《環球郵報》在中國總理李克強正式訪問加拿大前夕報道說，加拿大和中國同意啟動有關引渡條約的談判。經過草率認定，不僅《環球郵報》同一天的社論，就連議會反對派和一眾新聞評論員對這一決定也是冷嘲熱諷。《環球郵報》擔心這類條約會讓加拿大及其司法制度同北京的“高壓手段”產生瓜葛。其他人則提到了中國的高處決率，中國缺乏正當程序和透明度的“野蠻”司法體系，以主當前反腐運動背後的政治動機。次日《環球郵報》繼續危言聳聽，在頭版刊登文章，講述中國特工如何扮成遊客進入加拿大，追捕習近平反腐運動下的逃犯，勸他們回國自首。這種所謂的“獵狐行動”其實世人皆知，在加拿大以外的許多國家都發生過。本文不是給他們找借口，而是提供背景，說明為什麼與中國簽訂引渡條約符合加拿大（及中國）的利益。

除了批評中國的人權記錄和特工的所作所為，加拿大媒體立即聯想到了數日前加拿大人高凱文的獲釋。高凱文以間諜罪被中國關押了兩年，他和妻子自稱基督教的“傳教士”，2014年8月被捕之前，他們在中朝邊境經營一家咖啡店。多數加拿大人認為，對高凱文的指控是無中生有，或許是對加拿大公開指責中國網絡間諜攻擊國家研究委員會的報復。9月初特魯多總理正式訪問中國期間，向對方提出了高凱文一案。特魯多的這次訪問被認為相當成功，在前哈珀政府對華關係起起伏伏後，他實現了“重啟”雙邊關係的目的（訪華期間，特魯多宣布加拿大將申請加入亞投行，加中籤署了12億美元的貿易協議，加方宣布在華開設更多簽證中心，甚至近在眼前的油菜籽進口禁令也暫時叫停，解決了加拿大農民的燃眉之急）。但特魯多有一個問題沒有解決：他離開中國的時候，高凱文還關在監獄裡。經過快速閉門審判，高凱文於9月14日被釋放。

就在審判並驅逐高凱文的前幾天，特魯多先生的國家安全顧問丹尼爾·讓在北京討論了啟動引渡條約談判的問題。政府聲稱，高凱文的釋放與啟動條約談判之間不存在利益交換和直接聯繫。也許確實是沒有明確的關連。中國人並不想在李克強訪問加拿大前夕找麻煩，特魯多訪華期間釋放高凱文也並不丟臉。事實上，兩國最高層之間的建設性對話才是解決問題的推手。

僅僅為解決一個領事案件而同意啟動引渡條約談判，對特魯多政府來說是不可能的。相反，決定啟動談判的依據是要讓涉及中國的法律問題有一個堅實透明的基礎。向加拿大派遣秘密特工的事情早已有之，甚至在習近平反腐運動之前就有。聲名狼藉的走私犯（同時賄賂中國官員）賴昌星1999年持假護照進入加拿大，並申請難民身份。他在被遣返之前足足爭取了12年，為的是避免被引渡回中國。賴昌星事件和讓他回國的政治壓力（暫且不討論他的罪行），成為中國不明智地背着加拿大當局擅自追捕罪犯的佐證。處理這類問題的最好方式，是用“正式”機製取代目前的“非正式”手段。與中國當局定期對話，用法律框架處理賴昌星這樣的問題，會使現狀顯著改善，讓中方不再我行我素。這是加拿大得到的第一個好處。

第二個好處是控制從中國大量流向加拿大的熱錢。沒人知道究竟有多少錢湧入加拿大，但後果大家都看得見，就是溫哥華飛漲的房價和BC省賭場里可疑的豪客。有人估計中國每年非法流出資金高達1萬億美元，加拿大吸收了其中相當一部分，原因是加拿大洗錢條例執行不力，機場執法寬鬆，甚至查獲到未申報的錢箱後，也只是象徵性罰款，錢仍然歸還持有者。其他多數國家都是將這種錢款沒收。據IBTimes報道，中國重要的經濟逃犯有26人在加拿大（美國40人）。加拿大並不需要這些人。阻止熱錢流入和貪官逃到加拿大的最可靠方法就是達成引渡條約，這樣他們很快會去別的地方。單是加拿大和中國就引渡進行談判（也許需要很多年）這件事，就能起到明顯的抑制作用。這是加拿大得到的另一個重要好處。

