直到1996年以前，人民幣即使在經常賬戶交易中也不是完全可兌換的。而一直到2009年以前，中國政府還不允許人民幣用於貿易結算。此後中國貨幣和金融影響力的飆升，反映在歐洲和亞洲離岸人民幣貨幣與債券交易的快速發展。到2014年，中國已經與30個國家和地區達成人民幣貿易結算互換安排，韓國三星、法國Alstom等公司的中國子公司已經採用人民幣支付結算。然而，儘管中華人民共和國不僅是美國的第二大貿易夥伴，而且是它的最大債權人，美國卻明顯缺席人民幣的國際化進程。

國際清算銀行的數據顯示，人民幣在全球貨幣交易中的份額已從2010年的1%上升到2013年的2%、2016年的4%。雖然遠不及美元88%的大頭，但仍反映了短期內的驚人增長。到2016年，人民幣已經是世界第八大交易貨幣。人民幣被納入IMF特別提款權貨幣籃子，只會進一步提高它作為結算貨幣的潛在吸引力。事實上，人民幣在貨幣籃子中的初始權重為11%，這讓它領先於英鎊和日元，僅次於歐元和美元。人民幣排在日元之前，說明未來人民幣的作用將擴大，雖然日元目前在全球貨幣交易中的份額比人民幣要高得多（2016年為22%）。

已經有預測認為，到一定時候，人民幣甚至有可能取代美元，成為國際大宗商品交易的計價單位。這種轉變類似於二戰之後美元自己作為國際儲備貨幣對英鎊的取代。目前人民幣已經在外國央行的外匯儲備中佔有一席之地，這一進展不僅是因為中國日益強大的經濟實力，也由於歐元相對疲軟。但至少到目前為止，美元作為首選“避險”貨幣，其地位仍受到了支撐。

之前人民幣國際化的重要舉措包括2010年7月在香港建立離岸人民幣市場，2014年11月的滬港通計劃，以及2016年12月的深港通計劃。離岸市場正式建立後，香港的人民幣交易激增，人民幣日益取代了香港對美元和歐元的外幣持有。而且，新近的互通計劃促進了兩市之間的直接投資流動。放眼東亞，中國自2009年以來一直是澳大利亞最重要的出口市場，澳大利亞Fortescue Metal等企業已開始用人民幣進行交易。但要實現人民幣的潛力，需要金融進一步自由化。近期人民幣疲軟，中國在海外直接投資下降，2016年12月海外直接投資同比下降了近40%。但勢在必行的是，中國當局應該繼續放鬆而不是收緊資本管制。

在亞洲之外，大幅提升人民幣的對外角色繼續取得重大進展。特別是倫敦已經成為香港以外最重要的離岸人民幣中心，倫敦的人民幣結算量在2016年超過了新加坡。2016年，倫敦證交所上市的人民幣債券超過95隻，融資總額約60億美元。目前的一個潛在重大舉措是以可行性研究方式審議建立新的上海－倫敦互通計劃，這將首次為歐洲投資者提供直接進入中國內地股市的通道。而且，倫敦也不是歐洲唯一的人民幣中心。2015年11月在法蘭克福建立的中歐國際交易所，是上海證券交易所、德意志交易所集團和中國金融期貨交易所的合資公司。盧森堡也集中了大量的人民幣計價基金。

人民幣國際化的另一個原因是中國與巴西、俄羅斯、印度、南非等其他金磚國家的關係日益緊密。金磚集團在國際貿易結算中已經漸漸遠離第三方貨幣，如美元和歐元，它們在2015年通過新的開發銀行和應急儲備安排進一步確立了正式關係。雖然英國2016年6月的脫歐公投被普遍視為對歐元前景的傷害，但它也給更團結的金磚集團提供了一個從歐盟的衰落中獲益的機會。有意思的是，在英國公投的第二天，金磚國家股市跌幅都明顯小於全球基準股指4.7%的平均跌幅。而且，在2016年6月24日少數錄得意外反彈的國家中，兩個表現最好的就是金磚集團國家，巴西股指意外反彈了5.5%，俄羅斯反彈5.3%。

雖然大部分國家都在更好地利用這條巨龍的威力和能量，就像中國老話說的那樣，但美國只在反覆爭論是否應該認定中國為“匯率操縱國”。這一指控很難得到中國經常賬戶盈餘數據的支持，2016年，其盈餘已經降到佔中國GDP的2.1%的溫和水平。特朗普執政期間，國會對中國出口水平的擔心，對中國企業向美國市場滲透的擔心，極有可能引發保護主義政策。但另一方面，特朗普總統本人應該充分了解與中國更積極交往的潛在共同利益，中國工商銀行就是特朗普大廈的最大金主，它是最大的租戶，為每平方英尺支付的租金比大廈內任何其他大辦公租戶都多。

具有諷刺意味的是，中國對他國影響力的增加促進了經濟的相互依存與聯通，恰在此時，美國卻傾向於採取更為孤立的戰略，如退出TPP這類國際協定。這種做法只能進一步為中國打開大門，包括中國有可能在已具雛形的區域全面經濟夥伴關係協定（RCEP）中發揮主導作用。RCEP包括東盟10個成員，以及中國、澳大利亞、印度、日本、新西蘭和韓國。美國領導的TPP極有可能被中國領導的RCEP實質性取代，後者代表的區域貿易集團覆蓋了27%的全球貿易。考慮到人民幣覆蓋面已經擴大，對美國領導地位的挑戰無疑已經形成。美國必須提高警惕，以免有朝一日門庭冷落。

The renminbi did not become fully convertible even for current account transactions until 1996 and the Chinese government did not allow it to be used for trade invoicing prior to 2009. China's soaring monetary and financial influence since then is reflected in burgeoning offshore renminbi currency and bond trading in Europe as well as Asia. Swap arrangements for renminbi trade settlement with 30 countries and regions had been entered into by 2014 and companies like Korea's Samsung and France's Alstom have adopted renminbi payment settlement in their Chinese subsidiaries. The United States' participation in renminbi internationalization remains conspicuous by its absence, however, notwithstanding the People's Republic of China's role as not only its second largest trading partner but also its largest creditor.

