圖片來源：CSIS | 戰略與國際研究中心

2018年台灣地方選舉——“九合一”選舉以執政的民進黨慘敗而結束。選舉中，國民黨候選人韓國瑜高喊“九二共識”，引發了翻轉全台灣選舉結果的“韓流”。選後，島內認同“九二共識”的縣市首長和議會處於絕對多數，他們要求在“九二共識“基礎上與大陸展開交流合作的強烈願望與拒不認同“九二共識”的民進黨當局形成強烈反差，民進黨當局為選舉結果尋找各種理由，為其上台後單方面改變兩岸現狀給台灣民眾造成的損失進行各種辯護，但在如此慘敗的戰績面前，所有的說辭都蒼白無力。

距離2020年台灣地區領導人選舉還有一年多的時間，民進黨有可能一方面全力準備2020年選舉，應對2018年選舉中展現出來的新民意，一方面繼續將台灣民眾無法繼續獲取和平發展紅利的責任推卸給大陸。兩岸關係或將進入到冷纏鬥階段。

一、圍繞“九二共識”內涵進行的冷纏鬥

此次選舉中，選民喊出了台灣最大黨是“討厭民進黨”的口號（意即討厭民進黨的人最多）。這是2016年民進黨上台以來四面出擊導致四面楚歌的結果。選舉過程中，以韓國瑜為代表的候選人高喊“九二共識”政治基礎上的競選承諾，贏得了選民的高度回應，並通過選票否定了民進黨的島內施政方針和對抗的兩岸政策。

選舉結束之後，台灣當局立即通過陸委會做出冷纏鬥舉動，即通過媒體公開放話，稱交流不應有任何政治前提，稱大陸對“九二共識”的定義就是一個中國原則，並挑釁性地稱“一個中國原則之下，中華民國在哪裡”？作為兩岸關係的常識，“九二共識”就是海峽兩岸在1992年就一個中國原則達成的共識，這是1992年兩岸兩會達成的共識。習馬會時馬英九在全世界的鎂光燈下對此做出了極為清晰的闡述，這一點眾所周知。陸委會的發言明顯具有挑撥分歧，不認同共識的態度。這種態度本身就是對韓國瑜等候選人提出並經選票確認的“九二共識”的否認。

二、圍繞兩岸城市交流進行的冷纏鬥

選舉結束後，蔡英文稱台灣選民沒有在兩岸政策議題上做出選擇或重大改變，這恐怕不符合選舉中選民的呼聲。國民黨候選人明明喊出了“九二共識”，當選連任的無黨派台北市長候選人柯文哲也明確表達了“兩岸一家親”的兩岸觀點和施政觀念，這怎麼能說選民沒有在兩岸政策議題上做出選擇呢？蔡英文明確講，台灣當局對城市交流採取正面開放態度，但是在台北與上海雙城互動交流中，台灣有關部門卻通過技術性、細節性的約束表達了對“九二共識”的不認同，表達出逼迫大陸赴台交流代表在民進黨當局立場下進行互動的意思。圍繞着兩岸城市交流性質問題，民進黨不是求同存異，而是拒不修正在兩岸關係上的政治定位和相關政策，這為兩岸城市交流的扯皮、降低效率埋下了伏筆。如此拖下去，藍營認同“九二共識”的縣市長們將在城市交流上面臨窘境。兩岸政策的決定權和主導權在民進黨當局手中，藍營縣市長的競選主張能否兌現，不僅在於這些縣市長們和大陸能力範圍內的積極響應，還在於民進黨當局是否真的支持“九二共識”基礎上的兩岸城市互動。

三、圍繞和平發展紅利進行的冷纏鬥

2019年即將打響2020年台灣地區領導人選舉的第一槍，中國國民黨和民進黨在未來幾個月內的政績也將成為未來選舉中重要的一張牌。若藍營執政縣市交流互動有成績，對中國國民黨候選人有加分作用，在未來的選舉中台灣選民對“九二共識”的正面作用也將加強。今後台海形勢雖然複雜嚴峻，但兩岸縣市交流合作會出現新氣象，取得新成果。民進黨當局在2020年選舉中也會魚目混珠，將這些和平發展紅利的獲得歸功於自己的兩岸政策。

