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| A view of the Gwadar port of Pakistan (Photo: VCG) |
Ten years ago, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was launched with fanfare during President Xi Jinping's landmark visit to Islamabad on April 20, 2015. The $65 billion corridor was billed as the flagship of China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). For Pakistan, it was a transformative leap for its economic future. Today, the mood is far less celebratory. The occasion came and went without a trace.
The CPEC at ten is dangerously adrift. Only 38 of the nearly 90 envisioned projects have been completed, and just 23 are under construction. Roughly one-third remain untouched. Far from triggering the promised wave of industrialization and regional integration, CPEC has stalled under the weight of Pakistan's own inefficiencies, misplaced priorities, and worsening governance. While both countries tout the partnership as a success, it is increasingly clear that the burden of letdown rests less with Beijing and more with Islamabad.
At its inception, CPEC aimed to rewire Pakistan's energy-starved grid, upgrade crumbling transportation infrastructure, and turn Gwadar, the deep-sea port, into an anchor for long-term industrial growth and enhanced regional connectivity. Few initiatives in the country's history carried such broad geopolitical and economic expectations.
For China, CPEC offered a strategic outlet to the Arabian Sea, circumventing the Malacca choke point for its maritime trade, shortening western China's access to the sea, and serving as a means of stabilizing its restive Xinjiang province by fostering economic integration.
But grand vision soon collided with political reality. CPEC's most critical components, particularly the SEZs and industrial parks, never materialized. The failure was not due to a lack of Chinese commitment, but rather to Pakistan's politicians' propensity for politically marketable projects and a chronic disinterest within Pakistan's bureaucracy in planning, coordinating, and executing.
The most glaring example is the redirection of resources originally earmarked for Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and industrial parks toward Lahore's Metro Train. With little to show in economic returns, it is a multi-million-dollar spectacle chosen over the hard, unglamorous work of building export-oriented zones, improving freight logistics, or fostering long-term job creation.
Similarly, the ML-1 railway project — arguably the most strategically important corridor under CPEC — has languished due to the government's inability to recognize its long-term investment value. Each successive administration has failed to appreciate the transformative economic multiplier the project could generate.
Once marketed as the future “Singapore of Pakistan,” Gwadar has failed to attract significant investment or industrial activity. The Gwadar airport, now the country's largest, has been completed, but operates only five flights a week. Power outages remain routine, basic urban services are lacking, and the much-promised 300 MW coal power plant has not materialized.
The cumulative investment in Gwadar under CPEC amounts to just $890 million, a tiny fraction of the corridor's total portfolio. That is not because China abandoned the idea — rather, it is because Pakistan failed to deliver on its end of the bargain. Land acquisition disputes, local resentment, lack of utility infrastructure, and persistent insecurity have made Gwadar a hard sell for any investor, Chinese or otherwise.
Security concerns have only amplified these failures. Since 2021, there have been 14 attacks targeting Chinese nationals in Pakistan, resulting in 20 deaths and over 34 injuries. Most of these incidents have occurred in Balochistan, where nationalists feel left out of the province's riches. For Beijing, the risks have begun to outweigh the rewards.
While China remains diplomatically supportive of CPEC, its reticence towards new investments-reportedly down 74 percent in 2023 from the previous year, suggests that China is quietly stepping back. Officials in both countries continue to talk about expanding cooperation into areas like agriculture, green energy, and digital infrastructure — but so far, the rhetoric has not been matched by resources.
CPEC was central to China's broader Belt and Road ambitions. Its stalling carries real costs for Beijing, both economically and strategically.
First, the strategic logic of CPEC, without a functional Gwadar and its inland connectivity, China's maritime routes to ship energy and goods remain vulnerable, perpetuating what its own strategists call the “Malacca Dilemma.”
Second, China's reputation as a reliable development partner is at stake. CPEC was marketed as the BRI's “flagship” — a model to be replicated across the Global South. It adds fuel to critics who accuse China of saddling poor countries with unpayable debts or making politically motivated investments in unstable regions.
Third, Chinese investors, both state-owned and private, face real losses. Projects that were supposed to generate returns have either stalled or underperformed. As security threats mount, so do the costs of protecting Chinese nationals and assets. This creates a chilling effect for future overseas investment, not just in Pakistan but across high-risk BRI markets.
Finally, Beijing's leverage over Islamabad — a cornerstone of its South Asia strategy — could erode. As Pakistan sinks deeper into crisis and begins to seek lifelines from the Gulf, the IMF, or even alternative lenders, China risks losing its privileged position as Islamabad's first and most favored partner.
Ten years of CPEC is a sobering reminder of how political short-termism, poor governance, and economic drift have squandered what may have been Pakistan's last big development opportunity. If current trends continue, China may soon conclude that its interests are better served elsewhere. And Pakistan, once at the heart of the Belt and Road vision, may find itself left behind — not because others abandoned it, but because it abandoned itself.
The CPEC still holds significant potential if approached with the seriousness and strategic vision it demands. But for that to happen, Pakistan must undertake a political and institutional reckoning. It must move beyond flashy, vote-grabbing infrastructure and begin the patient, often politically unrewarding work of building credible regulatory frameworks, enabling industrial policy, and restoring investor confidence.
If CPEC is to be revived, it must be reimagined — not as a set of handouts from China, but as a collaborative effort where Pakistan brings clarity, capability, and commitment to the table.
