新年伊始，截止到1月25日，朝鮮不甘寂寞，先後進行五次導彈試驗，其中還包括兩次高超音速導彈試驗。1月19日，朝鮮召開中央政治局會議，宣布鑒於美國未放棄敵對政策和軍事威脅，將研討重啟此前暫停的核和遠程導彈試驗。美韓研究機構也預測朝鮮今年可能進行遠程導彈試驗。2018年以來總體平靜的朝鮮半島局勢顯露出重回緊張的跡象。

目前朝鮮半島局勢存在內在的失衡，若長期維持現狀，對朝鮮極為不利。當前，美國主導的對朝國際制裁體系紋絲不動，甚至是越勒越緊，朝鮮經濟發展需要的絕大部分外貿、外資、外匯被切斷。在當今全球化的國際社會中，若是長期封閉，僅靠自力更生最多只能勉強維持政權生存，經濟發展和改善民生等長遠目標根本無從談起。平壤近年也多次承認制裁導致其經濟發展目標未能完成。

朝鮮與周邊國家的經濟社會發展差距越來越大，必然給其帶來越來越大的競爭壓力。尤其是，朝鮮與韓國長期分裂，始終面臨零和競爭的高壓態勢。韓國在經濟起飛的基礎上推動國家治理、外交、軍事等領域日益躍升為中等強國，對朝構成了很大的競爭壓力。韓國不僅在經濟上遠超朝鮮，在軍事上對朝鮮的優勢也越發明顯。外界往往關注朝鮮的核導進展，卻忽視韓國在軍事上的狂飆突進。在核武器上，韓國有美國的延伸威懾，並不亞於朝鮮的核威懾。在常規軍事競爭中，韓國比朝鮮更為咄咄逼人。文在寅政府時期的軍費創紀錄地增長了36.9%，按2021至2025年的國防中期計劃年均增幅將達6.1%。2020年全球火力（GFP）“世界軍力排名”中，韓國從2015年的第11位躍升到第6位，朝鮮則從2019年的第18位下降為第25位。2021年，韓國首架國產第五代戰機KF-21飛天，首枚潛射導彈升空，首艘自主研製的3000噸級常規彈道導彈潛艇“島山安昌浩”號下海。隨着美國解禁韓國的導彈射程，朝鮮引以為傲的中遠程導彈韓國也都有了，而且依靠豐富的資金和工業製造能力，技術水平更加先進甚至還出口發達國家。韓國還在積極部署輕型航母、潛艇、預警雷達等。

在上述情勢下，朝鮮必然希望打破現狀，儘快實現以經濟發展為基礎的綜合國力提升，儘快追趕周邊國家。2018年，朝鮮宣布集中精力發展經濟，其主要目標是在擁有核武器保障國防安全的情況下，通過外交攻勢打破外交孤立和制裁，再以某種程度上的改革開放實現經濟騰飛。朝鮮領導人會見美韓首腦時已多次提及實現經濟發展的迫切願望。

美國對朝鮮的意圖和困境洞若觀火。所謂“甲之蜜糖，乙之砒霜”，朝鮮越是急於打破現狀，美國越認為維持現狀更為有利，因此它奉行拖字訣，不急於和朝鮮達成實質交易。在目前緩和局面下，美國不必輕易觸碰朝核問題這個燙手山芋，不致耗費過多國內政治成本，在外交上可以集中處理中國、俄羅斯、中東等優先事務。而且，美國認為時間在自己一邊，只要堅持現有國際制裁框架，朝鮮就沒有經濟和軍事發展的後勁，即使平壤開發出核武器也不能當飯吃，長此以往仍將面臨垮台危機。因此，美國對於朝鮮近兩年持續的武力示強，即使觸碰了安理會制裁決議，姿態仍放得很低，大多淡化處理，反而高舉“無條件對話”的道義大旗。另一方面，拜登政府在維持對朝國際制裁體系、加強美韓和美日韓軍事同盟體制、堅持朝鮮無核化的原則立場方面毫無放鬆，可謂“說的全是軟話，做的全是狠事”。

不在平靜中爆發，就在平靜中滅亡。朝鮮必然要動起來，擺脫制裁繩索越勒越緊、越掙扎越緊的危局。其無非有兩種選擇，一種是在無核化問題上有實質進展，同步換取外界解除相應制裁，另一種是反其道而行，升級軍事示強，刺激美國和周邊神經，增進新的談判籌碼，迫使美國和國際社會承認朝鮮擁核國地位，並解除制裁。

