唐納德·特朗普被選進白宮，奧巴馬政府最終還是接受了這件躲不過去的事，而且宣布在“跛腳鴨”階段的最後日子裡，不再推動“跨太平洋夥伴關係”（TPP）。從美國的角度看，TPP已死。對於TPP其他11個夥伴國來說這一宣布令人失望，但屬意料之中，因為特朗普和希拉里·克林頓都反對TPP。日本已經通過TPP法案。TPP在新西蘭議會正等待通過。在加拿大，接手上屆政府TPP工作的自由黨正進行有關聽證，不過雖然反對派因此得到更多在媒體上曝光的機會，但聽證實際上只是一種拖延手段，為的是等華盛頓那邊的事情更加明了。

由於美國不打算也不願意批准今年2月簽署的這份協議，除非改頭換面，否則這份協議已經不可能繼續朝前走。根據現有規定，12個初始成員中至少有6個成員（佔全體成員GDP的85%）批准，協議才能生效。美國和日本佔到成員國GDP的80%（其中美國佔62%），因此美日兩國都有否決權。沒有美國，其他11國是否願意繼續推進TPP值得懷疑，因為許多成員國的主要目的就是獲得排他性機會進入美國市場。

那麼，美國和其他TPP國家的企業和出口商還有什麼選擇呢？多數其他TPP成員不會在一棵樹上弔死。澳大利亞、新西蘭、新加坡、馬來西亞、越南、汶萊和日本是談判中的區域全面經濟夥伴關係（RCEP）協議方。RCEP包括東盟10國和日本、中國、韓國、印度、澳大利亞、新西蘭。智利、秘魯和墨西哥是新成立的太平洋聯盟（PA）成員，該聯盟致力於拉美地區的貿易自由化。同加拿大一樣，墨西哥也是美國的北美自由貿易協定（NAFTA）夥伴。不過作為NAFTA成員近來可謂提心弔膽，因為特朗普揚言要修改或廢除這份實施了20載並對3個夥伴國都有益的協定。

TPP談判被指責是在幕後秘密進行的，實際上RCEP也是如此。雖然最後協議達成之後，TPP文本已經公開，但RCEP的條款依然模糊不清。人們普遍認為，根據東盟國家與東盟集團6個主要貿易對象國之間的雙邊協議，RCEP降低貿易壁壘的雄心和效果都比不上TPP。不過，除了貨物貿易，RCEP還包括服務貿易、投資、知識產權、競爭政策、爭端解決和技術合作，而且它納入了世界第二大經濟體中國。除了敏感產業不可避免地成為例外，以及部分產品需要循序漸進，這份協議完成的時候，會形成一個涵蓋全球45%人口、GDP總量達22萬億美元、貿易額佔全球40%的優惠貿易區。這將是世界上最大的貿易集團，而美國只能站在圈外看着。

對在該地區開展業務或出口的美國公司來說，要打入RCEP圈子，就會產生更多外包業務。正如新加坡亞洲貿易中心的評論：

“希望保持競爭力的公司，特別是在出口市場開展業務的公司，現在必須加倍努力。沒有了貿易優惠，這些公司在亞洲或歐洲的競爭對手面前就會處於劣勢。特朗普一直抱怨的工作外包會變得更多。想利用亞洲RCEP之類政策獲益的公司必須在亞洲設點，以便為這些增長迅速的重要市場提供商品和服務。”

當然，這一結果與特朗普想要的恰恰相反。

TPP本應（與RCEP和太平洋聯盟一道）成為通往更大的亞太自由貿易區（FTAAP）的路徑之一。這個龐大的區域性協議將整合并放大其各個組成部分的益處。中國一直把FTAAP作為終極目標來推動，亞太經合組織（APEC）甚至同意由中國和美國共同主持“戰略研究”，探討TPP和RCEP的兼容互補之道。雖然FTAAP會把中國納入一個更廣、想必也更嚴格的條約，但美國仍願意先關注TPP，它可以是任何更大型貿易協定的組成部分。通過這種手段，可以獲得先動優勢，為FTAAP設置規矩。從投資爭端解決，到知識產權、環境和勞工標準，許多美國產業就可以在諸多領域受益於貿易壁壘的降低，受益於規則的更加透明。但此戰略不復存在了，至少在可預見的未來是如此。

