2024年5月31日，美國國防部長勞埃德·奧斯汀在新加坡香格里拉安全會議上會見中國國防部長董軍。(照片：美國國防部）

軍事對話是中美關係最重要的問題。隨着這兩個大國展開戰略競爭，軍事交流被視作防止戰爭爆發的最後一道防線，特別是防止意外衝突或軍事領域的緊張局勢升級。兩軍在西太平洋有爭議水域和領域（如台海和南海）近距離接觸時情況尤其如此。多年來，這些對話因為各種原因中斷和暫停，主要原因是中國對美國與台灣往來的擔憂。

一如2022 年 8 月美國眾議院議長南希·佩洛西訪台灣後的情況。佩洛西訪台後，中國迅速宣布取消兩國戰區指揮官之間的交流，並取消防務政策協調會談和海上軍事安全磋商機制會議。此後的 16 個月里，兩軍除了國防武官間的常規溝通外，幾乎沒有其他形式的直接交流。

在此期間，西太平洋緊張局勢升級，導致中美兩軍之間發生了一些最激烈的接觸。2023 年夏天，中國海軍和空軍“不安全、不專業的行為”成為最危險的導火索，並完全有可能繼續升級。面對如此嚴重的威脅，恢復與中國的軍事對話成了拜登政府一年內多數時間的首要任務。

過去6個月里，許多雙邊軍事對話渠道已經恢復，這主要得益於以下活動：

- 2023年12月21日，參謀長聯席會議主席查爾斯·昆頓·布朗將軍和解放軍軍委聯合參謀部參謀長劉振立將軍舉行電話會議。

- 2024年1月8日至9日，防務政策協調會談在華盛頓特區恢復舉行。美國國防部負責中國事務的副助理部長邁克爾·蔡斯和中央軍委國際軍事合作辦公室副主任宋延超少將出席。

- 2024年4月3日至4日，在夏威夷恢復海上軍事安全磋商機制工作小組會議。

- 2024年4月16日，美國國防部長奧斯汀與中國國防部長董軍舉行視頻會議。

- 2024年5月31日，美國國防部長奧斯汀與中國國防部長董軍會晤。

應該提醒那些沒有意識到這些會議重要性的人：僅僅6個月前，兩軍幾乎沒有進行過任何有意義的直接交流，反而在空中和海上發生了一系列危險的接觸，差點再次引發2001年的撞機事件。美國政府高級官員表示， 截止2023 年秋季，中美之間軍事對抗升級的幾率在 6-12 個月內超過 50%。

但是，僅僅半年多時間過後，兩軍就已恢復軍事對話等重要渠道，兩國國防部長的新加坡會晤實際上宣告了兩軍關係已經正常化。

兩軍關係恢復的最根本原因，在於兩國特別是兩國領導人面對充滿困難的一年，都希望尋求雙邊關係的穩定。無論媒體如何報道，兩國關係基本遵循了去年 11 月習近平主席和拜登總統在伍德賽德峰會上達成的共識。

拜登政府目前正面臨一場充滿挑戰的連任競選。此外，烏克蘭和中東戰事不斷，美國無法承受與世界第二大國中國發生軍事衝突。大國競爭仍然到處存在，但管控緊張局勢、避免戰爭對華盛頓來說至關重要。同樣，中國尋求穩定與美國的關係，以便專註於其他重點工作。事實上，有人認為，2021 年拜登總統就職以來，中國一直希望穩定與美國的關係，但這一目標很難實現。

中美兩軍領導人跨越半個地球，努力實現妥協，但前景並不樂觀。中美關係趨於穩定，但從根本上看仍不穩定。許多戰略家認為，維持現狀的美國與崛起的中國之間仍然存在着結構性衝突，而且未來幾年將會加劇。

在程序層面，對美國而言，最嚴重、最緊迫的問題是印太司令部司令（現任海軍上將帕帕羅）與中國東部和南部的戰區司令部司令之間實現直接溝通，這是拜登和習近平在伍德賽德峰會上達成的共識。伍德賽德峰會已經過去了7個月，但這樣的直接溝通仍未實現。雙方沒有進行直接溝通之前，美方不會認為兩國領導人之間的共識得到了落實。

