Focus: How do you anticipate recent escalating national security concerns, such as the balloon incident, to impact both the foreign policies of both the United States and China in the coming years? How do you think the U.S. is handling its national security concerns regarding China? Do you think any changes should be made to address future security incidents? And what kind of crisis management measures should both countries be implementing?
Swaine: These incidents and subsequent exchanges, such as the recent meeting between Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the leading foreign policy expert in the Chinese government, Wang Yi, have simply deepened the animosity, and the suspicion that exists between the two sides. This kind of exchange, the failure to really engage in a meaningful and productive way, will just make it harder in the future to send credible signals of moderation or restraint on critical issues such as Taiwan, or to improve cooperative exchanges in various ways. These occurrences really just strengthen worst-case assumptions and outlooks about the motives and intentions of the other side. They also make it much harder to adopt more effective crisis management dialogues or mechanisms, which really does rely upon a certain amount of goodwill, if not trust, between the two sides. So all these kinds of incidents erode all of those sorts of interactions, so they do not bode well for the relationship going forward.
I think the United States is handling these security concerns rather poorly. If you take the U.S. government in general — not just the administration — the Congress is now, by and large, really at every opportunity hyperventilating about the threat that China poses to the United States, the global order, the world, the West, democracy, etc. … We can see this kind of hyperbolic response in the recent hearing of the new House Select Committee on China, where the members really sought to try to outdo themselves in their efforts to bash and criticize China and go after it in a variety of different ways. So the administration is also not doing very much to try to counter these kinds of excesses that we're seeing in Congress and that are being sent out, not just to the Chinese but to our friends and allies. In general, Washington and Beijing both are caught in a web of domestic politics. The securitization of virtually all aspects of their relationship is resulting in a deepening level of, as I say, “worst-case-driven suspicion" over the motivations and tensions of either side. Neither side is willing to acknowledge these factors — that both sides contribute to a negative interactive dynamic. Now the U.S. and China have tried to have crisis communication dialogues, but they haven't gotten very far. Each time some kind of major incident occurs, such as the recent balloon incident, one or the other side will suspend the dialogue. So you need to have a serious discussion by both sides about how they look at crisis management. They don't really agree on how they interpret the function and value of crisis management. They need to get to some common understanding. And then they need to really talk about what kinds of reciprocal assurances and mechanisms could they put in place that increase their ability to reduce crises and improve crisis management capabilities. They really do need to include civilians and talk about perceptions, misperceptions and processes on both sides that undermine the ability of the two sides to really engage in effective crisis management. So all of those things are needed, in addition to substantive dialogue, on all sorts of issues where the two sides have differences and where they also need to cooperate to address common threats.
Focus: Do you think there is a risk of tensions escalating into conflict in the coming years as this confrontation evolves? And if so, what else can be done to try and minimize that risk?
Swaine: There is a risk that we could end up in conflict between the U.S. and China primarily, I would think, over Taiwan. I don't think the chances of conflict are extremely high. They're certainly not inevitable, as some people seem to think in Washington. I think that is a fallacious and a dangerous concept to think that conflict between the U.S. and China is inevitable. It is not. But I do think that we could very well end up in a more serious crisis with the Chinese that could threaten the possibility of conflict, particularly over Taiwan.
Now, why is Taiwan in such a precarious situation? It's that way because the original understanding that the U.S. and China reached when they discussed the Taiwan issue back during the normalization of relations was that the United States would uphold what it calls its “one China policy,” and in return the tacit understanding (it wasn't formalized, but it was an understanding) that the Chinese would place a preference, or a first priority, on peaceful unification in resolving the Taiwan situation. So it was one China, peaceful unification. Now that basic understanding — even though there have been differences in interpretation over what it means, and there have been differences in behavior and upholding it on one side or the other — has basically held in place for many decades since normalization in the 1970s. But now and in recent years, it has really been eroding. And it's been eroding because of the overall worsening relationship between the U.S. and China, and because of changes in Taiwan itself. Taiwan has become a democracy since the 1970s. It's a very obstreperous democracy in many ways; it has many debates and differences. And you have a greater political voice for people who want to support Taiwan independence. That concerns Beijing.