其實，實現“貨出得去，人進得來”，其前提是承認“九二共識”。蔡英文當局不認可這一點，意味着冷纏鬥還將繼續。

Picture Credit: CSIS | Center for Strategic & International Studies

The “9-in-1” local elections in Taiwan ended with the defeat of the ruling DPP. KMT candidate Han Guoyu's high-profile endorsement of “One China” triggered a dramatic reversal in the elections. Following the elections, county and city chiefs in the island that identify with the “1992 Consensus” on “One China” constitute an absolute majority. Their strong desire for exchanges and cooperation with the mainland based on the consensus is in sharp contrast with the ruling DPP authorities' stubborn resistance against it. Facing the election outcomes, the DPP authorities are making every effort to evade responsibility for the losses they have incurred for the people of Taiwan by unilaterally changing the status quo of relations across the Taiwan Strait. Yet no excuse can justify such a defeat.

More than a year is left before Taiwan elects its next leader in 2020. The DPP may on one hand cope with the new public opinion revealed in the 2018 elections, or it can continue shifting responsibility for the island's inability to share the peace dividends from fine cross-Strait ties to the mainland while preparing for the elections in 2020. Cross-Strait relations may thus begin a period of cold wrangling.

During the latest elections, voters came up with the slogan “disliking the DPP”. During the elections, candidates like Han Kuo-yu came up with loud campaign pledges based on the common political basis of the “1992 consensus”, winning positive responses from voters, and discrediting the DPP's policies on the island as well as regarding cross-Strait ties.

After the elections, the Taiwan authorities immediately announced that exchanges should have no political preconditions, and provocatively questioning the Republic of China's status under the 'One China' principle.After the elections ended, Tsai Ing-wen claimed that voters in Taiwan did not make a choice. KMT candidates evidently endorsed the “1992 consensus”, Ko Wen-je, the re-elected mayor of Taipei, who has no party affiliation, also clearly emphasized the idea of both sides of the Strait belonging under one roof. How could one believe that voters have not made a choice on topics regarding cross-Strait policies?

Tsai made it clear that the Taiwan authorities retain a positive, open attitude to cross-Strait city-to-city exchanges. During the interaction and exchanges between Taipei and Shanghai, however, relevant authorities in Taiwan expressed disapproval of the “1992 consensus” through technical, detailed restrictions, indicating the inclination to press delegates from the mainland to interact with their counterparts in Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan authorities' principle. Regarding the nature of cross-Strait inter-city exchanges, the DPP authorities have sown the seeds of endless wrangling and inefficiency for such exchanges in the future by amplifying differences and refusing to adjust mainland policies and political positions. If such behavior persists, newly elected county and city chiefs in the “blue camp” who identify with the “1992 consensus” will face a dilemma in inter-city exchanges. Since the decision-making power remains in the hands of the DPP authorities, whether the “blue camp” county and city chiefs can honor their campaign promises rests not only on these local leaders, and the active responses the mainland side can make, but also on whether the DPP authorities truly support cross-Strait inter-city interaction on the basis of the "1992 consensus."

Since competition for the 2020 local leader election will begin in 2019, the performance of the DPP and KMT in the next few months will be crucial. Headway in cross-Strait inter-city interaction in counties and cities where the “blue camp” rules will help KMT candidates. Conditions across the Strait remain complex, cross-Strait exchanges at the county and city level may deepen. The DPP authorities will also take advantage of such developments and attribute such dividends from peaceful development to its own mainland policies.

In fact, the campaign promise of “goods can go out, people can come in” when it comes to cross-Strait ties was based precisely on the “1992 consensus.” The Tsai authorities' denial of that spirit means wrangling is just beginning, and will continue.