美國將金融工具作為大國博弈的手段，正逐漸替代貿易戰，且打擊對手的舉措也愈發頻繁。局部關閉中概股赴美上市，被視為推動中美金融“脫鉤”的最新動向。

近兩年，美國頻頻在金融領域動用泛政治化的“行政令”對華髮難，或將中國重點行業、目標企業或機構列入實體制裁名單實施資產管制，或發佈中長期融資禁令禁止進入美國資本市場融資。這種菜單式制裁是特朗普政府近兩年來一直在做的事情。

特別是去年5月，美國參議院一致表決通過《外國公司問責法案》，規定在美上市的外國企業如連續三年未按要求披露相關信息，將被強行要求退市。同月，美聯邦退休儲蓄投資委員會的“節儉儲蓄計劃”（TSP）正式宣布暫停追蹤含有中國股票的指數基金。10月，美國國會發起《美國金融市場誠信和安全法》，欲禁止美國的投資公司、退休基金和保險公司入股被美國商務部列入“實體清單”或被美國國防部列入受中國軍方支持公司名單上的中國公司。12月，美國財政部外國資產控制辦公室更是將所謂“中方涉軍企業”設為單獨制裁項目。由此可見，美國國防部與財政部已形成聯動執法機制，共同打擊中國企業，且不斷擴大對華企業的打擊範圍。

根據《彭博經濟報告》，近年來隨着中國經濟體量的不斷增長，以及中國企業海外融資規模的不斷擴大，在美上市的中國企業數量也迅速增長。2005年有36家中國企業在美上市，總市值2600億美元，僅佔美國市場總市值的1%左右。至2020年，大約有600多家中國企業赴美上市，總市值約為5.9萬億美元，佔美國市場總市值的8.7%。特別是中國科技巨頭的IPO佔據了在美上市的大頭。

凡此種種大都是特朗普政府行政令作為。可以說，特朗普時期最大的改變就是重置了中美關係，並在美國社會內部改造了對華關係的基礎和氛圍，讓“中國是美國最大競爭對手甚至敵手”成為美國社會普遍接受的認知。儘管人們對拜登時期中美關係的普遍預期比特朗普時期要樂觀一些，但預計未來若干年內，美國對華政策的框架不會發生根本性改變，特別是從拜登新政府對華強硬立場的最新表態看，在金融領域“對華施壓”的態勢也還會繼續，中美之間的金融博弈可能才剛剛開始。

美國利用其資本市場在全球金融市場的絕對主導優勢，對中國在美上市企業發佈投融資禁令，層層加碼，甚至發起准金融制裁行動，確實給中國企業造成了很大的負面影響，這不僅提高了融資成本，也降低了全球投資者的投資意願。鑒於美國資本市場在全球金融市場上短期內難以撼動的中心地位，未來美國金融打壓和制衡手段還會繼續帶有強烈的單邊主義色彩，這使得中國在中美金融博弈中處於嚴重的不對稱地位。

然而，中國可以通過主動開放來應對這種金融封鎖或金融“脫鉤”，實現“再掛鉤”。與美國形成鮮明對照的是，近年來中國金融開放的步伐不斷加快，給美國和其他國家金融機構帶來的利益也日益增加。2020年，中國央行工作會議就明確提出，要繼續推動債券市場基礎設施互聯互通，穩妥有序推進資本項目開放。銀保監會也發文提出，要推動消費金融、養老保險等領域的外資金融機構進入境內市場。

在這樣的大背景下，包括美國金融機構在內的外資加速進入中國。2019年，PayPal收購了中國GoPay七成股份，使其成為第一家在中國提供在線支付服務的外國公司。2020年6月，美國運通獲得批准，成為第一家通過與中國金融科技公司的合資企業在華開展境內業務的外國信用卡公司，同時被允許開展網絡清算業務。標普全球在2019年成立了一家外商獨資公司，成為第一家獲得許可在中國國內債券市場開展信用評級服務的公司。據估算，中國金融市場規模為47萬億美元，外資金融機構在銀行資產佔比不到2%，在保險市場佔比不到6%，金融開放將為外資金融機構創造巨大的增值和利潤空間。

事實證明，金融開放吸引流入中國的跨境資本不斷增加。截至2019年年末，境外機構與個人持有人民幣股票與債券達4.4萬億元，同比增長52.4%。而經歷了新冠疫情衝擊的2020年，境外機構凈增持銀行間債券規模超過1萬億元，中國金融市場的國際吸引力持續提升。

完全有理由相信，對於逐利全球資源配置效率的金融資本而言，一個龐大且日益開放的市場對全球資本具有最大的“黏性”，也會形成中美金融聯繫之間更加穩固的紐帶。

Financial instruments are gradually replacing trade wars as a more advantageous means of putting pressure on China, and the U.S. is frequently using it for gaming against other great powers. The partial shutdown of Chinese stocks listing in the U.S. is seen as the latest move to promote China's financial decoupling from the U.S.

