhere to the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. joint communiques to the letter, to avoid sending any inappropriate signals to separatists in Taiwan.

On the South China Sea issue, the United States has adopted a multipronged approach marked by growing negative words and deeds. For one thing, it seeks to enhance the legitimacy of the South China Sea arbitration and lends support to the Philippines' infringement and provocative actions around Scarborough Shoal and Sandy Cay. For another, the U.S. has accelerated the deployment of military forces to bases in the Philippines and strengthened its readiness to defend the islands with force by building a trilateral alliance with Japan and the Philippines, as well as a quadrilateral mechanism with Japan, the Philippines and Australia. In addition, in a show of force, it conducted a joint patrol involving multinational warships and aircraft in the South China Sea.

Blinken's discussions in China demonstrated the adverse impact of the U.S. presidential election on bilateral relations, notably addressing three issues:

First is China's support for Russia's military industry. The Biden administration portrays China as a key factor in the course of the Ukraine crisis. In this regard, China emphasizes the need for the United States to reflect on its own responsibilities regarding the crisis. The Ukrainian issue is not one involving China and the United States, and so the U.S. should refrain from framing it as such.

Second is Chinese interference in the U.S. election. In recent years, American politicians have been hyping this issue, accusing China of carrying out sharp actions against the United States, thereby undermining its democratic system.

For the Chinese, Washington is bound to place pressure on China no matter which American political party comes to power. In other words, why should China bother to interfere in the election if the end result is the same? Democrats blamed Russian interference for Hillary Clinton's 2016 loss to Donald Trump. Similarly, they might attribute a Biden loss in this year's election to Chinese interference.

Third is alleged overcapacity in China. Economic development and employment are central issues in the U.S. election. Since the final outcome of the election does not rely on the popular vote, and the candidates who wins a small majority in key swing states can capture the White House, the key lies in gaining the support of blue-collar workers in those states.

Not long ago, Treasury Secretary Yellen highlighted the problem of overcapacity during her visit to China, and now Blinken continues to apply pressure on China over this issue. These developments show that the Biden administration is trying to protect domestic industries so that the Democratic candidate can boost his appeal among blue-collar workers, secure the support of swing states in the industrial belt of the Midwest and avoid attacks from Trump on trade issues.

In conclusion, China-U.S. relations have shown some signs of stabilization following the San Francisco summit between the presidents in November. However, some vulnerabilities cannot be ignored. When the U.S. election kicks off in earnest in the second half of this year, candidates from both parties may be more inclined to play the China card. Blinken's visit epitomizes the ambivalence of the Biden administration, which seeks to stabilize its relations with China but also wants to flex its muscles. This poses a complex challenge for China's strategy toward the United States.