在戰略層面，恢復會晤並不等於達成協議。從奧斯汀和董軍在新加坡的會晤可以看出，在台灣、南海等一系列安全問題上，兩國乃至兩軍的立場和政策存在着根本性的分歧。在軍事活動方面，中美在對緊張局勢起因的認識上同樣存在根本性的分歧，而且，美國重視管理危機，中國則注重預防危機。華盛頓認為，只要其軍事行動符合國際法，就有權在中國周邊行動。因此，兩軍遭遇或者局勢升級時，美國的做法是基於危機管理的心態。這使得兩軍之間的溝通尤為重要，因為只有開放暢通的溝通渠道才能管理危機。

相比之下，中國的做法是危機預防。由於兩軍的遭遇發生在中國周邊，中國更希望美國減少軍事活動，並將其軍事部署遠離中國沿海。按照這種邏輯，管理危機的最佳方式是從源頭上防止危機的出現。

美國的反駁理由是基於法律：美國在包括台灣海峽在內的地區採取行動，並沒有違反任何法律，同時它將繼續行使自己的權利，比如航行自由行動。此前，這種持續的分歧促使美國採取行動伸張這些權利，也促使中國加快行動進一步驅逐美軍。這一循環很可能在未來重演。

中美國防部長舉行了會晤，但雙方都不抱幻想，不認為恢復軍事對話就能解決緊張局勢背後的根本原因。中美在軍事領域的鬥爭仍在繼續，而下一次台海危機不可避免地發生時，這種鬥爭可能失控。鑒於當前台灣島內的政治氣氛，以及即將到來的美國大選的不確定性，下一次危機可能隨時爆發。

但是，過去6個月的事情說明，大國競爭中，這些國家的地緣政治求生本能最為強烈，但只要擁有政治意願和冷靜的頭腦，仍然有可能通過對話管理軍事緊張局勢。持懷疑和悲觀 態度的人認為，中美關係註定崩潰，兩軍也將走向衝突。應該提醒他們的是，把防止戰爭作為最低共同目標仍然是有價值的任務——也許是最有價值的任務。儘管存在備戰的傾向，但這種目標本身當能推動兩軍及所有人努力追求和平。

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin meets with Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun at the Shangri-La Security Conference in Singapore, May 31, 2024. (Photo: U.S. Department of Defense)

Military-to-military (mil-mil) dialogues stand out as the paramount issue in U.S.-China relations. As the two great powers engage in strategic competition, mil-mil communications are regarded as the last line of defense against war, especially an inadvertent war or accidental escalation of tension in the military field. This is particularly true as the two militaries operate in close proximity in contentious waters and domains in the West Pacific, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Throughout the years, these dialogues have been disrupted and suspended for a variety of reasons, but primarily due to Chinese concerns over U.S. interactions with Taiwan.

Such was the case in the aftermath of Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Following her visit, China swiftly announced the cancellation of communications between the theater commanders of the two countries, as well as the cancellation of the Defense Policy Coordination Talks and of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings. For the following sixteen months, the two militaries had minimal direct communications other than through the routine, regular channels such as the defense attachés.

During this period, tensions escalated in the West Pacific, leading to some of the most intense interactions between the U.S. and Chinese militaries. By the summer of 2023, the “unsafe, unprofessional actions” of the Chinese navy and air force had emerged as the most dangerous flashpoints with the full potential for escalation. The threat was so severe that the resumption of mil-mil dialogues with China became a top priority of the Biden Administration for much of the year.

However, over the last six months, many of the mil-mil dialogue channels have now been resuscitated, largely due to the following activities:

- December 21, 2023: Teleconference between Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General CQ Brown Jr. and PLA Chief of Joint Staff Department General Liu Zhenli.

- January 8-9, 2024: Resumption of the Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT) in Washington DC between Michael Chase, DASD and Major General Song Yanchao, Deputy Director of CMC Office for International Military Cooperation.

- April 3-4, 2024: Resumption of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) working group meeting in Hawaii at the level of senior colonel.

- April 16, 2024: Virtual meeting between Secretary of Defense Austin and Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun.

- May 31, 2024: Meeting between Secretary of Defense Austin and Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun.

