俄羅斯總統普京時隔24年對朝鮮進行國事訪問，雙方簽署了《全面戰略夥伴關係條約》。條約規定，當任何締約方遭受侵略時，另一方將向其提供援助。近期，美國不斷指責朝鮮向俄提供彈藥、俄羅斯向朝提供先進軍事技術。在俄朝關係走向對抗美國准同盟的同時，國際分析人士也高度關注此訪對中國的影響，他們主要有兩種觀點，一是認為俄朝軍事接近將導致中國在半島的影響力弱化，二是認為這將為美國強化東亞同盟提供借口，導致中美關係進一步惡化。但筆者認為，這些觀點是對中俄美關係和東北亞安全的誤讀。

首先，俄羅斯不是朝鮮半島最核心利益攸關方，其在半島問題上的影響力必須通過中俄戰略協作和多邊對話機制實現。從歷史上看，1950-53年的朝鮮戰爭，俄羅斯不是直接參戰方，沒有參與停戰談判，也不是朝鮮戰爭停戰協定的簽字方。朝鮮、中國和美國才是停戰協定簽字方，這意味着半島最核心的外部利益攸關方是中國和美國。上世紀90年代，朝鮮半島問題四方會談參加國是朝鮮、韓國、中國和美國。21世紀初，中國主導建立“六方會談”後，俄羅斯和日本被邀請加入。2018年4月，朝韓領導人板門店峰會後發表的聯合聲明也表示，同意探索朝韓美或朝韓美中四方會談，將停戰協定轉變為和平條約，建立一個長久穩固的和平機制。

除了東北亞以外，俄羅斯在朝鮮半島問題上的戰略利益更有對歐洲安全的考量。俄羅斯的戰略重心始終在歐洲，但歐亞安全問題又相互影響。在烏克蘭問題上，俄羅斯認為是冷戰後歐洲安全架構的嚴重失衡造成了安全危機和衝突。因此，在東北亞地區建構一個均衡、包容和可持續的安全架構，將有利於強化俄羅斯在歐洲安全上的主張。普京訪朝當天在《勞動新聞》上發表文章，清晰表明了要在“歐亞地區建設相互平等和不可分割的安全架構”。

為此，俄羅斯對中國在半島問題上的主張和提議積極支持。例如，2017年7月4日，中俄兩國外長在莫斯科發表關於朝鮮半島的聯合聲明，雙方以中方關於朝鮮暫停核導活動和美韓暫停大規模聯合軍演的“雙暫停”倡議、實現朝鮮半島無核化和建立半島和平機制的“雙軌並行”思路以及俄方解決朝鮮半島問題的分步走設想為基礎，提出了共同倡議。今年5月普京訪華，雙方發表的聯合聲明中再次呼籲國際社會支持中俄的共同倡議。

第二，俄朝此次戰略夥伴條約並非類似美國和日韓那樣的軍事同盟，沒有改變地區的力量平衡。相反，美國近年在雙邊同盟基礎上建構小多邊安全機制，呈現了軍事同盟集團化傾向，本質上已經在改變力量平衡和戰略穩定。

到2018年為止，中俄與美國在聯合國積極合作，通過了多項限制朝鮮發展核導活動和實施一定程度經濟制裁的安理會決議。2018年，朝鮮半島外交出現重大轉機，中俄兩國按照上述雙軌思路為恢復“六方會談”積極創造條件。然而，2019年美朝河內首腦會談後，雙方關係出現全面停滯，其主要原因是美國堅持朝鮮完全棄核和進行不可逆的無核化，之後美國才考慮解除制裁和討論關係正常化。為打破僵局，2019年底，中俄向安理會提交草案，主張鑒於朝鮮核導活動暫停，履行了安理會決議部分義務，應調整對朝鮮的制裁。但由於美國和盟友堅決反對，朝鮮半島外交的重要窗口期再次被錯過。拜登政府執政後不斷強化軍事威懾和經濟制裁，朝鮮則通過強化軍力來應對，半島局勢進一步緊張。在中國看來，美國半島政策之所以強硬，本質上是要以朝鮮核導計劃為借口在東北亞加強軍事部署，維持霸權。

俄朝接近現階段主要是政治上的，關鍵信號是地區安全必須建立在平等安全基礎之上。而朝鮮半島要想持久和平，最終仍需回到“六方會談”的多邊外交軌道上來。

Russian President Vladimir Putin recently paid a state visit to North Korea, the first in 24 years, during which the leaders of the two countries signed a pact for a comprehensive strategic partnership. The pact includes “the provision of mutual assistance in the event of aggression against one of the parties to this agreement.”In recent days, Washington has persistently accused Pyongyang of ​​providing ammunition to Moscow, and Moscow of supplying advanced military technology to Pyongyang. But as the Russia-North Korea relationship edges closer to an alliance against the United States, international analysts are more concerned about the implications of Putin's visit for China. There are two prevailing views. First, closer military cooperation between Russia and North Korea will diminish China's influence on the peninsula; second, their cooperation will serve as a pretext for the United States to strengthen its alliances across East Asia, potentially further straining its relations with China. I believe, however, that these views stem from a misunderstanding of China-Russia-U.S. relations and the broader security issues in the region.

