農曆新年前突然爆發的新冠肺炎疫情讓中國完全措不及防。截至2月15日，確診病例總數達到68500例，是2003年SARS（5723例）的10倍多。疫情中心湖北省有56244例，佔全國總數的82.1%，省會武漢佔全省的70.2%。隨着世界各地陸續出現病例，世界衛生組織於1月30日宣布疫情是“國際關注”事件。

中國迅速進行了全國動員，並在國內採取嚴厲措施抗擊疫情，包括禁止進出武漢，大範圍實施航空、鐵路、公路和水運旅客出行限制。許多城市的居民小區被隔離，所有居民被要求儘可能呆在家裡。商業活動暫停，學校延期開學。

這些舉措對經濟產生了嚴重影響，餐飲、旅遊和零售等行業受到重創。2019年，中國傳統節日春節的出行人次達40億，今年則減少了八成以上。去年春節期間，餐飲業營收為7300億元人民幣（1050億美元），今年則下降到最低水平。

工業生產也受到嚴重打擊。例如，今年1月份的汽車產量比去年12月下降33.5%，比去年同期下降24.6%。2月份的降幅無疑會更大。截至2月12日，中國183家組裝廠當中只有59家恢復了生產，17%的組裝廠在2月23日前不會復工。2019年，旅遊業每天新增產值159億元（23億美元），如今已一落千丈。

中國供應鏈的中斷正波及到其他國家。由於缺少來自中國的零部件，日產（日本）和現代（韓國）的國內組裝廠均已暫停運營。德國2019年的全球汽車銷量為1590萬輛，價值4300億歐元，其中中國市場的銷量為520萬輛，合1500億歐元。德國已經關閉在中國的300多家整車和零部件工廠，而停工意味着每天6000萬歐元的利潤損失。

供應鏈中斷令全球貿易流動進一步惡化。俄羅斯塔斯社最近報道說，全球出口每周減少了2000億美元，比中美貿易戰的後果還要嚴重。

年初以來，中國石油消費的大幅放緩也拖累全球油價下跌了16%。歐佩克正準備提前召開例會，審議延長削減產油配額的可能性。

悲觀情緒蔓延

最近幾周，中國國內和世界各地對2020年經濟前景的悲觀看法層出不窮。美國國際戰略研究中心中國研究部主任裘德·布蘭切特估計，冠狀病毒疫情若持續半個月，中國就將損失2.7%的GDP，即3800億美元，從而使2020年的GDP增長率減少0.2個百分點。牛津研究所估計，中國第一季度GDP增長將減少0.4個百分點，全年增長在5.6%左右。高盛預計中國2020年GDP增長5.5%，但如果疫情持續三個月以上，GDP增長會降至5%甚至更低。

牛津研究所的本·梅認為，當前中國的冠狀病毒疫情比2003年的SARS更加嚴重，由於中國佔世界貿易的份額已經從2003年的5.3%上升到目前的12.8%，因此2020年全球GDP增長將減少0.2個百分點，降至2.3%，這是2008年全球金融危機以來的最低水平。

澳大利亞國際政策研究所的羅蘭·拉賈估計，如果中國的GDP增速降至4.5%，全球2020年的GDP增速將會減少0.3個百分點。

然而，美聯儲主席傑羅姆·鮑威爾和IMF發言人格里·賴斯都表示，現在進行估計還為時過早，後者更表示影響只是暫時的。世界銀行2月3日發表聲明說，中國政府擁有足夠它所需要的政策空間，來應對疫情對該國經濟的影響。

SARS無法相比

也有專家因中國2003年SARS時期的經歷而持樂觀態度。SARS爆發曾使中國2003年第二季度的GDP增長減少兩個百分點，降至9.2%。SARS結束後，經濟從第三季度開始強勁反彈，結果2003年全年的GDP增幅達到10.1%，高於2002年的9.1%。

這一勢頭延續到了2004年和2005年，這兩年的GDP增幅分別達到10.1%和11.4%。SARS持續了六個月，從峰值到消失有三個月時間。當前的疫情也有類似的時間線，因此樂觀者相信，中國會重複2003年的表現。

不過，簡單的經驗類比值得懷疑。從深度和廣度看，冠狀病毒對經濟的影響遠超17年前的SARS。2003年的SARS只有5723個病例，不到目前新冠肺炎病例的1/10。截至2月15日，新冠肺炎病例已達68500例，而且每天還在以1000多例的速度增長。SARS疫情期間，市民的旅行、購物、餐飲不受嚴格限制，工廠或學校也沒有關閉，疫情主要集中在廣州和北京，除了要對來自外省的遊客進行檢查，其他省份幾乎沒受什麼影響。