對平壤的利益認知來說，前者是在不得已情況下的次優選擇，後者才是更容易的首要嘗試。因此，朝鮮才祭出高超音速導彈這種通常軍事大國還在摸索的前瞻性武器。然而，美韓軍事界普遍認為，朝鮮試射高超武器的政治外交目的大于軍事目的，這一嘗試在技術和實戰層面並不“高超”，並未刺激到美國神經。畢竟先進武器的發展，需要製造業實力、材料、制導等支撐，需要長期巨額投入和不斷試錯，歸根結底還是要與本國經濟發展實力正相關。在美國無動於衷的情況下，下一步平壤可能進一步推高緊張，加大對美國施壓，這就是1月19日政治局會議威脅重啟核導試驗的原因所在。

雖然朝鮮半島緊張可能會升溫，但這不意味着朝鮮將回歸到2017年在核導武器上的狂飆突進模式。當時，朝鮮的主要目的是快馬加鞭突破核門檻，和談也不過是其緩衝和蓄力的工具。而當前朝鮮在軍事上的示強加碼，主要目的是實現擁核前提下的外交和制裁突破，爭取正常國家的發展空間。朝鮮目前的舉動，仍是2018年來以經濟建設為中心戰略路線的新表現，核心仍是對美交易。而且，朝鮮在核問題上也不會走得太遠，畢竟制裁這個大棒還在美國手裡。

朝鮮半島緊張再度升級，對周邊國家和地區都會有不利影響，長遠看對當事國也是不利的。眼下的關鍵是美朝雙方必須認識到各自國家和政策能力的界限，追求更為折中的現實目標。美國長期缺乏真心解決朝核問題的意願，不願在安全和發展方面照顧朝鮮切實關切，而是火中取栗，把朝核問題當作策略性工具，藉此深化美韓同盟和美日韓軍事合作，導致極度缺乏安全感的朝鮮堅定走上擁核自保之路。這中間的最大風險倒不是朝鮮對美髮動核襲擊，而是核擴散和國際核不擴散體系解體。困窘的朝鮮可能讓核、導技術流入國際市場，其他國家特別是周邊鄰國也有可能效仿朝鮮擁核。

朝鮮面臨美韓同盟的巨大安全壓力，發展核導武器主要出於防禦目的，而非美西方渲染的威脅他國。但國際核不擴散規則和地緣政治的約束，導致其很難像印、巴那樣成為不受制裁、正常發展的擁核國。縱觀朝鮮的國家戰略，始終存在安全與發展的內在張力，這嚴重製約了其長遠的發展。事實表明，絕大多數國家沒有核武器也能生存和自強，關鍵取決於該國的國內治理和合理的外交政策，核武器並不是保障安全和繁榮的充分或必要條件，擁核雖然可以獲得一定的安全保障，但若犧牲發展利益，也無法保障長遠的安全。

As of Jan. 25, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has conducted five missile tests, including two hypersonic models. On Jan. 19, the Political Bureau of the Workers' Party of Korea's Central Committee convened and announced that it would discuss restarting previously suspended nuclear and long-range missile tests in light of the failure of the United States to abandon its hostile policy and military threats. Research institutions in the U.S. and Republic of Korea are predicting that the DPRK may conduct long-range missile tests this year.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula, which has been generally calm since 2018, has shown recent signs of renewed tension. An inherent imbalance will make it difficult to keep things as they are for long. It would be extremely detrimental to the DPRK to maintain the status quo indefinitely. At present, U.S.-led international sanctions against the DPRK have not relaxed but have tightened. Most of the foreign trade, foreign capital and foreign exchange needed for the DPRK's economic development have been cut off.In today's globalized international community, if the DPRK remains closed for an extended period, the regime can at best barely survive by self-reliance, and there is no way to talk about long-term goals, such as developing the economy and improving people's lives. Pyongyang has repeatedly admitted in recent years that sanctions have caused it to fail to achieve its economic development goals.

