朝鮮最高領導人金正恩與美國總統特朗普即將於2019年2月27日至28日在越南河內舉行第二次會晤。

2018年6月在新加坡舉行的首次“金特會”以近乎完美的形式主義呈現和高度抽象的《朝美聯合聲明》開啟了朝美關係改善的大門，也成為半島和平機制構建的重要拐點。《聯合聲明》確定的“實現朝鮮半島無核化”、“建立新的朝美關係”、“構建朝鮮半島持久和平穩定機制”三項目標，為後續朝美談判提供了指導原則。

新加坡峰會後，朝鮮繼續“靜默”，沒有採取新的試核射導活動，並且開始拆毀部分核導試驗和衛星發射設施，同時在體制內加緊推進集中精力發展經濟的戰略調整。然而，由於缺乏基本互信，旨在落實新加坡峰會精神的朝美無核化談判進展不順。朝方絕不情願放棄已獲得的核能力，內心希望作為一個事實上的擁核國獲得參與國際體系運作的平等權利，因而堅持“分階段、同步走”原則，要求美方立即放鬆對朝制裁，對朝迄今已採取的暫停措施給予實質回報，今後根據美方兌現對朝安全保障的程度決定自己的核導政策。美方堅持認為朝方已有舉動只是姿態性的，要求朝交出核導清單並在特定時限內採取高質量和可信的棄核措施，不然不會放鬆對朝制裁。

雙方對“無核化”的定義也存在根本性分歧。朝方認為“無核化”是整個朝鮮半島的無核化，理應包括美國在韓日部署戰略戰術核武器的透明化以及未來“東北亞無核區”建設。美方認為“無核化”就是朝鮮的去核過程，內部高案是力爭在特朗普第一任期結束的2021年1月前實現朝鮮的無核化。

2018年底，第二次“金特會”提上日程，朝美工作層明顯加緊接觸。2019年1月1日金正恩發表新年賀詞，重申堅定不移實現朝鮮半島無核化，表示隨時準備與特朗普再次會晤。次日，特朗普做出積極回應，透露他已收到金正恩的親筆信，稱金正恩充分意識到“朝鮮有很大的經濟潛力”。1月中旬，由勞動黨中央委員會副委員長金英哲率領的朝鮮高級別代表團到訪白宮，見到了特朗普，帶回了他給金正恩的復函。

朝美加緊接觸籌劃第二次“金特會”，表明雙方推動朝核問題和朝美關係改善取得新進展的共同需要壓倒了各自在核問題上的單一訴求。

對朝方而言，勞動黨七大和七屆三中全會決定調整“並進”路線以後，舉國“集中一切力量進行社會主義經濟建設”的聲勢造得很足，但打破國際制裁、營造良好外部環境的實效有限，焦躁情緒正在積釀。金正恩真心實意希望締造一個不一樣的朝鮮，正試圖運用高超的外交技巧在保住最基本核能力和與美國達成妥協之間走出一條中間道路。

對特朗普政府而言，其在2018年美國中期選舉後執政阻力上升，急需在外交領域取得新的業績。當下特朗普的亞太議程就是謀求兩件事，一是處理朝核問題實現突破，二是對華貿易談判取得“成功”，兩件事的“機會窗口”只會在2019年上半年繼續敞開，進入下半年美國的所有內外議程都將開始向大選聚攏。

朝美各自公開宣布將舉行第二次“金特會”，表明雙方團隊已經談攏基本突破方向：朝鮮或將採取部分實質性棄核措施，其“工具箱”里可選擇的槓桿包括關閉寧邊核設施、明確接受國際監督與核查、重返《不擴散核武器條約》等；美國或將擺出承認朝鮮安全關切的具體姿態，包括與朝規劃結束朝鮮戰爭狀態的路徑、互設代表處以及局部象徵性放鬆對朝制裁、組織對朝國際能源和糧食援助等。

