Since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, Western powers have harbored unrealistic expectations that China might exert decisive pressure on Moscow to bring hostilities to an end. But this hope rests on a flawed strategic premise. The intrinsic nature of the relationship between China and Russia is ill-suited to serve as an instrument of conflict resolution.
History offers ample testimony to the fact that durable peace is most often forged through direct engagement and mutual compromise between adversaries. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) of the late 1970s, for instance, marked a pivotal easing of Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Likewise, the 1975 Helsinki Accords laid the groundwork for pan-European security and cooperation.In contrast, attempts to engineer strategic stability through the mediation of third parties have produced meager results. The thaw in Sino-American relations during the 1970s, for example, did not directly precipitate the end of the Cold War. Throughout the Reagan era, Washington remained unwavering in its policy of containing the Soviet Union.The current war in Ukraine is no exception to this pattern. Western observers often portray China as possessing unique influence over Moscow — an influence that could ostensibly be harnessed to bring about peace. However, such assessments misapprehend the deliberate formal structure of the China-Russia partnership. Defined by principles of non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of third parties, the relationship is grounded in mutual respect for strategic autonomy. To treat it as a decisive instrument for ending the war is not only imprudent but fundamentally misguided. The ultimate resolution of the conflict rests in the hands of the primary belligerents.
Furthermore, bilateral relationships — including this one — are shaped by the broader evolution of the international order. Since Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, Western perceptions of the Sino-Russian axis have grown increasingly wary and complex. In 2015, the United States launched its “rebalancing” strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, intensifying its efforts to contain China's rise even as China-Europe relations remained comparatively stable. The China-EU Joint Statement that year explicitly called for a political solution to the Ukraine crisis.A decisive shift occurred with the inauguration of President Donald Trump in January 2017. The U.S. National Security Strategy redefined China and Russia as strategic competitors — an assessment later echoed in the 2018 National Defense Strategy and subsequently adopted by NATO in 2019. It recognized China as a secondary challenge to the alliance. Concurrently, Beijing and Moscow elevated their bilateral ties to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for a New Era,” and by July 2020, the Director of the FBI publicly labeled China as the “greatest long-term threat” to the United States. This view was institutionalized in NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept, which characterized China as a “systemic challenge.”The trajectory of recent history clearly illustrates that mounting pressures within the international matrix have significantly deepened the strategic rift between China and Russia on one side and Western powers on the other.
Since 2013, the heads of state of China and Russia have signed no fewer than seventeen Joint Statements, eight of which explicitly address their comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination. Notably, the June 2019 Joint Statement articulated principles of non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of third parties — a direct extension of Article VII of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation signed in July 2001. That article affirms that bilateral military and technological cooperation would not be directed against any third country.Despite China's sustained efforts to reshape Western perceptions of its relationship with Russia, its endeavors have yielded limited results. Western nations have instead adopted increasingly assertive — if not overtly adversarial — policies toward China. NATO warships have repeatedly transited the Taiwan Strait, supply chains are being systematically decoupled from China and Chinese enterprises face growing restrictions in Western markets.In May this year, China and Russia issued a joint statement on global strategic stability, condemning the expansion of both new and legacy military alliances and coercive military posturing by nuclear-armed states in geopolitically sensitive regions. The statement stands as both a pointed critique of the prevailing international order and a testament to the two nations' shared discontent.
It must be acknowledged that whether driven by cautious experimentation or a strategic wager on the China-Russia axis the West's approach has consistently prioritized its own interests. It has sought to externalize security responsibilities while reaping maximum strategic returns at minimal cost. Certain Western think tanks have underestimated the pivotal role of Russian energy in sustaining China's economic stability and development. They have simplistically assumed that China could constrain Russia through economic leverage. Yet, in truth, Russia's strategic decisions remain sovereign choices, rooted in its national interests rather than being dictated by Chinese preferences.From an institutional standpoint, the China-Russia relationship does not constitute a formal alliance. For example, it lacks collective defense clauses akin to those enshrined in NATO's founding treaty. Instead, the two states operate on a foundation of strategic coordination, not military entanglement.
The ongoing war in Ukraine is, in essence, the culmination of a long-declining relationship between Russia and the West. In February 1992, then-President Boris Yeltsin of Russia and U.S. President George H. W. Bush signed the Camp David Declaration, proclaiming the end of the Cold War, renouncing mutual animosity and committing to the construction of a new relationship grounded in trust. Yet, more than three decades later, that hopeful vision lies in ruins. The Camp David Declaration has been reduced to a relic — an echo of a fleeting moment of optimism. Today, relations between Russia and the West have slid back into a new Cold War state, bereft of strategic trust and marked by mutual suspicion.
It is crucial to recognize that even amid this intensifying and multifaceted confrontation, perspectives within Russia regarding its relationship with China remain far from monolithic. On June 9, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, a publication held in high regard among Russia's intellectual and social elite, published a thought-provoking article asserting that Russia's current policies had failed to bolster its own competitiveness. Consequently, the nation has grown increasingly reliant on the Chinese market in a manner that is both artificial and unsustainable, thereby stifling innovation and hindering long-term economic growth. The article called for a fundamental reassessment of national strategy. It urged a renewed focus on domestic technological advancement and industrial development while cautioning against the hazards of replacing the European Union market with that of China.
The West, in its strategic calculus, has misread the dynamics of the China-Russia relationship and underestimated the essential need for sustained, candid dialogue among all stakeholders in the ongoing conflict. As a responsible major country, China has remained steadfast in its pursuit of peace in Ukraine, advocating tirelessly for dialogue and negotiation. It has issued significant diplomatic initiatives, including a position paper on reaching a political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. In partnership with Brazil, it also released the Six-Point Consensus, which outlines shared principles for de-escalation.Looking ahead, any durable resolution to the conflict in Ukraine must be forged through genuine negotiations between the parties directly involved. China will continue to explore viable avenues for reducing tensions and remains committed to playing a constructive and enduring role in the broader peace process.
