The past two decades have seen significant transformations to the global distribution of power – especially in the wake of the rare unipolar dominance achieved by the US after the collapse of the Soviet Union. From China's rise as a geo-strategic and economic power, to the resurgence of militaristic narratives and ambitions on the part of the Russian leadership, and the economic and political unravelling of the European Union (EU), the first two decades of the 21st century may go down in history as a critical turning point in great power rivalry – a calm before the storm.
In the past few years, I have come to devise a framework that I find rather helpful, in enabling the partial interpretation and comprehension of the underlying dynamics. I would term it the “Great Power” Quadrangle – between the U.S., China, the E.U., and Russia. A key distinction must be drawn between “greatness” and “superpower status,” with the former denoting the possession of sizable leverage and autonomy across more than one geographical regions, whilst the latter refers to powers who possess substantial, globally oriented ambitions and capacities. We may continue to see the U.S. as the only military and financial superpower in the world, even as China proceeds to consolidate its economic and manufacturing prowess.
To be clear, I am not asserting that the four entities in the Quadrangle – three nation-states and one super-national bloc above – are the only “great powers” in the world. For one, India wields highly momentous strategic leverage over each of these four constituents, and should also be deemed an important great power in its own right.
Key Components of the Quadrangle
In mapping onto the past two decades of dynamics, the Quadrangle can be disaggregated into four distinctive relationships.
Firstly, the Sino-American relationship is increasingly characterised by the dynamic of intense, strategic rivalry. This trend could perhaps be traced to the Obama-era “Pivot to Asia” grand strategy, unveiled in November 2011, which precipitated the emergence of a broad consensus amongst foreign policy elite in Washington: that China's growing economic strength, strategic confidence, and geopolitical dexterity posed a systemic challenge to American hegemony. Despite the occasional polite statements affirming the contrary, China and the U.S. today are indeed enmeshed in an all-out strategic competition – one that spans sensitive and cutting-edge technologies, military presence and strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific, trade and economics, as well as soft power and pseudo-ideological conflicts. Yet such flashpoints of competition – at least as of yet – have not manifested in disruptive warfare. Both the leaderships of Beijing and Washington are cognisant of the immense risks embedded within a direct confrontation between two AI-wielding, economically preeminent, and technologically advanced nuclear powers. It is for that reason that the “hot peace” paradigm – as envisioned by Wang Jisi – is likely here to stay, even as Donald J Trump takes to the White House again.
On the other hand, the EU and Russia have found themselves shifting, firstly gradually (post-Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008), then rapidly (subsequent to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia), from strategic co-dependence towards kinetic confrontation. Whilst the two economies had been highly inter-dependent on fronts of energy (with Russia serving as the primary supplier of oil (90%) and natural gas (40%) to the EU as of 2021), trade, and indeed, capital management (with Europe a highly popular site for wealth deposits by powerful Russian oligarchs), developments over the past decade have seen substantial deterioration to the Brussels-Moscow relationship. In the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, leading European states have positioned themselves as trenchantly aligned with Kyiv – and against what they view as Russian aggression.
On the Trans-Atlantic Relationship and the Sino-Russian Partnership
Having laid out the prerequisites above, I should now sketch briefly two observations: firstly, the intensifying Sino-American rivalry and European-Russian confrontation have contributed towards the strengthening of the Sino-Russian relationship, as well as a steady deepening of European dependence upon the U.S.
Secondly, the Trans-Atlantic and Sino-Russian relationships play largely mutually reinforcing roles – the more closely Washington and Brussels move towards one another, the greater the motivation for both Beijing and Moscow to do the same (whilst falling short of forming a formal alliance).
The increasing momentum in the Sino-Russian relationship, in turn, has bolstered the depth of the Washington-Brussels alignment on their approaches to both China and Russia – that is, until the most recent “rupture” during Trump's second term.
To the first, we should note that China and Russia do not make for natural partners. From Russian seizure of Chinese territories in the early 20th century and its participation in the Eight-Nation Army, to the more contemporary Sino-Soviet split, mistrust and scepticism had long characterised the dynamics between the two countries and their peoples. Even the settlement of long-standing land border disputes between Presidents Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin in 1994 was not without controversy – though in retrospect, the move perhaps rendered possible the significant expansion of trade, energy, and strategic cooperation throughout the early 21st century, between the two countries.
