面對特朗普總統在貿易問題上的混亂與不確定性，李克強總理近期在全國人民代表大會上作的政府工作報告釋放了經濟政策保持連貫性的訊息。他的經濟目標仍設定在“6.5%左右”，同時財政赤字維持在佔GDP的2.6%，低於去年的3%。

可以理解，持懷疑態度的評論員或許會從兩個對立的角度批評李克強的講話：太過具體，太過空泛。事實上，它是為中國在新的一年裡繼續應對各項挑戰做準備。

首先，太過具體。一年又一年，中國官方公布的經濟增長率一直在較窄的範圍內波動，2014年7.3%，2015年6.9%，2016年6.7%，2017年6.9%，2018年又變成了6.5%。

然而，中國的經濟增長真的如此穩定么？能源消費等其他用于衡量經濟活動的指標一直在劇烈波動。隨着網絡的興起與服務業增長，中國的產業結構與相對價格發生了急劇變化。遼寧和內蒙古等省份已經宣布以兩位數的幅度下調GDP，這就相當於承認此前曾在經濟數據上造假。這種變動不得不讓人懷疑官方數據的整體穩定性。

任何報告體系都存在造假的動機，讓結果看上去完成甚至是超過了預定目標。當經濟表現對於個人職場升遷存在巨大影響的時候，這種情況變得格外顯著。但無論在哪，經濟活動都一直處於混亂的動態之中。而當面對中國這種格外快速的增長與轉變時，經濟活動就變得更加難以追蹤。統計學家們深知這種特性，明智地努力提高數據的準確性。

不僅僅是海外分析人士認識到了發佈數據的局限性。在擔任遼寧省省委書記期間，李克強就曾宣稱中國的經濟增長數據多為“人造”，因此應當轉而關注如電力消費和貨物運輸等指標。在解讀中國經濟增長目標時，我們需要銘記這種關於數據準確性的“公開的秘密”。

第二，政府工作報告太空泛。這份36頁的工作報告列舉了九個關鍵政策目標。很多目標在措辭上都相當籠統，只是在重複過去十年的類似議題。舉個例子，“積極擴大消費，促進有效投資”。李克強再次強調要堅決打好三大攻堅戰：防控化解重大風險；精準脫貧；污染防治。這又有何新意，有何實質性內容？

然而，相對於太過具體、太過空泛，我們不妨將李克強的政府工作報告視為將延續改革的實質性內容融合在創造空間應對關鍵議題的信號中。

首先來看實質性內容。新聞記者本質上都在追尋那些可以成為新聞的“新鮮事”。相反，當管理中國這樣一個主要經濟體時，堅定不移的方向更為重要。中國面臨的挑戰依舊未變，這並不令人意外。它源於這些挑戰的本質與規模：無論是治理空氣污染，還是建立起完善的養老保障系統，抑或是降低中國對債務支撐房地產市場投資的依賴，都沒有藥到病除的特效藥。雖然在某些領域，改革和改變或許會來得更為迅猛、更為有效，但這並非挑戰依然存在的原因。

因此，可以理解為何李克強強調的三大攻堅戰透露出實質上的延續性。首先，加快供給側結構性改革，尤其是減少關鍵領域的過剩產能。第二，加速推動創新產業的發展。第三，深化國有企業、私營企業、產權、財政系統、金融領域、醫療養老以及環境保護等領域的改革。鑒於這些議題的數量和廣度，李克強的整份政府工作報告合理列舉了關鍵措施。

取得成功的關鍵並不是羅列細節，而是堅持不懈地在全中國推動貫徹落實。為了取得這一目標，習近平主席強調中共的領導作用以及政府機構改革。新成立的國家監察委員會將負責處理腐敗和違規等問題。一旦完成機構改革，幾大部委和監察機構的整合將精簡併優化政府職能。

貫徹改革需要時間，在改革獲益之前，需要付出調整成本。如果改革切實可行，新機構需要時間來投入運行。降低鋼鐵產能過剩或通過叫停工業活動減少污染都會給經濟增長帶來負面影響。然而，中共領導層一直不願接受經濟增長出現明顯放緩，無論這種暫時放緩會給長期經濟增長帶來何種益處。無法促進經濟增長或影響個人仕途，或傷害中共本身。

這就需要釋放信號。今年明顯調低的經濟增長目標釋放出的信號就是，為應對各種風險和挑戰，中國現在願意承受較低的經濟增速。從6.9%微降到6.5%幫助中共規避了對其領導層無法帶領經濟實現增長的批評。雖然外界對於數據的準確性依然存有疑慮，但這一信號成功得以釋放。李克強同時放棄了自己在2017年提到的“在實際工作中爭取更好結果”的期許：漸進式努力不應聚焦在繼續推動取得更高經濟增長數字上，而應放在解決其他優先事項上。

李克強還談到了防控風險。中國領導層深知中國經濟面臨的風險。前財政部部長樓繼偉就曾指出，中國金融領域存在“嚴重的扭曲”和“一系列亂象”，同時“中國發生系統性金融風險的可能性非常大”。而對影子銀行和安邦保險等個別企業採取行動將有可能拉低經濟增速。中國政府需要為應對這種情況預留空間， 而不是逼迫各省份拚命榨取最後一點經濟增速。而直到未知風險出現，我們永遠都無法預知還有哪些未知風險存在。

雖然報告關注的主要焦點是國內，但還存在一些外部風險，其中最為嚴峻的就是與美國的貿易戰。雖然貿易在2017年為中國經濟增長貢獻了10%，但自從2012年以來，貿易一直是中國經濟增長的有限凈貢獻項。如果美國針對中國啟動大規模的貿易限制措施，這一穩定態勢將發生急劇變化。中國領導人將很難如2008年那樣通過推出國內刺激計劃來抵銷來自國外的緊縮壓力。讓我們再次強調，為增長預留一些空間不失為審慎之舉。

通常，對於中國的分析都會低估中國領導人對面臨挑戰的了解程度，因此無法在準確的語境中分析中國的各項聲明。李克強總理在全國人大會議上作的政府工作報告就再次透露出了這樣一個跡象，即中國領導層實際上深知中國面臨的各種問題，他們給自己預留了空間來應對這些挑戰，並穩步在改革實質上取得進步。

Amidst the turbulence and uncertainty of President Trump's stance on trade, Premier Li Keqiang's recent work report to the National People's Congress contained a message of continuity on economic policy. He also set targets of “around 6.5%” for growth, together with a budget deficit of 2.6% of GDP, down from 3% last year.