在2007年2月13日結束的第五輪六方會談第三階段會談上，朝鮮曾經同意以最終廢棄為目標，關閉並封存寧邊核設施。在2018年9月的朝韓首腦平壤會晤中，金正恩向文在寅總統表示，如美方採取相應措施，朝鮮不僅願關閉寧邊核設施，也會允許核查人員進入。跡象顯示，承諾以可驗證方式關閉寧邊核設施極可能是朝方在第二次“金特會”上做出的關鍵讓步。

總之，第二次“金特會”有望達成小規模的一攬子協議，確定“棄核換安全”的初期路線圖和時間表。這樣做的好處是保持對話勢頭，又不動搖雙方立場的根本，為後續折衝開闢空間。

朝美無核化談判重啟後，美方一直強烈要求朝方儘快交出包括核武庫在內的大規模殺傷性武器及運載工具清單，這被美國內強硬派和技術派視為實現朝鮮無核化理所應當的第一步，在以往美國處理南非、利比亞等國核問題的過程中也有先例可循。但這一要求遭朝方強烈抵制。為推動朝美談判取得進展，韓國文在寅政府在2018年10月正式向美方提議暫緩要求朝方提交清單。朝方會不會同意提交一個局部意義的清單呢？這是個有趣的看點。

朝方接過中俄共同發起的“雙暫停”倡議，在對美談判中把朝鮮暫停核導活動、美國暫停在半島大規模聯合軍演當作一條原則立場加以推動，而“雙暫停”在平昌冬奧會期間已階段性實現，證明了其可行性。第二次“金特會”即將達成的共識會否包括美韓暫停聯合軍演，同樣引人注目。從特朗普在新加坡峰會後的一系列言談中可以看出，他本人並不認為這個問題不可商量，因為美國在朝鮮半島常年舉行大規模軍演既費錢又影響朝美談判。但美國軍方堅決反對，擔心暫停聯演影響美國在東北亞的長遠戰略利益。即便特朗普最終拍板暫停，也會包含“即刻恢復”條款。事實上，美方要求朝方採取的任何措施都必須不可逆，而自己所做的任何承諾都是可逆的，也就是說，一旦朝鮮違反協議重啟核導活動，美國可以立即實施更嚴厲的對朝制裁和進行更大規模的美韓軍演。

第二次“金特會”一定會達成新的共識，進一步鞏固已在半島重新確立的緩和氛圍和條件。今後，有兩次美朝峰會和三次朝韓首腦會晤、四次朝中首腦會晤共識墊底，只要朝美無核化不中斷，朝鮮與韓、中、俄等鄰國繼續深入發展和改善關係，半島局勢緩和勢頭將在2019年內得到延伸。但半島形勢也在加速積聚新的變量，隨着朝美談判越來越觸及實質、敏感內容，以及2020年美國大選臨近，維繫既有成果將會變得困難，新的臨界點一旦出現，各方將面臨是打破思維定式沿緩和方向繼續朝前走還是重回對抗軌道甚至戰爭衝突的選擇。

形勢的最大變數在美國，特朗普政府積極進行對朝溝通的另一面是從未停止為出台更強懲戒措施做準備。進入2019年下半年，美國國內政治形勢高度複雜化將不可避免地導致特朗普政府處理朝核問題更加急功近利，美國內強硬勢力更加處心積慮破壞朝美共識的落實工作。目前特朗普雖主導着朝核問題的解決進程，但個人色彩過濃，無法代表美國對朝政策的未來。

美國默認朝鮮擁核的可能性固然無法排除，但即便如此，也會盡量把朝鮮核武庫擠壓到最小規模，同時不會對朝中遠程彈道導彈能力建設顯示容忍度。美朝談判將在第二次“金特會”後進入真正的“深水區”，面臨“停滯即倒退”的危險。

朝鮮以可控方式進行改革並融入國際社會的意願是真誠的，但不會以放棄安全自保能力為代價。在朝鮮國內，特別是軍內，始終存在重提“並進路線”的潛流。如果美國在兌現對朝承諾方面出現拖延和反覆，金正恩是否有足夠能力壓制住國內的倒退衝動，是觀察和展望半島形勢下步走向不可忽略的因素。

