周柳建成：

克雷格·艾倫大使，非常感謝您今天能抽出時間。在僅僅100天里，喬•拜登總統政府的表現就超出了哪怕是他們自己的大膽預想。但並不是所有事情都變好了，尤其是在外交政策方面，包括美國與中國的關係。您覺這種狀況會一成不變嗎？

克雷格·艾倫：

我認為，必須把言辭和到目前為止我們看到的行動區別開來。如果你看實際的政策，幾乎是沒有任何改變。每次我們去問，拜登政府都會告訴我們說，正在對政策進行審議。但特朗普政府實施的制裁一項都沒有取消，除了法院介入的幾個小案子，可這與制定政策還是不一樣的。

而同時，從言辭方面看，已經出現了非常、非常重要的轉變。在大約一個月前楊潔篪、蘇利文、布林肯和王毅的安克雷奇會晤中，這種轉變就被預示或者可以說實際發生過了。當時刺耳的語言有些升級，事實上雙方對兩國關係的用辭都變差了。習近平主席在博鰲論壇上的講話是另一次措辭上的轉變，說明兩國關係的緊張程度是前所未有的。我想，今後我們可能還會聽到更多讓人不愉快的話。

周柳建成:

許多人說，這些措辭和語言是為了在政治上迎合國內聽眾。它真的會造成長期傷害嗎？傷害會落到商界頭上嗎，比如你代表的那些商家？

克雷格·艾倫:

讓我們來分析一下。我認為，美國政府的這種轉變讓北京有些沮喪。拜登政府做的兩件事促成了這種轉變和措辭。第一件是真正重視人權和民主價值觀，這是發自內心的，應該會持續下去。然而，中國卻認為這是一種意識形態上的冒犯。他們意識到這種情況會持續下去，他們正在進行反擊。

拜登相對於特朗普政府的另一個重大轉變，是更多地依賴和需要與美國盟友的團結。這不是口頭上的，而是實實在在的。就在安克雷奇會晤之前不久，印度總理莫迪、日本首相菅義偉、澳大利亞總理莫里森和喬·拜登舉行了“四方安全對話”會議，這顯示出在美國對華政策中盟友關係的重要性。同樣地，中方並不歡迎這種政策轉變。

由於習近平正在籌備今年7月1日的建黨百周年紀念、6個月後的冬奧會，以及最重要的2022年10-11月舉行的中共20大，我們也看到中國方面的一些重大轉變。這種言辭上的變化緊跟國內政策走向，是很難改變的。在這兩個國家，成為好的企業公民變得越來越困難，因為兩國之間的鴻溝似乎越來越大。

周柳建成：

我們聽說過美國與中國的差距和分歧，這些大家現在已經耳熟能詳了。但您提到，比如安克雷奇會晤之前，美國與它的盟友舉行了四方會議，中國人在離開阿拉斯加後也做了同樣的事。那麼，您認為他們都應當為這種做法及後果負很大責任嗎？

克雷格·艾倫：

是的。在許多這類問題上，北京和華盛頓顯然互為鏡像。在安克雷奇就很清楚，美方在會晤中首先發言，並提出人權問題，中方則立即作出反應，也提出對美方人權問題的關注。說來，美國將與盟友進行更密切的對話合作，而中國也打算這麼做。這種滲透到雙邊關係方方面面的鏡像和對抗，正不斷增多和變化着形式，給兩國關係的所有要素都帶來不確定性。

周柳建成：

不管怎麼你來我往，損害都難以自行消除。我認為可以說，如今兩國關係的狀況已經降到近乎脫鉤的水平，一場新冷戰也已經是司空見慣的話題。如果發生其中任何一種情況，會產生什麼樣的影響呢？

克雷格·艾倫：

拜登政府沒有用“脫鉤”這個詞，我認為這是一個非常積極的信號。事實上，就在昨天，國務卿布林肯拒絕了“冷戰”這個詞。我認為這是明智的，因為我們在選擇用歷史類比來描述美中關係時，必須十分謹慎。你選擇的類比會導向某種政策處方，它也許是合適的，也許是不合適的。貿易數據以及部分投資數據表明，脫鉤不過是一種幻想。2020年美國對華出口增長了18%。至少在大多數行業，脫鉤其實是毫無意義的概念。例如在消費品、農業、原材料、能源和金融方面，我們看到兩國貿易有巨大的增長。真正遇到脫鉤問題的是技術產業，一直以來都是這樣，今天更是如此。兩個國家都在相互進行技術限制，呼籲自力更生，呼喚安全的供應鏈和乾淨的網絡。

