意大利政府尋求與華盛頓建立更密切的關係，但同時希望同北京保持良好的經濟關係。此舉能否成功，很大程度上取決於意大利總理喬治亞·梅洛尼如何處理朱塞佩·孔特領導的上屆政府於2019年3月加入中國“一帶一路”倡議時簽署的諒解備忘錄（MoU）。

根據協議，今年年底前，意大利必須就是否續簽或者取消該諒解備忘錄做出正式決定。據官方統計，執政的保守派聯盟尚未決定如何行動。然而，喬治亞·梅洛尼在多個場合宣布有意退出這一基建項目，以使意大利的對華政策與美國政策保持一致。

2023年7月27日，梅洛尼在白宮會見拜登。雙方在會見結束時發表聯合聲明，承諾就涉華問題加強雙邊磋商。拜登政府自然歡迎意大利退出“一帶一路”倡議，歐盟領導人也支持意大利取消該協議，因為這將減少對中國的依賴，並充實對華關係“去風險”化的理念——歐盟委員會主席烏蘇拉·馮德萊恩在3月份的一次演講中提到了這一理念。另一方面，根據“一帶一路”倡議批評者的說法，在西方與中國之間的緊張關係日益加劇之際，續簽該協議將壯大中國領導人的膽量。

7月底，梅洛尼的親密政治盟友、意大利國防部長吉多·克羅塞托在接受採訪時表示，上屆政府在加入“一帶一路”倡議時做出了“即興而殘暴”的決定。這一聲明受到了意大利的歐洲與大西洋盟友的歡迎，但中國的《環球時報》在一篇社論里對此提出強烈批評。社論最後指出，希望“意大利能夠在沒有外部干涉的情況下做出理性決定”，明確指出美國和歐盟在向意大利政府施壓，要求其終止“一帶一路”倡議諒解備忘錄。

意大利是唯一正式加入中國國家主席習近平提出的“一帶一路”倡議的G7國家。習近平投入了大量政治資本，將意大利納入中國的軌道；而意大利的精英群體熱衷於建立商業聯繫，無視加入該倡議可能對西方盟友產生的影響。北京目前正大力遊說，希望將諒解備忘錄續簽5年，而華盛頓和布魯塞爾則希望梅洛尼出於戰略原因終止該協議。

但是，中意諒解備忘錄的效果如何？目前，還從未對該諒解備忘錄的收益和風險進行明確評估。然而，證據表明，該協議為幾家重要的意大利公司帶來了一些成果。但是，簽署諒解備忘錄時預估出現的更多商機並沒有出現。

2019 年 3 月，兩國政府在諒解備忘錄的框架內簽署了總共 29 項協議，分為機構協議和商業協議。29 項協議中，部分是在習近平主席對意大利進行國事訪問時，在他和意大利總理朱塞佩在場的情況下籤署的，並且已經實施。其他協議尚未取得進展，或者即使取得了進展，其影響也相當有限。

其中一項成功實施的協議涉及 Ansaldo Energia，該公司由意大利主權財富基金 CDP Equity控股 88%，其餘 12% 的股份由上海電氣持有。2019年3月與中國公司達成的協議已全面實施：2021年，Ansaldo Energia與上海電氣合作生產的AE94.2 KS渦輪機已全面投入運營。

另一個成功案例與意大利資產最多的聯合聖保羅銀行有關。在“一帶一路”諒解備忘錄框架下，該銀行與青島市簽署了一項財富管理試驗區的開發協議。由此，聯合聖保羅銀行成為第一家通過全資子公司，在中國提供財富管理服務的外資銀行。2019年12月，該銀行因在促進意中關係方面的工作獲得“絲綢之路”獎。

然而，根據意大利對外貿易委員會的最新報告，在雙邊貿易方面，該諒解備忘錄並沒有產生預期效果。2020 年以來，意大利在中國市場的份額一直保持在 1.1% 左右（相對較低）；2022 年降至 1% 左右。雙邊貿易額已從 2020 年的 550 億美元增長到 2022 年的近 780 億美元。但由於貿易失衡，2020-22年期間，中國對意大利的出口增加約180億美元，而意大利對華出口僅增加40億美元。