The United States itself looks at the relationship with China in a much more negative way — that is to say much more adversarial. And that increases the desire to show support for Taiwan. And then the Chinese react to this and they up their military activities, which in turn stokes more escalation on the U.S. side, and it moves closer to Taiwan and undermines the one China policy, which pledged to maintain only unofficial relations between the U.S. and Taiwan. So this dynamic that has gone back and forth has continued now and worsened in recent years. And now there are voices in the United States that argue that Taiwan is a strategic enclave, a critical strategic node in the U.S. defense posture in the region; therefore, based upon that logic, it must be kept from Beijing, because if Beijing were to acquire it, it would have strategic leverage. So we have to keep it from Beijing. That notion is diametrically opposite to the one China policy. It is not what the United States government should uphold, and it has not been upholding that view for many, many years.
So what we have now is a real myopic kind of stress on military deterrence on both sides. Both sides are relying on deterrence, and both sides are really downplaying or ignoring, relatively speaking, the need for credible reassurance about the continued applicability of their policies of peaceful unification and the one China policy. Both sides mouth these policies repeatedly, but they're doing things in both cases that undermine the credibility of their support for those policies. And that's why it's so dangerous now, because in the future you could get a situation where, say, the United States decides that the best way to deter China from becoming more threatening toward Taiwan, is to place combat forces on the island, or to deploy a warship regularly to Taiwan, or to send the secretary of defense to the island or the secretary of state, which we have never done. Any of those things could provoke the Chinese to take actions that we would in turn then regard as a threat to Taiwan, and we might have to respond in a military manner. So we could be in a very dire situation if this existing trend line continues into the future.
Focus: How have recent visits by U.S. officials to Taiwan impacted U.S.-China relations, and what do you think we can expect from potential upcoming visits, such as the House speaker? How can the U.S. and China then come to some kind of consensus on Taiwan? And how can we, in turn, avoid conflict?
Swaine: The recent trip to Taiwan by Nancy Pelosi, and a proposed trip in the future by Kevin McCarthy have been and would be very unhelpful. Even Taiwan was concerned about Pelosi visiting the island. Taiwan can't say no to these efforts by the United States. It wants to be seen as being supported by the U.S. and it certainly can't explicitly come out and say, “No, we oppose these visits.” But at the same time, I think they are not helpful and Taiwan really needs to express its views on this more directly. The administration needs to express its views on these types of visits from members of Congress more directly. There's also a possibility that this new House committee on China that I mentioned will hold hearings about Taiwan. That itself would be an unbelievably provocative type of action.
People in Washington seem to think now that these sorts of actions — if they provoke China — "so what?" Because the Chinese really won't do anything about it, they'll take it. They'll see how resolute the United States is about defending Taiwan, and therefore they'll back down. And that is just absolutely not the case. The Chinese are strengthening their capabilities; they are becoming more pessimistic about the United States' position on Taiwan; they are becoming really more resigned, it seems, to the idea that eventually they'll have to exert some kind of coercive effort toward Taiwan over the longer term to achieve what they regard is an acceptable outcome, which would be unification. We have no interest in provoking the Chinese in that direction, in effect backing them into a corner and showing them that we really don't think the one China policy has any merit anymore. All we are emphasizing is military deterrence. That is a dangerous concept, because if the Chinese believe that the United States has truly discarded the one China policy and is now backing the permanent separation of Taiwan from China, it will use force, even if in the initial rounds it might lose. So the idea that military deterrence alone can prevent conflict in this kind of a situation is, I think, foolish. The Chinese are committed to not allowing the permanent separation of Taiwan from mainland China, and I don't know of a single serious China security expert who would disagree with that point.
Now, as far as what we need to do about all of this, as I mentioned earlier: The United States and China need to get much more serious about reinvigorating or placing greater credibility into their respective positions. For the United States, it's the one China policy. It needs to make certain statements very clearly — that it does not believe Taiwan is a strategic node essential to the defense of the United States or its allies in the western Pacific, that it does remain open to a peaceful unification and peaceful independence if they were to occur through mutual agreement. The United States remains open to those kinds of options. It needs to be very clear that it has limits on the kinds of contacts that it will have with Taiwan, as long as China is itself sending credible indications of its continued commitment to peaceful unification, or its preference for a peaceful unification.
