在第78屆聯合國大會上，各方呼籲用“真正的多邊主義精神”解決全球問題。而在諸多全球問題當中，“落實2030年議程及其可持續發展目標”是優先事項，這也成為本屆聯大一般性辯論主題。用多邊主義解決發展問題，體現“全球南方”崛起的歷史潮流，符合中國式多邊主義的核心主張。

為什麼倡導中國式多邊主義？

中國共產黨的二十大報告提出“踐行共商共建共享的全球治理觀，堅持真正的多邊主義”。中國式多邊主義體現中國參與全球治理變革的思路，即增強新興市場國家和發展中國家的代表性和發言權。一些人因此質疑中國式多邊主義是要“另起爐灶”，是要顛覆現有國際秩序，顯然，這是對中國式多邊主義的歪曲。中國式多邊主義與美式多邊主義的關係是“基於美式，超越美式”。

所謂“基於美式”，是指首先要承認美式多邊主義的歷史貢獻。多邊主義實踐緣起於歐洲，集大成者是美國。早在19世紀，多邊主義在歐洲已有零星實踐，如1815年組建四國同盟（Concert of Europe）、1883年締結《保護工業產權巴黎公約》、1865年成立國際電信聯盟（ITU）。第一次世界大戰後，美國威爾遜總統倡議建立國際聯盟；第二次世界大戰後期，美國主導成立聯合國、布雷頓森林體系和關稅與貿易總協定（GATT）。此後幾十年，各專業領域的多邊機構如雨後春筍般產生，多邊主義實踐蓬勃發展。總體來看，美式多邊主義自1944年以來長期主導國際經濟合作，客觀上推動了經濟全球化和貿易投資自由化，保障了二戰後長期的和平與發展。

之所以“超越美式”，是因為在多邊主義的長期實踐中，美國逐漸背離“初心”。一方面，美國濫用霸權，已經走到了多邊主義的對立面，特朗普和拜登政府在行事風格上雖有不同，但本質都是把“美國優先”凌駕於多邊主義之上。另一方面，新興市場和發展中國家的利益訴求得不到有效反映，隨着經濟力量增長，它們對美式多邊主義的不滿日益增多。“無代表權的納稅”（taxation without representation）是引發18世紀美國獨立戰爭的重要原因。而現今國際社會廣泛存在一種類似的不公平現象，可以稱為“無代表權的貢獻”（contribution without representation）。但是，新興市場和發展中國家只是尋求對現行多邊主義的變革（evolution），而非革命（revolution）。

中國式多邊主義的實踐路徑是什麼？

在全球治理改革背景下，中國式多邊主義應運而生。2008年全球金融危機後，在“人類命運共同體”理念指引下，中國式多邊主義呈現“兩條腿走路”的思路。一是推動國際貨幣基金組織、世界銀行、世貿組織等傳統機制的改革。這些改革取得了一些成效，但由於美國阻撓和拖延，改革進展緩慢。例如，在世界銀行，按照改革後的新股份公式，中國應持有12%的份額，但實際只有6%，落後於美國和日本，排在第三位，改革成效遠未獲得體現。二是在中國倡議引領下提出新的多邊主義機制，特別是2013年起發起“一帶一路”倡議、亞洲基礎設施投資銀行（亞投行，AIIB）、金磚國家新開發銀行（NDB）和多邊開發融資合作中心（多邊中心，MCDF）。近三年來又提出全球發展倡議（2021年）、全球安全倡議（2022年）、全球文明倡議（2023年）。隨着世界各國積極響應，這些倡議正在走向多邊化。

亞投行是中國式多邊主義的最佳實踐案例之一。這是因為，亞投行是一個實體組織，擁有完備的法律體系、一流的治理結構和業務標準，享有最高信用評級，兼容南南合作和南北合作。亞投行源於亞洲，經過八年發展，快速成長為全球性多邊開發銀行。亞投行具有“五個全球”的特點：全球成員，全球投資，全球融資，全球採購，以及全球招聘。亞投行是一個基於資本的政府間國際組織，法定股本為1000億美元，其106個成員股東以主權國家為主。亞投行主要投資發展中國家的基礎設施項目，已投資項目超過200個，金額達400億美元；按照1:3的撬動比例，亞投行投資可撬動的各類社會資本超過1000億美元。亞投行投資的基礎設施既包括鐵路、公路、機場、油氣管道等傳統基礎設施，也包括數字基礎設施（衛星、寬帶）和社會基礎設施（公共衛生）。

