今年1月26日，中國國務院公布的《中國的北極政策》白皮書引發了世界對於中國在北極地區雖處萌芽狀態但快速增長的角色與利益的廣泛關注。中國對於北極地區的看法在過去十年中變得愈加具有戰略性。雖然白皮書中的大部分信息並非首次披露，但如“極地絲綢之路”等倡議卻預示着中國在北極地區的政治和經濟活動或將迎來一波高潮。而對於中國北極白皮書的反應則是褒貶不一。雖然很多國家私下或公開都對中國的意圖表現出焦慮情緒，但一些北極國家——尤其是俄羅斯——對於“極地絲綢之路”的支持極大地增強了中國的信心和取得進展的幾率。

中國在北極地區的意圖一直是討論的焦點。如果說白皮書可以為我們提供任何指導意義，那就是中國當前在北極地區的優先事項似乎是重點關注三個領域。在商業利益方面，白皮書強調探索自然資源和發展北極船運航線。在全球挑戰領域，中國將重點放在了北極地區的氣候變化、環境惡化和可持續發展。北極地區在中國被視為發揮全球治理角色的試驗田，而全球治理可以幫助中國令其聲音和利益最大化。為了確保中國在北極事務上的合法聲音與角色，中國已經出台了一系列政策倡議，包括促進科學研究、推動關注北極事務的多邊論壇，包括北極理事會，加強與有意願的北極國家的政治經濟雙邊協商合作，尋求與當地人的商業合作，以及提高關於北極的政策研究水平。

值得指出的是，貫穿整篇北極白皮書中，軍事安全議題完全沒有被提及。基於中國過往及當下關於北極的軍事——尤其是海軍——研究，我們不應認定北極地區的軍事議題不是問題。例如，過去五年，中國海軍指揮學院和中國海軍研究院已經在國家社會科學基金的資助下完成了三個關於北極的研究項目。其中之一是關於在北極地區建立一個供給基地，另外兩個是關於北極地區的船運航線。可以肯定的是中國可能已經在社科基金資助外進行了更多研究。然而，北極白皮書對於這一話題的完全迴避極有可能暗示着中國不願引發外界對於其在北極地區剛剛處於萌芽狀態的戰略產生過多的關注。這同時意味着通過投資與合作等軟性方式來打開極地地區大門是中國當下最重要的議程。

長期以來，中國一直在應在北極地區扮演何種角色上遭受着身份認同危機。北極白皮書將中國稱為北極地區不可或缺的一份子、北極事務的關鍵利益相關方，並指出中國在北極地區擁有關鍵國家利益。然而，中國不遺餘力地證明自己在北極地區擁有一席之地的同時，也揭示出中國這個非北極國家精心策划出來的一種身份認同方式。中國深知自己並非一個北極國家，在北極地區也不擁有領土或海域。因此，它至多能稱得上是一個“近北極國家”。這一事實極大地限制了中國在北極地區獲利的能力。它同時決定了中國必須尋求與北極國家以及其他國際和地區機構進行合作以對政策和結果施加影響。

這嚴重製約了對中國在北極地區野心和行為方式的評估。中國的確對這一地區充滿野心，鑒於北極地區作為全球公共領域的特殊屬性，中國不會放棄任何機會對其潛在或正當利益宣示主權。一旦擁有機會，中國將盡最大努力對北極敘事施加影響以期擴大其影響力和利益。然而，需要指出的是，在現階段，中國的很多利益依然只是前景而已，因此很可能會經歷不斷的調整與變化。

北極白皮書在確認中國早已推行的很多北極政策上發揮了關鍵作用，如科學外交，它同時揭示了中國野心的優先事項。以北極地區船運航線發展為基礎建立“極地絲綢之路”的提議引發了北極觀察者的廣泛關注。中國一直在探討將極地地區包括在“一帶一路”倡議中，但是北極白皮書是首個正式對此進行公布的政府聲明。

“極地絲綢之路”的邏輯遵循中國“一帶一路”倡議的整體理念。這些地區基礎設施匱乏，需要資金和技術來增強經濟連通，並發揮北極地區的潛在實力。利用基礎設施，尤其是針對基礎設施建設的融資，來向不熟悉甚至是不友好的地區推進，這已經成為了中國的一種行為方式。在北極地區開發船運航線正是建立經濟連通項目的一環，而連通性是“一帶一路”倡議的關鍵特色/優先事項。

雖然國際社會對中國在北極地區的“宣言”還存在諸多懷疑與擔憂，但一些北極國家已經對此表示歡迎。如果沒有一個或多個關鍵北極國家對該提議的支持，中國將很難提出一個如此重大的項目。俄羅斯一直是中國建立“極地絲綢之路”倡議的關鍵因素。中國國家主席習近平在2017年7月與俄羅斯總理梅德韋傑夫的會見中首次提出了這一項目。鑒於習近平領導下的中國和普京領導下的俄羅斯日益緊密的雙邊關係，俄羅斯意圖引入中國投資來開採其位於遠北地區的能源資源並建設東北船運航線，這條航線號稱是連接東北亞和西歐的最短海上交通路線。對北極國家實施“分而治之”已經成為了中國北極政策的關鍵組成部分之一。中國正在積極向冰島和格陵蘭島伸出橄欖枝，通過提供中國援助和資金來尋求這些國家對中國開展北極活動的支持。而擁有諸如俄羅斯這樣關鍵北極國家的支持，對於中國實現其更為複雜、雄心勃勃的野心——“極地絲綢之路”而言，是不可或缺的。