加拿大與中國簽訂引渡條約後，因政治問題而不是經濟犯罪的人可能命運未卜地遭到遣返。對於這種批評，特魯多總理說過，與中國就條約進行談判，加拿大會有嚴格的標準，會遵循符合加拿大價值觀的嚴格程序。從啟動條約談判到形成條約文本，其間是一個漫長的過程，而細節註定是關鍵。加拿大最新的引渡條約（與意大利簽訂，取代之前的條約）定義了可被引渡的罪行，即必須是兩國都認可的罪行。條約還列出了所需的證據標準，列出了一方為何可以拒絕引渡的強制性與任意性理由。可以認為，與中國的條約也將包含上述條件，甚至更多。中國與多數西方國家沒有簽訂引渡條約，除了澳大利亞（澳方尚未批准）、法國和西班牙，這些國家都有強大的法治傳統（當然西班牙是近些年的事）， 因此可以想像加拿大與中國也能找到共同點。當然，談判不會輕而易舉，也許要花很多年。在這期間展開進程與對話要遠遠好過目前的失控。

如果加拿大基於現有引渡模式和特魯多作出的保證，與中國達成協議， 那將有助於推動中國向國際司法標準靠攏，其過程也會消弭兩國的潛在麻煩，促進加中關係在其他領域向前發展。中國推動一項協議，幫助擴大其雙邊條約，收緊貪官身上的套索。這讓加拿大有討價還價優勢，去爭取達成加拿大公眾願意接受的協議。對加拿大來說這是另外的附帶好處。

批評者急於指責中國的司法體制，認定加拿大將變成同謀。他們對中國司法缺陷的批評是正當的，但並沒有批評到點子上。與中國打交道的方法應該是按照加拿大的利益和價值觀，制定雙邊的、基於法律的、明確合作內容的條約安排。這比嘴上譴責中國的體制而又一事無成強得多。

On the eve of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's official visit to Ottawa, the Globe and Mail reported that Canada and China had agreed to begin negotiations on an extradition treaty. In a hasty rush to judgment, this announcement was pilloried not only by the Globe in an editorial the same day, but by the opposition in Parliament and numerous other commentators. The Globe expressed concern that such a treaty risked implicating Canada and its judiciary in Beijing's “sledgehammer methods”. Others referred to Beijing high rate of executions, lack of due process and transparency in its “brutal” judicial system, and pointed to political motivations behind the current anti-corruption drive. The following day the Globe continued its breathless coverage, with a front-page story on Chinese agents entering Canada posing as tourists in an attempt to track down fugitives from President Xi's anti-corruption campaign and to try to persuade them to return to China to face the music. These activities, known as “Operation Fox Hunt” are widely known and have taken place in a number of countries besides Canada. That is not to excuse them, but to provide background for why an extradition treaty with China would be in Canada (and China's) interest.

In addition to criticism of China's human rights record and the activities of its undercover agents, there was immediate linkage in the Canadian press to the release, a few days earlier, of Canadian Kevin Garrett who had been held in detention in China on charges of spying. Garrett and his wife, self-professed Christian “missionaries” operated a coffee shop on the China-North Korea border prior to their arrest in August of 2014. Most Canadians assume the charges were trumped up as possible retaliation after Canada publicly accused China of being behind cyberespionage attacks on the National Research Council. Prime Minister Trudeau raised the Garrett case during his official visit to China at the beginning of September. He had what is generally regarded as a very successful visit, meeting his objective of “resetting” the bilateral relationship after the ups and downs of the previous Harper government (during the visit, Trudeau announced that Canada would apply to join the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, was present at the signing of $1.2 billion in trade deals, announced the opening of more visa centres in China and was even able to get an impending ban on the import of Canadian canola seed postponed, relieving an immediate problem for Canadian farmers). However, there was one problem Trudeau did not solve; when he left China Kevin Garrett was still in prison. He was finally released on September 14, after a quick closed-door trial.