In the past two years, the U.S. has frequently used pan-politicalized executive orders to make trouble with China in the financial sector, by putting China's key industries, target companies, or institutions on the Entity List and imposing asset controls. They've also issued medium- and long-term financing bans on China's access to the U.S. capital market for financing or commercial financing or on China's investment and related business in the U.S. This “menu” of sanctions has largely been the work of the Trump administration over the last two years.

Last May in particular, the United States Senate passed the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act with unanimous consent, which will force the delisting of foreign companies listed in the U.S. if they fail to disclose relevant information as required for three consecutive years. In the same month, the U.S. Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board's Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) officially announced the suspension of index funds that track Chinese stocks.In October, the U.S. Congress initiated the American Financial Markets Integrity and Security Act, which will prohibit U.S. investment companies, pension funds, and insurance companies from investing in Chinese companies that are on the U.S. Department of Commerce's Entity List or on the U.S. Department of Defense's list of companies backed by the Chinese military.In December, the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) created a separate sanctions program (Chinese Military Companies Sanctions) for so-called "designated Communist Chinese military companies.”All this shows that the U.S. Department of Defense and the Treasury Department have formed a joint enforcement mechanism against Chinese companies and have been expanding the scope of their actions against Chinese companies.

According to a Bloomberg economic report, the number of Chinese companies listed in the U.S. has grown rapidly in recent years as China's economy continues to grow and the scale of overseas financing for Chinese companies continues to expand. Data shows that in 2005, there were 36 Chinese companies listed in the U.S., with a total market value of $260 billion, accounting for only about 1% of the total market value of the U.S. market; while by 2020, there are about 600 of them, with a total market value of about $5.9 trillion, accounting for 8.7% of the total market value of the U.S. market. In particular, IPOs of Chinese tech giants account for the bulk of listings in the U.S.

All the above-mentioned actions were carried out against China under the executive orders of the Trump administration. Arguably, the biggest change during the Trump era is the reset of China-U.S. relations and the transformation of the foundation and atmosphere of relations with China within U.S. society. It made the notion that, "China is the biggest competitor or even adversary of the US," a generally accepted perception in U.S. society.Although people are generally more optimistic about Sino-U.S. relations under Biden than under Trump, it is expected that the framework of U.S. policy toward China will not change fundamentally in the next few years. Judging from the new Biden administration's latest stance of hardening its position toward China, the U.S. will continue to "pressure China" in the financial sector and may have just begun its financial game with China.

The U.S. has used its absolute dominance of capital markets in global financial markets to issue investment and financing bans on Chinese companies listed in the U.S., adding layers and layers of restrictions, and even initiating quasi-financial sanctions. This has had a significant negative impact on Chinese companies, not only raising financing costs, but also reducing the willingness of global investors to invest. Given the central position of the U.S. capital markets in the global financial market, which is difficult to shake in the short term, the future U.S. financial suppression and counterbalance will continue to be strongly unilateral, which puts China in a serious "asymmetric position" in the China-U.S. financial game.

However, China can respond to this financial blockade or financial decoupling by actively opening up to achieve recoupling. In contrast to the U.S., China's financial opening has accelerated in recent years, bringing increasing benefits to financial institutions in the U.S. and other countries. In 2020, China's central bank working conference made it clear that China would continue to promote the connectivity of bond market infrastructures and open capital projects in a steady and orderly manner. The China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission also issued a document proposing to promote the entry of foreign financial institutions in consumer finance, pension insurance, and other areas of the domestic market.

Against this backdrop, foreign investors, including U.S. financial institutions, have accelerated their entry into China. In 2019, PayPal became the first foreign company to provide online payment services in China after acquiring a 70 percent stake in Chinese company GoPay.In June 2020, American Express received approval to become the first foreign credit card company to conduct domestic operations in China through a joint venture with a Chinese fintech company, and was also allowed to conduct network clearing operations. Visa and Mastercard applied to form a network clearing license.S&P Global established a wholly foreign-owned company in 2019, the first foreign company licensed to conduct credit rating services in China's domestic bond market. The size of China's financial market is estimated to be $47 trillion. Foreign financial institutions account for less than 2% of banking assets and less than 6% of the insurance market in China. China's financial liberalization will create huge value-added and profit margins for foreign financial institutions.

Financial liberalization has proven to attract increased cross-border capital inflows into China. By the end of 2019, foreign institutions and individuals held 4.4 trillion yuan in Chinese stocks and bonds, up 52.4% year-on-year. And in 2020, which was impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic, the net increase in the size of Chinese interbank bonds held by foreign institutions exceeded 1 trillion yuan, and the international attractiveness of China's financial market continued to rise.

There is every reason to believe that a large and increasingly open market will be the most "sticky" for global capital, which is seeking to profit from the efficiency of global resource allocation. It will also form a more solid bond between China and the U.S. financial ties.