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| China's V-Day parade, Sept. 3, 2025 |
A summary conference reviewing the Sept. 3 military parade in Tian'anmen Square has convened — in part to prepare for the strategic repercussions the parade set in motion.
Both the parade and the Tianjin SCO summit triggered deep psychological reactions in the United States and throughout the West. Debates over China's strategic rise and the possibility of a continental alignment have intensified, pushing all sides to hasten their strategic adjustments. These developments signal the beginning of a new phase in the reshaping of the postwar international order, particularly changes made in the decades following the Cold War.
China showed not only its advanced military hardware but also its organizational strengths and ability to mobilize, signaling to the United States and its allies that it is moving with unprecedented speed toward comprehensive, systemic parity. As international observers have noted, China's military balance is “undergoing an irreversible transformation.”Where earlier Western discussions of military balance were largely centered on Taiwan, the scope has now widened to encompass Sino-U.S. relations and, more broadly, China's position relative to the U.S.-led alliance system.
U.S. President Donald Trump acknowledged that he had watched the “impressive” parade and understood the signal it conveyed. He promptly instructed the Pentagon to “rebuild American deterrence.” Meanwhile, U.S. strategists — including Secretary of War Pete Hegseth — sought reassurance in claims that the United States still retains advantages and that many of the systems China showcased remain untested in combat. They also expressed hope that the enhanced capabilities would never be applied non-peacefully.They are, in all likelihood, fully aware that for the United States to “rebuild deterrence” it must first rehabilitate deteriorating supply chains — a task that, in the case of rare earths alone, could take five to 10 years. China could use this interval to execute further strategic reconfigurations in critical domains such as semiconductors, defense materiel and outer space.
As Western confidence in deterrence falters, prospects for resolving the Taiwan question have become more discernible. The issue is no longer whether the question can be resolved but only when and in what form. The restrained reaction of the Lai Ching-te administration to the parade in Beijing underscored a tacit recognition that momentum for Taiwan independence has dissipated. Once strategic deterrence crosses a critical threshold, it ceases to be symbolic and may put peaceful reunification on the agenda. For the United States, the day when Taiwan loses its instrumental strategic value is approaching, and its policy of strategic ambiguity will inevitably give way to greater clarity.
The effectiveness of advanced weaponry and operational capacity, however, can only be validated in actual combat. Some actors may therefore seek to instigate a limited disturbance or proxy conflict on China's periphery, heightening regional security risks. At the same time, the United States may conclude that China has achieved a nuclear triad comparable to those of the U.S. and Russia, prompting Washington to intensify pressure on Beijing over arms control and nuclear security. Any U.S.-Russia rapprochement would likely prioritize the restoration of arms control frameworks, with both parties sharing an interest in bringing China into multilateral negotiations.
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| China's V-Day parade, Sept. 3, 2025 |
The diplomatic appearance in Beijing of the top leaders of Russia and North Korea formed a historic tableau signaling strengthened resolve and a greater willingness to articulate shared strategic intentions. China reaffirmed its orientation toward cooperation with select Global South states in countering hegemonism, balancing containment with cooperative security and enriching the discourse of struggle within its U.S. policy framework.Russian President Vladimir Putin has further mitigated the impasse precipitated by the Ukraine crisis, signaling to U.S. President Donald Trump that he will not countenance a strategic defeat and that Russia can afford to wait for the outcome of U.S. efforts to broker coordination between Europe and Ukraine.With China's guidance, Kim Jong-un entered the multilateral diplomatic arena for the first time, likely gaining a deeper appreciation of the opportunities such forums provide for strategic communication, information exchange and the projection of a diplomatic posture. This experience may catalyze a reorientation of the DPRK's security-seeking calculus beyond its excessive fixation on the United States. It is advancing a North Korean model of socialism along a broader and more open trajectory.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration's economic and financial team has intensified consultations with their Chinese counterparts to explore ways to overcome the bilateral impasse precipitated by tariffs and the TikTok dispute, with recent developments suggesting movement toward an “ultimate compromise.” Concurrently, the administration is accelerating work on a new U.S. National Defense Strategy and an updated China policy.Preliminary signals indicate that China may move toward strategic retrenchment from certain global commitments, emphasizing domestic security and the consolidation of hegemony within the Western Hemisphere, while the United States may shift from containment and preparation for direct confrontation to a posture oriented toward “peaceful coexistence” with China. Whether or not the U.S. chooses to engage on an equal footing, it must confront the reality that China has become too powerful to be readily constrained — an inevitability likely to be reflected in Washington's recalibrations.The TikTok case is revealing: Since algorithms are not easily separated from their technological and commercial ecosystems, the most feasible resolution may involve an equity arrangement in which Chinese and American stakeholders share both profits and regulatory oversight. Once the principal issues are substantially addressed, Trump is expected to visit East Asia under the American conception of “peaceful coexistence” and, together with Chinese counterparts, inaugurate a new chapter in China-U.S. relations.
