韓國7月初決定允許美國部署“末段高空區域防禦系統（薩德）”。一直以來，美國都試圖將其盟國納入更廣的對抗朝鮮導彈的反導系統，但由於中國強烈反對，韓國遲遲未參與正式討論。

鑒於“薩德”雷達的探測距離，目前各方就它的技術範圍仍未形成共識，而且它是影響安全環境的雙刃劍。許多美國分析人士稱，反導系統升級只是防禦性的，有助於美國保護自身及盟國的安全利益，且該系統的技術制約使它不可能瞄準俄羅斯或中國。如美國分析人士所說，北京需要一個友善的後院半島，與韓國關係鬧僵不符合中國的利益。

但另一方中國分析人士卻認為，“薩德”並不能夠對付當前或未來來自朝鮮的威脅。他們認為，“薩德”雷達的真正目標是將中國（和俄羅斯）置於美國監視之下，甚至形成美韓日三國聯盟的實戰基礎。除了讓朝鮮加速發展其武器，中國分析人士認為“薩德”還會使南北朝鮮隔閡加深，降低統一的可能性。同時他們警告“薩德”會給中韓、俄韓關係帶來持久的破壞。

這一問題的核心是，對於如何看待韓國的作用和關乎朝鮮半島安全與穩定的決定，中美之間存在分歧。美國和韓國認為“薩德”是對付越來越可能的朝鮮核威脅的戰術性保障，而中國把“薩德”看成是美國方面的戰略舉措，是更大的遏制方略的組成部分。

選自：環球網

首爾對中國在該地區其他問題上的立場一向表態謹慎，其中最引人注目的，就是在涉及到中國的海洋主權爭端上不得罪各方。韓國需要與中國保持良好關係有兩個主要原因，而且它要避免把北京推向與韓國自身安全或與對付朝鮮不相干的領域。

第一個原因是，中國已經成為對韓國經濟福祉至關重要的國家。去年第四季度起，中國超過日本，成為繼美國之後的韓國第二大貿易夥伴。第二個原因是，無論現在與平壤打交道，還是將來朝鮮半島發生任何諸如統一的巨變，韓國都需要北京的外交實力來對付朝鮮。2013年，中國明顯把中朝關係從“特殊”降到“正常”，這使首爾與北京交好更為可行。

薩德落戶韓國星州郡（資料圖）

韓國官員堅持認為，“薩德”是一個雙邊問題，只與美韓應對或阻止朝鮮進攻的防禦能力有關，“薩德”的部署決定不應讓中國參與。而且，在韓國領土部署“薩德”的決定既已作出，許多韓國人就認為這個問題與聯盟一樣，屬於國內議題（在韓國，聯盟問題一向被當作屬於外交政策的內部事務）。

部署“薩德”的決定以及選址東南部的星州郡，在韓國國內激起了人們對決策程序和標準的熱議。韓國民調機構STA今年7月進行的調查顯示，45.8%的受訪者認為“薩德”的部署“減少了軍事有效性，加劇了與中國和俄羅斯的衝突，從而有礙國家利益”。

這與今年早些時候頗有不同。在朝鮮進行四次核試驗之後，當時首爾峨山政策研究院的一份民調顯示，74%的受訪者贊成部署“薩德”。而民調機構RealMeter在7月13日公布的調查顯示，支持者的比例為44.2%。而韓國蓋洛普8月初的民調顯示，支持“薩德”的人數佔56%。這表明，韓國人在評判“薩德”時，非常在意對“朝鮮威脅”的感受。

7月份STA的調查還顯示，大部分韓國受訪者（60.2%）某種程度上都認為，看似草率公布的部署“薩德”決定是迫於美國的壓力。這種感覺讓韓國人對美國盟國的作用展開更廣泛、更深入的討論。這類討論一度被認為是按黨派劃界的，但實際上它引起的分歧要微妙得多。

在7月25日的東盟地區論壇會議上，以及中國外長王毅與韓國外長尹炳世舉行的會晤中，王毅對（部署“薩德”的）決定表示了遺憾，稱這一決定“損害中韓互信”。他對尹炳世外長提出，韓方應認真維護與中國的雙邊關係。在7月24日的會談中，王毅還要求韓國撤銷其部署“薩德”的計劃，並暗示該計劃將給中韓關係帶來持久影響。

由於韓國不斷在中美之間調整自己的位置，這種替換其實象徵著更大的問題。正如暨南大學陳定定指出的，即使中韓關係沒有因為“薩德”徹底變壞，對“薩德”的爭執也提醒人們兩國之間長期存在結構性的緊張。

現在，決定已經作出，選址也已完成，要逆轉是不可能的。首爾不想示弱，尤其是朝鮮還在繼續加強其彈道導彈能力。北京在直接影響“薩德”的部署方面選擇無多。

雖然外交上模稜兩可，韓國面對中美之爭已經作出戰略抉擇，那就是支持它的長期盟友美國。部署“薩德”的決定及其後續，使韓國在東北亞的立場變得明確。韓國需要處理它與最強大盟友和前（也可以說是現在）地區宗主國之間的關係。不過，這兩個大國也必須調整對韓國的期望。對中美兩國來說，一個走投無路的韓國不會成為重要的橋樑，只會是難以相處的夥伴。

In early July, South Korea decided to allow the United States to deploy the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. The United States has been seeking to link its ally into a broader missile defense system against North Korean missiles, but South Korea had been slow to enter formal discussions due to vociferous Chinese objection to the system.