The Bank for International Settlements data revealed that the renminbi's share in global currency turnover rose from 1% in 2010 to 2% in 2013 and 4% in 2016. Although obviously well behind the dollar's dominant 88% share, this nevertheless reflects spectacular growth over a short period of time and the renminbi was already the eighth most traded currency in the world by 2016. The renminbi's inclusion in the IMF's special drawing rights basket of currencies will only further boost its potential appeal as a settlement currency. Indeed, the renminbi's initial basket weight of 11% puts it ahead of the pound sterling and Japanese yen and behind only the euro and U.S. dollar. Its placement ahead of the Japanese yen could itself be interpreted as pricing in an expanded future role for the renminbi given that the yen's current share in global currency turnover today (22% in 2016) is much higher.

There is already speculation that at some point the renminbi could even supplant the dollar's role as the numeraire for international commodity trading and such a shift would be akin to the dollar's own replacement of the sterling as international reserve currency after the Second World War. The renminbi has already begun to find a place amongst the reserve holdings of foreign central banks, a development fueled not only by China's growing economic strength but also the relative weakness of the euro. The dollar's role remains supported by its position as the primary “flight to safety” currency, at least for now.

Major prior steps in the internationalization of China's currency include the establishment of an offshore renminbi market in Hong Kong in July 2010, the November 2014 Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect Program, and the December 2016 Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect Program. Renminbi-based transactionsin Hong Kong exploded after the offshore market was formally established and the renminbi has also been increasingly displacing Hong Kong foreign currency holdings of dollars and euros. Meanwhile, direct investment flows between the two markets were facilitated by the more recent Stock Connect programs. Looking beyond East Asia, China has been Australia's most important export market since 2009 and companies like Australia's Fortescue Metal Group have begun transacting in renminbi. Further financial liberalization is needed in order for the renminbi to realize its potential, however. Recent currency weakness has been accompanied by declining Chinese overseas direct investment and such direct investment was down almost 40% in December 2016 relative to the prior year. It is imperative that the Chinese authorities continue to loosen capital controls rather than retightening them.

The substantial scope for expanding the renminbi's external role remains evident in the major inroads it has already made outside Asia. London, in particular, has become the most important external renminbi center other than Hong Kong and overtook Singapore in renminbi clearing volumes in 2016. There were more than 95 renminbi-denominated bond issues listed on the London Stock Exchange in 2016, raising approximately six billion dollars in aggregate. A potentially major additional step is currently under consideration in the form of a feasibility study for a new Shanghai-London Stock Connect Program that would, for the first time, provide European investors with direct access to mainland Chinese stocks. Nor is London the only European renminbi hub. Frankfurt's China Europe International Exchange was launched in November 2015 as a joint venture between the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Deutsche Börse and China Financial Futures Exchange. Luxembourg also has a heavy concentration of renminbi-denominated funds.

Another element in renminbi internationalization concerns growing ties between China and the other “BRICS” nations of Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa. The BRICS group, which has been moving away from the use of third party currencies like the U.S. dollar and the euro in international trade settlement, added formal ties in 2015 via their New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement. Although the UK's Brexit vote of June 2016 was widely seen as damaging the prospects for the euro, this may present a more unified BRICS group with an opportunity to benefit from a weakened European Union. Interestingly, the BRICS stock markets all fell significantly less than the -4.7% average global benchmark decline on the day after the UK referendum. And, among the small group of countries enjoying positive abnormal returns on June 24, 2016, the two top performers were both part of the BRICS group – with Brazil enjoying an abnormal return of 5.5% and Russia 5.3%.

Even as much of the world becomes better positioned to take advantage of the dragon's might and power in line with the old Chinese proverb, the United States has done little more than repeatedly debate whether or not China should be branded a “currency manipulator.” This charge is itself hardly supported by data on China's current account surplus, which declined to a rather modest 2.1% of Chinese GDP in 2016. It is still quite possible that congressional concerns with both the level of Chinese exports and penetration of the U.S. market by Chinese firms will provoke protectionist policies under the Trump administration. On the other hand, the potential mutual gains from engaging more positively with China should be abundantly clear to President Trump himself, given that the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China represents the Trump Tower's biggest source of revenue – serving as its largest tenant and paying more per square foot than any other major office tenant in the building.

Ironically, at the very time that growing Chinese influences on other nations are enhancing economic interdependence and connectedness, the United States seems intent on more isolationist strategies as reflected by the retreat from international agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Such actions only open the door further to China, including the potential for China playing a dominant role in the fledgling Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The RCEP covers the 10 members of the Southeast Asian group ASEAN plus China, Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. There is every possibility that a U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership could be effectively replaced by a China-led RCEP, which would represent a regional trade bloc covering near 27% of global trade. Given how far China's monetary reach has extended already, the challenge to U.S. leadership certainly seems to be already underway. The United States must be careful not to be left out in the cold.