2024年5月8日，中國國家主席習近平（左）抵達匈牙利費裏海吉的李斯特·費倫茨布達佩斯機場時，受到匈牙利總理歐爾班·維克托的迎接。（圖片：Vivien Cher Benko/Pool/法新社）

歐盟會同美國一道遏制中國嗎？俄烏戰爭爆發以來，這個緊迫的問題一直在北京的戰略論壇上備受關注。為了避免這種情況的出現，中國國家主席習近平最近訪問歐洲，同兩個被中國視為在外交政策方面更具“戰略自主性”的歐盟國家——法國和匈牙利——進行接觸。法國隆重歡迎習近平的訪問，同時也向中國施壓，要求中國同俄羅斯保持距離；匈牙利傳遞的信息卻非常明確：該國將竭盡全力確保歐洲不會成為中國的敵人，同時將利用自己密切的對華關係，將匈牙利變為中國投資和人員進入歐盟的門戶。匈牙利國際事務研究院院長格拉登•帕平最近表示，“匈牙利正幫助歐洲告別脫鉤”。中國和匈牙利已經建立起牢固的雙邊關係，如今兩國關係提升為“全天候全面戰略夥伴關係”——這是中國在全面聯盟關係之外能夠提供的最高級別官方關係。

在和習近平一起舉行的新聞發佈會上，匈牙利總統維克多·歐爾班以宏大的戰略視角看待兩國之間的交往。他宣稱匈牙利“失去了20世紀”，但將“贏得21世紀”，並將中國視為實現這一雄心壯志的關鍵盟友。值得注意的是，匈牙利將目光轉身東方的過程始於2008年全球金融危機引發的大衰退，外界普遍認為，這場衰退削弱了美國的全球影響力。正如美國前財政部長亨利·保爾森指出的那樣， 2008年以前，中國人經常向美國官員尋求經濟治理方面的建議，2008年後，他們的熱情逐漸消退。匈牙利的領導人一直強調，2008年以來，地緣經濟重心已從大西洋轉移到太平洋，標誌着單極時代的結束。隨着新權力中心的出現，匈牙利發現對沖和優化其戰略選擇至關重要。因此，中國作為地緣經濟的新中心，已經成為匈牙利的戰略重點。

匈牙利向中國發出自己致力於長期接觸的明確信號。中匈兩國聯合儀式上籤署的第一份協議與“一帶一路”倡議有關。一些歐盟國家，尤其是意大利，對“一帶一路”倡議持保留態度，但匈牙利卻加倍支持。這一姿態發出了強烈的信號：匈牙利是看重中國未來發展的“價值投資者”。歐爾班是唯一出席在北京舉辦的三個“一帶一路” 大型論壇的歐盟領導人，顯然匈牙利已成為該倡議在歐洲的灘頭陣地。

在有關中國產能過剩和歐盟決心設置保護主義壁壘的討論里，匈牙利可能巧妙地為中國的綠地投資打開大門，從而提升本國的工業水平。中國電動汽車製造商沒有選擇向歐洲出口電動汽車，而是在匈牙利生產，從而促進當地就業。事實上，匈牙利已經吸引了超過 90 億歐元的中國電動汽車投資，而且是世界上唯一一個中國三大電池生產商都建立工廠的國家。然而，中國綠地投資的湧入打破了德國在該地區（也是德國事實上的勢力範圍）的主導地位。過去 30 年，匈牙利融入了龐大的德國工業生態系統，但中國通過競爭進入了當地市場。匈牙利外交部長表示，中國在匈牙利的存在與德國的工業利益並不對立，而是相互補充——德國汽車製造商在電池製造方面處於落後地位，而匈牙利的中國電池製造商可以為其提供相關產品。所以，德國交通部長沃爾克·維辛支持中國在電動汽車問題上的立場，並將歐盟的反補貼調查比作東德共產主義政權才可能採取的行動。

中匈合作很快將延伸至戰略能源領域，尤其是核能領域，這將進一步鞏固雙邊全天候關係。匈牙利計劃通過核能滿足國內 70% 的能源需求，而中國將成為這一過程的核心合作夥伴。儘管近期很難出現中國製造的發電機，但此類項目可以與其他歐盟成員國聯合開發。在匈牙利建設類似於欣克利角 C 核電站的中法合資核電站項目，可以緩解歐盟的擔憂，使得布魯塞爾更願意接受中國的能源投資。