韓國文在寅政府內憂增多，不僅保守派力量的對立情緒不斷上升並加速集結，經濟也逼近結構性危機邊緣。在此情況下，文在寅更加迫切需要“新陽光政策”結碩果，但在朝美談判不取得突破、對朝國際制裁未有鬆動的情況下已沒有多少“乾貨”可出。第二次“金特會”後，金正恩的首要日程將是訪問首爾，第四次“金文會”重在落實南北經濟合作項目，並為下階段朝美互動注入動力。

俄羅斯是在“重返亞太”和“開發遠東”的戰略框架下運籌自己在朝鮮半島的利益，去年下半年以來已利用自己在聯合國安理會的國際權力成功推動制裁朝鮮委員會在向朝提供人道主義救援方面“網開一面”，也着眼未來東北亞經濟圈構建在加強俄朝基建、科技、交通等合作方面做了準備。但目前俄國內經濟形勢不好，問題深重，與西方對峙僵局難解，無法對半島事務投入更多精力。

日本深懼特朗普政府為與朝達成妥協而放棄日方利益，比如默認朝鮮保有可對日本全境構成直接威懾的中程導彈，不把所謂朝鮮綁架日本人問題納入朝核問題解決軌道。日方已在加強對美遊說，力爭把日方關切問題塞入下階段朝美談判。

中國通過四次接待金正恩訪華、與美韓俄密切溝通、繼續嚴格執行聯合國安理會涉朝決議，在2018年以來的朝鮮半島變局中最大限度保持了自身主動性、靈活度和影響力。中國正蓄勢待發，準備適時提出推動實現半島永久和平的“中國方案”。現階段朝核問題的本質矛盾仍在朝美之間，加上中美關係緊張，中國尚難全方位介入，仍需審時度勢。下階段中國若想在半島變局中發揮引領作用，需具備四個基本條件：一是推動朝美和解，逐步解除國際制裁；二是保持中朝高層對話勢頭，適度重建兩國關係的特殊性；三是理順中美關係，把兩國矛盾控制在理性範疇內，盡量減少對重大國際地區問題合作的影響；四是突出與地區國家在核安全、防擴散、區域經濟合作等問題上的共同利益，構建互利共贏的地區環境。

The second meeting between the supreme leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kim Jong-un and the US President, Donald Trump, will be held in Hanoi, Vietnam, from February 27 to 28, 2019.

Held in Singapore in June 2018, the first Trump-Kim Summit opened the door to the improvement of relations between the DPRK and the US with a highly abstract Joint Statement. It also marked an important turning point in the construction of a peace mechanism for the Korean Peninsula. Three goals were confirmed in the Joint Statement: “achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”, “establishing a new DPRK-US relationship.” and “building a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula”. The Joint Statement provided guidelines for the follow-up negotiations between the DPRK and the US.

After the Singapore Summit, the DPRK continued hasn't conducted any new nuclear missile tests and began to dismantle some tests and satellite launch facilities. Meanwhile, it intensified its strategic adjustment, emphasizing domestic economic development. However, due to lack of basic mutual trust, the DPRK-US denuclearization negotiations, aimed at continuing the progress of the Singapore Summit, did not go well. The DPRK was reluctant to give up its nuclear capabilities, hoping to gain equal rights to participate in the operation of the international system as a de facto nuclear-armed country. Therefore, it insisted that the US relax sanctions against the DPRK. In the future, the DPRK will decide its nuclear missile policies based on the extent to which the US will ensure its security. However, the US insisted that the DPRK's actions were superficial, demanding the DPRK hand over an inventory of nuclear missile projects and adopt credible nuclear abandonment measures within a certain time frame, otherwise the US would not ease sanctions.

Both sides held onto a fundamental disagreement concerning the definition of “denuclearization”. The DPRK believes that it should mean the denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula, including the nuclear weapons deployed by the US in South Korea and Japan and the construction of a “nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia” in the future. However, the US considers “denuclearization” solely as the denuclearization of the DPRK. The best case scenario for the US is to denuclearize North Korea by the end of Trump's first term in January 2021.