這裡存在的一個風險是，美國會被人看成是背棄了亞洲，而中國將推動RCEP的完成，使之成為區域內更廣泛貿易的模板。西半球國家面前將出現一個一分兩半的太平洋。

對在亞洲開展業務的美國公司來說，重要的是保持在該地區的積極存在，當新貿易集團出現時對它充分加以利用。如上所述，這也許意味着公司必須使它們的存在本土化。現有雙邊協議，比如韓國與美國、加拿大、智利簽署的自貿協定，對此會有幫助。隨着TPP垮台，加拿大有望恢復與日本的雙邊自由貿易談判，該談判在日本加入TPP談判時中斷了（日本已經與智利達成協議）。有TPP談判奠定的基礎，也許美國和日本是時候考慮達成一個雙邊協議。不過，貿易政策由特朗普制定，很難想像這會是被優先考慮的事。

由於增長放緩，中國自己正面臨經濟挑戰。北京在尋找促進經濟增長的辦法，比如“一帶一路”倡議和增加國內需求。特別是，如果特朗普仍不斷威脅要破壞中國對美國的出口，那麼推動RCEP取得成功（也許通過作出一些讓步來提供契機），就可以成為刺激經濟活動的另一種手段。在美國對亞洲的經濟承諾出現問題之際，它還可以確立中國對東盟的領導。

最後，從長期看，華盛頓需要重新確認其在亞太地區的貿易存在。雖然來自美國大選的反對聲音增多，但供應鏈是相互交織相互依存的，無法獨自運行。短期內，TPP胎死腹中使美國的出口和西方在亞洲的利益受挫，使美國和TPP其他各國公司、工人和消費者受挫。它將需要很長的時間，才能評估並最終彌補這一損失。

With the election of Donald Trump to the White House, the Obama Administration has finally accepted the inevitable and has announced that it will cease efforts to push the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) forward in the waning days of the Lame Duck session. From a U.S. perspective, the TPP is now dead. For the eleven other TPP partners, this announcement is a disappointment, although not an unexpected one given the opposition to the TPP demonstrated by both Trump and Hillary Clinton. Japan has already passed TPP legislation and there is legislation pending in the New Zealand Parliament. In Canada, the Liberal Party, which inherited the TPP from its predecessors, has been conducting hearings on the treaty. However, while opponents received ample airtime, the hearings were really just a way to “rag the puck” until it became clearer what would happen in Washington.

With the U.S. unprepared and unwilling to ratify the agreement that was signed in February, it cannot go ahead unless it is revised. Under its current terms, it can only come into force if at least 6 of the 12 original members, comprising 85 percent of the combined GDP of all members (in 2013), agree to proceed. With the U.S. and Japan having a combined share of about 80 percent of combined GDP, this effectively gives both countries a veto (U.S. share is about 62 percent). Whether the remaining eleven would be interested in proceeding without the U.S. is debatable since gaining exclusive access to the U.S. market was the main priority for many member countries.

So where does this leave businesses and exporters in the U.S. and other TPP countries? Most of the other TPP players have another string to their bow. Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and Japan are parties to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement, which is currently under negotiation. RCEP includes all ten countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus Japan, China, Korea, India, and Australia and New Zealand. Chile, Peru, and Mexico are members of the newly formed Pacific Alliance (PA), which is engaged in liberalizing trade in the Latin America region. And along with Canada, Mexico is a North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partner alongside the U.S. However, being a member of NAFTA these days is not very reassuring given what Trump has said about revising — or scrapping — the 20 year old agreement that has worked well for all three partners.

