從2017年“印太”願景提出到2018年“印太戰略”出台，再到軍事、政治、經濟、外交、科技等多層面的政策實踐，美國“印太戰略”在認知層面、政策層面以及戰略層面取得了顯著進展。

第一，美國“印太戰略”的提出與推進不僅提升了國內對“印太”地區重要性的認識，還在國際層面促進了各主要國家（或國家集團）對“印太”地區的關注與政策跟進。一方面，美國戰略界對“印太”地區重要性的認識明顯提升，共和、民主兩黨在推進“印太戰略”上形成高度一致。這種共識增強了美國推進該戰略的意志、決心，有助於保持該戰略推進的穩定性與持續性。另一方面，美國“印太戰略”的推進還有效提升了國際社會對“印太”地區的關注。美國不是第一個使用“印太”概念的國家，也不是最早從政策層面關注“印太”地區的國家，但“印太”概念在國際層面的推廣以及“印太”地區被國際社會所廣泛關注，則與美國高調提出“印太戰略”有直接關係。隨着美國“印太戰略”的逐步清晰與穩步推進，域內國家或地區組織紛紛提出各自關於“印太”地區的戰略或構想。與之相對應，域外國家的關注度甚至更高，在政策層面更為高調，法國、德國、歐盟、加拿大等出台了各自的“印太”戰略。一時間，“印太”地區不僅成為美國戰略重心轉移的方向，甚至成為世界主要戰略力量集聚的中心。域內外國家或國家集團對“印太”地區的關注也在一定程度上配合或策應了美國的“印太戰略”推進。

第二，美國“印太戰略”的總體政策架構已經形成，並不斷得以充實完善。這主要體現在“印太戰略”具有清晰的戰略目標、明確的戰略針對對象、相對均衡的政策體系。特朗普政府基本構建了美國“印太戰略”的“全政府、全社會、全領域”政策構架，拜登政府全盤吸收這一政策框架並進一步加以完善，最主要體現在政策系統性與平衡性得到明顯加強：從政策上看，美國在保持對“印太”地區安全層面的戰略投資與高調介入的同時，更加重視在其他領域的政策設計與實施，尤其是推出“印太經濟框架”，搭建了推進“印太戰略”的經濟平台；從議題領域來看，美國不僅加強對傳統安全領域的關注，還將氣候變化、災難救援、疫情防控等非傳統安全領域問題納入“印太戰略”，一定程度上回應了部分域內國家的關切；從執政理念上看，拜登政府修正了特朗普政府的“美國第一”原則，重拾傳統的多邊主義路線，修復並發展了同盟與夥伴關係，如升級“美日印澳”四邊對話機制、構建“美英澳三邊安全夥伴關係”，重振了美國在國際組織與多邊平台的主導權。

第三，美國“印太戰略”對中國構成較大挑戰。美國將中國界定為對其構成全方位挑戰的戰略競爭者，美國國防部則稱中國為“步步緊逼的挑戰”（pacing challenge）。這意味着相對收益已成為美國對華政策的首要考量因素，其結果是美國更難與中國合作，更傾向於遲滯、阻遏中國的發展。在此背景下，美國“印太戰略”就是要通過地理上的抵近對中國形成直接壓力，並通過塑造地區環境對中國的發展施加間接壓力，最終目標顯然是為其“競贏中國”這一大戰略服務。毫無疑問，美國“印太戰略”對中國主權、安全利益造成了相當程度的壓力（台灣問題是最集中、最明顯的表現），給中國的發展環境帶來更多複雜性與不確定性，同時迫使中國將更多精力與資源集中於亞太地區，從而在一定程度上減輕了美國在全球層面面對的中國競爭壓力。從中美戰略競爭角度說，美國“印太戰略”一定程度上發揮了制衡中國發展戰略與進程的功能。

但美國“印太戰略”也存在諸多制約因素，最突出的體現是定位有嚴重缺陷。從本質上來說，美國“印太戰略”是在把中國作為主要競爭對手這一前提下所確定的霸權護持戰略，然而中國並沒有所謂的“霸權戰略”。中國政府屢次強調中國既不擴張也不謀求勢力範圍，更不會尋求所謂的霸權地位，因而不存在與美國爭奪霸權的問題。實際上，國際關係民主化、法治化、合理化是當今國際社會的共同期待，也是發展趨勢。“印太戰略”作為一種霸權護持戰略，其所尋求的是“一家獨大”的優勢地位，奉行的是“你贏我輸”的零和思維，採取的是小圈子、小集團式的陣營對抗和“脫鉤斷鏈”、“長臂管轄”等強權政策，這顯然與國際社會的期待以及時代發展的潮流相悖。可以說，美國“印太戰略”是以20世紀的思維與方式來處理21世紀的國際關係，這就難免到處碰壁。就此而言，美國“印太戰略”確定了不合時宜的戰略目標，主觀建構了一個想像中的“競爭對手”，開出了一味無效的、錯誤的“藥方”。這種戰略設計的缺陷已然成為美國“印太戰略”的“阿喀琉斯之踵”。

Since the announcement by the United States of its Indo-Pacific vision in 2017 and the release of its Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2018 — as well as its implementation of military, political, economic, diplomatic, and technological policies — the U.S. strategy has made significant progress at the cognitive, policy and strategic levels.