估計最終情況是複雜的，要取決於行業。所有美國技術公司都想進入中國，所有中國技術公司都想進入美國。我想，到頭來我們會看到美國、歐洲和日本的技術公司進入中國，這主要是為了中國和亞洲的市場。但在有些情況下，的確會有一些架構、系統、機構和項目被一分為二或不必要地重複，內部出現冗餘，這是一國或另一國的法律要求使然。我再補充一點，在中國，軍民融合的驅動力是實實在在的，國家主席就領導着一個軍民融合委員會，這會讓世界各國的科技公司再想一想，在中國開展的研發到底應該搞到什麼程度。

周柳建成：

我們正在經歷一場持續的疫情，從最脆弱的社區到最發達的經濟體，全世界都被它擊倒。美國和中國有可能為世界上最窮困的人帶去機會。我們必須做些什麼呢？

克雷格·艾倫：

對美國和中國來說，最重要的合作領域是氣候變化，因為在這個領域裡，全世界的窮人將受到最直接的影響。我認為，由於克里國務卿的努力，我們看到了一個充滿希望的開始。但細節決定成敗。

中國可以對全球經濟做的最重要貢獻，是在未來10年內以每年幾個百分點的速度迅速增加國內消費，吸引全世界的出口，同時將大量勞動密集型製造業遷出中國，這些產業越來越陳舊，而且無利可圖。從世界最貧窮國家的角度看，中國家庭支出佔GDP的比例若提高20個百分點，那它對全球福祉的好處，會大過我所能想到的任何事情。這很難做到，需要對國有企業進行重組，讓國庫有更多的錢，需要改革戶籍制度，需要更好地實施勞動法，需要對非洲、印度、巴基斯坦和孟加拉國進行大規模的勞動密集型產業投資。這是一個長期進程，但我們應該參與這一進程，以堅定有力的方式參與。這對中國人民的好處將是巨大的，對全球經濟也會產生非常積極的溢出效應。

周柳建成：

您代表着200多家在中國做生意的美國公司的聲音。它們是怎麼對您說的？

克雷格·艾倫：

我們必須一個一個行業來看。我們的多數消費品企業對中國中產階級擴大和消費支出強勁是很滿意的。大多數農業公司也很高興，因為美國對中國的農產品出口大幅增長了。能源公司對中國繼續進口大量石油、天然氣和煤炭特別是煉焦煤感到開心。應該說，在服務業方面，大家是挺開心的。中國金融服務業正在進行重大改革和開放，與一兩年前相比，外國公司正獲得許可，並可以100%擁有在中國的業務。

技術領域存在着不確定性和緊張。同樣，我們也需要把它拆開來看。製藥和醫療設備不同於半導體，不同於航空航天，也不同於信息技術。在所有這些領域，兩國國內都是增長與壓力並存，因為兩國都在努力梳理地緣政治關係，來自兩國政府的要求也影響着投資決策。這是一個還在持續的過程。我想我們的所有企業都想進入中國，同樣，中國企業也想進入美國。

真正值得關注的一個領域是數據。數據傳入傳出的規則是什麼？中國正在制定網絡安全和個人信息（或個人數據）的法律，美國在這個問題上也是爭論不休，歐洲人則有另外的標準。在這個領域，各公司要完全符合法律要求就不得不花費大量的時間。

周柳建成：

最後我想問，您對美中兩國領導人有什麼想說的。還有，人們對新任美國貿易代表戴琦的政策方向很好奇。她在代表總統執行命令方面有多重要？

克雷格·艾倫：

我很驕傲曾經與戴琦大使共事多年。我在各方面都非常尊敬她。她有訴訟律師背景，因此曾與WTO合作。她還有非常寶貴的國會背景，因為根據美國憲法，貿易政策最終是由國會制定，而不是由行政部門制定。她能把握參眾兩院的脈搏，那裡才是做最終決定的地方。貿易政策既是國內政策也是外交政策的一部分，拜登政府現在的重點是把國內政策搞好。在外交政策方面，盟國的作用及與全球夥伴的合作得到新的重視，這是我們在上屆政府中沒有看到的。我認為中國問題仍會是一個焦點。

如果兩位領導人能聽到我的話，我會說，我們在參與合作和競爭方面需要努力，也需要更努力地管控對抗的一面。我們兩國應該在各個層面進行充分的討論，從軍事到經濟、貿易、人文交往、簽證、氣候變化、公共衛生。我擔心，目前對話的缺失只會助長猜疑，讓那些希望誇大對方威脅的人得勢。在不了解的時候，就很容易對人做評判。真的是需要付出努力，才能了解對方的觀點，才能應對他們的預期，才能管控美中關係中不可避免的衝突。

周柳建成：

克雷格•艾倫大使，非常感謝您抽出了時間。

克雷格·艾倫：

也感謝你給我這次機會。

（為清楚起見，已對上述文字記錄稍作編輯）

James Chau:

Ambassador Craig Allen, thanks so much for your time today. In just 100 days, President Joe Biden's administration outperformed even their own bold ambitions. But not everything has changed for the better, especially on foreign policy, including U.S. relations with China. Do you think that's going to stay the same?

