1970年以來全球商業航運量幾乎增加了四倍，如今每年有近9萬艘商船裝載着98.4億噸貨物通過印度洋。霍爾木茲海峽、馬六甲海峽和曼德海峽是全球最重要的三大航運瓶頸，3600萬桶石油由此運出，等於全球近40%的石油供應和64%的石油貿易運量需要經過這一海域。除了40%的石油產量，印度洋還佔據全球漁業產量的近15%。

它無疑是連接中東、歐美、東南亞、大洋洲和東亞的一個戰略性貿易樞紐。印度洋上貿易航線的任何中斷，都可能對中國、日本、韓國等主要經濟體以及產油的波斯灣等地區產生巨大影響。簡單說就是，也許沒有比印度洋更重要的大洋了。

隨着1968年英國海軍從“東蘇伊士”撤出，美國人繼而介入。通過與英國的共同安排，美國租借了英屬印度洋領地的一個小島——迪戈加西亞島，在驅逐和遷走當地的近千居民後，美國在印度洋建立了永久海軍基地。該基地是美國在印度洋優勢地位的象徵，威懾着所有對美國發起挑戰的對手。這個地方是如此神秘，以至於不存在前往迪戈加西亞島的班機或海上交通服務。

中國在印度洋的利益與它的能源需求和商業利益同步擴大，中國一躍成為世界上最大的貿易國。中國近80%的能源進口和95%的貨物運輸要經過印度洋，尤其是兩大主要航運瓶頸，而它的整條航線都在美國和印度的軍事控制下，這兩個國家都把中國視為對手。實際上，中國的“海上絲綢之路”倡議使它更迫切地需要控制其貿易航線。任何一個與開放貿易利害攸關的國家，都無法承受在海上任由對手擺布。也因此，中國一直熱衷於借西方媒體所說的“珍珠鏈”港口實現在印度洋的永久存在，它在緬甸、斯里蘭卡、巴基斯坦等幾個沿海國家開發港口，同時還盯上了塞舌爾、蒙巴薩、達累斯薩拉姆等其他地區港口。2017年7月，中國在吉布提建立海外海軍基地，為目前中國在紅海一帶的永久性反海盜部署提供支援。

中國的崛起挑戰着美國在印度洋的主導地位。數十年來，美國一直試圖挑起印度對崛起的中國的恐懼，并力圖招募印度充當地區警察，以此來對抗中國。奧巴馬時代的“重返亞洲”也是這一戰略目標的組成部分。美國支持印度對抗中國，因為這與它遏制中國這一更廣泛的安全戰略目標是一致的。而渴望獲得地區主導地位的印度也歡迎美國的存在和支持，因為這與它主宰印度洋的願景相吻合。在利益上相互支持，這對它們的共同對手中國是不利的。

說到中國在斯里蘭卡、緬甸和巴基斯坦的港口建設，以及在吉布提的第一個海外海軍基地，印度和美國的海軍戰略家們謊稱他們擔心所謂的中國海軍在印度洋日益增長的存在，可是，他們卻無視美國海軍在迪戈加西亞島的存在，無視遍布印度海岸、安達曼群島以及如今設在毛里裘斯和塞舌爾群島的印度海軍基地。尤其安達曼群島離馬六甲海峽很近，這讓中國的海上利益面臨嚴重風險。然而，中國海軍在印度洋地區的存在主要是執行打擊海盜任務，屬於索馬里近海及紅海地區多邊安排的一部分。

印美印兩國一直特彆強調要進一步加強海上關係，尤其是2015年發表《美印亞太及印度洋地區聯合戰略願景聲明》之後。有關軍事關係的四個基礎協議允許雙方共享情報、使用戰略性海軍設施，等等。當然在現在的印度政府看來，美國加強在印度洋地區的存在是印度對抗中國的重要對沖。

印度和美國自1992年以來開始舉行的“馬拉巴爾”海上軍演，也展示出兩國的海上合作正在迅速發展。隨着2015年日本加入，現在澳大利亞也加入（曾於2007年退出），軍演的規模和範圍都有所擴大。這四個國家現在組成的“四方安全對話”（Quad），被美國的智庫和媒體吹捧為反對“獨裁”中國的民主國家集團。拜登總統首次參加的國際活動——四方首次（線上）峰會凸顯了美國外交政策的方向。

開國總理賈瓦哈拉爾•尼赫魯曾將印度洋上的所有外國勢力拒之門外，自那以後，印度對外交政策的看法已經發生了變化。隨着印度現在與美國結盟，總理納倫德拉·莫迪承認，印度願意與“在該地區擁有強大利益和利害關係”的域外大國合作。也因此，印度和美國之間有了四個基礎軍事協議，如今美印兩國舉行的軍演比任何兩個國家都多。

美國國防部長勞埃德·奧斯丁上任兩個月後對印度進行訪問，稱印度是“在當今快速變化的國際態勢下日益重要的合作夥伴”，這顯示了拜登政府對把印度當作對抗中國的地區代理人的重視。

中國的“一帶一路”倡議和“海上絲綢之路”需要海上自由，這使得中國和美國為爭奪印度洋的安全控制權展開了一場較量。由於印度現在選擇與美國在安全方面聯手，而這種關係顯然與中國的利益是敵對的，因此，一場對印度洋控制權的爭奪將導致資源的消耗，並有可能進一步加劇印度洋沿岸國家的分化。這種狀況既不符合兩國的最大利益，也不符合整個亞洲的利益。亞洲的未來最好是將外來者擋在門外。

Representing nearly a fourfold increase in the volume of commercial shipping since 1970 almost 90,000 vessels carrying 9.84 billion tons of cargo travel through the Indian Ocean annually. Three of the most critical global shipping choke points – Straits of Hormuz, Malacca Straits and Bab-el-Mandeb, from which some 36 million barrels of oil, equivalent to nearly 40 percent of global oil supply and 64 percent of oil trade pass through are in this ocean. In addition to 40 percent of oil production, the Indian Ocean accounts for nearly 15 percent of the world's commercial fishing.

