最近在廣島舉行的 G7 峰會和隨後在克什米爾舉行的 G20 旅遊會議，凸顯了這兩個集團言論的鮮明對比。G20峰會的口號是“同一個地球、同一個家庭、同一個未來”，而G7的好鬥態度可以概括為“我們必須脫離中國”。

對於東南亞國家聯盟（東盟）成員國來說，脫鉤是不現實的。雖然該地區可以受益於生產和投資從中國轉移到本國，但中國經濟與西方經濟完全脫鉤，可能導致貿易轉移、生產成本上升和長期福利下降。

目前，美國和歐洲經濟與中國脫鉤的行動似乎僅限於能源、半導體、信息和通信技術、採礦和礦產等行業。但脫鉤預計將影響幾乎所有行業，包括機械、機械設備、電氣元件和汽車。

鑒於東盟經濟體對美國、歐盟、中國和東亞的依賴程度相同，東盟必須保持中立，不選邊站隊，並且加強合作。通過利用其日益增長的經濟和政治影響力，這些成員國可以促進和平、促進合作，加強與國際社會的接觸。

美中地緣政治競爭加劇的背景下，東盟國家也必須深化區域經濟一體化。過去二十年，內部貿易佔東盟成員國貿易總額的比重一直徘徊在 22-23% 左右。可以肯定的是，它們對世界其他地區的出口在此期間有所增加。但東盟國家在全球貿易中的份額，在 2000 年至 2022 年間幾乎沒有增長，僅從 6.4% 增長到 7.8%。

進入21世紀以來，東盟內部貿易停滯，存在三種可能的原因。首先，該地區膚淺的一體化模式。由於東盟製造的大多數產品，是替代品而不是互補品，因此成員之間增加貿易的範圍本質上是有限的。

其次，更嚴格的原產地規則和非關稅措施可能成為貿易壁壘。這些法規和程序旨在確保健康、安全和環境保護，但它們的制定和實施可能無意中阻礙貿易和投資。

最後，應該認識到，東盟不是自給自足的地區。這些成員國嚴重依賴日本、韓國和中國等國家的投資和技術。東盟作為一個集團運作，但它不是關稅同盟，意味着成員國可以自行與其他國家或者集團接觸。這種靈活性使得成員國能夠追求自己的利益，並尋求多樣化的夥伴關係和協議，同時保持東盟共同體的凝聚力和活力。

由十個東盟國家、中國、日本、韓國、澳大利亞和新西蘭組成的“區域全面經濟夥伴關係”（RCEP）就是一個很好的例子。RCEP 約佔全球 GDP的三分之一和世界貿易和投資總額的四分之一，是世界上最大的自由貿易區，其目標是通過降低90% 的產品的關稅，促進貿易一體化。

另外一個代表性案例是“全面與進步跨太平洋夥伴關係協定”（CPPTP,以前稱作“跨太平洋夥伴關係協定”。 2018 年以來，四個東盟國家——新加坡、越南、汶萊和馬來西亞——加入了 CPTPP。該協定約佔全球 GDP 的 13%，旨在降低98% 的產品的關稅。

“印度洋-太平洋經濟繁榮框架”(IPEF) 是美國拜登政府於 2022 年 5 月發起的新組織，也尋求促進區域夥伴關係。但是，該協議因其排他性和分裂性而受到批評。除美國、日本、韓國、印度、澳大利亞和新西蘭外，七個東盟國家——新加坡、泰國、印度尼西亞、馬來西亞、菲律賓、越南和汶萊——已加入IPEF。但柬埔寨、老撾和緬甸被排除在外。

這種排斥可能加劇東盟成員國之間的經濟差距，激化地區緊張局勢，抵消現有大型區域貿易協定（如 RCEP）的好處。一些評論家認為，IPEF在很大程度上只具有象徵意義，旨在吸引美國選民，而不是實施有利於成員國的有效政策。同樣，印太地區的貿易部長最近在底特律召開會議，討論一系列旨在加強半導體和關鍵礦物等必需品供應鏈的措施。但是，他們達成的協議，除了減少對中國的依賴外，缺乏明確的政策目標。

中國與西方之間不斷升級的競爭，使得東盟國家陷入兩難境地，承受不起與任何一方脫鉤的後果。2000 年至 2022 年間，歐盟成員國與歐洲之間的貿易增長了兩倍多，從 1105 億美元增至 3423 億美元。東盟與美國的貿易額，從 1351 億美元飆升至 4522 億美元。同期，東盟對美國的出口幾乎翻了兩番，從 879 億美元增至 3567 億美元。

與此同時，東盟與中國的貿易額在2022年達到9753億美元，比2000年增長23倍。在此期間，東盟國家對中國的出口增長17倍，從222億美元增加到4081億美元。

此外，東亞、美國和歐盟都是東盟國家外國直接投資的重要來源地。2021年，東亞國家占該地區外國直接投資總額的33% ，而美國和歐盟分別佔22%和15%。

鑒於這些經濟聯繫的深度，敦促東盟國家與中國脫鉤是非常不公平的。這也是缺乏遠見的行為，因為脫鉤會破壞集團內部的貿易和經濟發展，加劇整個地區的政治不穩定。

全文翻譯自報業辛迪加（Project Syndicate），原文標題“ASEAN Between the U.S. and China”（2023）

The recent G7 summit in Hiroshima and the subsequent G20 tourism meeting in Kashmir underscored the stark contrast between the two groups' rhetoric. While the G20 emphasized its “one Earth, one family, one future” motto, the G7's combative attitude could be summarized as “We must divorce China.”