First, the Indo-Pacific Strategy has not only raised Americans' awareness of the importance of the Indo-Pacific region but has also gained attention and policy follow-ups from other major countries or groups of countries to that region. The U.S. strategic community's awareness of the importance of the Indo-Pacific region has increased significantly, and the Republican and Democratic parties have found a high degree of agreement. This strengthens the will and determination of the U.S. to promote the strategy and helps maintain its stability and continuity. In addition, the strategy has effectively focused the international community's attention on the region.The United States is not the first country to use the Indo-Pacific concept, nor is it the first to focus on the region at the policy level, but the promotion of the Indo-Pacific concept at the international level and the widespread attention of the international community to the region are directly related to the high-profile proposal of the United States.With the gradual clarification and steady progress of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, countries or regional organizations have put forward their own strategies or ideas. By contrast, the attention of non-Indo-Pacific countries is even greater and more high-profile at the policy level. France, Germany, the European Union and Canada have all introduced their own Indo-Pacific strategies. As a result, the region is not only the direction toward which the U.S. strategic focus has shifted but has even become the center — where the world's major strategic thinking is directed. The attention of countries or groups of countries inside and outside the region have, to a certain extent, coordinated with or responded to the United States as it implements its Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Second, the overall policy structure of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy has been formed and has been continuously enriched and improved. This is mainly reflected in the fact that the strategy has clear strategic objectives, clear strategic targets and a relatively balanced policy system. The Trump administration basically built a whole-of-government, whole-of-society, whole-of-field policy framework for it. The Biden administration has absorbed this policy framework in its entirety and further improved it, most notably in terms of systemic and balanced policies.From a policy perspective, while maintaining strategic investment and high-profile involvement in the security aspects of the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. has paid more attention to policy design and implementation in other areas. In particular, it launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity and built an economic platform to promote its strategy.From the perspective of topics, the U.S. has not only strengthened its focus on traditional security areas but also incorporated non-traditional security topics into the Indo-Pacific Strategy, such as climate change, disaster relief and epidemic prevention and control, in response to the concerns of some regional countries to a certain extent.From the perspective of governing philosophy, the Biden administration has revised the Trump administration's “America first” principle, revived traditional multilateralism, and repaired and developed alliances and partnerships — such as upgrading the U.S.-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and building the AUKUS trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States — to revive U.S. dominance in international organizations and multilateral platforms.

Third, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy poses a greater challenge to China. The U.S. defines China as a strategic competitor that poses an all-encompassing challenge to it. The U.S. Department of Defense calls China a pacing challenge. This means that relative gains have become a primary consideration in U.S. policy toward China, with the result that the United States is less likely to cooperate and is more inclined to delay and curb China's development.In this context, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy puts direct pressure on China by gaining geographical proximity, and it exerts indirect pressure on China's development by shaping the regional environment, with the ultimate goal, obviously, of serving its grand strategy of outcompeting China — in short, to “win.”There is no doubt that the Indo-Pacific Strategy has exerted considerable pressure on China's sovereignty and security interests (the Taiwan question is the most concentrated and obvious manifestation), bringing more complexity and uncertainty to China's development environment and forcing China to focus more energy and resources on the Asia-Pacific region. This will, to a certain extent, alleviate the competitive pressure that the United States faces from China at the global level. From the perspective of China-U.S. strategic competition, the Indo-Pacific Strategy has to some extent served as a counterweight to China's development strategy and process.

There are many constraints on the Indo-Pacific Strategy, most notably in its positioning, which has serious flaws. In essence, the strategy is designed to maintain U.S. dominance based on the premise that China is the main competitor of the U.S.However, China does not have a so-called hegemonic strategy. Beijing has repeatedly stressed that China neither expands nor seeks spheres of influence, nor does it seek so-called dominance, and thus there is no issue over competing with the United States for dominance.In fact, making international relations more democratic, law-based and rational is the common expectation of the international community today, and also the development trend. The Indo-Pacific Strategy, as a strategy to maintain U.S. dominance, pursues a zero-sum mindset and adopts a power policy of bloc politics, confrontation, decoupling and long-arm jurisdiction. This is obviously contrary to the expectations of the international community and the development trend of the times.The Indo-Pacific Strategy is supposed to deal with international relations in the 21st century, but it uses 20th century thinking and will therefore inevitably run into problems here and there. To be more specific, the strategy has improper strategic goals, an imaginary competitor and an ineffective and misguided way of doing things. This strategic design flaw has become its Achilles heel.