The trial and expulsion took place a couple of days after Mr. Trudeau's National Security Advisor, Daniel Jean, was in Beijing to discuss the start of talks toward an extradition treaty. The government claims there was no quid pro quo and no direct connection between the release of Garrett and their agreement to start discussing a treaty, and there probably wasn't any explicit linkage. The Chinese wanted to get an irritant out of the way before Li visited Canada and couldn't lose face by releasing Garrett during Trudeau's visit. The fact that there was constructive dialogue between the two countries at the most senior level no doubt helped resolve the issue.

It is most unlikely that the Trudeau government would agree to begin negotiations on an extradition treaty just to secure the release of one consular case. Rather, the decision to proceed rests on the need to put legal issues with China on a firm and transparent basis. The issues behind the despatch of undercover agents to Canada go back a long way, even before the launch of Xi's anti-corruption drive. Notorious smuggler (and briber of Chinese officials) Lai Changxing, who entered Canada on a fraudulent passport in 1999, claimed refugee status and fought extradition to China for 12 years before he was finally repatriated. Lai's saga, and the political pressure that had to be applied to get him back (his crimes were not in dispute) was a contributing factor to China's ill advised “self-help” methods of pursing convicted criminals without informing the Canadian authorities. The best way to deal with such methods is to provide for a front-door mechanism to replace the current back-door approach. Regular dialogue with the Chinese authorities and a legal framework to handle cases like that of Lai would be a marked improvement over the status quo, and would help put an end to Chinese free-lancing. That is the first benefit for Canada.

A second would be a means to control the enormous flows of hot money from China to Canada. No one knows for sure how much money is flooding into Canada, but the results are well known in terms of an inflated property market in Vancouver and suspicious high rollers at BC casinos. Some estimate put the illegal outflow from China at up to $1 trillion per year, and Canada gets its fair share, in part because of weak enforcement of money-laundering regulations and even lax enforcement at airports where suitcases of undeclared money have been seized, and then returned to their owners on payment of a nominal fine. In most other countries the funds are confiscated. According to a report in the International Business Times, 26 of the top Chinese economic fugitives have fled to Canada (the US has 40). Canada does not need these people. The surest way to stop the flow of hot money and corrupt officials from fleeing to Canada is to put in place an extradition treaty. They will quickly go elsewhere. Just the fact that Canada and China are talking about extradition (and the talks may go on for many years) will act as a significant disincentive. This is another major benefit for Canada.

But what about the criticism that if Canada signs an extradition treaty with China it will be sending back to an uncertain fate persons guilty of political rather than economic crimes? Prime Minister Trudeau has said that Canada has high standards and will follow a rigorous process consistent with Canadian values in negotiating a treaty with China. Agreeing to begin negotiating a treaty is a long way from agreeing to the text of a treaty, and the devil will certainly be in the detail. Canada's most recent extradition treaty (with Italy, replacing an earlier treaty) defines an extraditable offence—it must be a crime in both countries—outlines standards of evidence required and lists a number of mandatory and discretionary reasons why either party can refuse extradition. One can assume that a treaty with China will contain these conditions, and more. While China does not have an extradition treaty with most western countries, it has one with Australia (not yet ratified by Australia), France and Spain, all countries with a strong rule of law tradition (Spain in recent years). Therefore it is not inconceivable that Canada and China can find common ground, although the negotiation will not be easy and could take a number of years. In the meantime, a process and a dialogue will be underway, something that is far superior to the “under-the-radar” activities that are currently occurring.

If Canada is able to conclude an agreement with China on the basis of its current extradition model and the assurances given by the Prime Minister, it will have helped nudge China closer to international judicial standards, and in the process will have removed a potential bilateral irritant, thus allowing Canada-China relations to move forward in other areas. China is pushing an agreement, in part to help it expand its network of bilateral treaties and tighten the noose on corrupt officials. This gives Canada leverage to get the kind of agreement that will be acceptable to the Canadian public. Here is yet another collateral benefit for Canada.

The critics are quick to condemn the Chinese judicial system, and to jump to the conclusion that Canada will become complicit. Their criticisms of the shortcomings of Chinese justice are valid, but they miss the point. The way to deal with China is to engage on the basis of Canadian interests and values and build a network of bilateral, legally-based treaty arrangements that will define the terms of cooperation. That is far better than decrying the Chinese system, but doing nothing about it.