習近平與朱立倫在5月初舉行的會晤明確表達了國共兩黨、兩岸雙方對“九二共識”作為兩岸關係和平發展政治基礎的高度認同。習近平總書記對兩岸關係的論述表明，任何明示或默示反對“九二共識”的台灣政黨都不可能收穫和平發展的成果。如果沒有對“九二共識”的明確表態，台灣海峽就可能面臨著動蕩不安的未來。

一、“九二共識”是太平洋兩岸和海峽兩岸利益最大化的政治符號

習近平總書記提出“九二共識”是兩岸關係之錨的論述，表明大陸認為“九二共識”是兩岸關係和平發展最重要的政治符號。他在諸多場合表達了“九二共識”在兩岸關係中的重要性。朱立倫在擔任國民黨主席後，也明確了表達了“九二共識”是兩岸和平發展政治基礎的觀點。在習朱會上，朱立倫更是將共識的內容清晰化，表達了國民黨對這個政治符號的傳承和充分重視。

習朱會上，國共兩黨領導人的表態說明，兩黨對“九二共識”有着高度認同，這也釋放出海峽兩岸兩支主要的政治力量對在“九二共識”基礎上堅定推動兩岸關係、維護台海和平的清晰信號。畢竟，“九二共識”是太平洋兩岸、海峽兩岸均認可的重要共識，是海峽兩岸得以求同存異、妥協前行的重要政治符號。在這個政治符號下，太平洋兩岸、海峽兩岸的最大利益均可以維持和拓展。沒有這個政治符號，或者對這個政治符號不作清晰表態，兩岸關係就很難有穩定的和平發展。如果這樣，各方的利益均有可能受到損失。

二、“九二共識”是兩岸當局、國共兩黨的共識

由於習朱會是兩岸執政黨領導人的會面，所表達的自然是兩個執政黨的態度。這次會晤說明，兩岸執政黨對“九二共識”有着高度的認同。之前，兩黨在南京舉行的兩岸關係和平發展共同願景發佈十周年紀念活動更是以政黨名義昭示“九二共識”與和平發展的關係。

台灣當局對“九二共識”的態度也是明確的。朱立倫訪問大陸之前，台灣地區領導人馬英九在視導陸委會時發表講話，確認“九二共識”是兩岸當局的共識。朱立倫訪問大陸之後，馬英九舉辦“九二共識”展覽，展出相關歷史文件和圖片，用史實說明共識確實存在，而且是兩岸關係發展的關鍵。

三、“九二共識”是兩岸和平發展現狀的重要組成部分

2000年，堅持“台獨”的民進黨上台，兩岸兩會的談判因而中斷。七年前，陳水扁推動法理台獨，致使兩岸關係進入高危期。2008年，堅持“九二共識”的國民黨當選執政，兩岸用共識的方式達成了一個中國問題的妥協與共識，形成兩岸關係和平發展的局面。習朱會之後，馬英九督促蔡英文在“九二共識”問題上表態，並表明未來無論誰當選，都應該在共識基礎上發展兩岸關係。事實表明，兩岸關係和平發展的成果並非理所當然，它是建立在“九二共識”基礎上的。要維持兩岸關係現狀，必須對“九二共識”作出明確的表態。

兩岸執政黨和兩岸當局之所以如此，是因為民進黨一廂情願的想法將可能破壞兩岸關係和平發展的現狀，給台海帶來不穩定因素。民進黨至今沉醉在“太陽花”學運後“九合一”選舉的美夢中，認為只要迴避“九二共識”，宣示繼續兩岸和平發展，就能收割兩岸關係和平發展的成果。最重要的原因還在於，蔡英文作為陳水扁執政時期執掌兩岸關係的主要成員，對陳水扁時期的兩岸政策具有主要責任。她帶領着一批陳水扁執政團隊的主要成員參與競選，而且一直不表明對“九二共識”的態度，這難免造成兩岸執政當局和執政黨的憂慮。更何況，蔡英文不明確對“九二共識”的表態，表明她不願意將手中的牌攤給美國人看，暗含着跟美國和大陸平起平坐、討價還價的餘地。因此，要表明維持現狀，就要全面闡述她對兩岸現狀的理解，包括對“九二共識”的態度。

兩岸執政黨和兩岸當局對未來兩年關係能否維持和平發展都表示擔憂，這充分說明了兩岸執政的中國人對蔡英文當選可能破壞和平發展現狀的擔憂。如果蔡英文訪美時不能在“九二共識”問題上作明確表態，習近平主席下半年訪美時就存在着用一定篇幅跟美國領導人探討相關問題的可能性，這也意味着，中美兩國的其他問題可能會因為台灣問題被延宕。

The meeting in early May between Xi Jinping and Eric Chu, leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Kuomintang (KMT) respectively, clearly reflected the two parties' recognition of the 1992 Consensus as the political basis for peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. Xi's statement on cross-Straits relations showed that any Taiwanese party that explicitly or implicitly opposes the 1992 Consensus is not likely to yield the fruit of peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. Without a clear stance on the 1992 Consensus, the future of the Taiwan Straits may be fraught with disturbances.

