10月23日，安倍以自民黨總裁身份領軍眾院大選，三選三勝，創下自民黨60年建黨史上首個範例。而自2012年12月以來，執政聯盟連續三次贏得超過2/3議席，確保了“修憲動議”的法定席數，也堪稱和平憲法實施以來絕無僅有。此次勝選，掃平了內外執政障礙，為安倍贏得四年時間，如不出意外，到2019年11月，安倍累計任期即可超過日本憲政史上最長的桂太郎，成為名副其實的創紀錄者。這雖是意料之中，但其未來或仍在預測之外。今後，安倍政治走向何方，內外政策如何運作，尤其是作為世界經濟的三強之一，日本經濟將如何運營，必將對亞太地區產生不可忽視的影響。

本輪選舉，留下兩個結果：一是廢掉了最大的在野黨民進黨，其選前席位70席，選後則名實俱滅。二是黨內“後安倍”的覬覦者遭遇安倍長期政權，錯過政治機遇期，不得不面臨隔代競爭局面。安倍成功攘外安內，穩固了執政根基，但也暴露了日本政治生態“位尊而德不崇”的痼疾。

首先，安倍搞奇襲解散眾院，缺少日本社會所推崇的“大義名分”。今年8月，安倍為挽回政治面子已經實施了一次內閣改組，政局煥然一新，支持率也隨之回升，讓各方產生年內不會解散的錯覺。但安倍為進一步壓制黨內外的反安倍勢力，確保長治久安，不惜被指缺少政治道義，聲東擊西，給黨內外競爭者打了個措手不及。而早在年初，安倍為掃清蟬聯自民黨總裁障礙，親自主導修改黨規，將總裁任期從2任6年改為3任9年。為此，只要2018年眾院任期屆滿前舉行大選，安倍即可獲得穩控政局至2021年的機會，既可為東京奧運剪綵，又可借天皇換位開闢“新紀元”。

其次，面對安倍的無德大選，各方來不及提出像樣的政策議題，競選“對立軸”也難以樹立。各黨黨首隻能靠巡遊全國，在街頭互斗，而不是系統宣講政策主張，使民心渙散，或提前草草投票，或放棄投票。結果，投票率只達53.6%，僅次於2014年，為戰後第二低。原本因降低了選舉人年齡後的首次選舉會新增240萬人選民，但平庸的政策議題反倒丟失選民，折射日本政治漸失魅力。

三是，小池百合子弄巧成拙，自導烏龍，瓦解了在野勢力，反而幫了安倍的忙。選前，小池百合子人氣高漲，眾望所歸，舉“希望之黨”，標榜“國民第一”，她發誓阻止安倍長期執政，贏得民進黨新任黨首前原誠司帥眾投靠。但因小池搞事前清洗，排除異己，迫使民進黨的左派改旗易幟，自建“立憲民主黨”，異軍突起奪走55席，一躍成為超過“希望之黨”的最大在野黨。由此形成的三極混戰局面，也將中間選民推給了安倍。

在這樣的選舉背景下，安倍內外政策難脫機會主義和民粹主義的糟粕。特別是，面對高喊“美國第一”、不斷拆台國際多邊體制的特朗普，更難期待安倍能拿出有利於地區共贏、國際公平正義的政策。年底前，儘管亞太經合組織會議、東亞峰會等系列會議將在東亞密集召開，中美日領導人同台展開外交的機會較多，但安倍的心思不在於此，而是要借特朗普來訪，加固日美同盟，綁定日美地區政策，主導地區秩序和規則。

值得注意的是，今年是中日邦交正常化45周年，明年是中日簽訂“和平友好條約”40周年。而中日韓領導人會晤至今仍在日本擱淺，如何重啟，關乎明年安倍是否有理由求訪中國，推進中日關係改善。同時，今年也是東盟成立50周年，以東盟為中心的地區合作機制因TPP而難以深化。眼下，安倍政權將不包括美國的“TPPII”及“日歐EPA”擺到優先位置，而關於如何對接中國“一帶一路”尚未提上日程。相反，安倍卻在政治和安全上，繼續強調修憲，要給自衛隊找“合憲性”，應對所謂的地區威脅。如此看，安倍自第二次出山以來，雖在國政選舉上屢戰屢勝，但並未通曉為政者的最高境界不在於追求“位尊”，而在於達到“德崇”的道理。縱使安倍任期超過憲政以來最長的桂太郎，只要其在內外政策上繼續走偏，搖擺不定，就很難構建穩定的中美日三邊關係,對地區穩定作出貢獻也無從談起。

