3月10日至3月15日，清華大學戰略與安全研究中心（CISS）主任達巍（右四）、助理研究員孫成昊（左三）率領的代表團赴美國華盛頓和紐約兩地，走訪美國政府機構、智庫及高校。圖為代表團走訪海軍分析中心（CNA）。

筆者近日赴美國華盛頓、紐約兩地進行了一系列走訪調研，主要圍繞當前及下一階段中美關係與美方戰略界人士交換意見，試圖更好把握美國對華政策脈動以及兩國關係發展走向。

從整體態勢看，自舊金山會晤之後，兩國關係進入相對穩定時期。但也要看到，美國對華戰略競爭的決心較為堅定，難以在短期內做出調整。舊金山會晤對於穩定雙邊關係極為重要，兩國元首發揮戰略引領作用，一系列對話機制漸次鋪開，雙方不僅闡明了各自在關鍵議題上的原則立場，也推動了多個領域的對話與合作，並逐步向更多領域擴散。

例如，在芬太尼問題上的合作將有助於兩國執法機構進一步加強溝通與協作，即將開展的人工智能政府間對話或許也有助於在一定程度上緩和科技領域的緊張態勢。可以感受到，美方也在思考如何更好發揮元首會晤的積極作用，並通過推動各層面、各領域對話與合作獲得務實成果。

從中短期看，2024年的中美關係或許仍將保持較平穩態勢，卻也必須警惕防範可能的挑戰。首先，如何看待和應對涉及地區安全議題的風險點十分關鍵。尤其是在台海、南海等問題上，美方堅持自己的理解和政策取向，與中方存在分歧，但有一點是雙方共識，即都不希望在亞太地區爆發軍事衝突。美國也必須考慮如何平衡安全困境和同盟兩難的問題，即各方對自身“絕對安全”的追求可能惡化整體安全形勢、對盟友的過度承諾可能導致危機升級，甚至將美國牽連進一場不必要的衝突。

其次，如何避免美國大選這一國內政治因素干擾中美關係。從目前形勢看，在初選過程中，中國議題並非首要議題，美國民眾更多還是關心本國政治、經濟、社會等方面，在外交領域則更關注俄烏、巴以等更劇烈的危機和衝突。然而，美方已經出現將中國與美國國內政治、經濟、輿論形勢綁定的苗頭，包括炒作中方干預選舉，推動對中國聯網汽車、港口起重機的可能打壓措施，以及針對TikTok的法案等，都會導致中國議題以不同但負面的形式出現在美國民眾面前。

第三，如何形成中美兩國更可持續的戰略框架值得思考。對華戰略競爭的定位和框架始於特朗普，拜登加以沿用，這充分證明“競爭”作為對華戰略的關鍵詞是兩黨共識。區別在於，一些共和黨人士對於拜登政府的對華競爭舉措不甚滿意，認為強調接觸過多，強調競爭過少；競爭言語過多，競爭舉措過少。無論如何，這意味着美方反思對華“競爭”戰略本身的空間正在萎縮，更多的辯論焦點已經轉向具體的競爭方式。美方反覆強調競爭並不必然帶來衝突的說法或許沒有錯，但這一說法也無法否認衝突很可能是競爭的一種結果。而即便這種結果的可能性是百分之一、千分之一，也是中美兩國乃至世界都無法承受的。如果是這樣，用“競爭”定義中美關係就是極度危險且不可取的。

從更長遠的時間段看，美國大選結果對於下一階段中美關係將產生深遠影響。中國無意介入美國選舉，不管誰當選下一屆美國總統，中國都希望中美關係能夠穩定前行，但面臨的機遇和挑戰可能有所不同。

若民主黨繼續執政，將進一步加強對華戰略競爭的系統性框架，強化與盟友關係。當前拜登政府提出“投資、聯合、競爭”（invest、align、 compete）以指引其對華競爭策略，注重投資本國、聯合盟友以展開對華競爭，同時與中國框定有限的合作議題。