While the TPP was accused of being negotiated in secret, the same is true of the RCEP. And although the TPP text became publicly available after final agreements were reached, the terms of the RCEP remain vague. It is generally accepted that based on bilateral agreements between the ASEAN partners and the six countries with which the ASEAN bloc mainly trades with, that RCEP will be of lower ambition and benefit in terms of bringing down trade barriers in comparison to the TPP. However, in addition to the trade in goods, RCEP includes a trade in services, investments, intellectual property rights, competition policy, and dispute settlement and technical cooperation. The agreement also includes China, the world's second largest economy. Despite the inevitable carve-outs for sensitive sectors and long phase ins for some products, when the agreement is finalized, it will create a preferential trade zone for its members that will cover 45 percent of the world's population with a combined GDP of $22 trillion, while accounting for 40 percent of global trade. It will be the world's largest trade bloc—and the U.S. will be on the outside looking in.

For U.S. companies exporting to or operating in the region, it will likely lead to more outsourcing as companies seek to get inside the RCEP zone. As the Asian Trade Centre in Singapore has commented,

Companies hoping to remain competitive—and particularly those working in export markets—will have to work much harder now. Absent trade preferences, firms are at a disadvantage relative to competitors in places like Asia or Europe. The outsourcing that Trump has complained about is likely to accelerate. Firms that want to take advantage of benefits conferred through deals like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in Asia will need to be located in Asia to provide goods and services to these faster growing, significant markets.

This, of course, is the opposite outcome for which Trump has been advocating.

The TPP is supposed to be one of the “pathways” (alongside the RCEP and the Pacific Alliance) to a much broader Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), a mega regional agreement that would combine and multiply the benefits of its components. China has been pushing the FTAAP as an ultimate goal, and APEC has even agreed to a “strategic study”, co-chaired by China and the U.S., to explore the ways in which the TPP and RCEP could be made compatible and mutually reinforcing. While the FTAAP would bring China into a larger, presumably higher-discipline treaty, the U.S. has preferred to focus first on the TPP, which would become a building block of any larger trade agreement. In this way, it would have the first-move advantage and set the bar for the FTAAP. Many U.S. industries would benefit from the lowering of trade barriers and more transparent rules in many areas, from investment dispute settlement to intellectual property rights to environmental and labour standards. However, that strategy is out the window—at least for the foreseeable future.

The risk is that the U.S. will be seen as turning its back on Asia. China will push to conclude the RCEP, making the RCEP a template for broader trade within the region. Countries in the Western Hemisphere will see a divide down the Pacific.

For North American businesses operating in Asia, it will be important to maintain an active presence in the region and to take advantage of new trade blocs if and when they emerge. As noted, it may mean that companies will have to localize their presence. Existing bilateral agreements, such as the FTAs that Korea has with the U.S., Canada and Chile will help. With the collapse of the TPP, Canada can be expected to revive its bilateral free trade discussions with Japan that were suspended when Japan joined the TPP negotiations (Japan already has an agreement with Chile). It may be time for the U.S. and Japan to consider a bilateral agreement after the groundwork that has been laid through the TPP negotiations. Although, with Trump setting trade policy, it is hard to imagine that this will be a priority.

China is facing its own economic challenges as its economy slows. Beijing is looking for ways to boost growth, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and by increasing domestic demand. Giving RCEP a push to reach a successful conclusion (perhaps by making some concessions to provide momentum) would be another way to stimulate economic activity, particularly if Trump follows through on threats to disrupt Chinese exports to the U.S. It would also establish Chinese leadership vis a vis ASEAN at a time when U.S. economic commitments to Asia are in question.

Ultimately, over the long term, Washington will need to re-assert its trade presence in the Asia Pacific region. The supply chains are too interwoven and interdependent to go at it alone, despite increased opposition rhetoric emanating from the U.S. election. For the immediate future, however, the still-birth of the TPP is a setback for U.S. exports, for Western interests in Asia, and for companies, workers, and consumers in both the U.S. and other TPP countries. It will take time to assess and, eventually, remedy the damage.