其次，SARS過後的經濟反彈更多有賴於投資和房地產開發，這在今天已經不那麼奏效了。2019年，資本形成總額只拉動中國GDP增長2.0個百分點，房地產泡沫下，房地產的開發不再被鼓勵。

第三，貿易反彈對SARS過後的經濟反彈起了重要作用。當年貿易增長了37.1%，是10年當中最高的，其原因是擁有“入世”優勢，以及中國廉價勞動力的比較優勢。這一優勢如今不復存在，相反，中國正面臨著單邊主義和保護主義盛行的全球貿易環境。

第四，眼下企業的成本與收益遠不如2003年時有利。新冠肺炎爆發前，中國的工業利潤比上年下降3.3%。由於勞動力成本、租金、公用事業支出和銀行利息上升，加上業務暫停，大批中小企業和微型企業已瀕臨倒閉邊緣。清華大學最近對995家中小企業的調查發現，85.0%的企業連三個月都撐不下去。

因此，現實的經濟困境將是非常複雜的。經濟反彈和全年表現在很大程度上將取決於當前疫情的持續時間和嚴重程度，以及政府正確的政策和創新性商業路徑。簡單的線性經驗分析並不是全部答案，中國要為最壞的情況做準備。

謹慎的信心

烏雲中已經出現一絲曙光。本文撰寫時，每天新增病例數量已連續三天下降，2月12日全國為15152例，2月13日5090例，2月14日2641例，2月15日2009例。數據還顯示，湖北省從2月12日的14840例穩步下降到了2月15日的1843例，湖北以外地區的數據尤其令人鼓舞，新增病例連續12天下降，從2月3日的890例下降到2月15日的165例，有幾個省份的新病例為零。

除非出現第二個高峰，否則整個疫情將很快得到控制。與此同時，生產和服務的恢復已在全國各地展開。照此情形，經濟活動有望在3月下旬恢復正常，並在第二季度和第三季度回升。

如果是這樣的話，新冠肺炎對中國2020年全年經濟的負面影響將是有限的。現在需要政府有正確的政策組合，需要有新的商業路徑，特別是：

第一，為各類中小企業和微型企業提供積極的財政和金融支持，確保它們的生存和發展。這類政策措施中央和地方政府皆可廣泛實施。

第二，為發展尋找創新型新動能。疫情期間，我們見證了醫療防護服、口罩和醫療設備生產、物流和配送方面的非凡活力，尤其是火神山和雷神山醫院驚人的建設速度，只用了10天時間，這在世界歷史上前所未有。

而且，億萬居民的生活必需品供應得到了很好的保障。所有這些都是經濟增長的一部分。更重要的是，全國抗疫行動加快了人工智能、物聯網、機械人、網上購物、遠程診斷、智能駕駛以及城市、社區和企業智能化管理的發展。這將成為推動2020年及以後中國技術、產業和服務發展的驚人驅動力。

第三，繼續開展國際合作。暫時的疫情沒有也不會改變中國在全球供應鏈的核心地位。對中國來說，當務之急是避免國際貿易流動的中斷和延遲。在這方面國際商業界已經給予信任，英國駐華商會主席聖·約翰·摩爾表達了許多在華英國企業的心聲。他說，我們會留下，我們不會離開。

一位著名英國經濟學家曾經發現，疾病對經濟的影響很難量化。在某些情況下，如果政府採取正確的政策，疫情過後可能會出現更強勁的增長。最近的例子是巴西。2016 年寨卡病毒大規模爆發，給巴西經濟帶來致命打擊，因為2015 年巴西的經濟增長率已經是-3.5%。疫情過後，2016年巴西經濟增長率為-3.3%，略好於上一年，2017年和2018年經濟都在回升，每年各增長1.1%。

如果政策和路徑得當，如果成功與國際社會進行合作，中國經濟增長在中期內很可能仍將處在趨勢線上。假如把2020、2021和2022年放在一起，待三年之後再回頭來看，那麼我們很可能看到的是，三年整體的增長與沒有新冠肺炎並無多大不同。

The sudden outbreak of the novel coronavirus, COVID-19, caught China totally unprepared just before the Chinese Lunar New Year holiday. By Feb. 15, total confirmed cases had hit 68,500, more than 10 times the cases of SARS (5,723) in 2003, with Hubei province, the epicenter, accounting for 56,244, or 82.1 percent of the nation's total. Wuhan, the provincial capital, accounted for 70.2 percent of the provincial total. The World Health Organization announced on Jan. 30 that the epidemic was of international concern, as cases cropped up around the world.

