近期，中國外交部發言人在回答彭博社記者提問時，指出國際海洋法沒有“國際水域”一說，台灣海峽不是“國際水域”（international waters）。這本來屬於事實陳述，卻引發外媒討論，認為中美圍繞台灣問題的博弈進入“深水區”。無論“深水”還是“淺水”，釐清台海水域的法律地位，將有助中美兩國（包括媒體）在談論時表意更準確，這也是為競爭日益複雜的中美關係安裝“護欄”的一種方式。

“國際水域”不是法律語言

彭博社記者口中的“國際水域”並不是一個正式的國際海洋法的概念，有些國家用來非正式地指代“公海”（high sea）。1982年的《聯合國海洋法公約》（以下簡稱《公約》）沒有給出“公海”的定義，但在第七部分“公海”中提到“本部分的規定適用於不包括在國家的專屬經濟區、領海或內水或群島國的群島水域內的全部海域”（第八十六條）。由此可見，海洋法中的水域有公海、專屬經濟區、領海、內水、群島水域，但沒有“國際水域”。

台灣海峽屬於一國之內大陸與島嶼之間形成的海峽，其連接東海和南海，有不少國際船舶航行其中。美國國務院發言人稱“台灣海峽是一條國際水道（international waterway）”，這同樣不是準確描述台灣海峽的法律語言。《公約》第三部分“用於國際航行的海峽”（straits used for international navigation）規定，“在公海或專屬經濟區的一個部分和公海或專屬經濟區的另一部分之間的用於國際航行的海峽”（第三十七條）。由於《公約》只是描述而沒有給出這類海峽的明確定義，所以，單從地理特性和功能性上看，台灣海峽可被歸於這類海峽，但完全不適用本部分的通行制度。“本部分的任何規定不影響海峽沿岸國領海以外的水域作為專屬經濟區或公海的法律地位”（第三十五條），“如果穿過某一用於國際航行的海峽有在航行和水文特徵方面同樣方便的一條穿過公海或穿過專屬經濟區的航道，本部分不適用於該海峽；在這種航道中，適用本公約其他有關部分中包括關於航行和飛越自由的規定”（第三十六條）。這些規定排除了台灣海峽適用《公約》第三部分“用於國際航行的海峽”，需根據海峽內不同水域的法律地位來確定通行制度。

台灣海峽水域的構成與通行制度

由於兩岸情況特殊，中國迄今只公布了大陸、西沙群島和釣魚島的領海基線，其餘地方包括台灣島和澎湖列島的領海基線尚未公布。按照《公約》有關規定，內水是指領海基線向陸地一側的全部水域，是國家領土的組成部分。領海是指領海基線向海一側、寬度不超過12海里的海域，包括上空、海床和底土，也是國家領土的組成部分。沿海國在內水和領海享有主權。毗連區從領海基線量起，不得超過24海里，國家享有海關、財政、移民或衛生事項的管制權。專屬經濟區是領海以外並鄰接領海的一個區域，從領海基線量起，不應超過200海里。沿海國在專屬經濟區享有“勘探和開發，保全和管理自然資源”，“從事經濟行開發和勘探”的主權權利，以及三項管轄權，即對人工島嶼、設施和結構的建造和使用，海洋科學研究，海洋環境的保護和保全。

台灣海峽最窄處約70海里，最寬處約220海里。根據《公約》和中國國內法，台灣海峽水域由中國的內水、領海、毗連區和專屬經濟區構成。國家對不同水域享有的權利和義務不同，不同水域適用的通行方式也不同。如在領海，所有國家，不論為沿海國或內陸國，其船舶均享有無害通過權（第十七、十八、十九條）；如果任何軍艦不遵守沿海國關於通過領海的法律和規章，而且不顧沿海國向其提出遵守法律和規章的任何要求，沿海國可要求該軍艦立即離開領海（第三十條）。再如在專屬經濟區，所有國家享有航行和飛越的自由（第五十八條）。《中華人民共和國專屬經濟區和大陸架法》的第十一條同樣規定，任何國家在遵守國際法和中華人民共和國的法律、法規的前提下，在中華人民共和國的專屬經濟區享有航行、飛越的自由。

誰在破壞國際規則？

1982年《公約》開放簽字時，中國是首批簽字國之一。迄今已有160多個締約方，但不包括美國。美國沒有加入《公約》，固然有其國內政治的緣由，但本質上還是謀求全球海洋利益的霸權思維在作祟。因為不加入《公約》，並不妨礙美國享有《公約》中規定的權利，但可以規避義務。所以面對《公約》指出的“公海應只用於和平目的”（第八十八條），以及各國在專屬經濟區內“應適當顧及沿海國的權利和義務”，並應遵守沿海國制定的不與《公約》和其他國際法規則相抵觸的法律和規章（第五十八條），美國都可以選擇忽視。

自2020年以來，美國軍艦平均每月在台灣海峽航行一次。當然，由於台灣海峽有大片水域屬於專屬經濟區，美國在中國的專屬經濟區可以有“航行自由”，又因為沒有加入《公約》，它可以毫不“顧及沿海國在專屬經濟區的權利和義務”，宣稱“這是對一個自由開放的印太地區的承諾”。這種近乎挑釁的“航行自由”，為“台獨”分子撐腰打氣，不斷掏空、虛化“一個中國”原則底線。兩岸分治70多年，若非美國不斷花式支持“台獨”分子，兩岸的和平統一之路也不會走得這麼曲折。

