近期，中美關係面臨的挑戰和摩擦增多。經貿、涉台等問題之外，兩國在南海的互動也一直引人關注。特朗普政府的“印太戰略”仍將南海問題作為一個主要抓手。從長遠看，美國在南海問題上與中國對抗的姿態不會放鬆，有時還可能變得更加強硬。

中美南海分歧根源何在？

去年底以來，美相繼出台的國家安全戰略報告、國防戰略報告、核態勢評估報告和總統經濟報告等官方文件，均將中國視為“戰略競爭對手”，甚至貼上試圖挑戰美國所主導國際秩序的“修正主義國家”標籤。美戰略界、學界和輿論界關於中美關係的新一波負面論調抬頭，認為競爭將成為中美關係主流。有學者指出南海始終是中美戰略競爭的重點領域之一，甚至提出“中美在南海的衝突不可避免”。

中美關係的廣度、深度和韌性今非昔比，中美必然在南海發生衝突的觀點似乎有點危言聳聽。南海局勢自2016年下半年以來，基本保持“降溫、趨穩”勢頭，在中美關係議程上的位置也相對靠後。不過也應看到，在高調推行“自由、開放的印太戰略”的大背景下，美國在南海與中國“較勁”的勢頭仍在悄然積聚。在近期因美國對華政策消極面上升而引起中美競爭態勢加劇的情況下，南海問題成為中美關係新“引爆點”的危險不能排除。

在一些美國學者看來，中美在南海的戰略利益針鋒相對，難以調和：美國堅持“自由、開放”的國際和地區海洋秩序，中國則試圖修改有關遊戲規則；確保美國軍事力量自由進入或通過包括南海在內的“全球公共海域”是美國的國家利益，中國則試圖將南海當作“中國湖”，限制或排斥美國進入南海；美國“印太戰略”的優先目標是維護並加強同盟體系和夥伴關係網絡，中國則正在通過“一帶一路”等謀求印太地區主導地位，挑戰美國對該地區的影響。

然而，上述分析和論斷完全是從零和對抗邏輯出發，基於對中國有關政策意圖的誤解和曲解而做出的。中美在南海問題上的分歧，表面上看似乎是守成大國與新興大國之間的“結構性矛盾”使然，但“結構性矛盾”的說法並不能反映中美關係合作、競爭並存的複雜現實，也有可能成為“自我實現的預言”，將雙方最終推入“修昔底德陷阱”，對問題的解決並無益處。

如果拋開先入為主的成見，多一些換位思考和理性判斷，應當有助於將中美在南海的分歧控制在一個合理的區間。以筆者管見，中美管控南海分歧需要回答三個問題，以下逐一進行闡釋。

1、南沙主權紛爭：美國如何定位

中國是南海諸島的真正主人，自然也是南沙爭端的主要當事國。在爭端解決前，中國有正當的權利和合理的關切維護本國立場和主張不受損害，有關措施不應被視為“擴張活動”或對地區秩序的“破壞”。

美國雖表示對爭端的解決結果、亦即有關島礁的歸屬不持立場，卻對爭端的解決方式存在關切，反覆強調爭端能否和平解決事關美國利益。在其看來，這既是基於“維護國際秩序”的需要，也因為南沙爭端直接涉及其盟友菲律賓等，南海一旦生戰，將“考驗”美同盟義務。而考慮到中國與其他當事國間實力的“不對稱”，美不得不出面“維持平衡”。但這一判斷並非基於事實。和平解決南沙爭端，是中國從自身長遠利益出發所做的戰略選擇，也是爭端當事國間多次達成的共識，並不是任何外力影響或施壓的結果。如果美國在南海的目標是“不戰不亂”，中美雙方在南海問題上就不應有原則性的分歧。

恰恰是美國在南海爭端問題上，堅持以地緣政治思維和同盟關係來劃線，並在實際言行中釋放出強烈的“拉偏架”信號，才為和平解決南沙爭端帶來諸多干擾。比如，近來美國務院高官鼓勵東盟“運用集體力量捍衛航行自由”；美海軍“卡爾·文森”號航母戰鬥群今年3月到訪越南峴港，並與日本海上自衛隊在南海北部進行聯合訓練；甚至有美國學者提出，組建美日澳印“四國聯盟”的目的是為“解決南海問題”開闢新路徑。

美國去年12月決定將美駐以色列使館遷至耶路撒冷。雖然美方一再聲稱該行動不影響聖城最終地位，但仍然引起很多國家的擔憂。值得注意的是，美國會否將同樣的邏輯用在南海，以“不影響最終解決”為前提，在南沙採取影響爭端當事國立場的單方面行動？這種可能性是今後攪動南海局勢的一個隱憂。