For the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), decoupling is not an option. While the region could benefit from production and investment shifting away from China to ASEAN countries, a full economic decoupling between the Chinese economy and the West could also result in trade diversion, higher production costs, and reduced welfare over the long term.

The push to decouple the American and European economies from China currently seems to be limited to sectors such as energy, semiconductors, information and communication technology, mining, and minerals. But decoupling is expected to affect nearly every industry, including machinery, mechanical appliances, electrical components, and automobiles.

Given that ASEAN economies are equally dependent on the United States, the European Union, China, and East Asia, the bloc must maintain neutrality, refrain from taking sides, and strengthen cooperation. By leveraging their growing economic and political influence, member states could promote peace, foster cooperation, and increase engagement with the international community.

Amid the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the US and China, ASEAN countries must also deepen regional economic integration. Over the past two decades, intra-ASEAN trade as a share of members' total trade has stagnated at around 22-23%. To be sure, members' exports to the rest of the world have increased over this period. But ASEAN countries' share of global trade barely increased between 2000 and 2022, growing from 6.4% to 7.8%.

There are three possible explanations for the stagnation of intra-ASEAN trade since the turn of the century. The first is the region's model of shallow integration. Because most ASEAN-made products are substitutes rather than complements, the scope for increased trade between members is inherently limited.

Second, stricter rules of origin and non-tariff measures could act as trade barriers. While these regulations and procedures are aimed at ensuring health, safety, and environmental protections, their design and implementation can inadvertently impede trade and investment.

Lastly, it is important to recognize that ASEAN is not a self-contained region. Member states rely heavily on investment and technology from countries such as Japan, South Korea, and China. And while the bloc functions as a united group, it is not a customs union, which means that member states may engage with other countries or blocs on their own. This flexibility enables members to pursue their own interests and seek diverse partnerships and agreements while maintaining the cohesion and vitality of the ASEAN community.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which includes all ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, is a case in point. Representing roughly one-third of global GDP and one-quarter of the world's total trade and investment, the RCEP is the world's largest free-trade area, and its aim is to foster greater trade integration by reducing tariffs on 90% of product lines.

The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (previously known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership) is another example. Since 2018, four ASEAN countries – Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia – have joined the CPTPP, which accounts for roughly 13% of global GDP and aims to reduce tariffs on 98% of product lines.

The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), a newly established grouping launched by US President Joe Biden's administration in May 2022, also seeks to foster regional partnerships. But the agreement has faced criticism for being exclusionary and divisive. In addition to the US, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand, seven ASEAN countries – Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei – have joined the IPEF. But Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar have been left out of this new framework.

Such exclusions could exacerbate economic disparities between ASEAN members and heighten regional tensions, offsetting the benefits of existing mega-regional trade agreements, such as the RCEP. Some critics have argued that the IPEF is largely symbolic and intended to appeal to American voters rather than implement effective policies that benefit its members. Likewise, trade ministers from across the Indo-Pacific recently convened in Detroit to discuss a series of measures aimed at bolstering supply chains for essential goods, such as semiconductors and critical minerals. But the agreement they reached lacks clear policy objectives beyond reducing dependency on China.

Given that they cannot afford to decouple from either side, the escalating rivalry between China and the West puts ASEAN countries in a difficult position. Trade between the bloc's member states and Europe more than tripled between 2000 and 2022, from $110.5 billion to $342.3 billion. Similarly, ASEAN's trade with the US surged from $135.1 billion to $452.2 billion. ASEAN exports to the US nearly quadrupled from $87.9 billion to $356.7 billion over the same period.

At the same time, trade between ASEAN and China reached $975.3 billion in 2022, an astounding 24-fold increase from 2000. ASEAN countries' exports to China increased by a factor of 18 during this period, from $22.2 billion to $408.1 billion.

Moreover, East Asia, the US, and the EU are all significant sources of foreign direct investment in ASEAN countries. In 2021, East Asian countries accounted for 33% of total FDI in the region, while the US and EU accounted for 22% and 15%, respectively.

Given the depth of these economic ties, urging ASEAN countries to decouple from China is deeply unfair. It is also short-sighted, because decoupling would undermine trade and economic development within the bloc, fueling political instability across the region.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2023.www.project-syndicate.org