相比之下，羅馬和華盛頓之間的貿易平衡，對意大利來說一直是積極的。2022年，意大利對美國的貿易順差為390億美元。2022年，意大利對美出口達到730億美元，對華出口僅為180億美元。美國是意大利第二大出口市場，占意大利全部出口的11%，占非歐盟出口的20%以上，而中國僅占意大利出口的3%。因此，對於梅洛尼政府來說，除了戰略原因之外，與華盛頓結盟並尋求退出“一帶一路”倡議的背後存在着強有力的經濟邏輯。

梅洛尼對“一帶一路”倡議的態度發生180度轉變，也結束了本國中左翼政客此前的接觸努力。他們為中國打開了進入意大利的大門，並且經常參加“絲綢之路”相關活動。例如，2016年12月至2018年6月期間，領導中左翼聯合政府的前總理保羅·真蒂洛尼於2017年5月出席了在北京舉行的首屆“一帶一路”國際合作論壇。真蒂洛尼是唯一參加的G7國家領導人，甚至在論壇閉幕後的第二天，與中國國家主席習近平進行了閉門會面。意大利參與中國的這一基礎設施項目，也得到了意大利總統塞爾吉奧·馬塔雷拉的認可。2017年2月對中國進行國事訪問時，馬塔雷拉宣布意大利堅定支持“一帶一路”倡議，並表示“意大利將積極響應中方倡議並參與這一計劃”。朱塞佩·孔特政府是民粹主義的左翼“五星運動”黨與保守的民族主義“聯盟”黨之間的聯盟，於 2018 年 6 月至 2019 年 9 月執政。 2019 年 3 月，它簽署了關於“一帶一路”倡議的諒解備忘錄，但只不過是幫助此前中左翼政府播下的種子開花結果。

隨着孔特繼任者德拉吉的上任，以及中右翼聯盟在2022年9月議會選舉中加速獲勝，意大利的對華政策重新轉向歐盟和北約。2021年2月至2022年10月期間執政的德拉吉政府，對意大利境內“一帶一路”項目進行限制，阻止中國收購熱那亞港務局和北亞得里亞海其他港口的股份——這些項目構成了中意諒解備忘錄的支柱。德拉吉政府的理由是意大利法律中禁止向外國人出售此類基礎設施的規定，並威脅使用“黃金權力規則”——本質上講，它指的是採取干預措施，阻止私人對戰略公司進行投資的權力。

這與雅典比雷埃夫斯港的情況不同。2008年，中國國有企業中遠海運集團獲得該港口部分經營權，2016年收購了希臘國有運營商51%的股份，最後在 2021 年 10 月增至 67%。但在意大利，中國一直無法將其影響力擴展到意大利北部的港口。梅洛尼政府上台後，停止了剩餘的“一帶一路”基礎設施項目，並阻止中國收購具有戰略意義的意大利資產。

問題從來不是如何將戰略資產保留在意大利人手裡，而是選擇哪些外國公司持有這些資產的股份。例如，梅洛尼內閣決定排除中國公司，但卻允許美國公司進入。8月，意大利與美國私募股權基金KKR簽署諒解備忘錄，後者承諾斥資230億歐元收購意大利電信（TIM，該國最大的電信服務提供商）的固網網絡，而意大利政府保留該公司20%的股份以及對該電話網絡公司的戰略監管。

因此，梅洛尼退出中國“一帶一路”倡議，目的是為了和美國這個傳統盟友在政治和經濟領域保持戰略一致。最後一個問題是：意大利政府如何能在不損害中意關係的情況下，取消諒解備忘錄？

執政的保守派聯盟希望用一系列商業協議，取代該諒解備忘錄，從而表明有意與北京保持良好關係。這一模式也是法國總統埃馬紐埃爾·馬克龍 4 月份對中國進行國事訪問期間採用的。當時，在中國國家主席習近平的見證下，他簽署了涉及 36 家中法公司的 18 項協議，以擴大多個領域的雙邊合作，包括綠色技術、可再生能源和工業創新。意大利政府希望效仿法國——法國從未正式加入“一帶一路”倡議，卻成功地促進了對華經濟聯繫和商業機會。

如果梅洛尼成功地用另一套協議取代“一帶一路”諒解備忘錄，讓北京相信意大利的良好用意，並且如果中國沒有對意大利企業展開商業報復，那麼中意關係將向世界表明：美國盟友有可能在不損害對華關係的情況下，應對日益激烈的美中競爭。對於那些主張共存而不是競爭的人士來說，這是一場勝利。

The Italian government seeks closer ties with Washington but wants to maintain good economic relations with Beijing. Whether this will be successful, or not, depends much on how Italian Premier Giorgia Meloni will handle the question of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) under which the previous government led by Giuseppe Conte joined China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in March 2019.