應當說，為確保南海的長期穩定及爭端的最終和平解決，美國要做的不是質疑中國和平解決爭端的可信度，而是證明自身嚴守中立的可信度。

2、沿岸國和非沿岸國：對抗還是合作

中國是南海的沿岸國之一。這意味着中國在這片海域不僅可以按照國際法享有專屬性的主權權利、管轄權等海洋權益，也與其他沿岸國一樣，對南海地區的和平穩定、航道暢通和生態環境等擁有重大利益和關切。沿岸國就上述事項發揮主要作用，是權利也是責任。而且，隨着國力上升，中國在其中的作用也有望持續增大。這有利於地區秩序的維護和規則構建，符合包括美國在內的國際社會的公共利益。

對此持懷疑態度的人會認為，強調中國的南海沿岸國身份，正是為了服務中國“獨霸”南海、“排除”美國的戰略，但事實並非如此。在沿岸國中，中國並非要一家說了算。中國和東盟國家簽署了《南海各方行為宣言》，並正在商談制訂“南海行為準則”。中國還根據《聯合國海洋法公約》關於“閉海、半閉海沿岸國的合作”的規定，積極推動建立南海沿岸國合作機制。

在與非沿岸國關係上，沒有跡象顯示中國有意否定或排斥有關國家在南海的合法利益和合理關切。實際上，海洋法公約在要求閉海、半閉海沿岸國開展合作的同時，也規定在適當情況下可邀請其他有關國家和國際組織參與合作。這既體現了沿岸國的主導地位，也承認了非沿岸國的作用。這表明，中美在南海不僅沒有對抗的充分理由，反而存在務實合作的空間。

然而，美國在包括南海在內的中國近海所開展的軍事活動，以及中美在此問題上的尖銳分歧，極大影響了雙方探討建設性合作的基礎和氛圍，也被眾多學者和評論家作為雙方在南海存在“無法調和的戰略競爭”的證據。

實際上，中國作為沿岸國在南海擁有合理的安全關切，這屬於防禦性質，並不針對特定國家，也不影響包括美國在內的非沿岸國在南海國際航道行使國際法所賦予的自由通行權利。

問題在於，美國在南海開展的多頻率、高強度和超抵近的軍事活動，包括在中國南海島礁鄰近水域進行的“航行自由行動”以及其他軍事部署，都明顯針對中國，美方對此也不諱言。中國在安全上不得不採取應對措施。

為使有關分歧得到建設性處理，美國應當努力向中國等沿岸國證明，美軍事力量在自由出入和通過南海國際航道的同時，不會影響沿岸國家的安全。

3、構建海洋秩序：中美分歧有多大

中國既是典型的“海洋地理不利國”，也是發展中的海洋大國。

除台灣島外，中國絕大部分國土不直接面向大洋，而是毗鄰包括南海在內的一連串邊緣海。中國進入大洋，必須經過處於他國主權之下或鄰近他國的海峽或水道。所幸的是，按照現行國際海洋法的基本原則，不利的自然地理環境並不能剝奪一個國家走向大洋的權利。佔世界人口近15%的中國，在全球海洋的研究、利用和保護以及相應的規則制訂方面，不應也不會缺席。

新時代中國國力的提升、海外利益的拓展、海洋意識的重新覺醒，都決定了中國有能力也有必要再次走向遠洋，更多地認識海洋、利用海洋、保護海洋。同時，中國的發展中國家地位，又決定了當前及今後一個時期，中國與技術發達的海洋國家相比，在海洋的現代化利用管理方面差距仍然不小。自由、開放的海洋秩序不僅符合中國的長遠利益，中國甚至比其他國家更需要它。

在新世紀曆屆聯合國大會上，中國代表就“海洋和海洋法議題”所闡述的主張多次強調尊重所有國家合法、和平利用海洋的權利和自由，要求促進海洋開放，提出沿岸國法律規章不應損害航行自由原則，新的國際海洋立法進程不應損害各國依法享有的航行等權利。在全球海洋治理平台上發出的這些中國聲音，與美國所說的“自由、開放”的海洋秩序觀並無原則分歧，反而存在諸多潛在共同點。

現代海洋秩序由各國共同構建，隨意給別國貼上“修正主義”標籤不具建設性。回顧歷史，現代國際海洋法律體系成形後的第一次修改，恰恰是美國堅持自身關切所帶來的結果。《聯合國海洋法公約》在1982年談判完成後，美國認為公約的國際海底開發制度與美國利益不符，在公約文本表決時投了反對票，並拒不批准公約。此後，聯合國秘書長召集非正式協商，於1994年制定了一份公約“執行協定”，對公約有關規定做出了修改。