So you need to have reassuring statements being made that are much clearer and not at all out of line with past statements that the U.S. and China have made. But you also have to have a willingness to take certain actions to restrict contact with Taiwan, or to restrict military actions around Taiwan in response to moderate or restrained actions by the other side. So there needs to be at least a tacit understanding that if you do this, we'll do that. And the U.S. and China are simply not having those kinds of conversations.
Focus: How are the domestic agendas of both China and the U.S. shaping and influencing the bilateral relationship between the two countries?
Swaine: Now, if you look at how the domestic agendas or domestic situations of both China and the United States are influencing their bilateral relations ... I think the influence is quite strong, particularly so on the U.S. side, although I think it also exists on the Chinese side. Both countries are experiencing serious domestic problems of various types. And these problems tend to increase the tendency of leaders and politicians on both sides to look for reasons why they're experiencing these problems. And oftentimes what occurs is pointing to some kind of external factor that is impacting the country that is making it worse, that is challenging the leadership of each country, and therefore is creating domestic problems. So in the United States, you have the domestic situation of social unrest of various types. All of these tend to make Americans less secure. They feel more insecure about their current situation, about the future. … And this is really fertile ground for people to use that insecurity and hype in a really excessive way, the type of threat that China poses to the United States.
You also have the problem that once you have this very harsh climate that exists in some ways in the United States, the administration itself, which seeks to have bipartisan agreement on various policies, it is intimidated to some degree ... [and] is really affected in the ability to come out and push back against these kinds of views or to establish a more moderate type of position for itself. It's trying to do that in certain ways. But I don't think it does it nearly enough, in part because it's afraid of the domestic political implications and ramifications of not taking what is considered to be a sufficiently vigilant, sufficiently oppositional or confrontational stance toward China. So, for all sorts of reasons, you have domestic politics working to influence the situation.
On the Chinese side, you have something somewhat different. You don't have the kinds of differences within the senior levels of the government and the leadership that each side, or different factions, would play to and use the United States to do that. But what you do have is domestic problems in China that confront the entire regime. And for the regime, it needs to be sure that it has popular support; and sustaining popular support requires, to some extent, economic success and also a vision and an impression that it is standing up for China's nationalist interests overseas. And what that means is, China takes a harder-line position in showing its stance, its resolve, in standing up for Chinese national interests, not just Chinese Communist Party interests but national interests. And so it tends to incline leaders to become more steadfast, more confrontational when they're facing what they see as U.S. provocations. So that dynamic, domestically induced in part, is also working on the Chinese side. Both of these dynamics really are running in the wrong direction, undermining the ability of both sides to come to some meaningful dialogue with one another.
Focus: China recently called for a cease-fire in the Ukraine conflict, asking for a resumption of peace talks, an end to unilateral sanctions. And it stressed its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons. How do you think this will impact the conflict moving forward?
Swaine: I think the Chinese position, as recently stated in the 12 points on the Ukrainian issue, is not much different from its previous position. It has made these kinds of points before in various ways, separately or together, but it's not sort of packaged in the same way. And it hasn't been quite as explicit on some points, such as the non-use of nuclear weapons. But the U.S. and most of its allies, both in Europe and in Asia, don't really give this effort that much credibility. I think they just feel it's the same old thing and it's not really that serious [but] disingenuous, in some ways, because they still see China as essentially supporting the Russian position, even though Russia hasn't come out and in every case repeated what the Chinese have been saying or suggesting. I think it's unfortunate if the Chinese position is simply dismissed as taking Russia's side and [that it's] disingenuous.
I think there needs to be a desire to engage with the Chinese on this to see what kinds of proposals what kinds of ideas might be possible over time. They're not possible right now, I think, in the context of Ukraine war, and neither side, Ukraine nor Russia, is willing at this point to sit down and start talking with the other. They're both trying to gain a more advantageous position on the battlefield, and this is likely to continue for some time. But if this grinds on and we don't have any kind of movement toward any sort of resolution, and neither side seems to be gaining ground, and neither side seems to be on the verge of disaster or defeat, then you're looking at an open-ended, draining conflict that will be extremely destructive for Ukraine, destructive for the global economy in some ways and also for the interests of many other countries. So there really is an interest in trying to get some understanding about how we can begin to move down a path toward some kind of negotiated settlement at some point in this conflict. And so the Chinese offer in this regard should not be dismissed out of hand.