展望未來，匈牙利與中國的戰略夥伴關係引發了一個問題：匈牙利能否像歐爾班所設想的那樣，成為中國與歐盟之間的橋樑？它真的能“告別脫鉤”嗎？在此背景下，中國在匈牙利支持的重大互聯互通項目，例如連接布達佩斯和貝爾格萊德的鐵路，確實可能促成與歐盟更密切的合作。貝爾格萊德-布達佩斯高鐵向西延伸至維也納，向南延伸至比雷埃夫斯，可以為歐盟東南地區創造巨大價值，並推進歐盟中心與外圍地區的凝聚力，而這也是歐盟的核心目標之一。

可以肯定的是，當匈牙利面臨其他歐洲國家指責其背叛歐洲的團結精神，並在意識形態上與莫斯科和北京的“獨裁者”保持一致時，中國敏銳地意識到與匈牙利的全天候全面戰略夥伴關係可能帶來一些負面影響。所以，站在歐爾班身邊的習近平當時明確表示：中國支持匈牙利在歐盟內發展壯大。他同時強調，歐盟仍然是中國現代化建設過程中不可替代的合作夥伴。

毫無疑問，匈牙利和中國建立全天候關係是大膽的舉動。地緣政治中，小國就像單車，在高速公路上與大型卡車（大國）並駕齊驅。一旦出現問題，這些“單車”就會遭遇災難性的後果：要麼被卡車碾壓，要麼被推到路邊。匈牙利意識到了這種危險。為減輕來自美國的壓力，它和共和黨的“美國優先”派系建立意識形態方面的聯繫，戰略性地對沖自己和中國的關係。2024 年 3 月，歐爾班在美國會見了特朗普，歐爾班的智庫與美國保守派團體建立了密切的夥伴關係。然而，在殘酷無情的地緣政治世界裡，軍事和強制力往往發揮着約束作用。

匈牙利的對華關係不斷深化，體現了該國雄心勃勃的戰略重心轉移。但是，這種夥伴關係仍然存在局限性。中國沒有能力在海外投射實力，無法為匈牙利提供強大的保護，以抵禦潛在的地緣政治影響，尤其是美國的影響力。匈牙利和中國的全天候關係可能帶來豐厚的經濟利益，但如果沒有獲得整個歐盟的支持，它可能在地緣政治舞台上面臨被孤立和弱點增多的風險。為了確保未來的發展，匈牙利明白，它必須以實務的手段平衡自己的東方目標，同時使自己牢牢紮根於歐洲大地，提升歐洲的戰略自主性。只有這樣，它才有可能在未來的地緣政治風暴中保護自己。

Chinese President Xi Jinping (left) is greeted by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban as he arrives at Liszt Ferenc Budapest airport at Ferihegy, Hungary on May 8, 2024. (Photo: Vivien Cher Benko/Pool/AFP)

Will the EU join the United States in efforts to contain China? This urgent question has loomed large in strategy forums across Beijing since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. Chinese President Xi Jinping's recent European tour aimed precisely at averting this scenario by engaging with two EU countries perceived by Beijing as more “strategically autonomous” in their foreign policy: France and Hungary. While the French response to Xi's visit involved pomp and circumstance, coupled with pressure on China to distance its relationship from Russia, Hungary's message was unequivocally clear: the country will go to great lengths to ensure that Europe does not become an enemy of China and will use its close ties with Beijing to transform Hungary into a gateway for Chinese investments and people into the EU. As Gladden Pappin, the president of Hungary's foreign policy research institute of state recently put it, “Hungary is helping Europe kiss decoupling goodbye.” With solid bilateral ties already established, China and Hungary have now elevated their relationship to an 'all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership'—the highest level of official bond China can offer, short of a full alliance.

During the press conference with Xi, Hungarian president Viktor Orban casted Hungary's engagement with China in a grand strategic light. He declared that Hungary "lost the 20th century" but will "win the 21st century," viewing China as a crucial ally in this ambition. Notably, Hungary's pivot to the East began shortly after the Great Recession, which is widely perceived as having undermined U.S. global influence. As former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson once noted, until 2008, the Chinese frequently sought economic governance advice from American policy officials. Post-2008, their enthusiasm waned. Hungarian leaders have consistently emphasized that since 2008, the geoeconomic center of gravity has been shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific, signaling the end of the unipolar era. With new power centers emerging, Hungary finds it essential to hedge and optimize its strategic options. Consequently, China, as a new epicenter of geoeconomic gravity, has become a strategic priority for Hungary.

