2019年6月中旬，習近平主席對朝鮮進行了國事訪問，這也是中國最高領導人時隔14年首次訪朝。這次訪問是在中美貿易爭端有很大不確定性、朝美對話自2月河內會晤後出現明顯停滯的背景下舉行的。6月底，中美首腦在大阪G20峰會期間舉行會晤，雙方在貿易問題上重啟談判，並且討論了朝核問題。美國總統特朗普在隨後訪問韓國期間，與朝鮮最高領導人金正恩在板門店進行了歷史性會面，讓人們看到了朝美新一輪外交磋商和政治解決朝核問題的希望。

對此，不少分析的解讀角度是中美朝三方博弈，即中國希望在中美貿易戰中打“朝鮮牌”，迫使美國達成協議，而朝鮮則期待打“中國牌”，迫使美國讓步。國際政治中的“打牌論”經久不息，也有道理，然而在朝鮮半島問題上，中國的對朝政策邏輯並非僅用“打牌論”就能解釋。筆者認為，中國在美朝關係上更多是思考如何扮演好美朝的外部智庫角色。

朝鮮對“美國特色民主制”的認知困難

朝鮮核危機走到今天是各種因素疊加的結果，而朝美始終處於高度不信任狀態是核心原因。當然，美國政府採取的敵視朝鮮立場，試圖顛覆朝鮮現政權，是促使朝鮮“擁核自保”的一個重要起因。同時，朝鮮對美國的認知及由此而來做出過激反應，也是不可否認的。筆者認為，從認知角度看，朝鮮最大的困難在於準確、平衡和理性地理解美國特色的民主制。

首先，美國兩黨政治下的總統選舉往往會帶來一時間政策立場上的“極端化”，具體表現為，候選人為了在論戰中讓自己的觀點鮮明，會提出幾乎全盤否定現任總統的政策。而對美國極度不信任的國家，往往會聚焦負面言行，不能完整地看到全貌。

第二，新總統當選後需要一段時間保持和競選綱領的一致性，而這往往會被其他國家看成對外交承諾的背叛，從而對威脅產生錯誤認知。克林頓總統第二任期內，朝美關係的互動已經到了相當高的層級，2000年10月奧爾布萊特訪問平壤，已經在討論克林頓訪朝事宜。朝鮮次帥李明騄訪問美國時，曾邀請克林頓訪朝，並承諾解決美國的一切安全關切。美國民主制的特點在於，每當政府更迭的時候就會進行外交政策評估，事實上不僅僅是外交政策的重新評估，國內政策也是一樣，小布殊執政後整個對朝話語體系就變了。

美國作為超級大國，其國內政治動態外溢到國際政治，極大地影響着外部對美國對外戰略、外交政策及政策連續性的認知。與此同時也要看到，由於朝鮮的政治體制完全不同，又長期與美國沒有外交關係，再加上國小力微，它自然會感到困惑、不懂、憤怒，從而產生過激反應，導致緊張升級。朝鮮應該更多地理解美國民主制的特點，妥善地應對美國國內政治過渡期出現的外交行為波動。如何巧妙地緩解美國的壓力，利用好戰略機遇期，中國在同美國打交道過程中積累了大量的經驗可以分享。這方面中國可以起到朝鮮的外部智庫作用。

美國破解對朝“認知僵化”需要中國

美國對朝鮮同樣存在“認知僵化”問題。冷戰後美國成為唯一超級大國，在對外認知上，美國對那些與其不同質的國家進行簡單分類，將朝鮮、伊朗等定義為“無賴國家”，將索馬里等定義為“失敗國家”，將中國、俄羅斯定義為“修正主義國家”。特別是對第一類國家，同它們進行外交談判或對其減少制裁，幾乎成了政治不正確的事。這種政治上的禁忌，造成美國對朝核問題談判往往無法全心投入。朝核問題的最終解決需要朝美實現關係正常化，以及朝鮮融入國際社會和地區經濟社會網絡，而這個過程需要分階段、同步走。朝鮮在核問題上做出承諾與行動，需要與減少對朝制裁和朝美關係正常化談判同步進行。在朝核問題上，特朗普總統可以說是前所未有的非常規美國領導人，是唯一與朝鮮領導人見面的在任美國總統。然而，他在對朝政策上突破的最大障礙，則是美國國內已經形成的偏見和認知。

朝美沒有外交關係，經濟往來為零。中國則是主要大國中最了解朝鮮的國家，也是關係最緊密的國家，中國給美國的建議對特朗普說服其國內反對者很有幫助。中國國務委員王毅近期對媒體透露，習近平主席在大阪與特朗普會面時提出適時緩解對朝制裁，這實際上就是中國在發揮美國在朝鮮半島問題上的外部智庫作用。

On June 20, 2019, President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the first visit to the DPRK by a Chinese leader in 14 years. The visit took place in an atmosphere of great uncertainty: the China-US trade dispute carried on and, in February, talks between the DPRK and the United States in Hanoi had broken down. At the end of June, however, the presidents of China and the United States met during the G20 summit in Osaka. The two sides re-launched talks on trade issues and also discussed the DPRK nuclear issue. During his subsequent visit to South Korea, US President Donald Trump met with DPRK leader Kim Jong Un in Panmunjom, projecting hope for a new round of diplomatic consultations and political settlements.