For those who don't realize the significance of these meetings, they should be reminded that merely six months ago, the two militaries almost had no meaningful direct communications, but a series of dangerous encounters in the air and at sea that were extremely close to creating another EP-3 incident. According to senior U.S. government officials, the risk of a military escalation between the U.S. and China was higher than 50% within 6-12 months by the fall of 2023.

However, within merely six months, the two militaries have resumed the key channels of the mil-mil dialogue. The meeting in Singapore between the two defense chiefs practically announced the renormalization of U.S.-China mil-mil relations.

The most fundamental reason for the resumption of mil-mil ties was the two countries', especially the two leaders', desire to seek the stabilization of bilateral relations in what has proven to be a difficult year for both. Regardless of media sensations, bilateral relations have largely followed the consensus from the Woodside Summit last November between President Xi Jinping and President Biden.

The Biden Administration is currently facing a challenging reelection campaign amidst distractions from ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. With this, the U.S. can not afford to entertain or engage in military conflict with China, the second largest power in the world. Great power competition is still prevalent, but managing tensions to avoid a war is imperative for Washington. Similarly, China seeks to stabilize relations with the U.S. in order to focus on other priorities. In fact, some would argue that China has hoped to stabilize relations with the U.S. since the inauguration of President Biden in 2021, but achieving this has proved elusive.

While China-U.S. military leaders have essentially come halfway across the world in efforts to meet each other halfway, the picture is far from rosy. The U.S.-China relationship is being stabilized, but it remains fundamentally unstable. The structural conflict between the status quo U.S. and the rising China is still present, and only stands to escalate in the years to come in the eyes of many strategists.

On the technical level, for the U.S., the most serious and immediate issue that needs to be addressed is the direct bilateral communication between the Commander of the Indo-Pacific Command- now Admiral Paparo, and his counterparts at the Eastern Theater Command and the Southern Theater Command, as agreed by Biden and Xi at the Woodside Summit. That meeting has yet to happen though it's been seven months since Woodside. The U.S. side will not consider the agreement between the two leaders fulfilled until that communication occurs.

Furthermore, on the strategic level, the resumption of the meeting does not equate to the reaching of agreements. As seen from the Austin-Dong meeting in Singapore, the two countries, hence the two militaries, have fundamental differences regarding their positions and policies on Taiwan, the South China Sea, as well as a long list of security issues. On military activities, the U.S. and China fundamentally differ with each other on the source of tension, and the U.S.' priority of crisis management versus the Chinese focus on crisis prevention. Washington believes in its right to operate in China's periphery as long as those operations are within the boundaries of international law. Therefore, the U.S. approach is based on the mentality of crisis management when encounters or escalations happen. This has made the mil-mil communications particularly vital because only with open, unhindered communication channels could the crisis be managed.

China's approach, in contrast, is one of “crisis prevention.” Since the encounters have all taken place in China's periphery, China's preference is for the U.S. to reduce its level of military activities and withdraw its military presence further from the Chinese coastline. In this line of logic, the best way to manage a crisis is to prevent it from happening in the first place.

The U.S. counterargument is a legalist one – that Washington is not violating any law by operating in areas including the Taiwan Strait and will continue to exercise its right, such as the freedom of navigation operations. This continued disagreement has previously pushed the U.S. into action to assert such rights, and pushed China to dial up its operational tempo to drive the U.S. further away, a cycle that could very possibly repeat itself in the future.

Despite the defense chiefs' meeting, neither side bears the illusion that the fundamental source of tension is resolved by the resumption of mil-mil dialogues. The struggle between the U.S. and China in the military domain continues and could potentially blow out of control when the next Taiwan Strait crisis inevitably happens. And given the current climate of Taiwanese domestic politics and the uncertainty associated with the upcoming U.S. election, the next crisis could be just around the corner.

But the experience of the past six months does underscore one thing: despite the strongest geopolitical instinct in a great power competition, dialogues to manage military tensions are still possible when political will is present and cooler heads prevail. For skeptics and cynics who believe that U.S.-China relations are nothing but doomed and the two militaries are fundamentally on a collision course, they should be reminded that the prevention of war as a lowest common denominator is still a worthy cause – perhaps the most worthy of all. That aspiration alone should drive the two militaries, as well as all of us, to work toward peace despite the inclination to prepare for war.