亞投行與“一帶一路”之間是什麼關係？

一段時間以來，“一帶一路”被污衊為採用低標準，諸如破壞環境、侵犯人權、製造債務陷阱、搞新殖民主義，等等。亞投行能否參與“一帶一路”成為一個諱莫如深的話題。一些人認為，參與“一帶一路”會影響亞投行聲譽，並企圖推動亞投行和“一帶一路”脫鉤。在法律上，反對者認為，既然亞投行法律沒有明確授權支持“一帶一路”，亞投行就不應參與“一帶一路”。而支持者認為，“一帶一路”建設符合《亞投行協定》第1.1條目條款規定的“改善基礎設施互聯互通”，而且支持“一帶一路”建設與相關規則的具體條款不抵觸，亞投行應當參與“一帶一路”建設。事實上，亞投行迄今投資的200多個項目幾乎都分佈在“一帶一路”沿線國家，基本上是“一帶一路”項目。亞投行與世界銀行等機構簽署了支持“一帶一路”的諒解備忘錄。

我們在判斷一個國際機構有無條約授權時，不以條約明確授權為準，而是只要有利於實現條約目的和宗旨，且不違反條約明文規定即可。此即目的解釋法，或稱暗示授權（implied power）。目的解釋法有利於國際機構以條約目的為指導，靈活適用規則，適應變動中的世界。亞投行借鑒世界銀行的經驗，採取目的導向的條約解釋方法，典範地體現在處理與共建“一帶一路”的關係上。

亞投行不僅參與“一帶一路”，還引領“一帶一路”實現高質量發展。中國進出口銀行項目是一個範例。眾所周知，中國進出口銀行是“一帶一路”資金融通的領先機構，它於2022年制定了新的《環境社會框架》（Environmental and Social Framework），向國際金融機構的通行標準看齊。這次修訂規則得到亞投行和MCDF的鼎力支持，其結果是，《環境社會框架》直接納入了亞投行和世行的諸多高標準。

結語

一些人提出：“大家都搞自己的多邊主義，還怎麼開展多邊合作？”這個問題的實質是認定中國“另起爐灶”了。這恰恰是中國明確反對的。中國式多邊主義旨在“優化現有爐灶”，而不是“另起爐灶”；也即，繼承美式多邊主義“基於規則+倡導高標準”的優點，糾正其“發展中國家代表性不足”的缺點，增加中華優秀傳統文化“共商”元素。

Countries attending the ongoing 78th United Nations General Assembly have called for resolving global issues through “true multilateralism.” A priority emerged and became the theme of general debate: implementing the UN Agenda 2030 and its goals of sustainable development. Resolving development concerns through multilateralism reflects a clear historical trend, marked by the rise of the Global South and conforms to the core principles of Chinese-style multilateralism.

Multilateralism, Chinese style

The report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China states that the country “practices consultation, cooperation and shared benefits in global governance [and] upholds true multilateralism.” Chinese-style multilateralism embodies Chinese thinking about participation in global governance — that is, increasing the representativeness and say of emerging economies and developing nations. Some people suspect that Chinese-style multilateralism means creating a new international order and overthrowing the existing one. This is a distortion. The relationship between Chinese and American styles of multilateralism is that the Chinese style is based on America's but transcends it.

”Based on American style” first means recognition of the historical contributions of American-style multilateralism. Multilateralist practices originated in Europe, but it was the United States that epitomized it. Multilateralism was being practiced in Europe as early as the 19th century, although in a sporadic manner, such as the Concert of Europe in 1815, the Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property in 1883 and the International Telegraph Union in 1865. After World War I, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson pushed for the establishment of the League of Nations. In the latter stages of World War II, the U.S. led the building of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods system and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT. In the decades that followed, multilateralist institutions mushroomed in various professional realms, and the practice has thrived. Generally speaking, American-style multilateralism has dominated international economic cooperation since 1944 and promoted economic globalization, trade and investment liberalization, guaranteeing long-term peace and development in the postwar era.