依照《公約》和國內法的規定，中國政府對台灣海峽的水域享有主權、主權權利和管轄權，同時也尊重其他國家在這一海域的合法權利。如果故意操弄這一問題，誣稱“中國違反國際海洋法規則”，中國當然有必要講清楚，以正視聽。

There is no legal basis for “international waters” in the international law of the sea. It is false to call the Taiwan Strait international waters, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said at a regular news conference on June 13 when asked by a reporter from Bloomberg. It is a fact. Some foreign media said there are more and more disputes between China and the United States concerning the Taiwan question. Clarifying the legal status of waters in the Taiwan Strait will help China and the U.S. have a better understanding and talk about Taiwan more accurately. It will set guardrails for China-U.S. relations, especially on the Taiwan question.

“International waters” not a legal term

The term “international waters” used by the Bloomberg reporter is not a formal legal term in the international law of the sea, but it is used informally by some countries to refer to “high seas.” The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea does not give a definition, but in Part VII, titled “High Seas,” it stipulates in Article 86 that “The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.” Thus, the waters covered in the law of the sea include the high seas, exclusive economic zones, territorial seas, internal waters and archipelagic waters — but not “international waters.”

Situated between the mainland and the islands of a country, the Taiwan Strait connects the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Many international ships sail there. Ned Price, spokesman for the U.S. Department of State stated: “The Taiwan Strait is an international waterway,” which again is not accurate legal language. Part III of the Convention, titled “Straits Used for International Navigation,” stipulates in Article 37: “This section applies to straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.” Since the Convention only describes but does not give a clear definition of this type of strait, the Taiwan Strait may be classified as such on the basis of its geographical characteristics and functionality alone. But the regime of navigation under this part does not apply at all. According to Article 35, “Nothing in this Part affects the legal status of the waters beyond the territorial seas of States bordering straits as exclusive economic zones or high seas.” As stipulated in Article 36: “This Part does not apply to a strait used for international navigation if there exists through the strait a route through the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics; in such routes, the other relevant Parts of this Convention, including the provisions regarding the freedoms of navigation and overflight, apply.” These provisions exclude the application of Part III of the convention to the Taiwan Strait. The regime of navigation is to be determined in accordance with the legal status of the different waters in the Taiwan Strait.

Composition of waters in the Taiwan Strait and the navigation regime

Because of the special situation of Taiwan, China has so far only announced the baselines of the territorial waters of the mainland, the Xisha Islands and the Diaoyu Islands, while the baselines of the territorial waters of the remaining places, including the island of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, have not yet been announced. Under provisions of the convention, “internal waters” means all waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea that form part of the territory of the state. The territorial sea extends to a limit of 12 nautical miles from the baseline of a coastal state. Within this zone, the airspace above the sea and the seabed and subsoil are part of the territory of the state. A coastal state exercises full sovereignty over its internal waters and the territorial sea. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, but inside the zone the coastal state has control over customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary matters. A state's exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, extending seaward to a distance of no more than 200 nautical miles out from its coastal baseline. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has sovereign rights “for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources” and for “the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone,” as well as jurisdiction that includes the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.

The Taiwan Strait is approximately 70 nautical miles at its narrowest and about 220 nautical miles at its widest. Under the convention and Chinese law, the Taiwan Strait's waters comprise China's internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone. States have different rights and obligations over different waters, and different modes of navigation apply to different waters. For example, ships of all states, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea (Articles 17, 18 and 19); and “[i]f any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.” (Article 30). For another example, in the exclusive economic zone all States enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight (Article 58). Article 11 of the Chinese law that governs the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf similarly provides that, “[a]ll states shall, on the premise that they comply with international law and the laws and regulations of the People's Republic of China, enjoy the freedom of navigation and overflight in its exclusive economic zone.”

Who is breaking international rules?

When the final Convention on the Law of the Sea was presented in 1982, China was one of the first signatories. To date, there are more than 160 parties, excluding the United States. While there are certainly domestic political reasons for the U.S. not joining the convention, it is essentially because of the its hegemonic mindset seeking its global maritime interests. Not being a party to the convention does not prevent the U.S. from enjoying the rights the convention provides, but it does help the country circumvent its duties. Therefore, in the face of the convention, which provides that “[t]he high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes” (Article 88), and that in exclusive economic zones “States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law insofar as they are not incompatible with this Part” (Article 58). The United States can choose to ignore these provisions.

U.S. warships this year have been sailing in the Taiwan Strait about once a month on average. Of course, because a large portion of the strait falls within China's exclusive economic zone, the U.S. has “freedom of navigation.” Because the U.S. is not a party to the convention, it can claim — without “regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State” — that this represents a U.S. “commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region.” Such freedom of navigation borders on provocation by supporting Taiwan separatists and continually hollowing out and deflating the “one China” policy. For more than 70 years, if it were not for America's constant support for advocates of Taiwan independence, the road to peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Strait would not have been so tortuous.

In accordance with the convention and Chinese law, China's government enjoys sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters of the Taiwan Strait, while respecting the legitimate rights of other countries in these waters. If this question is deliberately manipulated using the false claim that China is in violation of the rules of the international law of the sea, China certainly needs to clarify which is right.