China's quick national mobilization and severe measures to combat the disease domestically, including a travel ban into and out of Wuhan and extensive air, rail, road and freight passenger travel restrictions. Residential areas in many cities were quarantined, with all residents required to stay at home as much as possible. Business operations were suspended, and schools postponed classes.

All those moves have seriously affected the economy. The catering, travel and retail sectors, among others, have been hit hard. Traditional Spring Festival travel within China, which hit 4 billion trips in 2019, saw a decline of more than 80 percent. Catering business revenue, which saw a turnover of 730 billion yuan ($105 billion) during last year's Spring Festival period, has dropped to minimal.

Industrial production has also been hit hard. For instance, automotive output in January this year was down 33.5 percent from December, and 24.6 percent down from a year ago. Undoubtedly, February's drop will be even sharper.As of Feb. 12, only 59 of 183 assembly plants in China had resumed operations and 17 percent of the total will not resume by Feb. 23. The tourist industry, which contributed an added value of 15.9 billion yuan ($2.3 billion) per day in 2019, has been in free fall.

Interruptions in Chinese supply chains is spreading to other countries. Nissan (Japan) and Hyundai (South Korea) have both suspended operations at their home assembly plants because of a lack of parts from China. Germany had worldwide automotive sales of 15.90 million units worth 430 billion euros in 2019, with 5.2 million units, or 150 billion euros, playing in the China market. Germany has closed more than 300 auto and parts plants in China. Each day of work suspension represents a profit loss of 60 million euros.

Supply chain interruptions further aggravate the world trade flows. Russia's TASS News Agency reported recently that world exports are losing $200 billion per week, larger than the aftermath of China-U.S. trade war.

A drastic slowdown in China's oil consumption has also dragged world oil prices down by 16 percent since the start of the year. OPEC is preparing to advance its meeting to review a possible extension of oil quota cuts.

Pessimism widespread

Pessimistic views on economic prospects for 2020 in China and around the world have flowed in abundance over recent weeks. Jude Blanchette, China Research Director of CSIS estimated that if the coronavirus epidemic lasts for half a month, China will lose 2.7 percent of its GDP, or $380 billion, resulting in a 0.2 percentage point fall in 2020 GDP growth. The Oxford Institute has estimated that China's Q1 GDP growth will shed 0.4 percentage points and the whole year's growth rate will be around 5.6 percent. Goldman Sachs puts China's 2020 GDP growth at 5.5 percent, but if the epidemic lasts more than 3 months, GDP growth will fall to 5 percent or even lower.

Ben May of Oxford held that the current coronavirus outbreak in China is more serious than SARS in 2003, and since China's share of world trade has increased from 5.3 percent in 2003 to the current 12.8 percent, world GDP growth will shrink by 0.2 percentage points to 2.3 percent in 2020, the lowest since the 2008 global financial crisis.

Roland Rajah of the Australia International Policy Institute estimates a 0.3 percentage point fall in 2020 global GDP growth if China's GDP growth slows to 4.5 percent.

However, both Jerome Powell, chairman of U.S. Federal Reserve, and Gerry Rice, an IMF spokesman, said it was too early to give an estimate, with the latter saying the impact will only be temporary. The World Bank issued a statement on Feb. 3, saying that the Chinese government has all the policy room it needs to manage epidemic's impact on the country's economy.

SARS not comparable

There are also experts who hold optimistic views, based on China's experience with SARS in 2003. The outbreak of SARS drove China's GDP growth down by 2 percentage points in Q2 2003 — to 9.2 percent. After the end of SARS, the economy rebounded strongly from Q3. As a result, the whole year of 2003 saw GDP growth of 10.1 percent, higher than 2002's 9.1 percent.

The momentum continued into 2004 and 2005 with GDP growth hitting 10.1 percent and 11.4 percent, respectively. SARS lasted for six months. From its peak to its disappearance was three months. The current epidemic has followed a similar timeline. Hence, the optimists are confident that China will repeat its 2003 performance.

