由於充斥着裙帶關係和派系鬥爭，中國精英政治長期以來一直被看成是變幻不定的遊戲，政治不穩定、不確定的陰影從來未曾遠離。雖然過去30年來，中國領導層一直努力將制度規範納入其精英選拔過程，但人們始終擔心這個新生制度性機制的有效性和持久性。不過，中國政治的觀察家們是不是過於吹毛求疵，忽視了精英招募中重要的制度性進步了呢？已經宣布的相關條例，究竟在多大程度上得到了切實執行？在這一過程當中，制度限制和政治障礙到底是什麼？

對少數民族幹部的選拔是很好的研究案例，它有益地揭示了這個問題。中國是一個以漢族為主體的多民族國家，中國共產黨早就意識到，把少數民族幹部納入黨和國家精英，即可以用來作宣傳，也可以讓少數民族群體覺得這個體制能給他們提供進階機會。1949年中華人民共和國成立以來，幾代中共領導人一直都在努力招募培養少數民族幹部。雖然多年來下發了多個關於選拔少數民族幹部的指導方針和指示，但直到1984年全國人大通過《中華人民共和國民族區域自治法》,這套體系才正式制度化。

自治法規定，所有少數民族自治區地方政府（從鄉鎮級到省級）的最高職務都應該由具有區內主要少數民族背景的領導幹部擔任。地方政府負責人僅次於黨委書記，擁有重要的決策權和區內事務管理權。中國有155個少數民族自治地方，其中包括5個省級區，30個州，120個縣。據中國政府的資料，目前這些地方的政府負責人均不是漢族。實際上，自治法實施以來，這一特殊的制度規定在省一級從未破例。而且，在2002年對自治法的修正中，對中國政治制度當中的民族區域自治制度的定義從“重要”改成了“基本”，突顯了少數民族幹部選拔過程的穩步制度化。

在中國政治高層，挑選少數民族領導人更多靠的是非正式標準，而不是顯性規則。在1987年十三大以來組成的六屆中共中央委員會當中，儘管沒有明文規定少數民族在這個最高領導層的應佔比例，但少數民族委員始終佔10-11%（包括正式委員和候補委員）。而且這一比例幾乎比前五屆高出近一倍，這說明，中共更加重視要在重要機構內保持少數民族穩定的代表性。不過，中央委員會的絕大多數少數民族成員都只是候補委員。例如，第十八屆中央委員會中，少數民族正式委員只有10人（佔4.9%），過去30年里，只有一位少數民族（回族）領導人回良玉是政治局委員。

在國務院，國家民族事務委員會主任一直由少數民族幹部擔任。通常，還會有至少一位少數民族領導出任國務委員或副總理，如司馬義•艾買提1993年至2003年任國務委員，回良玉2003年至2013年任副總理，戴秉國2008年至2013年任國務委員，楊晶2013年至今任國務委員。

當然，中共領導層並沒有讓少數民族人士參與它的國家事務最終決策。少數民族領導人從未進入過中國事實上的權力核心——政治局常務委員會。在五個少數民族自治區，區委書記這個最高職位30年來一直由漢人擔任。在不是由少數民族自治的省里，少數民族幹部做黨委書記也不多見，最近30年來僅有的三個例外是前江蘇省委書記回良玉、前貴州省委書記石宗源和現任吉林省委書記巴音朝魯。

分析人士通常借人際關係、派系身份等因素，來評估一位領導人的晉陞前景。結合傳統做法和對制度規範的理解，我們能夠識別出領導層中的一些後起之秀。現在的中共中央委員會少數民族委員當中，蒙古族幹部楊晶（1955年生）和維吾爾族幹部努爾•白克力（1961年生）由於有大量領導經驗，有可能成為下屆政治局委員的人選。

楊晶現任中共中央書記處書記、國務委員（兼國務院秘書長）。他在黨和政府國家一級機構中同時擔任關鍵的管理職務，這在少數民族領導人中是罕見的。楊晶是內蒙古准格爾旗人，事業起步於他所在自治區的共青團，1993年他任共青團內蒙古自治區委書記。因此，楊晶也被視為團派的上升期領導人。2004年到2008年，楊晶擔任內蒙古自治區政府主席。之後他調到北京，出任國家民族事務委員會主任。由於他的少數民族身份和團派背景，楊晶迅速升到了現在的位置。