Chinese-style multilateralism has transcended the American style because the U.S. has gradually deviated from its original intent. On one hand, it has abused its hegemony and drifted to the opposite side of multilateralism. Although the Trump and Biden administrations have behaved differently in style, they have both put “America first” above multilateralism. On the other hand, the interests and demands of emerging economies and developing nations have not been reflected effectively. As their economic strength grows, they are increasingly dissatisfied with American-style multilateralism.“Taxation without representation” was an important trigger of the American war of independence in the 18th century. A similar unfair phenomenon exists in the present-day international community. It may be called “contribution without representation.” Yet, emerging economies and developing nations are only seeking evolution, not revolution.

China's pragmatic route

Chinese-style multilateralism has emerged against a background of global governance reform. After the global financial crisis of 2008, under the concept of “a community with a shared future for mankind,” Chinese-style multilateralism has demonstrated a twin track approach.One track promotes the reform of such traditional institutions as the IMF, World Bank and WTO. Such reforms have seen some progress but have proceeded slowly thanks to U.S. resistance and disruption. For instance, at the WTO, according to the new shares equation after reform, China should hold a 12 percent share, but only has 6 percent, behind the U.S. and Japan — far from reflecting the effect of the reform.The other track involves multilateral mechanisms proposed by China, especially the Belt and Road Initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, NBD and Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance since 2013. China has also proposed the Global Development Initiative (2021), Global Security Initiative (2022) and Global Civilization Initiative (2023). These are gradually being actively embraced by other countries.

The AIIB is one of the best examples of Chinese-style multilateralism. This is because the AIIB is a physical entity with a complete legal framework, first-rate governance structure, professional standards and top credit rating. It caters to both South-South and South-North cooperation. Having originated in Asia, the AIIB has rapidly grown into a global multilateral development bank in just eight years.The AIIB's global features lie in five aspects: membership, investment, fundraising, purchasing and employment. It is a capital-based intergovernmental organization with an authorized capital stock of $100 billion, with most of its 106 member-shareholders being sovereign states. The AIIB invests mainly in infrastructure projects in developing countriesand has so far invested $40 billion in more than 200 projects. According to the 1-to-3 leverage ratio, AIIB investments may raise may raise $100 billion in various forms of non-governmental capital. AIIB-invested infrastructure projects range from such traditional categories as railways, highways, airports and oil and gas pipelines to digital infrastructure (satellite and broadband) and social infrastructure (public health).

Relationship between AIIB and BRI

For some time, the BRI has been bad-mouthed as employing low standards, causing environmental damage, committing human rights violations, creating debt traps and practicing a new colonialism. Whether the AIIB should participate in the BRI has thus become a sensitive topic. Some people believe participating in the BRI tarnishes AIIB's reputation, and they have attempt to decouple them.Opponents hold that since AIIB rules have not in clear terms authorized it to support the BRI, it should not participate. Supporters argue that the BRI conforms to the stipulation of “improving infrastructure interconnectivity” under clause 1.1 of the AIIB Agreement. Therefor, support for BRI construction projects does not contradict concrete clauses of related rules, and the AIIB should participate. In fact nearly all of the more than 200 AIIB-invested projects are distributed in countries along the Belt and Road and are basically BRI projects. The AIIB has signed memorandums of understanding with such institutions as the World Bank on supporting the BRI.

While judging whether an international organization has authorization under a specific treaty, one should not dwell on whether there is clear authorization in the treaty. What's important is whether or not it is conducive to achieving the purpose and goals of the document, and it can support it as long as it does not violate explicit stipulations of the document. This is purposive construction, or implied power.Purposive construction is conducive to international organizations flexibly applying rules under the guidance of treaty purposes and adapting to a changing world. The AIIB drew on the World Bank's experience and adopted a purpose-oriented treaty explanation, which has best been embodied in handling its relations with the BRI.

The AIIB not only participated in the BRI but has also fostered its quality development. The Export-Import Bank of China project is a typical example. The bank has been known as a leading institution for BRI fund-raising. The new environmental and social framework it created last year aligns with the universal standards of international financial institutions. The current round of rules revisions has received the full support of the AIIB and MCDF. As a result, the framework has directly adopted many of the high standards of the AIIB and World Bank.

Conclusion

Some people have asked, how can countries engage in multilateral cooperation with everyone proceeding with their own brand of multilateralism? Behind this question is the assumption that China is building a new order, which is exactly what China is opposed to doing. Chinese-style multilateralism intends to optimize the existing order rather than create a new one — that is, inheriting the American style's merits of being rules-based, advocating high standards, correcting the defect of under-representing developing nations and adding the fine traditional Chinese element of consultation.