2016年6月14日，中國外交部長王毅（左二）和東盟外長一同出席在中國雲南玉溪舉行的中國-東盟國家外長特別會議。（法新社）

2013年9月，中國與東盟國家就“南海行為準則”（COC）全面啟動磋商。2017年8月，中國與東盟國家簽署COC框架文本。如無意外，中國和東盟國家領導人將在今年11月的中國-東盟領導人峰會上正式宣布啟動COC實質性磋商，也就是對“重要和複雜問題”開展磋商。COC備受國際社會關注的不外乎兩點：它到底是什麼？何時正式出爐？

第一，COC是什麼？其中至少包涵三個層面的內容，即為什麼要制定COC，它與2002年簽署的《南海各方行為宣言》（DOC）有何關係，它的性質是什麼。

COC並非近些年南海問題升溫而製造出來的一個新概念。早在1992年7月東盟外長會上，菲律賓就提出制定“南海行為準則”的構想，最終得到與會外長對通過一項南海宣言的支持，即《東盟南海宣言》。

1992年至2000年，中國政府當時認為，東盟與中國領導人共同簽署的聯合聲明等政府性文件足以指導處理南海爭端問題，沒有必要再另搞一套。但從2000年起，中國政府又從強化發展同東盟關係長遠利益出發，同意與東盟國家成立COC磋商聯合工作組。

2002年之前，中國與東盟國家就COC舉行了積極磋商，但因為對其草擬的文本內容、性質以及具體涉及的適用地理範圍、聯合軍演、爭議海域捕魚活動等細節問題存在分歧，最終各方妥協性推動簽署了眾所周知的DOC，用以暫代COC。

2011年7月，中國與東盟達成《落實<南海各方行為宣言>指針》。2013年9月，落實的DOC聯合工作組就COC啟動具體磋商，以此為標誌，COC磋商就此全面鋪開。

至於DOC與COC的關係，DOC是中國和東盟國家就南海問題籤署的首個政治文件,對於管控南海危機、維護南海和平穩定具有里程碑式的重要意義。COC是DOC的升級版，兩者一脈相承，不可割裂。DOC第十款明文規定“有關各方重申制定南海行為準則將進一步促進本地區和平與穩定，並同意在各方協商一致的基礎上，朝最終達成該目標而努力”。中國和東盟國家正是在全面有效落實DOC框架下積極推進COC的磋商，且兩者同為一個工作組的人員構成。因此，COC的制定理應以DOC為起點和框架，在此基礎上尋求最廣泛共識，照顧各方舒適度。

COC的性質問題，也是最為核心的問題。COC是類似於DOC的政治文件？還是具有約束力的法律文件？目前東盟國家內部尚存爭議，沒有統一的認識。很明顯，制定一個沒有任何法律約束力的COC，對東盟國家增信釋疑、有效管控南海爭端危機、阻止域外力量介入作用有限。當初正是由於東盟某些國家認為DOC不具備法律約束力，才肆意採取有違DOC的單邊行為，破壞遵守DOC的承諾和彼此間的政治互信。

目前，中國政府對於COC秉持的是一種開放態度，是否具有約束力將視與東盟10國磋商進程而定。如果中國政府當前直接表示COC不具有任何約束力，勢必會打擊東盟的積極性，也顯得中國不自信，因為長期以來某些國家本身就對中國充滿猜疑，所謂中國擔心COC的約束力也制約自身在南海的行動。但從當前形勢來看，COC是否具有約束力，或者說有多大程度上的約束力，討論此項內容的時機還遠遠未到。各方有很高的期待，但也要有足夠的耐心。

越南希望將COC變成一項附帶爭端解決機制的具有強制約束力的法律文件，希望藉此掣肘中國政府在南海的維權行為。菲律賓單方面提起南海仲裁案，仲裁庭對菲律賓提出的DOC是不具有約束力的政治文件予以支持，也就變相鼓勵將COC定性為具有法律約束力的爭端解決機制。然而，可以斷定的是無論是已經制定的DOC，還是正在磋商中的COC，都不可能是領土主權和海洋劃界的爭端解決機制，而是為了共同維護南海地區的和平與穩定的危機管控機制，旨在促進各方提升互信，避免發生衝突，通過打造共同認可的地區規則，為最終和平解決爭端奠定基礎。中國政府堅持“擱置爭議，共同開發”，以“雙軌思路”處理南海問題。

第二，COC何時出爐？2017年8月簽署的COC框架文本只是整個COC磋商進程中的階段性成果，不涉及具體的“重要和複雜性問題”，也並非外界所誤解的COC正式文本。在COC磋商中，妥協性簽署DOC之前碰到的諸如適用範圍、軍事活動等系列重要和複雜問題會再次一一呈現，實質性磋商必將是一個逐步積累、舉步維艱的過程。COC的制定關係到各方利益及南海地區和平與穩定大局，需要有充分的空間和時間來協商，而重中之重則是有一個高度的政治互信和良好的外部環境為基礎，這也就決定了COC磋商無法設置明確的時間表，一切都只能在沒有外界重大幹擾和南海形勢基本穩定的前提下循序漸進。美國、日本、澳大利亞作為南海域外國家，長期以來急切期望制定具有強制約束力的COC，並給國際社會造成中國有意在COC上“拖延”的錯誤認識。其實2016年7月的中國-東盟外長會上，王毅外長對於COC磋商提出了十六字願景，即“合理預期、協商一致、排除干擾、循序漸進”。

東盟已走完50年歷程，南海問題不是中國和東盟間的問題，更不是中國-東盟關係的全部。部分南海聲索國出於一己私利，對落實DOC框架下合作項目積極性不高，更有國家利用東盟輪值主席國機會假借東盟10國之力對中國施壓，力促儘快簽署COC，甚至讓美國、日本等域外力量參與其中，這顯然是極不明智的抉擇。眼下當務之急是各方繼續全面有效落實好DOC框架下的務實合作，以合作促發展，為COC的最終制定創造必要條件和良好氛圍。

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (second from left) and Asean foreign ministers attending an Asean-China foreign ministers' meeting in Yuxi, China, on 2016 June 14 (AFP)

In September 2013, China and the ASEAN countries began negotiations to produce a code of conduct in the South China Sea (the COC). A COC framework text was signed in August 2017 and, if things go smoothly, their leaders will announce the formal launch of the substantive part of the COC consultation at their summit in November. This consultation will deal with certain “important and complex issues”. But what is the COC anyway, and when will it be realized?

