哪裡在轉向呢？不，並不是奧巴馬政府的轉向亞洲，我說的是另一個轉向，它發生在候選人特朗普從候選人變成候任總統、再變成總統的時候。一些人希望，或者不如說想讓自己和別人相信，那位具有煽動性的“流氓”候選人終會消停下來，成為更老練、更傳統的特朗普總統。但特朗普總統頭幾個星期的施政表現證明，這些希望是徒勞的。正如《經濟學人》寫的：“在他的批評者看來，特朗普先生魯莽、一團糟，尤其上周針對七個中東國家公民的臨時入境禁令，秘密起草，倉促實施，根本不可能實現它宣稱的保護美國避受恐怖襲擊的目標。”

2017年1月27日星期五，在美國弗吉尼亞州的阿靈頓，唐納德·特朗普總統在國防部英雄廳簽署了行政命令。(奧利維爾·杜里瑞,阿巴卡通訊社)

示威者和移民權利倡導者聚集在克林頓城堡國家紀念館，遊覽紐約自由女神像的起始點。（美聯社）

他的頭幾個星期委實非比尋常，令人精疲力竭。儘管我們關心的是全球治理和自由世界秩序，但正像布魯金斯學會的湯姆·懷特數月前所說，特朗普和他的親信——包括“白宮西翼黑武士”史蒂夫·班農或邁克爾·弗林——似乎打算“將秩序付之一炬”。看來本屆總統的信念是：民族主義甚至民粹主義藥方才是“對症下藥”，至少對美國來說是如此。

充其量，這位總統劍拔弩張的外交政策言論是在效仿偉大的湯姆·謝林的國際關係核威懾戰術決策法。謝林將這一戰略定義為“非理性中的理性”。幾十年前，一些總統顧問曾經請求當時的總統理乍得·尼克松採用這種戰略。該理論認為，面對競爭對手表現得略為瘋狂，可以提高談判中的地位。然而困境在於，特朗普主要針對的似乎是他的朋友，面對天然對手尤其是俄國的普京時，他的態度反而更微妙。他讚賞的都是民粹主義者，如英國獨立黨前領導人奈傑爾·法拉奇，或菲律賓現總統。在他腦子裡似乎不存在什麼理性客觀。

這些念頭來自哪裡？特朗普從哪裡得出這種概念，認為無論對朋友還是對敵人，國際關係都只是一場零和競賽？毫無疑問，在貿易和WTO或NATO等戰略聯盟方面，沒有人比特朗普本人更極端。幾十年來，至少在貿易上，他一直都對不利的多邊貿易協定大加痛斥。他不斷批評美國加入的協定傷害了美國，讓美國製造業就業機會流向墨西哥和中國。特朗普指責前任政府，說它們為了幫助別國寧肯犧牲美國利益。他在周四的早餐祈禱時表示，“我們幾乎被世界上所有國家利用”，“再也不會發生這樣的事了”。但他的世界觀還有更陰暗一面。他的一些觀點直接取自史蒂夫·班農，後者是右翼新聞、觀點與評論網站“布賴特帕特新聞”前執行主席，特朗普的首席策略師。許多人認為，班農全程介入了移民行政命令的推出。此外，班農一直支持歐洲國家的民粹運動，主張終結歐盟。特朗普對這些觀點的認同，標誌美國政策的顯著轉變。經過數十年依靠建立多邊聯盟確保和平之後，如今白宮表明它將有意破壞這些國際機制。班農2014年在梵蒂岡的演講中表示，這是對更美好過去的回歸：

“我認為，強大的國家和國家強大的民族主義運動創造強大的鄰國”，班農說。“這才是構建西歐和美國的模塊，我認為它是我們的前進方向。”

然而，這種民族主義政治路徑與歷任美國總統及其主要顧問們格格不久。美國例外一向是美國外交政策思想的要素之一，但在自由秩序建築師們看來，狹隘的民主主義和豎起高牆會導致敵對、競賽和戰爭。科德爾·赫爾曾長期出任弗蘭克林·羅斯福總統的國務卿，是戰後外交戰略的主要設計者，愛德華多·波特最近在《紐約時報》上引用他的著述說，“如果我們能通過降低貿易和關稅壁壘，通過消除人為的貿易障礙，來增加各國之間的商業往來，我們就能大大消除戰爭本身”。這可不是呼籲越來越多的民族主義。