There is still no consensus on the technical scope of the THAAD battery due to its radar ranges, and its effect on the security environment is equally divisive. Many U.S. analysts contend that this defense systems upgrade is merely defensive and aids U.S. protection of the security interests of itself and its allies, and that the technical limitations of the system make it unable to target Russia or China. As U.S. analysts have argued, it is actually counter to Chinese interests to turn cold on South Korea, when Beijing needs a friendly peninsula in its backyard.

Chinese analysts, on the other hand, argue that THAAD cannot deal with current or potential North Korean threats. They contend that the real purpose of the radar is to keep China (and Russia) under U.S. surveillance and even potentially form the practical foundations of a trilateral U.S.-South Korea-Japan alliance. In addition to expediting further weapons development in North Korea, Chinese analysts suggest THAAD will drive the wedge between the two Koreas further, decreasing the possibility of reunification. Moreover, they warn of the continued damage that THAAD will cause to the South Korea's relationships with China and Russia.

At the heart of this issue is the difference in how China and the United States view the role of South Korea and decisions related to the security and stability of the peninsula. Whereas the United States and South Korea see THAAD as a tactical bulwark against the growing credibility of a North Korean nuclear threat, China sees THAAD as a strategic move on the part of the United States, part of a larger pattern of containment.

Source:www.huanqiu.com

For its part, Seoul has been reticent to make any statements on China's posture elsewhere in the region. This has been most noticeable in its complicated balancing act with ongoing maritime territorial conflicts involving China. South Korea needs good relations with China for two main reasons, and shies away from pushing Beijing in areas it sees as not directly related to its own security or dealings with North Korea.

First, China has become an immensely important country for South Korea's economic well-being: China surpassed Japan to become South Korea's second largest trading partner, after the United States, since the fourth quarter of last year. Second, South Korea needs Beijing's diplomatic weight vis-à-vis North Korea, both in dealing with Pyongyang now and in the event of any changes on the Korean peninsula, such as reunification. China's apparent downgrade of relations with North Korea from “special” to “normal” relations in 2013 makes Seoul's courting of Beijing even more viable.

THAAD being deployed in Seongju county,South Korea.

South Korean officials maintain that the THAAD issue is a bilateral one pertaining exclusively to U.S.-ROK defensive capabilities to meet or deter a North Korean attack and that the decision to deploy THAAD should not include China. Moreover, now that the decision to deploy THAAD on South Korean soil has been made, many South Koreans have suggested that the issue has become an area of domestic debate just as much as it is an alliance one (alliance concerns in South Korea historically have been considered as much of a domestic issue as a foreign policy one).

In South Korea, the decision to deploy THAAD and the selection of the Seongju County in southeastern South Korea has provided new kindling wood to the hot domestic debate over the process and criteria of the final decision. In a July poll conducted by South Korean polling service STA, 45.8 percent of respondents believed that THAAD deployment will “hinder the national interest by reducing military effectiveness and aggravating conflict with China and Russia.”

This is a bit of a swing from earlier this year—following the fourth North Korean nuclear test—when a poll from the Seoul-based Asan Institute for Policy Studies reported that 74 percent of respondents favored deployment of THAAD. A July 13 Real Meter survey put the level of support at 44.2 percent. But an early August Gallup Korea poll placed support for THAAD at 56 percent. What this shows us is that South Korean opinion about THAAD is extremely sensitive to the perception of the North Korean threat.

The July STA poll also showed that the majority of South Korean respondents—60.2 percent—believe to some degree that what seemed to be a rushed announcement regarding THAAD deployment was due to U.S. pressure. Part of this sentiment links to a much broader and deeper debate among South Koreans on the role of the U.S. alliance. This debate, which once was thought to cut along party affiliation lines, is actually much more nuanced in its divisiveness.

At a sideline meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang and South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se and at the ASEAN Regional Forum on July 25, Minister Wang expressed regret over the decision, citing the THAAD decision as, “[undermining] the foundations of trust between the two countries” and asked Minister Yun how South Korea would work to protect its bilateral relations with China. Last week [on July 24], Minister Wang asked South Korea to rescind its plans to deploy THAAD, suggesting it will have a lasting effect on Sino-South Korean relations.

The exchange is symptomatic of a much bigger issue, as South Korea continues to negotiate its place between China and the United States. As Dingding Chen of Jinan University points out, even though the China-South Korea relationship will not completely sour over this issue, the THAAD debate is a reminder of the longstanding structural tensions between the two countries.

Now that the decision, as well as site selection, have been made, reversal of the THAAD decision is unlikely. Seoul will not want to look weak, particularly as North Korea continues to develop its ballistic missile capabilities. And Beijing has few options for directly influencing THAAD deployment.

Despite any diplomatic ambiguities, South Korea's strategic decision in regards to the Sino-U.S. rivalry has already been made in favor of its long-standing ally, the United States. The THAAD decision and its aftermath makes it clear where South Korea stands in Northeast Asia. South Korea will need to negotiate its relationship between its strongest ally and its former (and arguably current) regional suzerain. However, these two great powers will also need to recalibrate their expectations of South Korea. Rather than serving as an important bridge, a cornered South Korea will be a difficult partner for both.