According to the agreement, an official decision as to whether to renew or cancel the MoU must be taken by year-end. Officially, the conservative coalition in power in Rome has not yet decided what to do. However, Giorgia Meloni has declared on various occasions her intention to exit from Beijing's infrastructure project so as to align Italy's China policy with that of the U.S..

Meloni met with Biden in the White House on 27 July 2023. In their joint declaration issued at the end of the meeting, the two sides committed to strengthen bilateral consultations on China-related issues. While the Biden administration would certainly welcome Italy's exit from the BRI, the leadership of the EU is also in favor of Italy's canceling the agreement, since this would reduce dependence on Beijing and give substance to the notion of 'de-risking' ties with China as described by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in a speech in March. Renewal of the accord, by contrast, will – according to the critics of the BRI - embolden the Chinese leadership at home and abroad at a time of growing tensions between the West and China.

At the end of July, Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto – a close political ally to Meloni - said in an interview that the previous government made an 'improvised and atrocious' decision when it joined the BRI, a statement that was well received by Italy's Euro-Atlantic allies but strongly criticized in an editorial by the Global Times which concluded by hoping that 'Italy can make a rational decision without external interference,' clearly referring to alleged U.S. and EU pressure on the Italian government to put an end to the MoU on the BRI.

Italy is the only G7 nation to have officially endorsed Chinese President Xi Jinping's signature foreign policy project. Xi invested significant political capital in bringing Italy into China's orbit, with facilitation from local elites eager to foster commercial ties in disregard for the implications that this could have for Rome's western allies. Beijing is currently lobbying hard in favor of a silent renewal of the MoU for five more years, while Washington and Brussels hope that Meloni will break off the agreement for strategic reasons.

But how effective has the China-Italy MoU been? A clear assessment of the benefits, and risks, of the MoU has never been produced. Yet, there is evidence that the agreement delivered some results for several important Italian companies, while disappointing with regard to the greater business opportunities expected when the MoU was signed.

A total of 29 agreements, divided among institutional and commercial deals, were signed at the margin of the broader strategic MoU between the two governments in March 2019. Some of these 29 agreements – penned in the presence of President Xi Jinping and Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte on the occasion of the Chinese President's state visit to Italy - have been implemented, while others have not moved forward – or if they have, their impact has been quite limited.

Among the successful agreements is one involving Ansaldo Energia, a society controlled 88% by Cdp Equity (Italy's sovereign wealth fund) where Shanghai Electric has a 12% stake. The agreement reached in March 2019 with the Chinese counterpart has been fully implemented: in 2021 the AE94.2 KS turbine made by Ansaldo Energia as a result of the partnership with Shanghai Electric has become fully operational.

Another success story is the one related to Intesa Sanpaolo - Italy's largest bank by total assets – which in the context of the broader strategic MoU signed an agreement with the Municipality of Qingdao for the development of a designated wealth management Pilot Zone. As a result, Intesa Sanpaolo became the first foreign bank to offer wealth management services in China through a wholly-owned subsidiary. In December 2019, the bank received the Silk Road Award for its work in fostering Italy-China ties.

However, when it comes to bilateral trade the MoU has not delivered the results expected, according to the latest report by the Italian Trade Agency. Rome's share in China's market has remained constant (and relatively low) at around 1.1% since 2020, dropping to around 1% in 2022. The total value of bilateral trade has grown from $55 billion in 2020 to nearly $78 billion in 2022, but with a trade imbalance in China's favor whose exports to Italy increased by around $18 billion while Italy's exports to China went up only $4 billion in the 2020-22 period.