《海洋法公約》作為160多個國家經九年談判達成的一攬子協議，原本不允許保留性條款，對修正程序也做了明確、嚴格的規定。繞過明文規定的修正程序、另訂相關協定來修改公約，構成了國際締約實踐中的一個經典案例。在規則制訂過程中，任何國家都有基於自身利益的合理關切，美國作為大國應當有切身體會。

從大的戰略取向來看，中美之間並不必然走向對抗，但由於在南海的戰略定位和利害關切不同，中美難免會產生碰撞和摩擦。最終能否摸索出一條良性互動的共處之道，端視雙方能否突破戰略互信缺失的瓶頸，在構建新型國際關係和人類命運共同體的理念下管控矛盾和分歧，實現基於規則的利益趨同。

（文章出自南風窗）

The South China Sea is heating up, especially with the United States conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) against China near the Spratlys, Paracels, and Scarborough Shoal.

Points of disagreement

A series of strategic reports released by the Trump Administration since late 2017, including the National Security Strategy, place China as its number one strategic competitor and label it and Russia as revisionist powers. Some U.S. scholars take a very pessimistic view of U.S.-China relations and believe that this relationship is no longer characterized as cooperation with elements of competition but the other way round. They see the South China Sea as an important source of U.S.-China strategic rivalry and even assert that conflict between the two countries over the South China Sea is inevitable.

Such a view may be an overstatement. Since late 2016 the situation in the South China Sea has been stable and the territorial and maritime disputes have been under control. The South China Sea issue is temporarily not in the forefront of the agenda of the China-U.S. bilateral relations. However, the confrontation between the two countries in the South China Sea is still quietly gaining momentum and the risk of conflict cannot be disregarded.

According to some American scholars, the United States and China have overlapping strategic interests in the South China Sea: The U.S. promotes an open and free maritime order while China is challenging that order. It is in the national interest of the U.S. to ensure free access and passage of its military forces in the global public domain, including the South China Sea, while China takes the South China Sea as a “Chinese Lake” and tries to deny U.S. access to the area. One of the priorities of the Indo-Pacific strategy is maintaining the U.S.-centered alliance system and partnership network, while China is seeking dominance and excluding U.S. influence in the same region through its “Belt and Road” initiative.

These assumptions are based on a zero-sum mentality and a misreading of China's strategic intentions. And the conclusion that U.S.-China conflict in the South China Sea is inevitable is no more than a self-fulfilling prophecy and will not provide a solution to the problem.

In order to manage and bridge their differences in the South China Sea, China and the United States should not subscribe to this preconceived idea but rather put themselves in each other's shoes. To this end, they had better answer three questions.

What is the U.S. position on South China Sea disputes?

China is the sovereign of the Spratly islands and a major party to the territorial disputes over the archipelago. Prior to the final settlement of the disputes, China is legitimately concerned about defending and preserving its rights and interests. The measures adopted for that purpose cannot be regarded as expansionist or undermining regional order.

In accordance with its official statements, the United States does not take a position on who has sovereignty over the Spratly features, but it does have an interest in how the disputes are solved. The American officials keep saying that peaceful settlement of the disputes, which is essential under a rules-based international order, is vital to the national interest of the United States. In addition, the disputes directly involve the Philippines, an American ally. If the disputes escalate into a war or military conflict, the U.S. obligation under the alliance might be triggered and its credibility tested. Due to the asymmetry between China and other claimant states in their national powers, the United States has to play a role in maintaining the balance.

However, the fact is that China also sticks to a peaceful settlement of the South China Sea disputes. The choice is made by China on its own out of a strategic calculation of its long-term interests. It also reflects an agreement among all the parties directly concerned in the disputes. It is not a result of pressure from any third party. Anyway, if the goal of the U.S. policy is to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea, then the difference between China and the United States in their strategic interests in the South China Sea may not be that big and irreconcilable.

The most effective way to solve a territorial dispute is through talks between the parties directly concerned. Giving a dispute too much significance does not help. Unfortunately that's what the United States is doing with the South China Sea disputes. It also applies its alliance system to the disputes, sending a strong signal that it is actually taking sides.

In order to maintain peace and stability and ensure a peaceful settlement of the disputes in the South China Sea, what the United States has to do is not question China's intentions to solve the disputes peacefully. Instead, it should show its own impartiality.

Cooperation or confrontation?

