2022年2月12日，拜登政府出台首份印太戰略報告。該報告出台之前，拜登政府曾展開廣泛的國內外協調，如國會兩黨的協調、各部門協調以及與盟友和夥伴的協調。這反映了拜登政府對報告的高度重視，也是該份戰略報告比預期更晚出台的原因之一。

相較於特朗普政府在2019年發佈的64頁印太戰略報告，拜登政府的這份報告大幅縮減至19頁，但歷史脈絡、主要目標與實施方案等關鍵內容均清晰呈現。報告首先回顧了美國參與印太地區事務的歷史，分析了該地區的經濟重要性與戰略挑戰，說明了美國繼續加大對該地區投入的必要性與重要性。

其次，報告闡述了美國印太戰略的五大支柱，也就是五大目標，包括：

自由開放

集體能力

共享繁榮

增進安全

建立韌性。

具體而言，其總體目標是維護印太地區的自由開放，這一點與美國傳統的“門戶開放”政策以及全球公域（如海洋、天空、網絡等）開放相一致。其核心路徑是推進集體行動，形成合力——“這一戰略的核心重點是與該地區內外的盟友、合作夥伴和機構進行持續和創造性的合作”，主要措施涵蓋經濟、安全、外交等方面。

最後，報告提出未來12-24個月的行動方案，這也是對上述主要措施的具體化，包括：

1）向印太地區投入更多資源，如強化在東南亞和太平洋島國的外交存在，以及增強該地區的海上執法力量等；

2）在2022年上半年發起“印太經濟框架”；

3）強化軍事威懾，包括儘快落實美英澳三邊安全夥伴關係（AUKUS）；

4）支持東盟中心地位；

5）支持印度的地區領導地位，突出印度作為地區安全凈提供者的新角色；

6）推動美日印澳“四邊對話”機制（QUAD），將其打造成印太地區的首要集團；

7）拓展美日韓三國合作；

8）與盟友一道共同推進太平洋島國開發；

9）支持印太地區良治與問責；

10）在印太地區構建可信、安全的數字基礎設施網絡等。

拜登政府印太戰略報告具有如下特點：

一是目標更清晰，領域更全面，操作性較強。拜登政府對於美國印太戰略目標的界定更為精細化，不僅強調“自由、開放”這一特朗普政府印太戰略的核心目標，還增加了其他四項目標，尤其是突出了印太地區發展中國家關注的基礎設施建設、氣候變化等問題，因而更能引起域內相關國家的共鳴。從領域上來說，特朗普政府主要側重於從安全層面強化美國在該地區的戰略存在，但對經濟層面、非傳統安全層面的關注甚少。某種程度上說，特朗普政府的印太戰略更像是美國的印太安全戰略，而拜登政府的印太戰略在議題與領域上則要豐富完備得多。從操作性上看，拜登執政一年的政策實踐顯示，這些行動方案已經或正在推進，特別是在聯盟現代化與夥伴關係構建方面取得了較大進展，如美日韓、美日澳三邊關係的提升，以及QUAD的升級、AUKUS的建立，等等。可見，拜登政府印太戰略要比特朗普政府時期的印太戰略更為高效。

二是拜登政府將印太地區的重要性提高到關乎地區與國際秩序形態的層次，並將中國的挑戰視為最核心挑戰。該文件指出：“中國將經濟、外交、軍事和技術力量結合起來，在印太建立勢力範圍，試圖成為全球最具影響力的大國……我們在未來10年的共同努力，將決定中國能否成功改變使印太和全球受惠的規則和規範。”拜登政府印太戰略雖提及氣候變化、疫情防控等挑戰，但主要還是着眼於應對中國挑戰，儘管美方否認印太戰略是專門針對中國的。該戰略重申了拜登政府對華戰略的基調，即與中國更有效地展開競爭，同時負責任地管理競爭，使其不至於引發衝突。在諸如氣候變化、核不擴散等全球性問題上，美國積極尋求與中國的合作。