如果拜登成功連任，對華政策連續性較強，其主要目標是在不發生衝突的前提下為“競贏”中國打下基礎。一方面，拜登政府可能繼續推動經貿、科技領域的精準“去風險”或“脫鉤”政策，加強對華出口管制、投資審查，加速調整供應鏈聯盟策略，在科技領域持續擴大“小院”和堆砌“高牆”。另一方面，在沒有連任壓力前提下，拜登政府對華保持溝通與合作的動力仍存，兩國現有對話機制有望延續和拓展。

若共和黨一邊的特朗普勝選，美國對華競爭戰略方向不會發生實質性變化，但在競爭策略上會出現調整，競爭重點領域會有所變化。總體看，第二任期的特朗普將更接近2020年、而非2017年剛剛執政時的狀態。例如，在經貿領域，中國可能將承受較為強烈的正面衝擊。特朗普在競選期間已表示，計劃對所有中國產品增加高達60%的關稅，且不在意中方對美國產品增加關稅的反制措施。

在軍事安全領域，特朗普第二任期的政策前景遠沒有經貿領域那麼明確。特朗普在安全領域更偏向有限的“孤立主義”，即不願為盟友承擔過多責任，更傾向於從經濟成本和收益的角度看待安全關係，導致經濟政策安全化的同時出現安全政策經濟化的雙重趨勢。在這種情況下，誰能夠最終進入特朗普的內閣團隊，誰將出任總統國家安全事務助理、國防部長、國務卿等重要職務將很大程度上塑造其涉華軍事安全政策。

更令人擔憂的是，在特朗普第二任期內，中美現有對話機制可能面臨衝擊。特朗普及其團隊或許仍然對芬太尼等對美國國內政治影響較大的議題感興趣，但對氣候變化等全球治理議題並不在意。兩國部分現有對話機制和溝通渠道或將面臨“凍結”風險，雙方可能需要在其他領域找尋更多共識與合作點。

From March 10 to March 15, a delegation led by Director of the Center for Strategic and Security Studies (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Da Wei (fourth from right), and Assistant Researcher Sun Chenghao (third from left), traveled to Washington, D.C. and New York, N.Y., to visit U.S. government agencies, think tanks and universities. The picture shows the delegation visiting the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA).

Recently, I traveled to Washington D.C. and New York for a series of visits. The main focus was exchanging views with officials and experts from the United States on the current and next stage of China-U.S. relations. The aim was to better understand the fluctuations in U.S. policy toward China and the development trend of the relationship.

With the summit in San Francisco, the relationship between the two countries entered a relatively stable period. However, it should be noted that the U.S. remains steadfast in its posture of strategic competition with China, which makes adjustments in the short term difficult. Yet, San Francisco has been crucial for stabilizing bilateral relations, with the leaders of both countries playing a strategic leadership role. A series of dialogue mechanisms have gradually unfolded, with both sides not only clarifying their respective principled positions on key issues but also promoting dialogue and cooperation in multiple areas and gradually expanding into more.

For example, cooperation on the fentanyl issue will help law enforcement agencies in both countries further enhance communication and collaboration. The upcoming governmental dialogue on artificial intelligence may also help to some extent in easing tensions in the technology sector. It can be observed that the U.S. is also considering how to better leverage the positive summit meetings and achieve practical results through promoting dialogue and cooperation across various levels and fields. In the short to medium term, the China-U.S. relationship this year may continue to be relatively stable, but it's also necessary to be vigilant, to guard against possible challenges.

First, it is of crucial importance to correctly perceive and address points of risk in regional security. As to the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea and other matters, the U.S. maintains its own understanding and policy orientation, which may differ from China's. But there is a consensus on both sides that neither wishes to see military conflicts erupt in the Asia-Pacific region.The U.S. must also consider how to balance security dilemmas with alliance commitments. Pursuing absolute security for oneself may exacerbate the overall security situation, while excessive commitments to allies may lead to escalation of crises, potentially dragging the U.S. into an unnecessary conflict.