For the third consecutive time, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Liberal Democratic Party won an overwhelming majority in the lower house of Parliament. This win is unprecedented in the 60 years of the LDP's history, and could mean Abe has the votes required to revise Japan's pacifist constitution. This victory also paved the way for Abe to win another four years in office. If so, by November 2019, Abe will become Japan's longest-serving prime minister, outdoing Katsura Taro. How his policies will unfold, and how the Japanese economy will perform will have a significant impact on the Asia-Pacific region.

The election crippled the Democratic Party, Japan's largest opposition party, which lost most of the 70 seats it held before the election. It also left little room for anyone within his own party to challenge him. Abe succeeded in consolidating the foundation of his government, but this also exposed deep problem within Japan's political ecosystem.

First, Abe called a snap election by dissolving the House of Representatives, a move considered unprincipled. In August, Abe reshuffled his cabinet in an attempt to save “political face”. The reshuffle injected new vigor into the political system and led to a rebound in his approval rating. In order to further suppress opponents within his party and to ensure the stability of his government, he then called a snap election, catching everyone off guard. As early as the beginning of this year, to pave the way to lead the LDP for another term, Abe personally led revisions to his party's charter, extending the LDP president's maximum term of office from two terms (six years) to three terms (nine years). With the new rule in place, as long as the general election of the House of Representatives is held in 2018 upon expiry of its tenure, Abe would definitely have the chance to govern the country till 2021. In such a scenario, Abe will have the honor of opening the Tokyo Olympic Games, and could also usher in a “new era” by cashing in on the abdication of Emperor Akihito and the coronation of the new emperor.

Second, Abe's gambit offered other parties no time to put together their policy agendas. The leaders of the other parties went on nationwide tours and locked horns with each other, but didn't have an opportunity to explain their policies in detail. Voters were disappointed, casting their ballots hastily or choosing not to vote at all. The turnout rate was only 53.6%, the second lowest in postwar Japan's history, higher only than the 2014 election's. As the first general election after the lowering of the voting age, the number of qualified voters increased by 2.4 million, but the actual voting rate turned out to be disappointedly low. This shows that a mediocre policy agenda can no longer charm voters, who are losing interest in Japanese politics.

Third, Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike's self-defeating moves weakened the opposition and turned out to be of great help to Abe. Before the election, Koike, as the leader of the Party of Hope, was very popular, and she vowed to end Abe's rule. With these encouraging signs, the Democratic Party, which was led by Seiji Maehara, chose to merge with Koike's party. However, due to Koike's moves to “cleanse dissidents”, the left-wing forces from the Democratic Party rebelled against Koike and set up the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, which won 55 seats in the lower house, overtaking the Party of Hope to become the largest opposition party.

With these factors being taken into account, Abe's domestic and foreign policies could easily be labeled as “opportunistic” and “populist”. In particular, at the times when Donald Trump advocates “America First” and attempts to undermine the global multilateral system, it would be daydreaming to expect Abe to adopt and implement policies that are beneficial to win-win regional cooperation, international fairness and justice. Before the end of this year, a series of international meetings, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and East Asia Summit, will be held in Asia, and leaders from China, the US and Japan are expected to have more diplomatic interactions at such events. However, Abe might not have interest in such interactions, and instead wants to make use of the Trump visit to strengthen Japan-US alliance, to coordinate US-Japan stances on regional policies and to dominate in the regional order and rules.

This year marks the 45th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, and next year will celebrate the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the two countries. The China-Japan-South Korea summit has been postponed indefinitely, and when and how it could be restarted will affect whether Abe can justify visiting China next year. At present, Abe's government is concentrating on the TPP and the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, and has not been receptive to China's Belt and Road Initiative. He is still busy pursuing revisions to the constitution to build up Japan's military in response to “regional threats”. Abe fared well in the elections, but he has failed to grasp the essence of a politician: not to seek high positions but to attain virtue. Although Abe may replace Katsura Taro as the longest-serving prime minister in postwar Japan's history, he will not contribute to regional stability if he continues with his extreme and unstable policies.