台灣問題是中美關係中最核心、最敏感的問題。拜登政府在這一問題上的政策表述依然如舊，如強調保持台灣海峽穩定和平，重申“‘一個中國’政策以及在《與台灣關係法》、‘三個聯合公報’、‘六項保證’之下的長期承諾”等原則立場。然而，該報告在具體措施方面除了一以貫之地表示要增強台灣的自衛能力之外，還特彆強調“美國將捍衛我們的利益，阻止對我們國家、盟友和夥伴的軍事侵略，包括台灣海峽，並通過發展新的能力、作戰概念、軍事活動、國防工業計劃和更有彈性的軍力態勢來促進地區安全”。這是否暗示美國有意將台灣海峽納入其防衛圈？是否意味着在防衛台灣問題上的傳統“戰略模糊”政策正漸進轉向？值得注意的是，這一政策立場與特朗普政府2020年初提前解密的印太戰略框架中所表達的政策立場基本一致。特朗普政府在那份報告中宣稱要“保衛第一島鏈國家，包括台灣”。這是否說明美國兩黨政府在提升台灣防衛能力，甚至在協防台灣方面達成了某種默契或共識？這些問題值得認真研究與高度關注。

三是高度重視發揮聯盟與夥伴關係作用，尤其是突出發揮美日印澳“四邊對話”的功能，以及抬升印度的戰略制衡作用。該報告並未提及巴基斯坦，一定程度上也是關照到印度的需求。拜登政府更為積極地促進歐洲盟友介入印太地區，意圖打造印太地區-歐洲大西洋的更緊密聯繫。由於域內盟友與夥伴在地緣政治、經濟、文化等多層面與中國有複雜聯繫，在諸多問題上難以有效發揮制衡中國的作用，通過引入歐洲盟友力量，美國可以在更廣泛議題上獲得對華施壓的國際支持，同時令該地區本已錯綜複雜的局勢更加複雜化，從而有助於美國構建“影響力均勢”來塑造中國崛起的戰略環境。

拜登政府印太戰略的推進具有很大的外部依賴性。換言之，這項戰略的實施不僅依託於美國的戰略能力與意志，而且還仰賴於其盟友與夥伴的戰略能力與意志。拜登反覆強調加強國際合作、形成集體能力的重要性，但這種合作的有效性與持久性是存疑的：一方面與中國戰略競爭並不是美國盟友和夥伴的優先任務；另一方面美國行政部門存在穩定性問題，如果再出現特朗普式的政府，那麼國際合作就更加困難。

此外，拜登政府的可用資源有限，無論是經濟層面的倡議，還是安全層面的構想，都體現出其戰略目標與實施能力的不對稱性。美國的國際戰線太過廣大，超出了其資源承受力，儘管拜登政府試圖收縮，但恐難如願。這種廣泛的戰線以及全球利益的存在，使得美國無法將有限資源大幅度轉移到印太地區。印太地區是美國的重點關注，但並非唯一關注。正如一位美國高級官員在印太戰略報告發佈的背景介紹中所表示的：“本屆政府意識到持續在該地區保持接觸的重要性，也認識到美國無法享有在一時僅僅聚焦於一個地區或一個問題的奢侈” 。由是觀之，拜登政府印太戰略的前景具有顯著的不確定性。

The Biden administration released its first Indo-Pacific Strategy report in early February, after extensive coordination with all stakeholders involved, including both parties in Congress, federal executive departments and the country's allies and partners. The full coordination shows that Biden attaches great importance to the document and partly explains why it came later than expected.

At just 19 pages, the document is much shorter and more condensed than the Trump version published in 2019, which had 64 pages. But it doesn't fall short of any elements regarding the U.S. engagement history, major goals and action plans in the region. It first looks back at the country's engagement in the Indo-Pacific, analyzes the economic significance and strategic challenges of the region and concludes that continuing to make big investments in the region is indispensable.

Then it outlines five primary objectives:

• Advance a free and open Indo-Pacific

• Build connections within and beyond the region

• Drive regional prosperity

• Bolster Indo-Pacific security

• Build regional resilience to transnational threats.

In general, the major goal of the strategy is to defend the freedom and openness of the Indo-Pacific, which is in line with the traditional U.S. open-door policy and open access to the global commons. It aims to expand sustained cooperation with allies and regional institutions in economy, security and diplomacy through collective efforts.