Hungary has provided clear signals to China on its commitment to engage for the long term. During the joint China-Hungary ceremony, the first deal signed was related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While some EU states, notably Italy, have distanced themselves from BRI narratives, Hungary is doubling down. This commitment sends a powerful signal that Hungary is a "value investor" in China's future trajectory. With Orban being the only EU leader present in all three BRI related “Mega-Fora” organized in Beijing, it is clear that Hungary has become the BRI beachhead in Europe.

Amid discussions of Chinese overcapacity and the EU's determination to erect protectionist barriers, Hungary may have cleverly opened a gateway for Chinese greenfield investments that upgrades Hungarian industry. Rather than exporting electric vehicles (EVs) to Europe, Chinese EV manufacturers might now build their products in Hungary, boosting local employment. Indeed, Hungary has attracted more than EUR 9 billion in EV-related investments from China and it is the only country in the world where all three major Chinese battery producers have established plants. Yet, this influx of Chinese greenfield investments has disrupted German dominance in a region that has been a de facto German sphere of influence. For the past 30 years, Hungary has been integrated into the massive German industrial ecosystem, but China has now competitively entered the scene. According to Hungary's Foreign Minister China's presence in Hungary is not antithetical but rather complementary to German industrial interests. The Chinese battery manufacturers in Hungary supply German automakers who are lagging behind in battery manufacturing. It's no surprise that Volker Wissing, Germany's transport minister, supported the Chinese position on EVs and derogatorily compared the EU's anti-subsidy probe to something Communist East Germany might once have come up with.

Further cementing the all weather relationship, China-Hungary cooperation will soon extend to the strategic energy sector, particularly nuclear energy. Hungary has envisioned nuclear energy covering 70% of its energy needs, with China becoming a core partner in the process. Although Chinese built generators are hard to imagine in the near future, such projects could be jointly developed with other EU member states. A Sino-French joint nuclear venture in Hungary, similar to Hinkley Point C, could alleviate EU fears and make Brussels more receptive to Chinese-related energy investments.

Looking ahead, the strategic partnership between Hungary and China raises the question: Could Hungary serve as a bridge between China and the EU as Orban envisions? Could it really “kiss decoupling good-bye?” In this context, significant connectivity projects supported by China in Hungary—such as the railway linking Budapest to Belgrade—might indeed lead to closer cooperation with the EU. The extension of the Belgrade-Budapest high-speed railway to Vienna in the west and Piraeus in the south could generate substantial value in the EU's southeastern region and advance EU center – periphery cohesion – a core goal of the EU.

To be sure, as Hungary faces accusations from other European nations of betraying European unity and aligning ideologically with the "authoritarians" in Moscow and Beijing, China is keenly aware of the potential backlash from its all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership with Hungary. Standing next to Orban, Xi made a clear and unequivocal statement supporting a strong Hungary within the EU. Xi emphasized that the EU remains an irreplaceable partner in China's modernization efforts.

Hungary's all-weather friendship with Beijing is undeniably bold. In geopolitics, small countries are like bicycles navigating highways alongside massive trucks—the great powers. A misstep could lead to catastrophic outcomes for these “bicycles,” either getting crushed under the trucks' wheels or pushed to the wayside. Aware of the danger, and in an effort to mitigate pressure from the U.S., Hungary has strategically hedged its relationship with China by cultivating ideological ties with the MAGA faction of the GOP. In March 2024, Orban met with Trump in the United States, and Orban related think tanks have established close partnerships with U.S. conservative groups. However, in the brutish and ruthless world of geopolitics, military and coercive power often play a disciplining role.

While Hungary's deepening relationship with China signifies an ambitious strategic pivot, limitations of the partnership remain. Without the capacity to project offshore power, China cannot offer Hungary a robust shield against potential geopolitical repercussions, particularly from the United States. Hungary's all weather engagement with China may provide substantial economic benefits, but without broader EU support, it risks isolation and increased vulnerability on the geopolitical stage. To truly secure its future, Hungary understands that it must balance its Eastern ambitions with a pragmatic approach that keeps it firmly anchored within the European fold, working from within to make that fold more strategically autonomous. Only then can it hope to safeguard itself from the geopolitical storms ahead.