It's also important not to dismiss it because if the United States and the West provide more significant, sophisticated, high-level weapons to Ukraine, and Ukraine is able to use those weapons to begin defeating Russia on the battlefield, China might at that point look at the situation and say, “We tried, we put forth a peace offer, it was roundly rejected by the West and there's no other viable option here … . [T]he U.S. and NATO are doubling down on their military support for Ukraine, so we need to support Russia, by providing military arms to Russia.” I think that would be a disastrous move on the part of China, but I could see the arguments for that emerging if this war continues to grind on, and there's no real effort to try to establish some kind of pathway to peace and a negotiated settlement —particularly if the Chinese effort in this regard is just simply dismissed as being irrelevant or just a way of supporting the Russian position. So I think that there needs to be a greater seriousness on this issue. There also needs to be greater clarity on the Chinese side about the exact dangers involved if they were to provide arms to Russia. I think that would be a very serious red line that, if crossed, could really change China's relationship with the West, with Europe, for some time to come — and possibly with countries in Asia as well. So it's something that really, China should resist doing.
But the United States itself, along with NATO, also has to resist providing the kinds of capabilities that I think could completely defeat Russia on the battlefield and drive it out of Ukraine entirely. That would be great if that could happen. And then we could all be very sure that the consequences of that would be acceptable. But I think it's such an unpredictable kind of a situation in terms of its consequences for Putin acting desperately in certain ways to try and stave that off, [so] I think the United States should be looking more toward trying to stabilize the situation than trying to establish or create a “total win.” The Russians will not withdraw from Crimea — I think that is highly unlikely. So they would resort to the most desperate means to defend against that occurring. And we don't want to get into that kind of situation.
Focus: The U.S. leadership has spoken a lot about pursuing competition rather than conflict with regard to China, and in areas where the two sides can cooperate are trying to do so. From a foreign policy perspective, do you think this is the right approach?
Swaine: So if we step back and look at the overall U.S. approach to China, the U.S. leadership talks a lot about pursuing competition rather than conflict with China. And it also talks about cooperating where we can. In general, I think this is the right approach. You do want to have an approach to China that recognizes that there are areas where the two sides are going to compete. There's going to be competition. It doesn't have to be zero-sum competition in every case; it doesn't have to be at an intense level of competition that really blurs over into confrontation, if not crisis or conflict. Of course, you don't want that. You want a constructive form of competition. You want something that avoids the worst case outcomes in both areas. That's why I think it's wrong for the United States to talk about winning the competition with China. Nobody's going to win the competition. It's going to be an ongoing, open-ended process of the two sides competing with each other. And the best way to compete with each other is by strengthening capabilities.
For the United States, this means strengthening its capabilities in a variety of different areas — economically, technologically, as a model of human rights and justice domestically, where we're not the best model these days. The United States really needs to strengthen itself and not focus so much on undermining the Chinese, which the administration has done in its recent actions and Congress has done its recent actions regarding high-tech for China. … Where it seems often that the purpose of the U.S. government is not just to prevent China from acquiring high-tech capabilities of relevance to military or national security but to prevent China from becoming a high-tech nation at all. And that is a major issue that the United States government needs to address much more clearly than it has. So you need to have the right kind of competition.
The second thing is, you have to have a genuine desire to try to establish a stable basis for cooperation between the two sides to work together in areas where they have common interests. And there are many critical issues in which the two countries must cooperate. Climate change would probably be the most important, which is a genuine existential threat in various ways. The pandemic issue … we can have more pandemics like COVID-19 and we need to be able to interact much more effectively and not just securitize this entire field, which both sides have done. And we need to cooperate on the global financial system and the health of the global economy — a wide variety of things. And we're just not engaging each other on this. We're not having substantive talks on this. And that is really what is necessary. The administration places far more stress on competition, and in many ways zero-sum competition, than it does on cooperation. And that really needs to change. I don't believe we should have stress in general on the issue that the U.S.-China relationship is really just a struggle between democracy and authoritarianism. This sets up an absolute zero-sum extreme stance, which I think is a not correct in several ways. And I think the value of competition between the United States and China, although important, should not be at the center of what determines policy by both countries toward the other. It should be interests that relate to hard security questions, questions of economic growth and development and questions of real security between the two sides, including the kinds of non-traditional security issues that I just mentioned. So I think there you need to have a much more meaningful discussion about how you really can improve cooperation and integrate competition with cooperation between the two sides.