A skeptical commentator might understandably criticize Li's speech from two, opposing angles: It was too specific. And it was too general. In fact, it helped set the stage for another year's effort on tackling China's challenges.

First – too specific. Year after year, China's officially-announced GDP growth rate has moved in a narrow band from 7.3% in 2014, 6.9% in 2015, 6.7% in 2016 and 6.9%t in 2017. 6.5% in 2018, anyone?

Yet has growth really been so stable? Other measures of economic activity such as energy consumption have moved much more dramatically. With the growth of the internet and services, there have been significant changes in sectoral mix and relative prices. Regions such as Liaoning and Inner Mongolia have announced double-digit downward revisions to GDP, admitting previous falsification of data. Such swings make the overall stability of official numbers suspect.

In any reporting system, there are incentives to game the system and demonstrate targets have been met or exceeded. This is especially true when performance has a big influence on individual careers. But, economic activity everywhere is dynamic and messy. It is especially hard to track when it's growing and shifting as rapidly as it is in China. Statisticians are wise to the games and make their own efforts to improve data accuracy.

It is not just overseas analysts who spot the limitations in reported data. Li Keqiang, in his time as Liaoning Party Secretary, himself declared Chinese GDP figures to be “man-made” and looked instead at numbers such as electricity consumption and freight transport. We need to bear in mind this “open secret” about data accuracy when interpreting announcements on growth targets.

Second – the work report was too general. The 36-page work report lists nine key policy goals. Many are general in their wording and repeat familiar themes from the past ten years: “Actively increasing consumption and promoting effective investment” to choose but one. Li sees three critical battles to be fought: Defusing major risks; poverty alleviation; and addressing pollution. What's new here and where's the beef?

And yet, rather than being too specific and too general, Li's statements can be better viewed as combining substance on the continuity of reform with signals that create the space to tackle key issues.

Substance first. Reporters by their nature look for what is 'new' to make the news. On the contrary, in steering a major economy such as China, constancy of direction is more valuable. The list of China's challenges remains remarkably consistent— this should not be a surprise. It results from the nature and scale of these challenges: there are few quick fixes to air pollution, putting in place a comprehensive pensions system or reducing China's dependence on debt-funded real estate investment. While in some areas, reform and change might have been faster and more effective, that is not really why the challenges remain relevant.

It makes sense therefore for Li's top three priorities to demonstrate continuity on substance. First, stepping up supply-side structural reform – in particular, reducing overcapacity in key areas. Second, moving faster to make China a country of innovators and, third, deepening reform in the areas of state-owned enterprises, private enterprise, property rights, the fiscal system, the financial sector, pensions and healthcare and environmental protection. And given the number and breadth of issues, the full work report does a reasonable job of listing key actions.

The key to success is not more detail here, but persistent implementation across China. To this end, President Xi is emphasizing the leading role of the Party and changes in government structure. The new National Supervision Commission will address both issues of corruption and lack of compliance or perceived resistance. Once implemented, the consolidation of various ministries and regulators will reduce overlaps and improve accountabilities.

Implementing change takes time: there are adjustment costs before benefits come through. New institutions need time to get up and running if change is real. Cutting steel capacity or shuttering industrial activity to reduce pollution hurts growth. Yet the Party leadership has always been reluctant to accept a significant growth slowdown, whatever the longer-term benefits. A perceived failure to deliver on economic growth could risk undermining either individual leaders or the Party itself.

This is where the signals come in. The clear downward trend in GDP targets signals the acceptance of lower growth now in exchange for tackling risks and challenges. The small reduction from 6.9% to 6.5% helps ward off criticism that the leadership is failing to deliver economic performance. This signal gets through regardless of questions on data accuracy. Li also dropped the aspiration for growth to be “higher if possible” that he voiced in 2017: incremental effort should not go on pushing for ever higher GDP, but should have other priorities.

Li talked too of managing risks. The Chinese leadership is all too aware of the risks facing the economy. Former Finance Minister, Lou Jiwei, has described the financial sector as “severely distorted” and “messy,” adding that the “likelihood of China generating systematic financial risks is pretty big.” Actions on shadow banking and major individual cases such as Anbang, the insurer, will tend to reduce growth. The government needs to have room to take this on, rather than have provinces scrabbling for the last bit of growth. Other risks, the unknown unknowns, always remain, by definition, unknown until they emerge.

While the focus is primarily domestic, there are also external risks – the largest being a trade war with the United States. Since 2012, trade has made a limited net contribution to growth, although it did contribute a tenth of China's growth in 2017. This stable picture would however change rapidly in the face of meaningful trade restrictions from the United States. Chinese leaders would be reluctant to offset contractionary pressures from abroad with domestic stimulus in the way they did in 2008. Again, having some leeway on growth is prudent.

Too often, analysis of China underestimates how aware China's leaders are of the challenges they face and fails to place announcements in the right context. Li's NPC work report is another sign that the leadership is indeed well-aware and is giving itself the space to tackle these challenges and to steadily make progress on the substance of reform.