（從左至右）亞美尼亞國防部長蘇倫·帕皮基揚、柬埔寨國防部長狄西哈、中國國防部長董軍、越南國防部長潘文江上將和阿塞拜疆國防部長扎基爾·加桑諾夫出席於2025年9月18日在北京舉行的第十二屆北京香山論壇。

9月17日至19日，第十二屆北京香山論壇成功舉辦，筆者應邀與會，收穫頗豐。中美作為世界上有重要影響力的大國，雙邊關係穩定關乎全球和平穩定。會議期間，有中方學者指出，今年1月特朗普開啟第二任期以來，與中國競爭、遏制中國的核心邏輯未發生根本改變，但美國在施壓過程中逐漸認知中國的戰略韌性，所以對華從脅迫階段進入到彼此妥協的階段。然而，台灣、南海等議題的持續發酵，疊加中美戰略信任不足與新興技術帶來的誤判風險，中美潛在衝突點日益增多。第十二屆北京香山論壇的研討表明，構建有效的危機管理體系、避免軍事衝突，已成為中美關係的緊迫課題。

中美危機管理的歷史經驗提供了啟示，雙方在危機處理中展現出既博弈又合作的複雜動態。如，朝鮮戰爭爆發之初，中美因缺乏直接溝通渠道，導致美方嚴重誤判中國維護地緣安全紅線的決心。中國多次警告美軍不得越過“三八線”，但被美方視為“虛張聲勢”，最終在錯誤的時間、錯誤的地點打了一場錯誤的戰爭。

1996年，美國允許台灣地區領導人李登輝竄美，觸發台海危機，中國通過軍事演習展示捍衛國家主權和領土完整的強大決心和意志，美國則派遣兩個航母戰鬥群到台海地區耀武揚威。雙方雖未發生直接衝突，但此次危機暴露中美溝通不暢和誤判風險。1999年，以美國為首的北約轟炸中國駐南聯盟大使館，造成中方人員傷亡、館舍嚴重毀壞。美國初始僅表示是“誤炸”，這種行徑激起中國人民極大憤慨。該事件最終以美國道歉和賠償得以平息，但它進一步凸顯雙方及時、直接對話的必要性。2001年中美南海撞機事件，則通過外交談判解決，但過程曲折，反映了雙方信息傳遞和海上意外相遇的風險應對機制不足。

這些危機均對中美關係造成長期負面影響，並揭示了危機管理的重要性。當前，中美危機管理面臨多重挑戰。首先，戰略互信缺失加劇危機爆發風險。美國近年來將中國視為“頭號戰略競爭對手”，不斷在國內外釋放對華敵意，限制了其危機管理的決策靈活性。中美雙方對危機管理的認知差異也加劇了互信不足。美國往往強調危機爆發後的“管理”，為其軍事挑釁找借口。中國則強調“危機預防”，要求美國不要搞挑釁、不要觸發危機後才想着去應對。

美國在本屆北京香山論壇前後及期間的舉動，對於削弱中方戰略信任的消極影響可見一斑。在北京香山論壇開始前，美國防長赫格塞思在與中國防長董軍的視頻通話中作出罕見表態，明確表示美國無意與中國發生衝突，也無意尋求中國政權變更或扼殺中國。這一表述被美方參會代表施燦德強調為“重大轉變”。然而，美方軍事力量並沒有收斂，轉身就在南海進行挑釁。這種口頭善意卻行動挑釁的矛盾，只會加劇中國對美政策誠意的懷疑。並且，本屆北京香山論壇吸引了全球100多個國家、地區和國際組織的1800餘名代表，部級和軍隊總長級以上代表有40多位，唯獨美國降級參會。這種刻意的“冷落”對於中美增強戰略互信極為不利。

其次，中美潛在危機風險點日益增多。台灣問題尤為敏感，是中國核心利益中的核心，而美國為了遏制打壓中國，不斷打“台灣牌”，強化與台灣民進黨當局勾連，不斷踩踏一個中國原則紅線。南海方向，美國持續開展所謂“航行自由行動”，中美雙方海空力量近距離接觸頻繁，增加意外事件風險。菲律賓等國家在美“背書”下更趨激進，不少分析家擔心其為獲取最大利益，甚至可能製造摩擦將美國拖入對華衝突。此外，網絡、太空、人工智能等領域成為博弈前沿，進一步加劇了危機不確定性。網絡攻擊或太空資產碰撞等意外事件可能迅速導致中美危機升級。

