圖片來源：新華社

經過一年來形勢的不斷吃緊和對朝鮮核計劃引發衝突前景的擔憂，朝鮮半島的緊張局面終於暫時消退了。4月27日，金正恩和韓國總統文在寅在非軍事區內首次舉行了大事張揚和充滿象徵意味的會面。這次會面開啟峰會外交的新紀元，很快，美國總統唐納德·特朗普也將與金正恩會面，從而可能為朝鮮半島迎來新開端鋪平道路。

按多個標準衡量，最近的朝韓首腦會晤都是一次成功，雖然一些關鍵細節問題仍有待解決。與過去相比一個突破是，金正恩同意在非軍事區的“和平之家”與韓國總統文在寅會面。這樣一來，他就成為第一位到達軍事分界線韓國一側的朝鮮領導人。金正恩在談到朝鮮面臨的經濟困難時也十分坦率。但是，說到為朝鮮半島確立一條新路，最重要的也許是雙方在《板門店宣言》中承諾實現無核化。在朝韓首腦會議文件中，這還是第一次直接提到無核化。

南北方的這次峰會應該被看成是至少兩個連續峰會中的第一個，目的是改善與朝鮮的關係，進一步確保即將到來的美朝峰會取得成功。《板門店宣言》有助於這些目標的實現，它確立了朝韓關係新框架，並開始着手解決美朝對話所要涉及的安全問題。這份文件的着眼點是朝韓合作的三個領域：在共同繁榮下發展、緩和軍事緊張、開創朝鮮半島的永久和平。

《板門店宣言》關於共同繁榮的一個關鍵內容，是雙方同意履行朝韓之前的所有聲明和協議。如果朝鮮遵循無核化承諾，那會給它帶來明顯的經濟上的好處。關於緩和緊張局勢，宣言再次確認了一項互不侵犯協議，呼籲停止敵對行為，實現分階段裁軍。雙方還同意爭取在2018年年底之前達成和平協議，以結束朝鮮戰爭。雖然無核化名義上放在了協議的最後，但如果接受之前朝韓雙方達成的所有聲明和協議的話，朝鮮也應該遵守1992年《關於朝鮮半島無核化的聯合宣言》。

幫助建立合作框架的同時，仍然有必要為宣言中達成的分階段裁軍制定細節。但也許最重要的是在制裁仍然有效的情況下，確定雙方如何實行所商定的經濟與社會合作。

如果說，與韓國總統文在寅的首腦會晤打開了朝鮮無核化大門，那麼完成無核化協議就將取決於特朗普總統。不過，對這次會晤的期望應當有保留。《板門店宣言》在某些方面故意含糊，而“特金會”達成的任何協議只會是由上而下的願望，不會是一份詳細的協定。但如果這次峰會取得成功，則無論達成什麼協議，其中都應該包括我們所期待的某些內容。

最重要的內容是雙方如何定義無核化。美國和朝鮮一向對無核化的內涵有不同定義。對美國來說，無核化意味着朝鮮徹底、可驗證、不可逆地放棄核計劃。相反，朝鮮通常的說法是“朝鮮半島的無核化”，意思是無核化進程還要包括廢除美國的核保護傘，以及美國軍隊撤出朝鮮半島。雙方對無核化有共同定義，這將是重要的第一步。

時間表也很重要。雖然《板門店宣言》需要更多的細節，但它設定了明確的基準：5月1日起結束軍事分界線一帶的敵對行為，5月份舉行軍事會談，8月15日舉行離散親人團聚活動，年底前締結和平條約。無論美國與朝鮮達成什麼協議，都需要明確規定無核化進程何時結束，什麼時候可以開始核查，以及什麼時候可以解除制裁。美國建議在解除制裁前先完成無核化，就像利比亞那樣。朝鮮則認為在徹底實現無核化之前，應該採取分步走的方法，讓它得到某些好處。首腦會晤結束後，雙方需要就無核化細節及其他問題進行談判，但應該制定出明確的時間表。

無論達成什麼協議，都不應囿於無核化。美國應當爭取將聯合國安理會決議涉及的所有朝鮮大規模殺傷性武器都納入協議。我們已經知道，朝鮮有化學和生物武器計劃。鑒於去年對金正男的VX神經毒氣暗殺，以及聯合國專家小組報告稱朝鮮與敘利亞有化武交易，大家都明白，朝鮮當局既願意出售，也願意使用其他的大規模殺傷性武器。

美國應該爭取讓協議有明確的內容，不過，朝鮮同樣有要優先解決的問題，包括締結和平條約、獲得安全保證和解除制裁。它還可能要求把美國向朝鮮提供直接經濟援助作為協議的一部分。

有報道顯示，朝鮮不會提出要求讓美國撤軍、停止提供核保護或終結美韓同盟，而只會要求軍事演習能顧及當前形勢、美方保證不進攻朝鮮、不使用或不在韓國安置戰略性資產、美國同意締結和平條約。如果朝鮮的安全要求真的只是這種程度，那麼達成協議就有切實的基礎。

在朝韓首腦會議上，金正恩對先前的協議未能落實表示了失望。從他成為一國領導人以及2012年《閏日協議》早夭的那一刻開始，美國對此就一清二楚。雖然金正恩也許不會把《閏日協議》甚至1992年的無核化聯合宣言作為範本，但若是他真正理解全面落實《板門店宣言》或與特朗普總統達成的協議的必要性，那麼解決朝核問題也許就有機會，朝鮮半島就會迎來新的開端。而如果他做不到的話，我們最終就會回到原點，壓力與日俱增，衝突為期不遠。

Photo Credit: Xinhua

After a year of rising tensions and concerns over the prospect of conflict over North Korea's nuclear program, tensions on the Korean Peninsula have momentarily eased. On April 27, Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in met for the first time in the de-militarized zone (DMZ) surrounded by pageantry and symbolism. The meeting kicked off a new era of summit diplomacy and will soon be followed by a critical meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un that may pave the way for a new beginning on the Korean Peninsula.

