There is no doubt that the shifting relationship between the United States and China ranks among the most significant geopolitical issues of the 21st century. The rapid upward rise of the Chinese economy and military power over the last several decades has unequivocally transformed the global power structure, directly challenging the long-time dominance of the United States in the post-Cold War era. Washington, in turn, is carefully developing a new, multisided approach aimed to tactfully counter the expanding influence of Beijing.
The adjustment of strategies — characterized by economic decoupling, high-tech restrictions and military posturing in the Indo-Pacific region — will transform the bilateral relationship and the shape of global security itself. Changes that began during Donald Trump's first term, including the implementation of tariffs, the emergence of supply chain resiliency and the launch of Indo-Pacific defense programs, are not about to evaporate. They constitute the foundation of a bipartisan consensus in Washington regarding China.
Nevertheless, more strategic adjustments are taking place, pointing to a more delicate and precision-oriented strategy. These consist of the planned, selective decoupling of essential sectors, a revised method of dealing with sophisticated partnerships to perpetuate multilateral alliances, the extended use of soft power to resist China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative and a more aggressive policy in dealing with Taiwan.
Such actions are not merely about deterrence. Instead, they reflect an effort to control the rising influence of China within a finite system and to maintain the current rules-based international order, in which the United States has played a leading role.
Economic decoupling and technological limitations are the two key factors driving the relationship between the United States and China. The primary objective of Washington is to limit China's technological progress and reduce the threat to national security posed by giant Chinese enterprises. Companies such as Huawei and TikTok have been subjected to stringent regulations as the United States criticizes the threats to data security and the potential impact on national security. More seriously, the U.S. is enforcing export controls and investment reviews to curtail China's ability to acquire advanced technologies in key areas, such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing.
The real reason behind all this is to ensure that China does not utilize such high-tech capabilities to modernize its military or push its surveillance capabilities into every area of society and life, as technological superiority has now become one of the major factors in future military dominance and global domination.
Economically, the U.S. has focused on diversifying supply chains. It wants to alleviate its overdependence, and that of its allies, on China for essential products — a vulnerability that the COVID-19 pandemic brought into high relief. Such ideas as friendshoring and nearshoring are being promoted, with various manufacturing and sourcing activities shifting toward countries that are similar or geographically more accommodating.
The tariff war initiated by the Trump administration is ongoing and continues to put pressure on both economies. It is not an economic and technological separation in the sense of a total breaking of ties, which would be useless and harmful to both sides. Instead, it is a tactical move to uncover and address weak links, to undermine what the U.S. considers to be unjust trade practices and ultimately to demonstrate the superiority of market-based systems over state-controlled capitalism in China.
Another critical pillar of the new U.S. strategy includes military and geopolitical dimensions. The Indo-Pacific region is considered to be robustly militarized in direct reaction to China's active behavior and modernization of its armed forces. The vast territorial claims by China in the South China Sea, its growing military presence in the Taiwan Strait and its activities in the East China Sea have set alarm bells ringing in the region and in Washington.
The US is strengthening its military presence, conducting regular joint training exercises with partners in the area and prioritizing freedom of navigation operations in specific waters. The objective is to prevent Chinese aggression, ensure regional stability and comply with international maritime law.
This plan entails a considerable overhaul in terms of alliance management. The U.S. is not only consolidating its traditional bilateral alliances with important partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines but also establishing new multilateral coalitions. The formation of groups such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), comprising the United States, India, Japan and Australia, and the AUKUS security pact with Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, aims to establish a networked security architecture. These coalitions aim to counter China's emerging strength, promote regional security burden sharing and foster the development of joint deterrence. Even for NATO, which is predominantly an Atlantic institution, a new kind of economic powerhouse is beginning to emerge as a challenge, as is a more unified and comprehensive method of evaluating global security.
Moreover, the United States is becoming increasingly aggressive with regard to Taiwan. Although formally adhering to the “one China” policy, which is based on a tacit recognition of Beijing's claims without taking sides, Washington is deciding to provide the island with significantly more arms to defend itself in case of an attack by the mainland. It is supplemented with a greater sense of diplomatic strength although this is unofficial. It is a show of the island's intent to meet any aggression. The concept of “strategic ambiguity” is also in play, as the U.S. is increasingly interested in strengthening Taiwan's self-defense capabilities and preventing a forcible takeover, given the enormous military and economic consequences of a war.
In addition to its brutal power and economic dominance, the new U.S. strategy places great emphasis on soft power and the provision of alternatives to China's international initiatives. The Belt and Road Initiative, a grandiose global infrastructure and investment project developed by China, has expanded Beijing's economic and geopolitical influence in Asia, Africa, Europe and perhaps Latin America.
In response, the U.S. is bolstering its campaigns of soft power, advocating democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law, while promoting attractive and sustainable options in global development. It engages in more public diplomacy, cultural exchanges, educational programs and the empowerment of organizations in civil society. It is working to encourage hearts and minds to join the Global South, primarily by providing the advantages of open societies and transparent governance.
At the same time, the U.S. and allies are busy creating alternative models of development and financing in place of the BRI. Initiatives such as the Build Back Better World (B3W) and its successor, the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, aim to provide developing countries with an alternative.
Where U.S.-China relations are headed is anyone's guess, with several possible scenarios that portray a long-term strategic competition, including a military standoff, intense technological rivalry and even proxy war — though not an all-out hot war, as was the case in the Cold War era. Relations will also be characterized by ideological polarization, economic and security blocs, a renewed arms race and international power jostling.
Although direct military conflict between the two nuclear powers will be cordoned off by the devastating effects of mutually assured destruction, the competition will insinuate itself into just about every aspect of international affairs. Regional military conflict is a more dangerous situation in which confrontation over contentious issues such as Taiwan, the South China Sea or cyberspace can escalate into full-scale wars. The cause of such a conflict may be a miscalculation, an accidental escalation or domestic pressure on one or both sides. The effects would be disastrous, not only affecting the involved parties but also the global economy, its supply chains and intercontinental stability. A war could potentially force the involvement of other regional and international forces. The most preferred, yet also the most challenging, approach is managed competition.
According to the realist approach to international relations, competition is a traditional trend that persists in an anarchic international system. Because of self-interest and the desire for power and security, states will naturally find themselves in a state of rivalry. Thus, realism maintains that competition will always prevail in U.S.-China relations over cooperation.
In the international system, one of the basic features is power struggle. Realism, however, does not always translate to inevitable war. The two countries, the United States and China, are not natural rivals. What remains, then, is that the two factions competing for power must negotiate their way out of the struggle without conflict degenerating into a raging conflagration. This requires prudent leadership across the Pacific — clear communication, the creation of effective crisis management measures and a practical understanding of the fundamental interests of each party and their respective red lines.
Global stability depends on their ability to navigate this multilateral competitive environment successfully and avoid triggering a global disaster due to the effects of national interests. The international community is a spectator, hoping that wisdom and blueprint thinking will prevail over the failures of intrinsic impulses and fluctuations in the balance of power.