The release of China's Arctic White Paper in late January brought broad attention to China's somewhat nascent but rapidly expanding role and interests in the Arctic region. China's perception of the Arctic has been increasingly strategic in the past decade. Even though most of the information in the White Paper is not new, initiatives such as the Polar Silk Road could indicate a coming surge in China's political and economic endeavors in the Arctic. The reception of China's declaration on the Arctic has been mixed. While many countries are secretly or openly anxious about China's intentions, the support from some Arctic countries, especially Russia, on the Polar Silk Road greatly boosts China's confidence and chance of progress.

China's intentions in the Arctic region have always been a focal point of debate. If the White Paper serves as a guideline, China's current priorities in the Arctic seem to be focused on three areas. In terms of commercial interests, the paper emphasizes the exploration of natural resources and the development of the Arctic shipping lane. In terms of global challenges, China is focused on climate change, environmental degradation and sustainable development in relation to the Arctic. The Arctic is identified in China as a platform to experiment with China's role in global governance that maximizes China's voice and interests. To ensure China's legitimate voice and role in Arctic affairs, China has adopted a series of policy initiatives, including enhancing scientific research, promoting the role of multilateral fora on Arctic affairs, including but also beyond the Arctic Council, enhancing political and economic bilateral coordination and cooperation with willing Arctic states, pursuing commercial cooperation with local indigenous peoples, and improving policy studies related to the Arctic.

It is worth pointing out that throughout the White Paper, the issue of military security is completely left out. Based on China's past and current military—especially navy— research on the Arctic, it would be wrong to assume that the military aspects of the Arctic are not an issue. For example, in the past five years, the Naval Command College and Naval Research Institute of China have conducted three Arctic research projects under the National Social Science Research Fund. One of them is on the establishment of a supply base in the Arctic and the other two are about the Arctic shipping lane. It is safe to assume that more projects have been conducted outside the National Social Science Research Fund. However, the complete evasion of this topic in the paper most likely suggests China's unwillingness to raise too much attention to its nascent strategy on the Arctic, and indicates that soft approaches through investment and cooperation are high on China's agenda to open the door to the polar region.

For a long time, China has suffered from an identity crisis over its role in the Arctic. The Arctic White Paper names China as an integral player and a key stakeholder in the Arctic's affairs and identifies key Chinese national interests in the Arctic. However, China's exhaustive efforts to justify its role in the Arctic also reveal a carefully calibrated approach due to China's non-Arctic state identity. China understands that it is not an Arctic state and does not possess land or maritime territory in the Arctic. Therefore, the most the country could claim is that China is a “near Arctic state.” That fact significantly limits China's ability to poach in the Arctic region. It also determines that China has to seek cooperation with Arctic states and other international as well as local entities to shape policies and outcomes.

This calls for serious qualifications in evaluating China's ambition and approaches to the Arctic. China is indeed ambitious and will not neglect any opportunity to claim what it could potentially and legitimately be entitled to, given the Arctic's special nature as global commons. Given the opportunity, China will maximize its efforts to shape the discourse on the Arctic to expand China's influence and interests. However, it should be pointed out that at this stage, many of the Chinese interests remain prospects and are therefore subject to constant adaptations and changes.

The Arctic White Paper plays a key role in confirming many of the Arctic policies that China has been pursuing, such as science diplomacy, and illustrating the priorities of China's ambition. The proposal to build a Polar Silk Road based on the development of the Arctic shipping route has caught the broadest attention from Arctic observers. Including the polar region in China's Belt and Road Initiative had been in discussion for some time, but the White Paper is the first formal government statement to announce its inclusion.

The logic of the Polar Silk Road follows China's overall rationale on the Belt and Road Initiative. There is a lack of infrastructure and a need for financing and technologies to increase the economic connectivity and potential of the Arctic region. To use infrastructure, especially financing, as a way of pushing into an unfamiliar or unfriendly domain has become a pattern for China. The focus on the Arctic shipping lane falls under the mandate of building connectivity projects, the key feature/priority of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Despite wide international suspicion and concern about China's “declaration” on the Arctic, some Arctic states have been more welcoming. Without one or more key Arctic states' embrace of the proposal, it would have been difficult and awkward for China to introduce such a major proposal. Russia has been a key factor in China's proposal to build the Polar Silk Road. Chinese President Xi Jinping first raised the project with Russian Prime Minister Medvedev in July 2017. In the broader context of warm ties between China and Russia under Presidents Xi and Putin, Russia has its eyes on Chinese investment in energy stakes in its Far North as well as the northeast shipping route, which presumably is the shortest sea lane of communications between Northeast Asia and Western Europe. To “divide and conquer” the Arctic states has been a key element of China's Arctic policy. China has actively reached out to Iceland and Greenland, soliciting their support of China's Arctic endeavor in exchange for Chinese assistance and financing. However, having the backing of a major Arctic state such as Russia is indispensable to China's more intricate and ambitious agenda, the Polar Silk Road.