所以，如果特朗普真的認為二戰以來歷任總統走的這條路是錯的，那麼現在我們要走向哪裡呢？外交關係委員會的斯圖爾特·帕特里克提出一些替代方案。如我最近在Rising BRICSAM網站發文所指，他心目中一共有五個替代方案。帕特里克認為，無論出現哪種替代秩序，所有五個選項中的要素都會被置入。雖然美國有可能更加孤立，但特朗普執政下，美國的行動很可能以侵略性為主，所以，無論存不存在同盟或國際機制，都有可能出現某種形式的民族主義大國框架。

這對美歐、美俄或最重要的美中這些主要雙邊關係來說意味着什麼呢？顯然，就算特朗普上台之前，無論克林頓、布殊還是奧巴馬政府，中國都越來越受到了美國的關注。所有人都承認，中國的國際特別是地區實力日益強大。儘管東海和南海局勢緊張，美中未能完全努力實現朝鮮問題上的合作，但美中兩國在伊朗特別是氣候變化問題上達成協議，成為推動解決這些問題的基礎。特朗普在貿易和“一個中國”政策上態度更加對立，這一切還能繼續下去嗎？

奧巴馬時期政府官員、布魯金斯學會高級研究員傑弗里·貝德在布魯金斯學會的一份報告中提出一個方案，有可能扭轉美中緊張關係。考慮到習近平主席和其他領導人在中共十九大召開前難以啟動緩和性雙邊政策，貿易投資應該是最直接的合作領域。毫無疑問，在一些關鍵部門，外國人面臨太多投資壁壘，中國的進口壁壘也十分繁多。中國領導人願意就投資貿易條款進行談判或重新談判，對美中關係來說將是“對症下藥”。最終，貿易投資倡議也有利於推進市場改革，而這也是習近平一再表示支持，將來也會繼續這麼做的。

So where is the pivot? No, not the Obama Administration's Asian pivot. I'm speaking of another pivot. This one was to occur when candidate Trump transformed from candidate to President-elect and then to President. Some hoped, or rather convinced themselves and others, that the incendiary 'rogue' candidate would settle down and emerge as a more diplomatic, more traditional, President Trump. But the first weeks of President Trump administration have proven those hopes to be futile. As The Economist wrote: “To his critics, Mr. Trump is reckless and chaotic. Nowhere more so than in last week's temporary ban on entry for citizens from seven Middle Eastern countries—drafted in secret, enacted in haste and unlikely to fulfil its declared aim of sparing America from terrorism.”

President Donald Trump signs Executive Orders in the Hall of Heroes at the Department of Defense Friday, Jan. 27, 2017 in Arlington, Va. (Olivier Douliery/Abaca Press/TNS)

Protesters and immigrants rights advocates gathered at Castle Clinton National Monument, the physical departure and arrival point for tours of the Statue of Liberty in New York City. (AP)

His first weeks have already been extraordinary and exhausting. While we concern ourselves with global governance and the liberal world order, Trump and his inner circle, including Steve Bannon, 'the Darth Vader of the West Wing,' or Michael Flynn, appear to be ready to 'burn the order to the ground,' asTom Wright at the Brookings Institution suggested several months ago. This appears to be a presidency built on a belief that nationalist, even populist prescriptions, are 'just what the doctor ordered' – at least for the United States.

Taken at its best, the high-strung foreign policy rhetoric of this President seems to echo the great Tom Schelling's tactical decision approach to nuclear deterrence in international relations. Schelling identified this strategy as the 'rationality of irrationality' and decades ago it was applied by some Presidential-watchers to then president Richard Nixon. The theory suggests appearing just a little crazy in order enhance your bargaining position with a competitor. However, the dilemma is that Trump is seemingly mostly targeting his friends, while being more nuanced when it comes to his perceived natural rivals, most notably Russia's Putin. His praise appears to be saved for populists like the UKIP's former leader Nigel Farage, or the current President of the Philippines. And there appears to be no rational objective in mind.