The answer to the first question involves at least three things. Why is the COC necessary? What is the relationship between the COC and the DOC - the Declaration on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea – which was concluded in 2002? And what is the nature of the COC?

To begin with, the COC is not a new concept manufactured because of recent tensions in the South China Sea. The ASEAN countries adopted a “South China Sea Declaration” as early as in July 1992 when their foreign ministers met and acted on a Philippine proposal for a “South China Sea code of conduct”.

The Chinese position from 1992 to 2000 was that such inter-governmental documents were adequate for guiding China and ASEAN countries in handling disputes on the South China Sea and that there was no need to devise new mechanisms. Yet from 2000 onward, the Chinese government agreed to set up a China-ASEAN working group for COC consultation in the long-term interests of stronger ties with ASEAN countries.

China worked vigorously with ASEAN countries on the COC. But parties disagreed on many things like the language, nature and geographical coverage of the document, joint military exercises, fishing activities in disputed waters. Finally, a compromise was reached in the 2002 signing of the now well-known DOC as a temporary substitute for the COC.

In July 2011, China and ASEAN reached the “Guideline for the Implementation of the DOC”. In September 2013, the joint working group for DOC implementation held consultations on the COC.

What is the relationship between the DOC and the COC? The DOC is the first political document signed by China and the ASEAN countries on the South China Sea. It's an important milestone in the efforts to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea and to control and manage possible crises in the region. The COC is an upgraded version of the DOC. They are closely related and must not be separated from one another. Article 10 of the DOC provides that concluding parties reaffirm their commitment to a COC aimed at furthering peace and stability in the region on the basis of consensus. In fact, China and the ASEAN countries are promoting COC consultation within the framework of comprehensively and effectively implementing the DOC and have used the same working team to achieve the purpose. The formulation of the COC, therefore, ought to take the DOC as its starting point and structural framework, while seeking the broadest possible consensus and accommodating all parties.

Finally, we come to the core question: the nature of COC. Is it, in essence, a political document similar to the DOC, or is it a legal instrument that is binding on the parties? ASEAN member countries remain divided on this question. If the COC at end of the day is not legally binding, it can only play a limited role in helping the ASEAN countries effectively manage disputes and crises in the South China Sea and fend off intervention by non-regional players. Certain ASEAN members, as we remember, have taken unilateral actions in violation of the DOC, reneging on their own commitments and undermining political trust with other countries, because they did not regard the document as legally binding.

At present, China holds an open attitude towards the COC, letting the consultation process take its own course. If China were to say that the COC shouldn't be legally binding, that would not sit well with the ASEAN countries. Nor would it help China's image. Certain countries are full of suspicions of China. In their view, China would hate a legally binding COC because it would constrain her actions in the South China Sea. It is still far too early for China to address the issue of whether the COC is a legally binding document or not, or what that would mean. What China needs to do now is demonstrate patience.

Vietnam wants the COC to be a strong legally binding instrument complete with a dispute-settlement mechanism. It wants to harm China's efforts to protect its rights in the South China Sea. The Philippines received support in the arbitration case that the DOC was just a non-binding political document. This was interpreted as an encouragement to make the COC a legally binding, dispute-settlement mechanism. What can be said categorically is that neither the DOC nor a COC still under discussion can become a dispute-settlement mechanism that defines territorial sovereignty and maritime demarcation. They are designed to manage crises and collectively maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea by promoting mutual trust, preventing conflicts and building commonly accepted rules conducive to the eventual peaceful settlement of disputes. The Chinese government will continue to pursue the policy of “shelving the dispute and going for common development” and follow the “dual-track approach” in handling the South China Sea issue.

When will the COC be realized? The COC Framework adopted in August 2017 has nothing to do with specific negotiations on the “important and complex issues”. Nor does it provide any formal text of the COC. In the course of COC consultation a host of important and complex issues will be encountered, such as applicability of geographical areas and military activities, similar to those before the signing of the DOC. The COC consultation will be a gradual accumulation of consensus. At stake are the interests of different parties and the overall peace and stability in the region. Time and space is needed to address the issues. China's negotiations on the COC cannot follow a set timetable as it can only proceed on the condition that there is basic stability and no major outside interference in the region. The United States, Japan, and Australia are not countries along the South China Sea. But they have misled the world with the false notion that China is impeding the COC negotiation process. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi indicated clearly at the China-ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in July 2016 that COC consultation could only make gradual progress with reasonable expectations, consensus-building, and freedom from unwarranted interference.

Some claimants, driven by selfish interests, were not enthusiastic for cooperation under the DOC framework. Some others, using the rotating ASEAN presidency, opted for a speedy conclusion of the COC by putting pressure on China and bringing in influence from the US, Japan, and other outside players. This is unwise, and will not enjoy popular support inside the region. It is imperative for all relevant parties to earnestly and comprehensively implement the cooperation projects under the DOC framework, promote development through cooperation, and create conditions favorable to the realization of the COC.