It is unquestionably a strategic trading hub connecting the Middle East to Europe and Americas, to Southeast Asia, Oceania and East Asia. Any disruption in the Indian Ocean trading routes can have a huge impact upon major economies like China, Japan, Korea, the oil producing Persian Gulf, and beyond. In short, there is perhaps no other ocean as important in comparison.

Following the withdrawal of the British from its naval commitments 'east of Suez,' in 1968 the Americans stepped in. Through a mutual arrangement with the British, the U.S. leased Diego Garcia, a small island in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) and set up a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean after expelling and relocating nearly 1,000 local residents. This base symbolizes the American preeminence in the ocean and deters any adversary to challenge the U.S. The place is so secretive that no regular flights or maritime traffic operate to Diego Garcia.

China's interests in the Indian Ocean have expanded in parallel with its energy needs and commercial interests that have catapulted China to the status of the biggest trading nation in the world. Nearly 80 percent of China's energy imports and 95 percent of its goods traffic passes through the Indian Ocean, particularly involving the two of the major shipping choke points. The entire shipping routes are militarily controlled by the U.S. and India – the two countries that consider China as their adversary. Its 'Maritime Silk Road' initiative have actually made the need for China to control shipping on its trade routes more acute. No country with so much at stake on open trade can afford to leave the seas at the mercy of its adversaries. China has therefore been keen to make its presence in the Indian Ocean permanent through what the western media calls, 'string of pearl' ports – developing ports in several littoral states like Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and eyeing other regional ports like Seychelles, Mombasa, Dar us Salam, and more. China set up its overseas naval base in Djibouti in July 2017, which supports China's permanent anti-piracy deployment around the Red Sea region for now.

China's rise challenges American primacy in the Indian Ocean. For decades the U.S. has tried to stoke India's fears of rising China and has sought to enlist India as a regional gendarme against China. The Obama era 'Pivot to Asia' was also a part of this strategic aim. American support for India against China aligns with its broader security and strategic goals of containing China. India, aspiring for regional primacy, welcomed the American's presence and support as much as it aligns with the Indian vision of dominating the Indian Ocean. Mutual support for each other's interest works against their common adversary – China.

Citing Chinese port building in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Pakistan and its first overseas naval base in Djibouti, Indian and American naval strategists are ostensibly concerned at what they claim as growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. But they overlook the American naval presence in Diego Garcia and Indian naval stations all across India's coast, in Andamans, and now in Mauritius and Seychelles. The Andamans is particularly close to the Malacca Straits, putting the Chinese maritime interests at serious risk. China's naval presence in the Indian Ocean region is however, mostly for the anti-piracy missions as a part of a multilateral arrangements close to the Somali coast and the Red Sea region.

The two countries have, especially since the signing of 'U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision Statement for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region' in 2015, laid special emphasis in furthering maritime ties. The four-foundation agreements on military relations allow for intelligence sharing, use of strategic naval facilities and much more. Surely, the current Indian government believes that America's forward presence in the Indian Ocean region as a vital hedge against China.

The burgeoning naval collaboration is also demonstrated through the 'Malabar' naval exercises that India and the U.S. have held since 1992. Joined by Japan in 2015 and now Australia (after exiting in 2007) these have grown in size and scope. These four states now constitute 'the Quad' – touted as group of democracies against 'authoritarian' China by the American think tanks and the media. President Biden's first international engagement – the first (virtual) summit of the Quad underscores the direction American foreign policy is taking.

Indian outlook towards the foreign policy has changed since the days of its founding prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru when India shut out all foreign presence in the Indian Ocean. With India now aligned to the U.S., Prime Minister Narendra Modi concedes that India was willing to work with extra- regional powers “with strong interests and stakes in the region.” Hence, the four foundation military agreements between India and the U.S.. The U.S. and India now conduct more military exercises than any other two states.

Secretary for Defense Mr. Lloyd Austin declared India as “an increasingly important partner among today's rapidly shifting international dynamic,” within two months of assumption of post on a visit to India, demonstrating the importance that the Biden administration attaches to India as a regional surrogate against China.

China's 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI) and its 'Maritime Silk Road' which necessitates freedom of the seas sets up a tussle for security control of the Indian Ocean between China and the U.S.. And since India has now chosen to be in a security relationship with the U.S. that is clearly hostile to the Chinese interests, a contest for control of Indian Ocean will consume resources and in likelihood further polarize the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. Such a state is not in the best interests of either of the countries or Asia at large. Asia's future is best served with keeping the outsiders out.