At the end of 2018, the second Trump-Kim Summit was put on the agenda. Since then, the DPRK and the US have increased contact. On January 1, 2019, Kim Jong-un delivered a New Year's speech, reaffirming his unwavering resolution to realize the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula while expressing his readiness to meet President Trump again. The following day, Trump responded positively, revealing that he had received a personal letter from Kim, and saying that Kim “realizes so well that North Korea possesses great economic potential.” In mid-January, a high-level delegation of the DPRK, led by Kim Yong-chol, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, visited the White House and met Trump, then brought his reply back to Kim Jong-un.

The DPRK and the US have stepped up their efforts to plan for the second Trump-Kim Summit.

For the DPRK, the adjustment to the policy of “joint development of economic construction and nuclear weapons” was decided at the Seventh Party Congress and the Third Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers' Party. After that, the policy of “concentrating all forces of the country for socialist economic construction” was widely publicized, but had limited effectiveness in breaking international sanctions. Anxiety was accumulating. Kim Jong-un sincerely hopes to create a different North Korea and is trying to use his superb diplomatic skills to strike a middle path between retaining the most basic nuclear capabilities and compromising with the US.

Domestic resistance to the Trump Administration increased after the mid-term elections in 2018, so it became urgent to achieve new results in foreign affairs. Trump's current Asia-Pacific agenda has two goals. One goal is to make breakthroughs on the DPRK nuclear issue, and the other is to achieve “success” in trade negotiations with China. The window of opportunity for the two issues will only remain open in the first half of 2019. In the second half of the year, the agenda in the US will begin to focus on the upcoming presidential elections.

Both the DPRK and the US publicly announced the holding of the second Trump-Kim Summit, indicating that the two sides have already reached a consensus on the political direction needed for a breakthrough. North Korea may adopt some substantial nuclear abandonment measures ranging from the shutting down of the nuclear facilities in Yeongbyeon, explicitly accepting international supervision and verification as well as rejoining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The US may recognize the security concerns of the DPRK, including planning the path to the end of the Korean War, mutually establishing representative offices, relaxing sanctions, and organizing international energy and food aid to the DPRK.

At the third phase of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks, which ended on February 13, 2007, the DPRK agreed to shut down and seal the nuclear facilities in Yeongbyeon while aiming at eventual abandonment. In the meeting between the DPRK and South Korean leaders in Pyongyang in September 2018, Kim Jong-un told President Moon Jae-in that if the US took corresponding measures, North Korea would not only close the nuclear facilities in Yeongbyeon, but would allow inspectors to enter.

In short, the second Trump-Kim Summit is expected to reach a small-scale package agreement, and determine the initial road map and timetable for the plan of “denuclearization in exchange for security”. The advantages of doing so are to maintain the momentum of dialogue without shaking the fundamental positions of both sides and to open up space for the subsequent negotiations.

After the resumption of the denuclearization talks between the DPRK and the US, the US has been strongly demanding that the DPRK hand over the inventory of the mass destruction weapons including nuclear arsenals and their means of delivery as soon as possible. This is regarded by the hardliners and professional officials in the US as the first step to realize the denuclearization of North Korea. This action can be traced back to the way the US dealt with nuclear issues in other countries like South Africa and Libya. However, this request was strongly resisted by the DPRK. In order to advance the progress of the DPRK-US negotiations, the Moon Jae-in Administration of the Republic of Korea (ROK) officially proposed to the US in October 2018 the suspension of the request for inventory submission. But will North Korea agree to submit a partial inventory? Let's wait and see.

The DPRK adopted the “double suspension” initiative, jointly proposed by China and Russia. The “double suspension” achieved staged outcomes during the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. It is equally important whether the second Trump-Kim Summit will conclude with the suspension of the joint military exercise between the US and South Korea or not. Trump himself does not think that the issue is unnegotiable, which can be seen from his speeches after the Singapore Summit, as the large-scale military exercise held by the US on the Korean peninsula is costly and affects DPRK-US negotiations. However, the US military resolutely opposes the idea, fearful that the suspension will affect the long-term strategic interests of the US in Northeast Asia. Even if Trump finally decides to suspend the military exercises in the future, it can be reversed. In fact, all measures that the US requires the DPRK to take must be irreversible, while all commitments made by the US are reversible. That is to say, once North Korea violates the agreement to restart the nuclear program, the US can immediately impose more severe sanctions against it and carry out larger-scale US-South Korea military exercises.