However, a simple empirical comparison is questionable. The economic impact of the coronavirus far exceeds that of SARS 17 years ago, starting with size and depth. SARS in 2003 had only 5,723 cases, less than one-tenth of the current COVID-19, which hit 68,500 as of Feb. 15 and is still increasing by more than 1,000 cases per day. During the outbreak of SARS, there were no stringent restrictions on people's travel, shopping or catering. Nor were there factory or school closures. The epidemic was mostly focused in Guangzhou and Beijing, with other provinces little affected, except for inspections to arriving visitors from other provinces.

Second, the post-SARS economic rebound depended more on investment and real estate development, which is no longer so effective today. Total capital formation pulled China's GDP growth by only 2.0 percentage points in 2019. Real estate development, with property bubbles, is no longer encouraged.

Third, the trade rebound played a good role in the post-SARS rebound, with the whole year's growth rate hitting 37.1 percent, the highest in a decade, due to the advantages of World Trade Organization accession and China's comparative advantages in cheap labor, which no longer exist today. On the contrary, China faces a sober world trade environment entangled by unilateralism and protectionism.

Fourth, the business cost-benefit balance today is much less favorable than it was in 2003. Before the outbreak of COVID-19, China's industrial profits had declined by 3.3 percent from the previous year. With the cost of labor, rent, utilities and bank interest rising and operations suspended, a vast number of SMEs and micro businesses have been left on the brink of closure. A recent survey by Tsinghua University on 995 SMEs found that 85.0 percent of them cannot survive for even three months.

As a result, actual economic adversity will be complicated. The economic rebound and whole year performance will depend to a large extent on the length and depth of the current epidemic and on correct government policies and innovative business pathways. A simple, linear empirical analysis is not the whole answer. China needs to be prepared for the worst-case scenario.

Cautious confidence

A silver lining in the clouds is already apparent. As of this writing, the number of new cases daily had fallen for three consecutive days. Nationally, there were 15,152 on Feb. 12, with 5,090 on Feb. 13 and 2,641 on Feb. 14. There were 2,009 cases on Feb. 15. Data from Hubei province also shows a steady fall from 14,840 on Feb. 12 to 1,843 on Feb. 15. The non-Hubei data is especially encouraging, with a daily drop in new cases for 12 days in a row, from 890 on Feb. 3 all the way down to 165 on Feb. 15. A few provinces reported zero new cases.

Barring a second peak, the whole epidemic will soon be under control. Meanwhile, resumption of production and services has been expanding across the country. Under these circumstances, we are likely to see economic activity return to normal in late March and pick up during Q2 and Q3.

In that case, the negative impact of COVID-19 on the Chinese economy for all of 2020 will be limited. What is required is a correct policy mix from the government and new pathways for businesses, especially:

First, active fiscal and financial support for various SMEs and micro businesses to secure their survival and development. Such policies and measures can be found extensively from both the central and various local governments.

Second, finding innovative new drivers for development. During the epidemic, we have seen remarkable activity in the production, logistics and delivery of protective medical suits, masks and medical treatment devices — and especially the amazing speed at which Huoshenshan and Leishenshan hospitals were built — just 10 days, something never before seen in world history.

Also, the supplies of daily necessities for hundreds of millions of residents have been well secured. All those are a part of economic growth. What is more, the national campaign combating the epidemic has accelerated the growth of artificial intelligence, the internet of things, robots, online shopping, remote diagnosis, intelligent driving and the intelligent management of cities, communities and companies. This will become an amazing driving force that advances China's technology, industry and services for 2020 and beyond.

Third, continuous international cooperation. The temporary disease in China has not and will not change China's nexus position in the global supply chain. It has been a top priority for China to avoid interruption and delays in the flow of international trade. The international business community has already awarded a credit in this regard. Expressing the sentiment of many British businesses in China, the chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce in China, St. John Moore, said: We are here to stay. We are not leaving.”

A famous British economist once found that the economic impact of disease is hard to quantify. In some cases, the post-disease period could see much stronger growth if the government has the correct policy. The most recent case is Brazil. The massive outbreak of the Zika virus in 2016 was a deadly blow to the Brazilian economy, which had already experienced negative growth of -3.5 percent in 2015. After the epidemic, the Brazilian economy sat at -3.3 percent in 2016, slightly better that the previous year and then picked up in 2017 and 2018, with 1.1 percent growth in each of those years.

If China has the right policies and pathways, and if it works successfully with the international community, there is a high chance that its economic growth will stay within its trend line over the medium term. If we put 2020, 2021 and 2022 together and look back three years later, we will most probably see an overall growth rate over the three years that differs little from what it would have been with no COVID-19.