Craig Allen:

I think that we need to separate the rhetoric from the actions that we have seen thus far. If you look at actual policies, there's been practically no change whatsoever. The Biden administration is telling us every time we ask them that the policy is under review. But none of the sanctions that had been put in place by the Trump administration have been removed, except in a couple of small cases where courts have intervened. But that's different from the making of policy.

At the same time, from a rhetorical basis, there has been a very, very significant shift. That shift was presaged, if you will, or practiced, in the Anchorage meeting between Yang Jiechi, Jake Sullivan, Tony Blinken and Wang Yi about a month ago. There was quite a harsh rhetorical uptick at that time. And indeed the rhetoric of the relationship has deteriorated on both sides. President Xi Jinping's comments at the Bo'ao Forum were yet another rhetorical shift, indicating a degree of tension that had not existed before. I think that we'll probably continue to see increased use of difficult language going forward.

James Chau:

A lot of people say that the rhetoric and language plays to the domestic audience politically. But does it actually cause long-term damage? And is that borne by businesses, such as those you represent?

Craig Allen:

Let's unpack that for a second. I think the shift in the administration of the United States has led to some frustration in Beijing. The Biden administration has done two things that underlie the shift and rhetoric. The first is a real emphasis on human rights and democratic values. That is coming from a heartfelt place, and we should expect it to continue. The Chinese, however, look at that as an ideological affront. They understand that this should be expected to continue, and they are hitting back.

The other major shift from the Trump administration to Biden has been a much greater reliance and demand for cohesion with America's allies. That is not rhetorical; that is real. The meeting of the Quad: Prime Minister Modi of India, Prime Minister Suga of Japan and Prime Minister Morrison of Australia with Joe Biden, shortly before the Anchorage meeting, was an indication of the importance of alliances and relationships within this, as the United States looks at China. Again, the Chinese side does not appreciate that shift in policy.

On the Chinese side also, we see some significant shifts, as Xi Jinping prepares for the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party on July 1 of this year and as he begins to prepare for the Olympics some six months later — but most important, as he prepares for the 20th Party Congress, which is expected to be held in October and November 2022. The rhetorical shifts here are embedded in domestic policy dynamics that are going to be difficult to change. Being a good corporate citizen — in both countries — is becoming more and more difficult, as the gap between the two seems to grow ever wider.

James Chau:

We hear about the United States and China in terms of gaps and differences. Those are words that have become commonplace now, but you spoke, for example, about the United States meeting with its allies, the Quad, in the run-up to Anchorage. The Chinese did exactly the same thing right after they left Alaska. So, if not equally, do you think they both bear a great burden of responsibility in terms of the actions, but also the consequences that come out of that?

Craig Allen:

Right. There is a clear mirroring between Beijing and Washington on so many of these issues. And we saw that in Anchorage very clearly. The U.S. side spoke first at the meeting and raised human rights, while the Chinese side mirrored that exactly and raised human rights concerns in the United States as well. To the extent that the U.S. is going to be talking and working more closely with allies, China is going to be doing that as well. So this mirroring and this conflict, which really permeates many aspects of the bilateral relationship, continues to grow and change form, creating uncertainties in all elements of the relationship.

James Chau:

No matter how much they mirror, that damage doesn't cancel itself out. I think it's very fair to say that the state of the relationship has now declined to a level where decoupling and a new Cold War have become commonplace discussion points. If either were to occur, what would be the impact?

Craig Allen:

The word decoupling is not used by the Biden administration. I think that that is a very positive signal. Indeed, just yesterday, Secretary of State Tony Blinken rejected the term cold war. I think that's wise, because we need to be careful about picking our historical analogies to describe the U.S.-China relationship. The analogy that you pick will lead to certain policy prescriptions that may or may not be appropriate. The trade numbers, and to a certain extent the investment numbers, suggest that decoupling is a myth. U.S. exports to China in 2020 rose 18 percent. At least across most industries, decoupling is really not a relevant concept. In consumer goods, for example, in agriculture, in raw materials, in energy, in finance, we see a tremendous amount of growth in trade between the two countries. The question where decoupling becomes very real is across the technology industries. That's been true for a long time. But it's more true today. In both countries, we see a mirroring of technology restrictions and a chorus of voices calling for self-reliance, secure supply chains and clean networks.

