2023年4月26日，美國總統喬·拜登和韓國總統尹錫悅在白宮玫瑰園會晤。

韓國總統尹錫悅在萬眾矚目中開始了訪美之行。之所以被矚目，離不開他自己的“努力”。似乎還沒有哪一位美國的友邦領導人在訪美前這麼高調地祭出閃亮的“投名狀”——迅速恢復韓日關係，表示考慮對烏軍援，發表涉台言論，等等。只憑這些，就可以想像尹總統在美國受歡迎的程度。

尹總統之所以如此重視這次美國之行，是因為此次美韓首腦會面是在半島緊張局勢日益嚴峻和中美戰略競爭背景下進行的，其成果將在很大程度上決定今後韓國的方向，也將對中韓關係、中美關係、地區局勢等產生相當的影響。

韓國民眾對尹總統訪美是有很大期待的。有韓國媒體以“韓美應成為共享價值和利益的雙向同盟”為題報道此次首腦會晤，從側面反映出韓國民眾並不認同美韓同盟的平等性，認為沒有從同盟那裡得到與其付出相匹配的對待。

從歷史經驗來看，與美國共享經濟利益的可能性不大。現實更證明了這一點。就在美韓首腦即將會晤前夕，美國政府向韓國提出要求，如果中國禁止美國企業美光向中國出口，三星電子、SK海力士等韓國企業不要填補中國的半導體缺口。也就是說，拜登政府要求盟國企業不惜損害自身利益，來“參加”美國的對華半導體戰爭。尹錫悅政府也沒有讓美國失望，韓國總統室回應稱，將“盡最大努力將韓國企業的損失降到最低”。意即韓國願意配合，只是希望代價不要太大，損失不要太多。這種不平等的關係對美韓同盟的未來不是一個好兆頭。

但美國認為，在韓國人最擔心的安全問題——朝核問題上確認美國對朝的延伸威懾，將是美國對盟友最好的補償。據韓國媒體報道，韓美兩國正在推進共同文件中明文規定的“如果韓國受到朝鮮的核攻擊，美國也將使用核武器”的方案。同時，為提高核延伸威懾的共同企劃和執行力，雙方正在協商另設部長級常設磋商機制。一旦確定下來，美國將通過正式文件向國內外明確有關“核報復”的承諾。韓方認為這一點“意義重大”。

這對美國來說也意義重大。美國關注的重點是如何應對中國。隨着實力下降，美國的“如意算盤”是通過與盟國和友邦結成遍布中國周邊的“小團體”，在政治、經濟、科技、安全、外交等多方面打壓、遏制中國，讓中國孤立於世界，最終阻斷中國的發展之路。而強化、擴大在朝鮮半島的軍事存在，結成牢固的美韓、美日韓同盟網絡，在東北亞地區對中國甚至俄羅斯形成軍事壓制，無疑是一步好棋。

但這步棋能否下成，還要看尹錫悅政府如何回應美國要其進一步參與制衡中俄的要求。這是一個困難的選擇。雖然尹總統自己的傾向性很明顯，但他還要考慮來自中俄可能的反應，考慮國內經濟放緩、外貿逆差、企業受損的壓力，以及國內民眾和在野黨強烈的反對聲。最重要的是，韓國要有正確的自我認知，而不是迷失在美國給予的“風光”中，只有這樣才能對自身做出準確的定位。

U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol in the Rose Garden of the White House on April 26, 2023.

Republic of Korea President Yoon Suk-yeol just completed his closely watched visit to the United States. The trip attracted much attention thanks mostly to his own efforts: No leader of a U.S. ally has ever presented such high-profile “proof of allegiance” before visiting. He swiftly repaired relations with Japan, disclosed a plan for military aid to Ukraine and made comments on Taiwan. It is thus easy to see how he will be viewed in the U.S.

Yoon did so much for the trip because his meeting with President Joe Biden would take place against a backdrop of escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula and China-U.S. strategic competition, and its outcome will to a great extent determine the ROK's future orientation and affect China-ROK and China-U.S. relations, as well as the regional situation.

The South Korean public had very high expectations for the Yoon visit. One media outlet even came up with the headline “ROK and U.S. Should Become Two-Way Alliance of Shared Values and Interests” — which indicates members of the public don't consider the U.S. and ROK as equals in the alliance, or believe their country has been treated in a way that matches its contribution.

Judging from past experience, the probability of sharing economic benefits with the U.S. is low. Reality has further proved this. Just before the summit meeting between the ROK and American leaders, the U.S. government required the ROK to prevent Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix Semiconductor Inc. from filling China's semiconductor gap once China prohibits Micron Technology, Inc. from exporting to China. This represents the first time the Biden administration has asked companies in an allied country to participate in the U.S. semiconductor war against China at its own expense.The Yoon government didn't let the U.S. down. The ROK president's office said the government would try its best to reduce the losses of ROK companies “to the minimum,” meaning the ROK is ready to cooperate —only it hopes the price won't be too high and losses won't be too much. Such an unequal relationship doesn't bode well for the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Yet the U.S. believes affirming extended U.S. deterrence against North Korea, which is the ROK's biggest concern, will be the best compensation. According to South Korean media, the ROK and the U.S. are working toward stipulating in explicit terms in a joint document that “if the ROK suffers a nuclear attack by the DPRK, the U.S. will also use nuclear weapons.”Meanwhile, to upgrade the capacity for jointly planning and executing nuclear extended deterrence, the two sides are discussing the establishment of a new mechanism for regular ministerial level consultations. Once the decision is made, the U.S. will make a clear commitment at home and abroad in the form of a formal document about the will of “nuclear retaliation” ratified posthumously by leaders of both countries. The ROK side deems this to be “of significant importance.”

This is also important for the U.S., which is concentrating on how to deal with China. As U.S. strength declines, it is forming small cliques with allies and partners on China's periphery — suppressing and containing China in such aspects as politics, economy, science, technology, security and diplomacy — in a bid to isolate China from the rest of the world and finally cut off its path of development.At that point, enhancing and expanding a military presence on the Korean Peninsula, building a solid U.S./Japan/ROK alliance network will certainly be a critical move for militarily suppressing China, and even Russia, in Northeast Asia.

However, the prospects for the success of such a move hinges on how the Yoon government responds to the U.S. demand for it to participate further in its attempts to contain China and Russia. This will be a difficult choice to make, though Yoon's personal inclination is obvious. He still has to consider potential responses from China and Russia, pressures from the slowing domestic economy, foreign trade deficits and business losses — as well as strong opposition from the general public and opposition parties at home. Most important, to position itself correctly the ROK should have a clear awareness of its own conditions, avoid being intoxicated by glory bestowed by the United States.