Trump's erratic maneuvering on Ukraine — marked by abrupt policy shifts and calculated ambiguity — appears driven less by a principled commitment to peace than by an effort to reset U.S.-Russia relations. That agenda aligns the interests of the extractive and energy sectors with hard-line anti-China factions, advocates for a strategic “pivot to the East” and conservative political-religious coalitions. It is further motivated by Trump's personal ambition to secure a Nobel Peace Prize.Putin has seen these motivations and seeks to use Trump to prolong and expand Russia's tactical advantages while forestalling the risk of a strategic reversal. Ukraine's Voloymyr Zelenskyy administration, in coordination with European partners, is likely to resist external pressure, extend the conflict and leverage its duration to induce political and strategic adjustments.The Ukraine conflict has settled into a protracted war of attrition. The prospect of a near-term summit between Putin and Zelenskyy is remote, and a decisive victory by either party appears unlikely in the long term. Trump seems increasingly impatient with mediation and may prefer to allow the crisis to evolve according to its own dynamics. Consequently, attempts to “reset” U.S.-Russia relations are unlikely to gain immediate traction. Objectively, such a posture may further galvanize Moscow's determination to pursue its eastward strategy and accelerate efforts to realign the post-Soviet space.
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| Chinese President Xi Jinping and First Lady Peng Liyuan with more than 20 world leaders in attendance at China's V-Day parade, Sept. 3, 2025. |
Kim Jong-un's courteous but minimal exchange with South Korean National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik in Beijing conveyed little substantive information, suggesting that Pyongyang's strategic focus remains oriented toward Washington rather than Seoul. The Lee Jae-myung administration, accordingly, has few short-term expectations for inter-Korean engagement. The decisive variable on the peninsula remains U.S.-DPRK relations.The Trump administration may consider abandoning the precondition of denuclearization to resume high-level dialogue with Pyongyang ahead of the U.S. midterm elections, seeking to consolidate diplomatic gains partially accumulated during Trump's first term. Should such a shift occur, change on the peninsula could precede any interim settlement of the Ukraine crisis, with direct implications for China's strategic interests and opportunities.
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| China's V-Day parade, Sept. 3, 2025 |
On the day after the Sept. 3 parade, Trump used social media to urge China's leader to “give my warmest regards” to Russian and North Korean leaders “as you conspire against the United States of America.” Such jocular informality has no deterrent effect on the deepening strategic interactions of China, Russia and North Korea. In any case, no China-Russia-DPRK alliance exists, nor would the formation of such an alliance accord with China's strategic interests.An independent China will not permit its diplomatic maneuvering room to be constrained by excessive alignment with anyone. China's position is clear: In developing relations with any country, it adheres to the principles of non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of third parties. It does not engage with “small cliques” and opposes bloc politics in any form.
By contrast, in recent years the United States has pursued bloc-building, formed ad hoc coalitions and sought camp-based alignments in the region. From a U.S. perspective, shifts in relative national capabilities inexorably yield transfers of international power, and Washington is determined to forestall any erosion of its global primacy.Although China does not embrace the prescriptions of Western strategic theory, as the foremost rising power it cannot avoid deeper engagement in global governance amid the disorder accompanying hegemonic retrenchment. Consequently, China will be called upon to take on a larger share of great-power responsibility, moving from the sectoral to the systemic level — an exceptionally arduous process that, for a China long focused on domestic development and transformation, involves new circumstances, new questions and new missions.
At the Tianjin SCO summit, President Xi Jinping introduced the Global Governance Initiative, extending the reach of the Global Security, Global Development and Global Civilization Initiatives launched over the past two years. They further reinforce China's comprehensive vision for building a community with a shared future for mankind.At the summary meeting following the Sept. 3 parade, Xi reiterated a core message: China must seize the initiative of history, make clear to the world that it is a steadfast defender of the postwar international order and present itself as a responsible major power committed to advancing a community with a shared future.
From this point forward, China must recognize that its endeavors — whether to overcome containment and restrictive measures across multiple domains, to respond effectively to challenges in its periphery and beyond or to capitalize on opportunities generated by the transformations of the era — will serve as a model for the world. What is thereby reinforced will be not just China's sovereignty, security and development interests but also the confidence and strategic choices of countries that closely observe its practices and seek constraints on hegemonic behavior by both greater and lesser powers.A stronger and more self-assured China that shapes the trajectory of the international order through a more proactive posture and concrete action constitutes the most salient new element of this unfolding strategic chapter in a sweeping global transformation.