The recent inter-Korean summit was a success by many measures, even if some of the key details remain to be worked out. In a break with the past, Kim Jong-un agreed to meet South Korean President Moon Jae-in at the Peace House in the DMZ, making him the first North Korean leader to travel south of the DMZ. There was also a frankness in how Kim Jong-un spoke of the economic difficulties facing North Korea. Perhaps most significant for setting a new path on the Korean Peninsula, however, was the commitment by both Koreas to realizing denuclearization in the Panmunjom Declaration, the first direct reference to denuclearization in an inter-Korean summit document.

Designed to improve relations with North Korea and help ensure the success of the upcoming U.S.-North Korea summit, the inter-Korean summit should be viewed as the first of at least two interlocking summits. The Panmunjom Declaration helped to achieve these objectives by establishing a new framework for inter-Korean relations and beginning to address the security issues needed for talks between the United States and North Korea. The document focuses on three areas of inter-Korean cooperation: the development of co-prosperity, the reduction of military tensions, and the development of a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula.

One of the key elements of the Panmunjom Declaration regarding co-prosperity is the agreement to implement all prior inter-Korean declarations and agreements which would provide North Korea with clear economic benefits should it follow through with denuclearization. In the area of reducing tensions, the agreement reaffirms a non-aggression pact, calls for the end of hostile acts, and a phased disarmament. Both sides also agreed to seek a peace treaty to end the Korean War by the end of 2018. While denuclearization is the last element of the agreement, nominally, the adoption of all prior inter-Korean declarations and agreements should also commit North Korea to the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korea Peninsula.

While helping to create a framework for cooperation, details will still need to be worked out on the phased approach to disarmament agreed to in the declaration, but perhaps most important will be defining how the economic and social cooperation agreed upon will be conducted while sanctions are still in place.

If the summit with South Korean President Moon opened the door to a denuclearized North Korea, it will be up to President Trump to close the deal on denuclearization. But expectations should be managed. The Panmunjom Declaration is intentionally ambiguous in some regards and any agreement reached at the Trump-Kim summit will be about top down aspirations, rather than a detailed agreement. However, if the summit is successful, there are certain elements we should look for in any agreement.

The most important element will be how the two sides define denuclearization. The United States and North Korea have historically had different definitions of what denuclearization means. For the United States, denuclearization has meant the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear program. In contrast, North Korea has often referred to the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” by which it means the removal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula as part of the process of denuclearization. An important first step will be arriving at a common definition of denuclearization.

Timelines will also be important. The Panmunjom Declaration placed clear benchmarks, even if further details are still needed, for the end of hostile acts in the DMZ by May 1, military talks in May, family reunions on August 15, and the conclusion of a peace treaty by the end of the year. Any U.S.-North Korea agreement will need to clearly define when denuclearization will be concluded, when inspections can begin, and when sanctions relief can begin. The United States has suggested that denuclearization be relatively quick, as was the case with Libya, before sanctions relief can begin, while North Korea has suggested a phased approach that would provide some benefits before complete denuclearization is achieved. Details on denuclearization and other issues will need to be negotiated after the summit, but clear timelines should be established.

Any agreement should go beyond denuclearization. The United States should be pushing to include all of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction included in UN Security Council resolutions in an agreement. North Korea is known to have a chemical and biological weapons program. With the assassination of Kim Jong-nam with VX nerve gas last year and the UN Panel of Experts report on North Korea's dealings with Syria on chemical weapons, we know that the regime is willing to both sell and use other weapons of mass destruction.

While there are clear elements the United States should seek in any agreement, North Korea will have priorities as well. These are likely to include the conclusion of a peace treaty, security guarantees, and sanctions relief, but will also likely include a request for the United States to provide direct economic aid to North Korea as part of any agreement.

Reports have indicated that North Korea will not ask for the removal of U.S. troops, the end of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, or an end to U.S.-South Korea alliance, merely that military exercises be appropriate to the situation, the U.S. pledge not to attack North Korea, that strategic assets not be used or based in South Korea, and that the U.S. agree to a peace treaty. If this is truly the extent of North Korea's security requests, there could be real grounds for an agreement.

At the inter-Korean summit, Kim Jong-un noted disappointment at North Korea's failure to implement prior agreements, something the United States knows all too well from his time as leader and the short-lived 2012 Leap Day Agreement. While Kim was likely not referencing the Leap Day Agreement or even the 1992 joint declaration on denuclearization, if he genuinely understands the need for full implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration and any agreement reached with President Trump, there may be a chance to resolve the North Korean nuclear situation and achieve a new beginning on the Korean Peninsula. However, if he does not, we may end up back where we were before— with increasing pressure and the prospect of conflict.