China is a coastal state next to the South China Sea. It means that China not only enjoys exclusive maritime rights and interests in this area under international law, but also has a direct stake in the peace, security, stability, free passage, and marine environment of the South China Sea. It has a right to a major role in any South China Sea dispute settlement. As China grows stronger, it is expected to make more input. This is beneficial to regional order and serves the international community, including the United States.

Someone may suspect that China is seeking domination in the South China Sea and trying to keep the United States out. However, this is not true. China is cooperating with other coastal states in managing South China Sea affairs. China and the ASEAN countries have signed a Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea (DOC) and are negotiating a code of conduct in the South China Sea (COC). China is also promoting the idea of establishing a mechanism for South China Sea coastal state cooperation in accordance with Article 123 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which stipulates that states bordering a closed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other.

In terms of the relationship with non-coastal states, there are no signs that China is denying the latter's legitimate rights and interests in the South China Sea. In fact, the UNCLOS stipulates that coastal states, when cooperating with each other, shall endeavor to invite, as appropriate, other interested states or international organizations to cooperate with them. The provision reflects the leading role of the coastal states as well as the role that non-coastal states could play. In this sense, China and the United States are not destined to confront each other in the South China Sea, but have ample room to cooperate with each other in the region.

In the meantime, U.S. military operations in the South China Sea and other sea areas adjacent to China, and the differences between the two countries regarding the legality of these operations, do affect the environment for constructive cooperation. They are also taken as the evidence for U.S.-China strategic rivalry in the South China Sea.

When emphasizing its own strategic interest in the South China Sea, the United States has to understand that China, as a coastal state, also possesses legitimate security interests in the area. China's security concern is defensive in nature and is not targeted against any specific country. Nor does it obstruct freedom of navigation and overflight enjoyed by any state, including the United States, in the international sea lanes of the South China Sea.

The problem is that, the U.S. military presence, including the FONOPS and other military deployments, in close vicinity of China's territory, is aimed against China. Even the U.S. side does not deny it. In this case China has to react.

In order to constructively address the problem, what the United States should do is prove to the coastal states along the South China Sea, including China, that their security will not be affected when the United States exercises its freedom of access and passage in the area, especially by its military forces.

How do China and the U.S. view the global maritime order?

In international maritime affairs, China is a geographically disadvantaged state and a developing sea power.

Most of China's territory, apart from Taiwan, does not face the open ocean, but is rather locked by a chain of marginal seas. In order to sail to the open seas, China has to pass through straits or narrow sea lanes either under the sovereignty of other countries or close to them. Fortunately, under the existing rules of the law of the sea, geographical disadvantages do not deprive a country of its right to go to the oceans. China, with 1/5th of the world's population, naturally has growing interests in global marine governance, including the use and protection of the high seas and the international seabed area.

In the modern era, China's development, the extension of its overseas interests and the re-awakening of its maritime consciousness all signify its growing maritime capability. At the same time, China is still a developing country, and its navy still falls behind that of more advanced countries. Under such circumstances, open and free marine space is in China's interest more than that of other countries.

Since the new millennium, Chinese delegates, when addressing the oceans and the Law of the Sea at the United Nations General Assembly, have kept calling for respect for legitimate and peaceful uses of the oceans by all countries, demanding the opening of the sea, stressing that the laws and regulations of coastal states shall not damage freedom of navigation, and suggesting that new international maritime legislative processes shall not prejudice the navigational and other rights of states under international law. These positions are not in conflict with the “open and free” concept promoted by the United States. Instead the two sides should have more potential common ground.

Every sovereign state may participate in the international law making process. And labeling any other country revisionist is not constructive. Historically the major revision to the rules of the modern law of the sea actually came from concern from the United States. Upon the completion of the negotiation on the UNCLOS in 1982, the United States was dissatisfied with Part XI – the provisions governing the international seabed area – and voted against the document and didn't ratify the Convention. The United Nations Secretary-General later convened an informal consultation and in 1994 adopted an “implementation agreement” of the UNCLOS, containing substantial modification of the relevant provisions.

The UNCLOS is a package deal reached by over 160 countries through negotiation. As a result, it does not allow for any reservation unless expressly permitted by its other articles, and provides for specific procedures for the amendments. Therefore modifying a treaty through an implementation agreement constitutes a classic case in international rule-making. Anyway, in international legislation, it is natural for every participating country to raise its concerns and leave its footprint in the process. The United States has experience of this.

In conclusion, China and the United States are not bound for conflict in the South China Sea. They do have divergent interests and friction will always exist. Whether the two countries could explore a way for positive interaction depends upon their ability to overcome the lack of mutual strategic trust and to find common interests based upon agreed norms and under the idea of building a new international relationship and a community of shared future for mankind.

(This article is from the International Public Policy Review in Singapore.)