當前，中美雖已建立多種危機管理機制，但效能持續經受考驗。雙邊機制包括1998年《海上軍事安全磋商機制》、2014年《建立重大軍事行動相互通報信任措施機制諒解備忘錄》與《海空相遇安全行為準則備忘錄》、國防部熱線等。其他如《海上意外相遇規則》和東盟主導的對話機制也涉及中美。然而，這些機制多聚焦戰術技術等層面，且易受政治氛圍影響。

一般而言，學界認為的有效危機管理包括四要素：

一是信號清晰，避免模糊或矛盾信息導致誤判；

二是溝通渠道暢通，確保高層直接對話；

三是防止民族主義綁架政策；

四是第三方角色，如聯合國等多邊平台提供調停空間。

為加強危機管理，中美似可考慮加強如下努力。

首先，提升溝通效力，釋放清晰信號。中美應為減少誤判增強海空域感知能力，搭建現代化熱線系統，避免依賴單一渠道，並將現有熱線擴展至多層級，確保“7×24小時”暢通。

其次，完善危機管理機制與規則。建立危機預防框架，設立1.5軌聯合危機管理工作組。工作組應聚焦高風險議題，制定紅線和降級程序。此外應細化行為準則，制定危機處理手冊，明確行為準則和通訊協議。

最後，構建戰略互信。應強化中美“戰略穩定對話”，同時推動選擇性合作，積累互信，為危機管理創造良好氛圍。諸如北京香山論壇為中美安全對話交流提供了重要平台，美方應予重視。

總之，中國通過本屆北京香山論壇向國際社會清晰傳遞了其全球安全觀，那就是，真正的安全源於平等對話與包容合作，而非對抗與分裂。論壇本身即是這一理念的生動實踐，為包括衝突相關方在內的多國提供了獨一無二的對話平台。中美應守住不衝突不對抗底線，特別是美方應在戰略上校正認知邏輯，防止誤解誤讀誤判。只要中美相向而行，擰緊危機管理的“安全閥”，增進互信與合作，雙方就完全可以相互成就共同繁榮，造福兩國並惠及世界。

(From left) Armenian Defence Minister Suren Papikyan, Cambodian Defence Minister Tea Seiha, Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun, Vietnam’s Defence Minister General Phan Van Giang, and Azerbaijan's Defence Minister Zakir Hasanov attend Beijing Xiangshan Forum in Beijing, China on Sept 18, 2025.

At the 12th Beijing Xiangshan Forum held in September, the stability of ties between China and the United States — major countries with significant global influence in the cause of peace — was a topic of concern.Some Chinese scholars pointed out that, though there has been no fundamental change in the core logic of the U.S., which emphasizes competing with China and containing it. Since Trump began his second term in January, Washington has gradually come to terms with China's strategic resilience while increasing pressure on it, thereby transitioning from a phase of coercion to one of mutual compromise.However, as such subjects as Taiwan and the South China Sea continue to ferment, exacerbated by insufficient strategic mutual confidence and risk of misjudgment brought by emerging technologies, potential points of conflict have been on the rise. As discussions at the forum indicate, building an effective crisis management regime and avoiding military conflict has become a pressing task in China-U.S. relations.

Historical experience in bilateral crisis management is a source of inspiration. The two sides have demonstrated a complex dynamic that includes collaborating while competing. For instance, at the beginning of the Korean War, owing to the absence of channels for direct communication, the U.S. seriously misjudged China's determination to preserve its security. Despite repeated Chinese warnings against the crossing of the 38th Parallel by the American military, Washington saw these as bluffs. This resulted in what is now characterized as the U.S. fighting the wrong war at the wrong time in the wrong place.

In 1996, the visit of Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. triggered a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, with China staging military drills to demonstrate its strong resolve to preserve national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The U.S. dispatched two aircraft carrier strike groups to waters off Taiwan. Although there was no direct conflict, the crisis exposed the risks of poor communication and misjudgment. NATO, led by the United States, bombed the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999, resulting in serious casualties and damage, which the U.S. initially said was “unintended.” The incident ignited extreme indignation in the Chinese public and ended in a U.S. apology and compensation, further highlighting the necessity of timely, direct dialogue. The mid-air collision of Chinese and U.S. military aircraft over Hainan island in 2001 was resolved through diplomacy, but the process was full of twists and turns, reflecting the lack of corresponding mechanisms for bilateral information exchange and risk management for maritime incidents.