From where do these ideas emerge? Where has Trump adopted this notion that international relations is a zero-sum contest with friends and rivals alike? Certainly on trade and strategic alliances such as the WTO or NATO, you need go no further than Trump himself. For decades now, at least with respect to trade, he has thundered against bad multilateral trade deals. Repeatedly, Trump has condemned United States for entering agreements that damage the United States and drive American manufacturing jobs to Mexico and China. Trump has been quoted as condemning previous administrations for their readiness to aid others at the expense of the United States. “We're taken advantage of by every nation in the world virtually,” he said on Thursday at a prayer breakfast. “It's not going to happen anymore.” But there is even a darker side to his worldview. Some of his perspectives seem to owe their authorship directly to Steve Bannon, former executive chair of Breitbart News, a rightwing news, opinion, and commentary website, who is also Trump's chief strategist. Many have suggested that the substance and rollout of the immigration executive order had Bannon's involvement all over it. Among other things, Bannon has been supportive of the populist movements in European countries and has favored the end of the European Union. Trump has echoed these sentiments, marking a remarkable shift in U.S. policy. After decades of building multinational alliances as a guarantee of peace, the White House has now indicated it may purposely undermine these international institutions. Bannon, in his 2014 speech at the Vatican, cast this as a return to a better past:

I think strong countries and strong nationalist movements in countries make strong neighbors,” Bannon said. “And that is really the building blocks that built Western Europe and the United States, and I think it's what can see us forward.

But this nationalist political approach seems so out of sorts with previous U.S. Presidents and their key advisors. American exceptionalism has always been an element of U.S. foreign policy thinking, but the architects of the liberal order saw that narrow nationalism and building walls led to rivalry, competition, and war. Cordell Hull, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's long-serving secretary of state and a key architect of postwar foreign strategy, once wrote and was quoted recently by Eduardo Porter in the New York Times saying, “if we could increase commercial exchanges among nations over lowered trade and tariff barriers and remove unnatural obstructions to trade, we would go a long way toward eliminating war itself.” This is not a call for growing nationalisms.

So if Trump truly believes that the well-worn path trodden by previous Presidents since the end of World War II are misguided, where do we go from here? Stewart Patrick, from the Council of Foreign Relations has suggested a series of alternatives. As I pointed out in a recent post at Rising BRICSAM, there are, in his mind, five alternatives. Patrick has suggested that elements from all five are likely to be built into whatever alternative order emerges. Though greater U.S. isolation is possible, it is more likely that aggressive U.S. actions will dominate during a Trump Administration and so a nationalist great power architecture of some form is likely with or without alliances and international institutions.

What does this suggest for key bilateral relations say with Europe, Russia, or, most importantly, China? It was evident even before Trump that China occupied growing U.S. attention whether from the Clinton, Bush, or Obama administrations. All recognized the growing power of China internationally, and especially regionally. Notwithstanding tensions over the East and South China Seas and difficult and incomplete efforts to forge US-China cooperation in Korea, US-China agreements over Iran and climate change particularly have been foundational in moving these issues forward. Can this be continued in Trump's far more competitive stance over trade and the One-China policy?

Jeffrey Bader, a former Obama official and currently a senior fellow at Brookings has identified options in a Brookings report that have the potential to reverse rising tensions US-China relations. Acknowledging the difficulty for President Xi Jinping and the other leadership figures facing the 19th Party Congress in initiating temperature-lowering bilateral policies, there is an immediate area of cooperation in trade and investment. There is no question that there are far too many barriers to foreigners in select, but key sectors, and too many barriers to imports. A willingness on the part of Chinese leadership to negotiate or renegotiate investment and trade provisions could 'just be what the doctor ordered' for the US-China relationship. Ultimately, proposals in trade and investment have the added benefit of advancing market reforms, which Xi has repeatedly supported and will likely continue to do so in the future.