First, Russia is not one of the major stakeholders on the Korean Peninsula, and can only exert influence on issues in the region through strategic coordination with China and multilateral dialogue mechanisms. During the Korean War (1950-53), Russia was officially not a belligerent; therefore, it did not participate in the armistice negotiations or sign the final agreement. The signatories are North Korea, China and the United States, which means that the most important external stakeholders on the peninsula are China and the United States.In the 1990s, North Korea, South Korea, China and the United States participated in the so-called Four-Party Talks. In the early days of the 21st century, China took the lead in establishing the Six-Party Talks; and then Russia and Japan were invited to join the multilateral mechanism. In April 2018, the Panmunjom Declaration was issued after the inter-Korean summit, stating both nations' agreement to promote trilateral meetings involving themselves and the United States; or quadrilateral meetings — involving the two sides, the U.S. and China — with a view toward replacing the armistice with a peace agreement and establishing a permanent and solid peace regime.

Today, Russia focuses more on its strategic interests in East Asia out of concern for security issues in Europe. Its strategic focus has long been in Europe, but the security of Asia and Europe are intertwined. Regarding Ukraine, Russia asserts that the serious imbalance in the European security architecture after the Cold War has created security crises and conflicts. Therefore, building a balanced, inclusive and sustainable security architecture in Northeast Asia will help bolster the impact of its proposals on European security. On the day he landed in North Korea, Putin published an article in Rodong Sinmun, an official newspaper in North Korea, in which he emphasized the need to “build an architecture of equal and indivisible Eurasian security.”

To this end, Russia has lent generous support to China's proposals on the peninsula. For example, the foreign ministers of the two nations issued a joint statement in Moscow on July 4, 2017. They also presented a joint initiative based on China's “double suspension” initiative (wherein North Korea could suspend its nuclear and missile activities in exchange for the suspension of large-scale U.S.-South Korea military exercises). It also offered a dual-track approach of denuclearizing the peninsula while establishing a peace mechanism, as well as Russia's step-by-step vision for a resolution. In their joint statement issued during Putin's visit to China in May, the two nations once again called on the international community to support their joint initiative.

Second, the comprehensive strategic partnership pact between Russia and North Korea is not a military alliance unlike those built by the United States, Japan and South Korea, and it has not upset the balance of power in the region. Yet Washington has created many small multilateral security mechanisms on the basis of bilateral alliances in recent years, demonstrating a trend toward building military alliances. This approach has undermined the balance of power and strategic stability across the region.

By 2018, China, Russia and the United States had engaged in active cooperation at the United Nations and adopted a number of Security Council resolutions designed to restrict North Korea's nuclear and missile development and impose economic sanctions on Pyongyang. Diplomatic activities on the Korean Peninsula reached a milestone, as China and Russia created enabling conditions for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks in accordance with the dual-track approach.However, since the Hanoi summit in 2019, relations between the U.S. and North Korea have stagnated on all fronts. Why? The United States has insisted on the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as a precondition for its lifting sanctions and discussing the normalization of relations. To break the deadlock, China and Russia submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council at the end of 2019 arguing for the adjustment of sanctions because the nation had suspended its nuclear and missile programs and fulfilled some of its obligations under Security Council resolutions. In the face of firm opposition from the United States and its allies, however, an important window of opportunity for diplomatic success on the Korean Peninsula was once again closed.Since the 2020 U.S. elections, however, the Biden administration has continued to strengthen military deterrence and economic sanctions on Pyongyang. And Pyongyang has responded by expanding its military power, adding to tensions. From China's perspective, Washington's tough stance is driven by its goal of expanding its military presence in Northeast Asia and maintaining its dominant position by using North Korea's nuclear and missile programs as a pretext.

At present, Russia and North Korea are moving closer, primarily at the political level, signaling that regional security must be based on an architecture of equal security. To achieve enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula, it is imperative that communication resumes under the multilateral framework of the Six-Party Talks.