The second Trump-Kim Summit will reach new consensuses to ease tensions on the Peninsula. Subsequently, based on two US-DPRK Summits, three meetings between the leaders of the DPRK and the ROK, and four meetings between top leaders of the DPRK and China, as long as the denuclearization process between the DPRK and the US is not interrupted and the DPRK continues to develop and improve relations with neighboring countries, like South Korea, China and Russia, tensions on the Peninsula should ease in 2019. However, new variables are rapidly accumulating. As DPRK-US negotiations increasingly involve essential and sensitive content and the 2020 US election is approaching, it will become difficult to preserve existing outcomes. Once a new critical point appears, each side will face the choice of continuing towards mitigation or returning to confrontations.

The biggest variable lies in the US. The other side of the Trump Administration's active communication with the DPRK is that it never stops preparing for stronger disciplinary measures. In the second half of 2019, the highly complicated political situation in the US will inevitably lead to the Trump Administration's eagerness for quick success and instant benefits in dealing with the DPRK nuclear issue. The hardliners in the US will be more deliberate in disrupting the implementation of the DPRK-US consensus. At present, Trump dominates the DPRK nuclear issue, but he may not be representative of future US policy towards the DPRK.

The possibility that the US acquiesces to the DPRK's nuclear status cannot be ruled out, but even so, the US will try to squeeze its nuclear arsenal down to the smallest number and will show no tolerance for the DPRK's construction of long-range and intermediate-range ballistic missile capabilities. US-DPRK negotiations will enter the real “deep end” after the second Trump-Kim Summit, facing the danger of stagnation.

The DPRK shows sincere willingness to reform and integrate into the international community in a controlled manner, but it will not be at the expense of giving up its ability to protect itself. In the DPRK, especially in the military, an undercurrent of revisiting the policy of “joint development” always exists. If the US procrastinates and constantly changes its mind in fulfilling its commitments to the DPRK, Kim Jong-un may not be able to suppress backward impulses in the DPRK.

The inner troubles have increased in the ROK. Not only has the opposition of conservative forces been strengthening, but the economy has also approached the edge of structural crisis. Under these circumstances, Moon Jae-in urgently needs the new Sunshine Policy to work. But if no breakthrough is made in DPRK-US negotiations or the international sanctions against the DPRK are not loosened, there will be few achievements to show. After the second Trump-Kim Summit, Kim Jong-un's next stop will be Seoul. The fourth Kim-Moon Summit will focus on implementing the North-South economic cooperation projects and inject momentum into the next phase of DPRK-US interactions.

Russia protects its own interests in the Korean Peninsula under the strategic framework of “returning to the Asia-Pacific” and “developing the Far East”. Since the second half of last year, Russia has used its international powers in the UN Security Council to successfully promote the Sanctions Committee on North Korea to give North Korea a way out through offering humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, it has prepared for Russia-DPRK cooperation in infrastructure, science, technology, and transportation for the future construction of the Northeast Asian economic circle, with a summit between President Putin and Chairman Kim Jong-un already in the works. However, amidst severe problems in domestic economy and stalemates with the West, it can spare little energy for the Peninsula issues.

Japan is terribly afraid that the Trump Administration will abandon its interests for a compromise with the DPRK. For example, the US may acquiesce to North Korea keeping intermediate-range missiles that can directly deter the entire territory of Japan. Japan has been intensely lobbying the US to push Japanese concerns into the next stage of negotiations between the US and the DPRK.

Through meeting Kim Jong-un four times, closely communicating with the US and South Korea, and continuing to strictly implement the UN Security Council resolutions on the DPRK, China has maintained its initiative, flexibility, and influence to the maximum extent. China is prepared to propose a plan to promote permanent peace on the Peninsula. Tensions between China and the US, it is still difficult for China to intervene in the Korean peninsula.