The growing gap in economic and social development between the DPRK and its neighbors is bound to bring increasing competitive pressure. It is of particular note that the DPRK and the ROK have long been divided and have always faced zero-sum competitive pressure. The ROK's leap toward becoming a midrange power in the areas of national governance, diplomacy and the military based on its economic takeoff placed great competitive pressure on the DPRK. Not only is ROK far ahead economically but its military advantage over the DPRK is becoming increasingly apparent.While the rest of the world tends to focus on the DPRK's nuclear and missile progress, the ROK's rampant military progress is overlooked. In terms of nuclear weapons, the ROK has an extended U.S. deterrent, no less than the DPRK's nuclear deterrent. In conventional military competition, the ROK has been more aggressive than the DPRK. Military spending increased by a record 36.9 percent under the Moon Jae-in administration, and the medium-term defense plan for 2021-25 projects an average annual increase of 6.1 percent.In the 2020 Global Firepower ranking, the ROK jumped to sixth place from 11th in 2015, while the DPRK dropped to 25th place from 18th in 2019. In 2021, the Republic of Korea commissioned its first domestic fifth-generation fighter jet (the KF-21), launched a missile from a submarine and put into operation its first indigenously developed 3,000-ton conventional ballistic missile submarine, the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho.With the U.S. lifting the ban on the ROK's missile range, the ROK has all the medium- and long-range missiles that the DPRK is so proud to have. In addition, with its abundant capital and industrial capabilities, the ROK has produced more technologically advanced missiles and even exports them to other developed countries. The ROK is also actively deploying light aircraft carriers, submarines and early-warning radars.

In the above situation, the DPRK is bound to want to break the status quo and achieve the improvement of its composite national strength based on economic development as soon as possible to catch up with its neighboring countries.In 2018, the DPRK announced that it would focus on economic development. The main goal — with nuclear weapons ensuring its national security — is to break diplomatic isolation and sanctions through a diplomatic offensive and then achieve economic takeoff with some degree of reform and opening-up. The DPRK's leader repeatedly mentioned his urgent desire to achieve economic development when he met with the U.S. and ROK heads of state.

The U.S. has a clear understanding of the DPRK's intentions and predicament. As the proverb goes, one man's meat is another man's poison. The more the DPRK is eager to break the status quo, the more the U.S. thinks it is advantageous to maintain it. The U.S. is not eager to reach a substantive deal with the DPRK and is using delay tactics. Under the current detente, the United States does not have to touch the hot potato of the DPRK nuclear issue, which would bring domestic political costs. This makes it possible for it diplomatically to focus on China, Russia, the Middle East and other priorities.Moreover, the U.S. believes that time is on its side, and that as long as it adheres to the existing international sanctions framework, the DPRK will have no backbone for economic or military development. And even if Pyongyang were to develop nuclear weapons, those cannot be used as food. The DPRK will continue to face a crisis of collapse in the long run. Therefore, the U.S. has kept a low posture in response to the DPRK's continual shows of force over the past two years, even though it has violated the UN Security Council's sanctions resolution, mostly taking it lightly and downplaying it, rather than waving the moral banner of unconditional dialogue.On the other hand, the Biden administration has not relaxed. It has maintained the international sanctions system against the DPRK, strengthening the U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan-ROK military alliances and insisting on the principled position of denuclearizing the DPRK. It can be said that all the U.S. words are soft but all its actions are tough.

Unless the DPRK bursts out, it will perish by inaction. The DPRK is bound to move to alleviate the dangerous situation, as the rope of sanctions is tightening as it struggles. There are but two choices. One is to make substantial progress on denuclearization in exchange for the lifting of the corresponding sanctions; the other is to escalate a military show of strength to poke at the nerves of the U.S. and its neighbors, with new bargaining chips to force the international community to recognize the DPRK as a nuclear power and lift sanctions.

As Pyongyang perceives its interests, the former is the second-best option as a last resort, while the latter is easier to attempt first. That is why the DPRK has launched hypersonic missiles — the kind of forward-looking weapons that military powers are still figuring out. However, it is widely believed in the U.S. and ROK military communities that the DPRK's test launch of the weapons was more political and diplomatic than military, and that the attempt was not advanced at the technical and operational levels. So it did not much irritate U.S. nerves.The U.S. and ROK believe that, after all, the development of advanced weapons requires the support of manufacturing, materials and guidance, as well as a huge long-term investment and a continuous trial and error process. Ultimately, the effort must be in step with the country's economic development. With the U.S. indifference, Pyongyang may attempt to ratchet up tensions to increase pressure on the U.S. This is why the meeting of the DPRK's Political Bureau on Jan. 19 may have marked a restart of nuclear missile testing.