Many analysts have interpreted this from the perspective of a three-party game between China, the United States, and the DPRK. The argument is that China hopes to play “the DPRK card” in the China-US trade war to force the United States to reach an agreement, while the DPRK expects to play “the China card” to force the United States to make concessions. Game theory has long been applied to international politics and it might explain some of the dynamics here. However, the logic of China's policy toward the DPRK on the Korean Peninsula cannot be explained by game theory alone. I argue that China is more concerned with how to play the role of external think tank in the relationship between the United States and the DPRK.

The DPRK Has a Perception Problem with American-style Democracy

The DPRK nuclear crisis is the result of various factors, but the high level of distrust between the DPRK and the United States is the core reason. Of course, the US government's hostility toward the DPRK and its attempt to subvert the current regime are significant causes of the DPRK's nuclear self-protection. At the same time, the DPRK's perception of the United States and the basis of its excessive counterattacks are undeniable. The DPRK must address the flaws in its perception of American-style democracy in order to understand it in an accurate, balanced, and rational way.

First, it is important for nations like the DPRK to understand that the two dominant political parties in the US presidential elections often elicit polarization in policy positions, but only for a time. Specifically, candidates make their views clear in debates and propose policies different from those of the current president. Countries that have great distrust of the United States focus too narrowly on the negative words and deeds raised during campaigns, which makes it hard for them to see the whole picture.

Second, we have seen that, after the election, a new president must deliver on campaign promises for a period. This is often seen by other countries as a betrayal of diplomatic commitments, creating a misperception of threats. During President Bill Clinton's second term, diplomatic interactions between the DPRK and the United States had reached a fairly high level. In October 2000, Madeleine Albright traveled to Pyongyang and discussed Clinton's trip to the DPRK. Afterward, the DPRK sent Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok to the United States and invited Clinton to visit and promised to resolve all US security concerns. American-style democracy is characterized by foreign policy re-assessments whenever the government changes. In fact, this is not only the case for foreign policy; this is true for domestic policy as well. The Gorge W. Bush administration changed the entire US discourse regarding the DPRK.

As a superpower, the United States's domestic political dynamics often spill over into international politics and greatly affect the external perceptions of US foreign strategy, policy, and diplomatic continuity. Given that the DPRK's political system is completely different and has had no diplomatic relations with the United States for a long time, coupled with the country's small strength, it is not so surprising that the country would become confused, unintelligible, and angry, resulting in excessive reactions and escalated tensions. The DPRK must understand that these are typical fluctuations in American-style democracy, not permanent threats. China has had long experience in dealing with the United States and can share how to subtly ease US pressure and use strategic opportunities. In this regard, China can play the role of external think tank to the DPRK.

The United States Needs China to Crack the DPRK's Perception Rigidity

The United States has a similarly rigid perception of the DPRK. After the Cold War, the United States became a global hegemon. In the process, it had adopted a simple classifications for other countries, defining, for example, the DPRK and Iran as “rogue states” and Somalia as a “failed country.” China and Russia, on the other hand, were defined as “revisionist states.” Having ominously dubbed certain countries “rogue states,” the US made it essentially politically indefensible to conduct diplomatic negotiations with them or to reduce sanctions against them. This political taboo has persisted, making it difficult for the United States to negotiate on the DPRK nuclear issue even today. A final resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue requires the normalization of relations between the DPRK and the United States, and the integration of the DPRK into the international community, including regional economic and social networks. The DPRK's commitments and actions on the nuclear issue must be synchronized with the reduction of sanctions against the DPRK and the normalization of relations between the DPRK and the United States, a process that must be done in stages. Trump can be said to be an unprecedented and unconventional American leader when it comes to the DPRK nuclear issue. After all, he is the only sitting US president to have met with a leader of the DPRK. However, his biggest obstacle to a policy breakthrough with the DPRK is the negative bias and perception that has persisted in the United States.

Since there are no diplomatic relations between the DPRK and the United States, economic exchanges are necessarily at zero. China is the country that best understands the DPRK, and it is the most closely related country. China's proposal to the United States has convinced Trump to try to persuade his domestic opponents. State Councilor Wang Yi recently announced to the media that President Xi asked Trump to ease the sanctions against the DPRK when they met in Osaka. This is China playing the role of the external think tank on the Korean Peninsula issue.