As a comparison, the trade balance between Rome and Washington has always been positive for Italy. In 2022, the trade balance in favor of Rome stood at $39 billion. In 2022 Italian exports to the U.S. reached $73 billion, while Italian exports to China were only $18 billion. The U.S. is the second-largest export market for Italy, making up 11% of all exports and more than 20% of non-EU exports, while China only accounts for 3% of Italian exports. For the Meloni government, there are thus compelling economic reasons – alongside strategic ones – for aligning closer with Washington and seeking to exit the BRI.

Meloni's U-turn on the BRI also puts an end to previous engagements undertaken by centre-left politicians who opened the doors of Italy to Chinese interests and who were regular attendees to Silk Road events. For instance, former Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni - who led a center-left coalition government between December 2016 and June 2018 – attended the first BRI Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing in May 2017. Gentiloni was the only leader of a G7 country to participate, and even took a closed-door meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping the day after the closing of the BRI Forum. Italy's participation in China's infrastructure project was also endorsed by Sergio Mattarella, Italy's president. During his state visit to China in February 2017, Mattarella declared that Italy firmly supports the BRI, adding that 'Italy will actively respond to China's initiative and be part of this plan.' When the government by Giuseppe Conte - a coalition between the populist and leftist Movement 5 Stars and the conservative and nationalist League, in power between June 2018 and September 2019 - signed the MoU on the BRI in March 2019, it was merely bringing to fruition the seeds that had been planted by previous centre-left governments.

With the arrival of Mario Draghi, Conte's successor, and then with further acceleration from the victory of a centre-right coalition in parliamentary elections in September 2022, Rome's China policy has shifted back toward that of the EU and NATO. The Draghi government, in power between February 2021 and October 2022, put limits to BRI's projects in Italy, blocking China's attempts to acquire stakes in the port authorities of Genoa and the other ports in the North Adriatic Sea that had formed the backbone of the MoU. The Draghi government did so by invoking provisions in Italian law that forbid the sale of such infrastructure to foreigners and by threatening to use the Golden Powers Rule – essentially the power to intervene to block private investments in strategic companies.

Unlike the case of the port of Piraeus in Athens, where the Chinese state-owned COSCO Shipping secured the right to operate parts of the port in 2008, then acquired 51% of its Greek state-owned operator in 2016, and finally increased its stake to 67% in October 2021, Beijing has been unable to extend its reach over the ports in northern Italy. The arrival of the Meloni government stopped the remaining BRI's infrastructural projects and blocked Chinese acquisitions of Italian assets considered of strategic significance.

The question has never been about keeping the strategic assets in Italian hands, but to choose which foreign companies will have a stake in them. For instance, the Meloni cabinet has decided to exclude Chinese companies, but has instead allowed U.S. firms to make inroads. In August, Rome signed a memorandum of understanding with U.S. private equity fund KKK which committed to offer €23 billion for Telecom Italia (TIM – the country's largest telecommunications services provider) landline network, while the Italian government will retain a 20% stake in the company and strategic oversight of the phone network.

Meloni's intention to exit China's BRI is thus about strategic alignment with the traditional U.S. ally, both in the political and economic realms. The final question is: How could the Italian government cancel the MoU without damaging Sino-Italian ties?

The conservative coalition in power in Rome wants to substitute the MoU on the BRI with a series of commercial agreements that would signal Italy's intention to maintain good relations with Beijing. The model is what French President Emmanuel Macron did during his state visit to China in April, when he signed - in the presence of Chinese President Xi Jinping - 18 deals involving 36 Chinese and French companies to expand cooperation in several areas, including green technologies, renewable energies, and industrial innovation. The Italian government wants to emulate France, a country that has never officially endorsed the Belt and Road Initiative, yet it has succeeded in boosting economic ties and business opportunities with China.

Should Meloni succeed in replacing the MoU on the BRI with another set of accords that would convince Beijing of Italy's good intentions - and should commercial reprisals from China against Italian companies not materialize - the Sino-Italian relationship would show to the rest of the world that it is possible for Washington's allies to navigate the growing U.S.-China competition without damaging ties with Beijing. It will be a victory for those favoring coexistence over competition.