1. The 1992 Consensus is a political symbol for maximized interests across the Pacific Ocean and across the Taiwan Straits.

Xi has reiterated the importance of the 1992 Consensus, which he often describes as the anchor of cross-Straits relations. This shows that the mainland regards the 1992 Consensus as the most important political symbol for cross-Straits peaceful development. Chu, after assuming office as KMT chairman, also explicitly referred to the 1992 Consensus as the political basis for peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.

During his recent meeting with Xi, Chu took a further step to clarify the content of 1992 Consensus, demonstrating the KMT's recognition of and emphasis on this political symbol.The endorsement of the 1992 Consensus as shown at the Xi-Chu meeting also sent a clear signal about the strong determination of the two main political forces to push forward cross-Straits relations and maintain peace across the Taiwan Straits on the basis of the 1992 Consensus.

2. The 1992 Consensus is the consensus of the two authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and the consensus of the CPC and the KMT.

As Xi and Chu are leaders of the governing parties on two sides of the Taiwan Straits, their stance invariably represents that of the two parties. Their meeting points to the two parties' recognition of the 1992 Consensus. At an earlier commemorative event marking the 10th anniversary of the release of the Common Vision for Cross-Straits Peaceful Development held in Nanjing, the two parties publicly declared the correlation between the 1992 Consensus and peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.

The attitude of the Taiwan authorities toward the 1992 Consensus is crystal-clear. Before Chu's visit to the mainland, Ma Ying-jeou, the current leader of Taiwan, confirmed that the 1992 Consensus is the consensus of the authorities across the Taiwan Straits. After Chu's mainland visit, Ma organized an exhibition on the 1992 Consensus. With historical documents and photos, the exhibition highlighted the realistic relevance of the 1992 Consensus, and illustrated its key role in promoting cross-Straits relations.

3. The 1992 Consensus is an important component of cross-Straits peaceful development.

In 2000, when the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took office, the cross-Straits negotiations had to be suspended. Seven years ago, Chen Shui-bian pushed for the so-called “de jure Taiwan independence”, bringing cross-Straits relations onto a high-risk track. Since 2008 when the Kuomintang, a party that recognizes the 1992 Consensus, took office, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits have reached compromises and consensus on the “one-China” position and ushered in a period of peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. After the meeting between Xi and Chu, Ma urged Tsai Ing-wen, the chair of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to make a statement on the 1992 Consensus and pledge to develop cross-Straits relations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. Experience shows that no one should take peaceful development of cross-Straits relations for granted. It must be based on the 1992 Consensus. To maintain the status quo of cross-Straits relations, a clear-cut stance on the 1992 Consensus must be articulated.

The DPP, however, maintains that so long as it declares its intention of promoting cross-Straits peaceful development, it will stand to yield the fruit of development even if it evades the 1992 Consensus. As a matter of fact, such thought on the part of the DPP would only result in compromising the current state of peaceful development across the Taiwan Straits and bringing instability to the region. As a key member of Chen Shui-bian's “cabinet” in charge of cross-Straits relations, Tsai Ing-wen should be held accountable for the damaging results of Chen's cross-Straits policies. Her reluctance to articulate her position on the 1992 Consensus gives the authorities and governing parties on both sides of the Straits ample reasons for concern. Her reluctance also implies her intention of concealing some of her negotiating chips to gain some leverage so that she can bargain as equal partner with the mainland and the US.

The governing parties and authorities across the Taiwan Straits are both worried about whether peaceful development will continue to prevail in cross-Straits relations in the coming two years. This bears full testimony to the concern of the leaders on both sides over the possible damage that Tsai Ing-wen's election may cause to the current peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. If Tsai falls short of making a clear statement on the 1992 Consensus during her visit to the US later this year, it is likely that Xi would devote some time discussing this issue with the US leader. And that means other issues in China-US relations may be stalled because of the Taiwan question.