Former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski once warned of the perils for the U.S. of an “anti-hegemonic” coalition comprising China, Russia, and Iran, united “not by ideology but by complementary grievances.” Vladimir Putin's 2007 Munich Security Conference speech previewed the fundamental disillusionment of the post-USSR Russia with the West-led “liberal” order, and paved the way for his shifting continually towards rivals and opponents to the West as a means of constructing a resilient, non-Western parallel world order. The Chinese state, on the other hand, felt snubbed by what it perceived as reticence in Washington to entertain its proposed “new type of great power relations.” Indeed, the reception was lukewarm and frosty at best – downright cynical at worst. The drastic escalation to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict since 2022 has apparently amplified the fissures between Brussels and Moscow. It has also rendered European states significantly more dependent upon the U.S., which had long been a primary contributor and pillar to the collective security umbrella of NATO. The U.S.' substantially greater manufacturing capacities and mature military-industrial complex came to the country's advantage, as European leaders looked towards the Biden administration for authorisation of billions USD worth of military aid packages, equipment, and ammunition, in supporting the Ukrainian war effort.
To the second observation, such dependence has occurred concurrently to – perhaps not coincidentally – a hardening stance on China from Brussels. From previously viewing China as a promising market and credible economic partner, the European establishment has shifted towards more bellicose rhetoric and gestures centred around portraying China as a “systemic rival,” “an economic competitor,” and – perhaps only tangentially – a “partner for cooperation.” The EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment was shelved in May 2021. Animosity towards Beijing rose steadily amongst the European public and politicians throughout 2022 – 2024, with the White Paper on the Future of Defence, published in early 2025, declaring that China is “thereby threatening European security and interests […and] pos[ing] a risk to regional and global security as well as to the EU's economic interests.”
In response to such rhetoric, China and Russia have remained seemingly unfazed – with the Chinese and Russian Presidents having met 42 times between 2013 and 2023, and developing a “deep friendship.” The sanction-struck Russia has turned to China as a primary provider of financial infrastructure, international currency clearing services, investments, and advanced technologies (for non-military purposes). China, in the meanwhile, views Russia as a valuable partner in the energy trade, Arctic exploration, and food security.
The Trump “Rupture”
What would it take for the mutually reinforcing cycle – per Observation 2 above – to stop? As with much in geopolitics, the key rests with the United States. US President Donald J Trump has long held Russia-favourable views in his foreign policy outlook. Indeed, during his first term, he repeatedly praised Putin and relished in their “very close relationship,” with Putin joining the ranks of a slew of other state leaders with whom Trump boasts of his close and affable ties. The 2018 Helsinki summit saw Trump defend Russia against allegations of interference in the U.S. presidential election – though that could perhaps be attributed more to Trump's self-interest and survival instincts.
Under Trump 2.0, all tentative signs point to a U.S.-Russian relationship reset. Whether this is best described as a “Reverse Nixon” or “21st Century Metternich” strategy, or – indeed – whether there exists even a “Grand Strategy” to begin with – remains to be seen. Yet it is evident that the U.S. end of the Sino-American axis, and the Russian end of the Russia-E.U. axis, are once again moving closer towards one another, at least in relative terms.
Given this, we should have every reason to think that Beijing and Brussels can and should seek to recalibrate their ties. Already, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has softened somewhat her rhetoric on China, noting the imperative for China and the E.U. to work together “in an era of hyper-competitive and hyper-transactional geopolitics.”
Will such rhetoric translate into concrete breakthroughs?
The answer is unclear. Whilst the Chinese leadership has effervescently sought to court European businesses and investors – as evidenced by the recent meeting between President Xi and a roster of “Who's Who” from Europe – it appears that its foreign policy establishment is pacing itself when it comes to re-stabilising and shoring up ties with its counterparts in the European Commission and Parliament. Government-to-government engagement will remain frosty, even despite high-level gestures and speech suggesting otherwise. Yet at the very least, sufficient room has been opened up by the rupture induced by Trump and his many Euro-sceptical, America-first acolytes in the administration.
The China-U.S.-E.U.-Russia Quadrangle is by no means determinative. Nor does it provide insights into the inner workings and domestic political interplay, especially amongst the 27 member-states of the E.U. Yet it does suggest that as the U.S. and Russia attempt the “unimaginable” – so, too, can China and Europe.
Where does all of this leave the world order? Only time can tell.