與楊晶相仿，巴音朝魯的晉陞也主要通過共青團系統。擔任共青團內蒙古自治區委書記後不久，巴音朝魯於1993年被提拔為共青團中央書記處書記，在後來的幾年當中他與當時主管共青團中央書記處的李克強一起工作。2001年，巴音朝魯調到浙江，比習近平到浙江早了一年。在浙江，他任副省長（2001-2003年)、浙江省委常委、寧波市委書記（2003-2010年）。之後他又調到吉林擔任多個領導任務，並於2014年正式出任吉林省委書記。巴音朝魯目前是唯一任省委書記的少數民族幹部。作為一個有大量地方經驗、與習近平和李克強有密切工作關係的少數民族幹部，巴音朝魯顯然很有機會繼續晉陞。

努爾•白克力現任國家能源局長和國家發改委副主任，是部級幹部中為數不多的年輕幹部（1960年以後出生）之一。努爾•白克力出生在新疆博樂，維吾爾族，他的主要工作經歷是在家鄉自治區，先是在新疆大學黨委，後成為烏魯木齊市市長（1998-2000年）。2008年，47歲的努爾•白克力出任新疆維吾爾自治區主席。任新疆第二把手六年之後，努爾•白克力調任現在的中央級職務。他的任命值得注意，因為這是第一次由一位少數民族幹部來領導國家至關重要的經濟機構。

對少數民族領導人任用模式的簡單回顧，清楚地說明了制度規範對少數民族精英選拔的作用。這些制度規範為各級管理層當中少數民族幹部代表性的穩定提供了一個框架。上面討論到的三位少數民族幹部後起之秀，他們在所在自治區建立事業時，都得益於這種制度安排。但他們的情況也證明，人際關係和派系政治仍然發揮着重要作用，特別是晉陞頂層領導崗位的時候。

即將召開的十九大將進一步揭示，制度化會在多大程度上增加少數民族在中國精英政治中的代表性。從觀察中國領導層政治的這一特點，我們開始對重要途徑有所感知，透過這種途徑，大量的制度規範在塑造着中國的精英招募。這些進展無疑將更廣泛地影響中國的政治，因此，它們會繼續是我們關注與分析的重點。

Fraught with patron-client ties and factional infighting, Chinese elite politics has long been perceived as an ever-changing game, with the shadows of political instability and uncertainty never looming far off. Though the Chinese leadership has labored over the past three decades to instill rules and norms into its elite selection process, concerns have persisted over the effectiveness and durability of these nascent institutional mechanisms. But have observers of Chinese politics been too cynical, overlooking important institutional developments in how elites are recruited? To what extent have proclaimed regulations actually been implemented? What institutional limitations and political barriers stand in the way?

The selection of ethnic minority leaders provides a good case study that sheds valuable light on these questions. China is a multiethnic country that is dominated by Han, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long recognized the value of including ethnic minority cadres among party-state elites, both for propaganda purposes and to inspire minority groups to view the system as affording opportunities for their own advancement. Recruiting and training ethnic minority cadres has been a continuous effort across different generations of CCP leaders, going back to the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. While multiple sets of guidelines and instructions regarding the selection of ethnic minority leaders have circulated over the years, the system was not formally institutionalized until 1984, when the National People's Congress (NPC) passed the Law of Ethnic Minority Autonomous Areas of the People's Republic of China.

The Law stipulates that the top post in the local government in all ethnic minority autonomous areas (from the township level to the provincial level) should be held by a leader from the same ethnic minority background as the majority of citizens in that area. Second only to the party secretary, the head of a local government has significant power over decision-making and the management of regional affairs. China has 155 ethnic minority autonomous areas, including 5 provincial-level regions, 30 prefectures, and 120 counties. According to the Chinese government, currently all of the heads of the local governments in these areas are non-Han. In fact, since the installation of the Law, this particular institutional rule has never been violated at the provincial level. Furthermore, revisions to the Law in 2002 reclassified the system of regional ethnic autonomy from a Chinese political institution that was “important” (重要) to one that is “fundamental” (基本), underlining the steady institutionalization of the process for selecting ethnic minority leaders.

At the top echelon of China's politics, the selection of ethnic minority leaders is bound more by informal norms than explicit rules. In the six CCP Central Committees that have formed since the 13th Party Congress in 1987, ethnic minorities have consistently constituted around 10 to 11 percent of the membership (including both full members and alternate members), even though no regulation has been openly promulgated on the representation of ethnic minorities at this highest level of leadership. Furthermore, this proportion is almost double the average of the five prior congresses, illustrating the CCP's increased attention to maintaining a stable ethnic minority presence in this important body. Nevertheless, most of the ethnic minority leaders on the Central Committee are alternate members. For example, only 10 full members (4.9%) of the 18th Central Committee are ethnic minorities. Over the past three decades, only one minority leader, Hui Liangyu (回良玉), a Hui, has served as a Politburo member.