I expect that the results will be very complicated, depending on the industry. All American technology companies want to be in China, and all Chinese technology companies want to be in America. I think at the end of the day what we're going to see is American, and European, and Japanese tech companies in China, mostly for the China and the Asia market. But there are indeed structures, systems, institutions and projects that might be bifurcated and duplicated in some cases, with redundancies built in, that are required by law in one or the other country. Let me just add a coda on that. In China, the drive for civil-military fusion is real. The president of the country is heading a commission on civil-military fusion. That gives technology companies around the world second thoughts about to what degree R&D should be done in China.

James Chau:

We're living through an ongoing pandemic, which has brought the world to its knees, from the most vulnerable communities to the most advanced economies. The United States and China have an opportunity to shape opportunities for the world's poorest people. What must be done?

Craig Allen:

 The most important area for the U.S. and China to collaborate is climate change, because this is going to be where the world's poor are going to be most immediately impacted. And I think that due to Secretary Kerry's efforts we see a promising start there. But the devil is in the details.

The most important contribution that China could make to the global economy is to increase domestic consumption rapidly by a couple of percentage points a year, every year for the next 10 years, to draw in global imports, and simultaneously to move out of China a lot of the labor intensive manufacturing that is just getting really old and unprofitable. From the world's poorest perspective, raising China's household spending as a percentage of GDP by 20 points would do more for global welfare than any other thing I can imagine. It's a difficult thing to do: You would need a restructuring of State-owned enterprises, with more money going to the national treasury. You would need reform of the hukou system. You'd need much better enforcement of labor laws. You'd need massive investment of labor-intensive industries to Africa, to India, Pakistan, Bangladesh. It's a long-term process. But that process should be engaged in — and in a robust manner. The benefits to the Chinese people would be immense. And the spillover effects to the global economy would be extremely positive.

James Chau:

You represent the voices of more than 200 American companies doing business in China. What are they telling you?

Craig Allen:

We need to look at this on an industry-by-industry basis. Most of our consumer goods companies are very happy with the growth of the Chinese middle class and robust consumer spending in China. Most of our agricultural companies are very happy also, with very significant increases in U.S. commodity — agricultural commodity — exports to China. Our energy companies are very happy in terms of China continuing to import a lot of oil and natural gas and some coal, especially metallurgical coal. I would say on the services side, people are pretty happy. The financial services industry is undergoing significant opening and reform in China. Foreign companies are getting licenses and are allowed to own 100 percent of their operations in China, in contrast to a year or two ago.

The area of uncertainty and tension is in the tech area. There again, we need to kind of break it down. Pharma and medical devices are different from semiconductors, which is different from aerospace, which is different from IT. In all of those areas, there's both growth and pressures within both countries, as both try and sort out the geopolitical relationship and investment decisions are being affected as a result of the government demands coming from both capitals. That is an ongoing process. I think all of our companies want to be in China. Similarly, Chinese companies want to be in the United States.

One area to really watch is data. What are the rules for bringing data back and forth? China is developing its cybersecurity and personal information or personal data laws, and the U.S.s is having a lot of debate on the same subject. And the Europeans have yet another standard. This is going to be an area where companies are going to have to spend an enormous amount of time in being fully compliant with the law.

James Chau:

I will finish by asking you what words you would share with the leaders of the U.S. and China. But before that, there's been some keen anticipation in the direction of the new United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai. How important will she be in terms of executing orders on behalf of the president?

Craig Allen:

I'm proud that I've been a colleague with Ambassador Tai for many years. I have enormous respect for her in every way. She comes from the background of a litigator and having worked with the WTO in that context. She also brings her immensely valuable background with our Congress, because trade policy at the end of the day under the U.S. Constitution is made by Congress, not by the executive branch. So she has her thumb on the pulse of the Senate and the House of Representatives where, ultimately, decisions will be made. Trade policy is a subset of both domestic policy and foreign policy, and the emphasis of the Biden administration right now is really on getting domestic policy right. On the foreign policy side, the role of alliances and working with our partners around the world has really been given a new importance that we had not seen in the previous administration. I think that China will remain a focal point, as well.

If I had the ear of both presidents, I would say that effort is needed to engage on the cooperation and on the competitive side of the relationship. More effort is needed also to manage the antagonistic side. There should be full discussions going on at all levels, between our two countries, from military to military, economics, trade, people to people, visas, climate change, public health. I fear that that the current lack of dialogue is just feeding suspicions and ceding the ground to those who might wish to exaggerate the threat that they see on the other side. It's easy to judge somebody when you don't understand them. It really requires effort to understand the other side's perspective, to be able to manage their expectations and to manage the inevitable conflict that we know is coming in the U.S.-China relationship.

James Chau:

Ambassador Craig Allen, thank you very much for your time.

Craig Allen:

Thank you for this opportunity.

(The foregoing transcript was lightly edited for clarity.)