All these crises had lasting negative effects on the China-U.S. relationship and revealed the importance of crisis management. Such management currently faces multiple challenges.First, lack of strategic mutual confidence amplifies the risk of a crisis. The U.S. has named China as its foremost rival in strategic competition in recent years and constantly uses hostile rhetoric at home and internationally, which constricts the flexibility in decision making it might otherwise have in a crisis.Cognitive differences over crisis management between China and the U.S. in turn have worsened the trust deficit. The U.S. usually emphasizes post-crisis management as it looks for excuses for its military provocations. While China stresses crisis prevention, asking the U.S. not to engage in provocation in the first place. Coping with a crisis after triggering it is not the best approach for Washington.

The negative influence of U.S. moves before, during and after the forum understandably reduced China's strategic confidence. Before the forum, during a video call with Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made the rare statement that the U.S. has no intention to confront China, nor does it seek regime change or suppression. Forum participant Chad L. Sbragia identified this as a “significant change.” Yet the US military was not restrained and immediately made a provocative move in the South China Sea.Such contradictions between words and deeds can only feed China's suspicions regarding the sincerity of U.S. policies. Moreover, the forum attracted more than 1,800 representatives from more than 100 countries, regions and international organizations, with more than 40 at or above the ministerial and chief-of-staff levels. Only the U.S. sent lower-ranking representatives. Such an intentional cold shoulder undermines the ability of the two major countries to increase strategic mutual trust.

Second, there are increasing risk points for crises. The Taiwan question is particularly sensitive, as it lies at the core of Chinese interests. To contain China, the U.S. regularly plays the Taiwan card as it seeks to enhance its collusion with the DPP party on the island. It routinely tramples on the “one China” redline. In the South China Sea, the U.S. continues to carry out so-called freedom of navigation operations. Close encounters between Chinese and U.S. naval and air forces have been frequent, which escalates the risk of an unexpected confrontation. Making matters worse, with America's endorsement, countries such as the Philippines tend to become more radical, leading many analysts to worry they may even create friction great enough to drag the U.S. into a conflict with China .In addition, AI technology, networks and outer space have become new frontiers in this major country rivalry, further intensifying the possibility of a clash. An accidental cyberattack or a collision of space assets could swiftly escalate into a confrontation between China and the United States.

Despite the various crisis management mechanisms already in place, their efficacy is constantly being put to the test. Bilateral mechanisms include the 1998 Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, the 2014 Memorandum of Understanding on Notification of Major Military Activities Confidence-Building Measures Mechanism the Memorandum of Understanding on the Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters and the hotline between defense authorities.Other mechanisms, such as the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea and ASEAN-led dialogue mechanisms also involve China and the United States. But these mechanisms involve mostly tactical and technical levels and are subject to the political atmosphere.

Academics generally believe that effective crisis management includes four factors:

• First, clear signals to prevent ambiguous or contradictory information from leading to misjudgment;

• Second, smooth communication channels to ensure direct dialogue at high levels;

• Third, prevent nationalism from hijacking policy;

• Fourth, third-party players, such as multilateral platforms, including the UN, to provide room for mediation.

To enhance crisis management, China and the United States might want to consider making the following efforts:

First, raise communication efficacy to communicate clear messages. Maritime and aerial domain awareness could be upgraded to reduce misjudgment. A modern hotline system could be set up to avoid dependence on a single channel. Existing hotlines could be expanded to multiple levels, with a guarantee of smooth 24/7 communication.

Second, perfect crisis management mechanisms and rules. A crisis prevention framework could be built, with a crisis management working team. This team would focus on high-risk subjects, draw redlines and downgrade procedures, specify rules of conduct, compile crisis handling brochures and clarify code of conduct and telecommunications protocols.

Third, build strategic mutual confidence. Dialogue related to strategic stability and cooperation could be strengthened to accumulate mutual trust and create a better atmosphere for crisis management. For example, the Xiangshan Forum offers an important platform for China-U.S. security dialogue. The American side should take it seriously.

To sum up, through the Xiangshan Forum the Chinese side explicitly conveyed to the international community its global security outlook. True security derives from equal dialogue and inclusive cooperation, not confrontation and division. The forum itself is a vivid example of this idea. It provides a unique platform for dialogue between parties including those in conflict.China and the United States should uphold the bottom line of no conflict and no confrontation, and the U.S. side in particular should calibrate its cognitive logic at the strategic level to avoid misunderstanding and misjudgment. So long as China and the U.S. meet each other halfway, tighten the safety valve of crisis management and advance mutual trust and cooperation, they surely can contribute to each other's success, achieve common prosperity and bring benefits to themselves and the entire world.