In the State Council, the directorship of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission has always been held by an ethnic minority leader. There has usually been at least one ethnic minority leader serving as a state councilor or a vice premier: for example, Ismail Amat (司馬義·艾買提) as state councilor from 1993 to 2003, Hui Liangyu as vice premier from 2003 to 2013, Dai Bingguo (戴秉國) as state councilor from 2008 to 2013, and Yang Jing (楊晶) as state councilor from 2013 to present.

The CCP leadership, of course, does not place ethnic representation above its own ultimate decision-making power in state affairs. Ethnic minority leaders have never made it onto the Politburo Standing Committee, the de facto nexus of power in China. For the five ethnic minority autonomous provinces, the region's top post of provincial party secretary has always been given to a Han Chinese throughout the past 30 years. It is also rare for an ethnic minority leader to become party secretary of a non-ethnic minority autonomous province. The only three exceptions in recent decades are Hui Liangyu, the former party secretary of Jiangsu; Shi Zongyuan (石宗源), the former party secretary of Guizhou; and Bayanqolu (巴音朝魯), the current party secretary of Jilin.

Analysts generally rely on factors like personal ties and factional identity to assess a leader's promotional prospects. By combining an understanding of the rules and norms with these traditional aspects, we can better identify some rising stars in the leadership. Among the ethnic minority members of the current Central Committee of the CCP, two Mongolian leaders—Yang Jing (b. 1953) and Bayanqolu (b. 1955)—and one Uighur leader, Nur Bekri (努爾 · 白克力, b. 1961), are likely candidates for the next Politburo, given their broad leadership experience.

Yang Jing now serves as a member of the CCP Central Secretariat and as a state councilor (and, concurrently, secretary general of the State Council). His is the rare case of an ethnic minority leader concurrently holding key administrative positions at the national level in both the party organ and the state. A native of Jungar Banner, Inner Mongolia, Yang began his career in the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) in his native autonomous region and became secretary of the Inner Mongolia CCYL Committee in 1993. Yang's time in this role coincided with Li Keqiang's tenure as first secretary of the 13th CCYL Central Committee. As a result, Yang is also viewed as a rising tuanpai leader. From 2004 to 2008, Yang served as head of the Inner Mongolia Ethnic Minority Autonomous Region. He was then transferred to Beijing to become director of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission. With his ethnic minority identity and tuanpai background, Yang quickly rose up the ranks to his current position.

Similar to Yang Jing, Bayanqolu also accelerated his career mainly through the CCYL system. After serving briefly as secretary of the Inner Mongolia CCYL Committee, Bayanqolu was promoted in 1993 to the CCYL Secretariat, where he spent the next few years working alongside Li Keqiang, who was in charge of the CCYL Secretariat. In 2001, Bayanqolu was transferred to Zhejiang, one year before Xi Jinping's arrival there. In Zhejiang, he served as vice-governor (2001-2003), standing member of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee, and secretary of Ningbo City (2003-2010). He then was transferred to Jilin for various leadership roles and officially became the party secretary of Jilin in 2014. Bayanqolu is the only ethnic minority leader who currently serves as a provincial party secretary. As an ethnic minority leader with broad regional experience and a close working relationship with both Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, Bayanqolu apparently has a good chance for further promotion.

Nur Bekri, currently the director of the National Energy Administration and a deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), is one of only a few young leaders (those born after 1960) at the ministerial level. As a Uighur born in Bole, Xinjiang, Nur advanced most of his career in his native autonomous region, first working in the Party Committee of Xinjiang University, then as mayor of Urumqi (1998-2000). In 2008, when he was only 47, Nur became governor of the Xinjiang Ethnic Minority Autonomous Region. After serving as the second in command in Xinjiang for six years, Nur was transferred to his current roles at the central level. Nur's appointment was notable in the sense that it was the first time that an ethnic minority leader had been tapped to lead a key national economic agency.

This brief review of the appointment patterns of ethnic minority leaders clearly indicates how institutional rules and norms factor into the selection of ethnic elites. These rules and norms provide a framework for the stable representation of ethnic minority leaders at different levels of governance. The three rising ethnic minority leaders discussed above all benefited from this institutional arrangement when they started building their careers in their native autonomous regions. However, their cases also demonstrate how personal ties and factional politics continue to play a significant role, especially in promotions to top leadership posts.

The upcoming 19th Party Congress will further reveal the extent to which institutionalization is increasing ethnic representation in China's elite politics. By observing this particular aspect of Chinese leadership politics, we can begin to perceive the important ways in which a wider array of rules and norms are shaping elite recruitment in China. As these developments will undoubtedly influence Chinese politics more broadly, they should continue to be a focus of attention and analysis.