The document ends with an action plan to be implemented in the next 12 to 24 months. The 10 core lines are listed as follows:

1. Drive new resources to the Indo-Pacific, including opening new embassies and consulates in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, and expand the U.S. Coast Guard presence and cooperation in Southeast and South Asia and the Pacific Islands;

2. Launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework in early 2022;

3. Reinforce military deterrence, in particular through the AUKUS partnership;

4. Strengthen an empowered and unified ASEAN;

5. Support India's continued regional leadership and recognize India as a like-minded partner and leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean;

6. Deliver on the Quad and make it play a leading regional role;

7. Expand U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation;

8. Partner to build resilience in the Pacific islands;

9. Support good government and accountability;

10. Promote secure and trustworthy digital infrastructure.

The strategy features clearer objectives and increased feasibility in more fields.

In addition to its emphasis on a “free and open Indo-Pacific” — the core of Trump's version — it adds four more objectives. With climate change and infrastructure involved, it will strike a chord with Indo-Pacific countries. In contrast, the Trump administration emphasized enhancing the strategic presence of the U.S. in the region but gave little notice to the region's economic concerns and non-traditional security threats.In terms of feasibility, the Biden administration has been pressing forward relevant regional plans for the past year or so, especially in the modernization of U.S. alliances and partnerships. Washington has promoted trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea, upgraded the Quad and launched AUKUS.

Moreover, with the release of the strategy, Biden gives more gravity to the Indo-Pacific, while reiterating that America sees the People's Republic of China as the core threat. It reads:“The PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world's most influential power. … Our collective efforts over the next decade will determine whether the PRC succeeds in transforming the rules and norms that have benefited the Indo-Pacific and the world.”Though the document mentions challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change, its eye is clearly on China, despite denials from the Biden administration. It reiterates the administration's China policy: engage in responsible competition and prevent a downward spiral to conflict. Washington seeks cooperation with Beijing on climate change, nuclear nonproliferation and other global issues.

The Taiwan question has been the central and most sensitive conundrum in China-U.S. ties. The Biden administration remains consistent in its Taiwan policy in the document:“We will also work with partners inside and outside of the region to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. … Our approach remains consistent with our One-China policy and our longstanding commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.”However, apart from supporting Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, the strategy goes further:“The United States will defend our interests, deter military aggression against our own country and our allies and partners — including across the Taiwan Strait — and promote regional security by developing new capabilities, concepts of operation, military activities, defense industrial initiatives, and a more resilient force posture.”Does this mean that the U.S. intends to include the Taiwan Strait in its national defense strategy? Or is the U.S. gradually veering away from its strategic ambiguity on Taiwan? Note that this position is in line with the declassified Indo-Pacific document released by the Trump administration in early 2020, which stated that island chain countries and regions, including Taiwan, should be safeguarded. To some degree it's an indication that Republicans and Democrats have consensus on defending Taiwan.

In addition, the strategy puts a premium on the role of alliances and partnerships, in particular the Quad. In a way, it also elevates India's role in regional strategic deterrence. The Biden administration is increasingly prompting America's European allies to engage in the Indo-Pacific, bringing their relationship closer.But many of its Indo-Pacific allies and partners have complex connections with China in geopolitics, economy and culture, so it will be hard for them to play an effective role in containing China. Bringing in its European allies, Washington can acquire international support to counter China, further complicating the already sophisticated situation in the region.

The Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy relies heavily on the capacity and willingness of U.S. allies. Biden has repeatedly underscored the importance of international cooperation in collective efforts, but the effectiveness and sustainability of such cooperation is thrown into question. Furthermore, the Biden administration has few available resources to fulfill its objectives, despite working its way through a strategic contraction, as the country's omnipresence around the world impedes it from committing more resources to the Indo-Pacific. The region is a key focus of the U.S. but not the only one.

As a senior official put it during the background press call previewing the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy: “The administration recognizes the importance of sustained engagement in the region. It also recognizes that the United States doesn't have the luxury to only focus on one region or one problem at a time.”Hence, the prospects for Biden's Indo-Pacific strategy are highly uncertain.