Second, how to respond to the interference of domestic political factors — such as those associated with the U.S. presidential election — is another important consideration. China-related issues are not the primary focus during the primary election process, as American voters are more concerned about the economy and society, while in the diplomatic arena they are more focused on intense crises and conflicts, such as Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine.But there are signs that public opinion — and some partisan political opinion — in the United States is now linking China to domestic politics and the economy. This includes hyping up allegations of Chinese interference in elections, pushing for crackdowns on Chinese-made internet-connected vehicles and port cranes, as well as legislation targeting TikTok, all of which may present China in different negative forms to the American public.

Third, it is worth considering how to establish a more sustainable strategic framework between China and the United States. The framing of China relations as a matter of strategic competition began with Donald Trump and has been continued by President Joe Biden, which demonstrates that competition is the keyword in the bipartisan consensus. Any difference lies only in some Republicans' dissatisfaction with the Biden administration's approach to competition with China. They believe it emphasizes engagement too much and competition too little, and that there's too much rhetoric and too few actual competitive measures.Either way, this implies that the space for the U.S. to rethink its “competition” strategy toward China is shrinking, and more debates are shifting toward specific modes of competition. While the often-repeated emphasis by the U.S. that competition does not necessarily lead to conflict may not be entirely wrong, one cannot deny the possibility that conflict may be one outcome of competition.Even if the likelihood of such an outcome is one in a hundred or a thousand, it is still something that neither China nor the U.S. — nor the world — can afford. If that's the case, defining the relationship between China and the U.S. primarily as one of competition is extremely dangerous and not advisable.

In the longer-term perspective, the outcome of the U.S. presidential election will have far-reaching implications for the next stage of China-U.S. relations. China has no intention to intervene in U.S. elections, and regardless of who is elected as the next U.S. president, China hopes that China-U.S. relations can continue to move forward steadily. However, the opportunities and challenges faced may vary.

If the Democratic Party continues to govern, it will further strengthen the framework of strategic competition with China and enhance relations with allies. The current Biden administration has put forward the “invest, align, compete” framework to guide its competitive strategy toward China, emphasizing investment in the U.S., aligning with allies to engage in competition with China and simultaneously delineating limited areas for cooperation.

If Biden is re-elected, there will be strong continuity in his administration's policy toward China, with its main goal being to lay the groundwork for out-competing China. On one hand, the Biden administration may continue to promote precise de-risking or decoupling policies in the economic, trade and technology fields; strengthen export controls and investment reviews concerning China; accelerate the adjustment of supply chain alliance strategies; and continue to expand the “small yard” and erect more “high fences” in the technological domain. On the other hand, without the pressure of another election, the Biden administration's motivation for communication and cooperation with China may still exist, and the dialogue mechanisms between the two countries would be expected to continue and to expand.

If Trump and the Republican Party win the election, there will be no substantial change in the strategic direction of U.S. competition with China, but adjustments may occur in the competitive strategy, with changes in some specific areas of competition. Overall, Trump's second term would likely resemble the situation in 2020 rather than when he first took office in 2017.For instance, in the economic and trade domain, China may face a more direct punch. During his campaign so far, Trump has already indicated plans to impose tariffs of up to 60 percent on all Chinese products, and he has shown a willingness to disregard any retaliatory measures from China, such as increased tariffs on American products.

In the realm of military security, the policy outlook for Trump's second term is far less clear than in the economic and trade domains. Trump leans toward a limited form of isolationism in security affairs, meaning he's reluctant to shoulder excessive responsibility for allies and tends to view security relationships from the perspective of economic costs and benefits.This has led to a dual trend where economic policies become securitized while security policies become economized. In this scenario, the individuals who ultimately join Trump's cabinet team, particularly those assuming key positions — such as national security adviser, secretary of defense and secretary of state — will heavily shape his security policy on China.

What's more concerning is that during Trump's second term, existing dialogue mechanisms between China and the U.S. may face challenges. Trump and his team may continue to prioritize issues such as fentanyl that have significant impact on domestic politics in the U.S., but they may not prioritize global governance issues such as climate change. Some existing dialogue mechanisms and communication channels between the two countries may be at risk of being frozen, prompting both sides to seek more consensus and points of cooperation in other areas.